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Abstract 
Automobiles have become counter-productive. Negative externalities resulting from car use have over-
come the social benefits automobiles brought when initially introduced. Having shaped most contemporary 
transportation systems, the automobility regime is known to be hard to revert from. However, as all path-
dependent systems, automobility can be subject to tipping points. Among other elements, the Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) have enabled the development of new solutions having the potential to sup-
port a paradigm shift. At the forefront of ICT-enabled developments, so-called ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes have emerged, encompassing smart transportation cards, Integrated Mobility Platforms and Mobility-as-
a-Service, that bundle different transport offers together and aim at providing users with a mobility solution of a 
level of service competitive with the one provided by private cars, ultimately holding the promise of supporting a 
shift from vehicle ownership to mobility usership and potentially help unlatching transportation systems from the 
current automobility lock-in. 
However, most of those solutions are being proposed by the private sector, which often has different interests 
than the public sector. While the organization of transport usually falls under the responsibility of public actors, 
new governance structures are needed in order to make the most out of ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes. Hence, this thesis aims at shedding light on the role that public bodies are playing into the birth of smart 
cards, integrated mobility platforms and MaaS, and more specifically on the way they are governing their devel-
opment. A case study strategy was employed in this thesis, where, building on grey literature and semi-structured 
interviews, the cases of smart cards development in London, integrated mobility platform unfolding in Vienna and 
Mobility-as-a-Service expansion in Helsinki served as empirical material. 
Based on a cross-case analysis conducted using governance and socio-technical transition literatures, the main 
findings of this thesis are that (i) public transport authorities and state-owned railway undertakings are usually 
quite reluctant to ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes brought by external actors and prefer developing 
those by themselves and stay in control or avoid collaborating; (ii) central governments can act as true enablers by 
developing visions including strong quantitative targets, showing political support for those solutions, acting as 
matchmakers between public and private bodies, developing legislation, providing funding and steering, and using 
network governance to make incumbent regime actors change behaviours; (iii) city governments have a greater 
role to play by setting stronger quantitative-based visions and stop governing by laissez-faire; (iv) ICT-supported 
integrated mobility schemes should not be understood as magic bullets and must be combined with demand 
management policies to be truly effective. 
By providing thick-descriptions of the nuts and bolts of smart cards, IMP and MaaS development, this thesis con-
tributes to the literature on transport integration, transport governance and socio-technical transitions, and con-
tributes to practice by suggesting fourteen recommendations for public authorities interested in a sustainable and 
impactful development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. 
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Résumé 
L’automobile est devenue contre-productive. Les externalités négatives résultant de l’utilisation de la 
voiture ont en effet surpassé les bénéfices sociaux introduits initialement. Ayant influencé en profondeur les sys-
tèmes de transports actuels, la société contemporaine semble aujourd’hui prisonnière du régime d’automobilité. 
Cependant, il existe certains éléments ayant le potentiel de créer un changement de paradigme. Parmi eux, les 
technologies de l’information et de la communication (TIC) ont supporté le développement de nouvelles solutions 
proposant une alternative à l’automobilité. Au premier plan de ces développements, des solutions de mobilité 
intégrée facilitées par les TIC (comprenant les Smart Cards, plateformes de mobilités intégrées, et le concept de « 
Mobility-as-a-Service »), promettent à leurs utilisateurs, en groupant différentes solutions de transport à travers 
une seule et même interface, une offre de mobilité tendant à être compétitive avec l’automobile. Plus que cela, 
ces solutions promettent un transfert de la possession de véhicule vers l’utilisation de solutions de mobilité, lais-
sant entrevoir potentiellement la fin de la souveraineté du régime d’automobilité. 
Cependant, la plus part de ces solutions sont proposées par le secteur privé qui n’a pas forcément les mêmes 
intérêts dans leurs développements que le secteur public. Ainsi, de nouvelles structures de gouvernance sont 
nécessaires afin de garantir un développement pérenne des solutions de mobilité intégrée facilitées par les TIC. 
Cette thèse vise à mettre en lumière le rôle que les autorités publiques jouent dans le développement des Smart 
Cards, plateformes de mobilité intégrée et MaaS, et plus particulièrement la manière dont elles gouvernent le 
développement de ces solutions. Trois études de cas (développement des Smart Cards à Londres, de plateformes 
de mobilités intégrées à Vienne, et de MaaS à Helsinki), constituent la base empirique de cette étude. 
À partir d’une analyse croisée des trois études de cas, réalisée en s’appuyant sur les littératures se focalisant sur la 
gouvernance urbaine et les transitions sociotechniques, les principales découvertes de cette thèse sont que (i) les 
autorités d’organisation des transports urbains et compagnies ferroviaires nationales sont souvent contre le déve-
loppement de solutions de mobilité intégrée par le secteur privé et préfèrent faire les choses par elles mêmes (ou 
en ayant la main), ou évitent de collaborer avec des parties tiers ; (ii) les gouvernements centraux ont un vrai rôle 
de facilitateurs a jouer, de par le développement de visions établissant des objectifs quantitatifs clairs, cadres 
législatifs, clair support politique, et de par l’utilisation d’appareils de gouvernance horizontaux ; (iii) les villes ont 
un rôle plus important a jouer qu’elles ne le font aujourd’hui, par l’établissement d’objectifs quantitatifs clairs a 
moyens et longs termes ; (iv) les solutions de mobilité intégrée ne sont pas des recettes magiques, et que pour 
être effectives elles doivent être combinées avec le développement de politiques influant sur la demande en 
transport. 
En présentant une description riche du jeu d’acteur sous-jacent au développement de solutions intelligentes de 
mobilité intégrées, cette thèse contribue aux littératures sur la gouvernance des transports, l’intégration des 
transports et les transitions sociotechniques, et contribue à la pratique en proposant quatorze recommandations 
destinées aux décideurs politiques intéressés à retirer le potentiel maximum de ces solutions. 
Mots-clés 
Mobilité urbaine ; gouvernance des transports ; autorités publiques ; transitions sociotechniques ; Mobility-as-a-
Service 
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Introduction 
This chapter presents the backdrop to this doctoral dissertation and explains why the selected topic 
is highly relevant and timely for the world of cities we live in nowadays. After presenting the actual state of 
urban transportation systems nowadays, the causes underlying their poor condition, and the main trend 
currently impacting the entire transportation sector, this chapter then frames the research problem that the 
doctoral dissertation seeks to address, before formulating the associated research question it aims to an-
swer. The chapter concludes by depicting my personal motivations for engaging in this project, the research 
objectives, as well as the potential contributions to research and practice, and finally outlines the structure of 
this thesis report. 
1.1 Background 
Here, the current issues that urban transportation systems are facing, and the current lock in which they 
are evolving are presented, as well as the challenges and opportunities brought by the digitalization trend. 
The purpose is to provide a general background for the study in order to better understand its potential 
impact. 
1.1.1 State of play 
In 2016, it was estimated that 54.5 percent of the world’s population lived in urban areas (UN, 2016). Cities 
are estimated to consume approximately 80 percent of the earth’s natural resources and produce a similar 
share of global CO2 emissions (WB, 2010). Consequently, it appears relevant to focus on cities in order to 
address challenges that modern societies are facing, such as climate change or non-renewable resources 
consumption. As the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, declared in his State of 
the Union Speech in September 2015, “[The fight against climate change] will be won or lost on the ground 
and in the cities where most Europeans live, work and use about 80% of all the energy produced in Eu-
rope.”1Thus, targeting urban infrastructure systems, such as energy, drinking water or green infrastructures, 
that are acknowledged to structure cities into huge “living organisms” (Hommels, 2005: 324) can be under-
stood as a strategy contributing to sustainability. Being responsible for emitting between 15 and 20 percent 
of CO2 emissions in the EU, and being often referred to as the backbone of cities (EC, 2008) – or the equiva-
lent of what the cardiovascular network would be to a human body (Samaniego and Moses, 2008) – urban 
transportation systems naturally appear as one of the battlefronts on which climate change fight should 
take place. 
Although most urban transportation systems still enable people to be somehow mobile in their cities, they 
are not functioning as effectively as intended or thought capable of when originally designed in their early 
days. Most urban transportation systems are now characterized by congestion that can be defined as a 
1 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5614_en.htm (accessed August 29th 2017). 
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state where people are encountering delays in their trips because the density of transportation flows had 
become superior to the network capacity. Congestion has severe negative impacts for cities and creates 
negative externalities from three perspectives. First, congestion has devastating economic impacts. Costs 
associated with congestion are related to delays, extra-oil combustion costs, vehicle maintenance costs, 
and traffic accidents. It is estimated that congestion was responsible for a 3–6 percent GDP decrease in 
cities throughout the 1990s (UN Habitat, 2013). The latest study by INRIX Research showed that total costs 
linked solely to time lost in congestion for Europe top 25 cities could account for as much as £126.8 billion 
by 2025. London alone would face £42 billion of lost time by 2025 if nothing is done by that time (INRIX 
Research, 2016). Second, congestion has damaging environmental impacts, as vehicles tend to take longer 
than necessary to accomplish a trip, thus emitting more pollutants than what they would have done with-
out congestion. Thus, congestion is responsible for a non-negligible part of CO2 emissions in urban transpor-
tation systems. Last but not least, congestion is harmful from a social perspective, as it introduces stress 
and, more generally, health issues for drivers as well as other road occupants. More and more congestion is 
becoming a rising concern in Europe. If nothing is done before 2050, it is estimated that total congestion 
costs within the EU will increase by about 50 percent (EC, 2011). Congestion is not only a problem in Eu-
rope; it is also serious in other parts of the world. For example, congestion costs in 2010 accounted for 4.22 
percent of Beijing’s GDP (Mao et al., 2012). Of course, solving traffic congestion in cities will not alone be 
sufficient to tackle climate change and natural resource consumption, but it might help to make cities re-
duce their environmental impact and potentially help pave the way towards more sustainable cities. 
A potential motivating factor is that there seems to be (a lot of) room for improvement. The average car 
occupancy rate in the global north is as low as 1.25 passengers per cars (Schäfer, 2011), even though most 
cars are designed to usually accommodate four to five adults. Furthermore, private cars remain unutilized 
most of the time. Cars are known to be parked for 95 percent of the time, on average (Shoup, 2005). With 
so much room for improvement, one could rightfully wonder what it is that is preventing policy makers 
from tackling congestion? As explained  below, car ownership and its overarching concept, termed auto-
mobility, as well as growing urbanization, can be held responsible for the poor state in which most urban 
transportation systems are nowadays and for prevailing those to improve in the future. 
1.1.2 Underlying causes : automobility and urbanization 
Automobility, which is synonymous with single-occupant fossil-fuel powered private cars, supported by a 
range of institutions and infrastructures, dominating space and responsible for massive environmental re-
source consumption (Urry, 2008), has been described as one of main socio-technical institution through 
which modern societies are organized (Böhm et al., 2006). By placing cars on a pedestal and raising them to 
the level of a cultural symbol, human society progressively entered the path-dependent automobility system 
(Urry, 2004). Since their early release to the public in the late nineteenth century by German automakers 
Benz and Daimler (for a full history of the development of cars, see Parissien, 2013), cars have always been 
associated with values of freedom, speed, masculinity, and social betterment (Sachs, 1992). “Small penis? 
Have I got a car for you. If you’re going to overcompensate, then by all means, overcompensate”. Those were 
the words for example used to advertise the new Porsche 911 Carrera 4 in 1989, summing up quite simply 
the place of the automobile in modern society, which can also be illustrated by the fact that automobile are 
the major item of individual consumption after personal housing (Sheller and Urry, 2000). 
The way automobiles have molded Western cultures and become one of their cornerstones is brilliantly 
resumed by French philosopher Roland Barthes, who defined automobiles as “the gothic cathedral of mod-
ern times” (Barthes, 1973). Automobiles had indeed become to modern societies what cathedrals were rep-
resenting in the Middle Ages; that is, a set of beliefs driving society, and for which the most advanced arts 
and techniques were employed to represent them materially. Automobility is acknowledged to have coerced 
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people into an intense flexibility (Urry, 2004), and led to the concept of “auto space” (Freund, 1993), being a 
space unbundled by any travel constraints. Given the promised liberty and freedom brought by the use of 
automobiles, car ownership has boomed over the last century. For example, the average number of cars per 
thousand inhabitants across the EU in 2015, according to Eurostat,2 was almost 500, compared to almost 
zero a century ago. In the US, car ownership rates have quadrupled since the 1960s (Davis et al., 2016).  
The twentieth century has also been marked by another important trend: urbanization. In 2008, following 
exponential growth (Pacione, 2001), it is estimated that a turning point occurred when, for the first time in 
history, more than half of the world’s population was living in cities. Most of the increase in the urban popu-
lation is known to originate from migration from rural areas, which is considered to be the most massive 
migration of modern times (Davis, 1955) and an on-going phenomenon, reinforced by globalization 
(Douglass, 2000), as the urban population is expected to grow to over 9 billion by 2100 (OECD, 2015). This 
important increase in urban population has ultimately resulted in an increase in mobility demand, which, 
combined with automobility, has resulted in new planning practices.  
In the 1933 Athens Charter, French-Swiss architect Le Corbusier presented the axioms of the functionalist 
urbanism current, intending to start planning cities among four functional distinct zones to live, work, enjoy, 
and circulate. Built on the idea that “a city for speed (was) made for success” (Amado, 2011: 3), Le Corbu-
sier’s functionalist city positioned the automobile at its center. Le Corbusier’s Ville Radieuse, also called the 
“City for three million”, proposed a symmetrical city centered around a central business district made of 
200-meter-high glass skyscrapers (Montavon et al., 2006), surrounded by a greenbelt, itself surrounded by 
satellite housing towns, all crossed by multiple driveways (Hseuh-Bruni, 2015), thus making most of the 
moves within the utopian city (that some would categorize as dystopia nowadays) dependent on the use of 
automobiles. Even though the Radiant City was never physically built, Le Corbusier paved the way for the 
development of car-centric cities, as the functionalist urbanism movement soon became the prominent 
planning trend of the twentieth century (Bofill and Veron, 1995). Influencing architects and forcing them to 
integrate parking spaces in most of their building developments (Morrison and Minnis, 2012), the functional-
ist urbanism quickly made architecture became a function of movement (Sheller and Urry, 2000), pushing 
even ironically famous architects such as Walter Gropius, Frank Lloyd Wright, and of course Le Corbusier 
himself, to design their own car prototypes (Amado, 2011). Known to have been shaped by key infrastruc-
tural developments (Konvitz, Rose and Tarr, 1990; Hodson et al., 2012), cities were progressively shaped by 
transportation system developments, themselves shaped by automobility (Sheller and Urry, 2000), ultimate-
ly reinforcing their dependence on automobiles. Cities that were once known as pedestrian cities, or transit 
cities step by step transformed into automobile cities (Newman and Kenworthy, 1999), where the realization 
of all activities of human life (work, entertainment and living) became entirely dependent on the use of cars.  
With car ownership in cities rising faster than transportation infrastructure development (including public 
transport), roads quickly became saturated with automobiles, resulting in increased congestion. Because of 
congested city centers, urban dwellers moved from city centers to the suburbs, leading to urban sprawl and 
ultimately to more people buying cars to commute to work, which reinforced the “Frankenstein-created” 
automobility regime (Urry, 2004) and made congestion in cities even worse. The concept of transit, defining 
people’s movements as the result of the human body actions, progressively made way for the concept of 
transport, defined as people’s movement relying on external source of energy, and closely associated with 
the idea of servitude and dependence (Illich, 1973). By reaching a state of “critical velocity”, along which 
individuals were unable to save time on their journeys without negatively impacting others (Illich, 1973), 
cars eventually became counter-productive, making the transport circulate function of functionalist cities 
2 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Passenger_cars_in_the_EU (Accessed August 30th 2017) 
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progressively cannibalize their live, work and enjoy functions (Robert, 2005). Ultimately, negative externali-
ties resulting from car use, such as road congestion, contribution to climate change and air pollution, as well 
as injuries and deaths from traffic accidents, overcame the social benefits, such as freedom of movement, 
that automobiles brought when they were initially introduced (Marsden and Reardon, 2018). 
1.1.3 Digitalization : challenges and opportunities 
Although path-dependent systems, such as automobility, are hard to reverse from, they are also known to 
be subject to tipping points and paradigm shifts (Walks, 2015). With new fuel systems, new materials, inno-
vative transport policies, new consumption patterns and smart cards, information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) were acknowledged to potentially contribute to this paradigm shift by supporting the 
emergence of the post-car system where transport will be made of “a mixed flow of slow-moving semi-
public micro-cars, bikes, many hybrid vehicles, pedestrians and mass transport integrated into a mobility of 
physical and virtual access” (Urry, 2004: 35). ICTs have been acknowledged for having supported the un-
folding of the “service revolution” (Barras, 1985), which has impacted many industrial sectors, including the 
transportation industry. They have also enabled a whole array of new transport solutions to take off, thanks 
to the development of dedicated digital platforms, supported by the rise of smartphones, enabling people 
to connect more easily to each other, and even in some cases to propose (mobility) services by themselves.  
Car-sharing, whereby a dedicated organization makes available to members a fleet of shared vehicles on 
short-term basis, is one such example. Although such schemes have existed for more than fifty years (see 
Shaheen et al., 1999), it is acknowledged that developments in ICTs, such as in global positioning systems, 
and the advent of smartphones have contributed to their wider acceptance (Shaheen et al., 2009). Similarly, 
car-pooling, which consist of sharing a vehicle between people from a certain origin to a specific destination 
(Galland et al., 2014), has been available since World War II, but only reached a critical mass of users re-
cently, thanks to recent advances in ICTs (Chan and Shaheen, 2012). One could also mention bike-sharing, 
where (like car-sharing) a pool of bicycles is made available to customers for short-term use; peer-to-peer 
car rental, where individuals are able to rent cars from one another thanks to a dedicated app or website; 
or ride-sourcing, where individuals are able to book rides offered by other car-owners who are not specifi-
cally professional drivers. One of the most interesting aspects of those ICT-facilitated mobility services is 
that those who use them do not explicitly need to own a vehicle to be mobile. Those solutions are basically 
“servicizing” mobility (Plepys et al., 2015). By using those new transport solutions, users directly have ac-
cess to the product function, which is to be mobile, rather than the product itself, which would be the vehi-
cle. Although new (digital) mobility modes rely on non-ownership modes, and might therefore be a solution 
to tackle car-ownership that constitutes one of the underlying issues of automobility, they also raise chal-
lenges. Because of their highly disruptive nature, these new mobility modes are also fragmenting the urban 
mobility landscape. While urban dwellers once had the choice of either using their personal vehicles or 
public transportation to meet their mobility needs, they now have the choice between a wide new array of 
ICT-supported mobility solutions, with lower occupancy levels than public transit. Hence, there is a need to 
develop new governance structures and processes to integrate those new mobility modes into existing 
public transit systems to ensure they serve the greater good and do not worsen the performance of existing 
transport systems. 
While digitalization has enabled the development of the above-mentioned ICT-supported mobility solu-
tions, it has also enabled a new way of organizing those solutions vis-à-vis each other. As detailed below, 
digitalization is enabling the integration of different transport modes, old and new, into different schemes 
(that constitute what is referred to in the thesis as ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes), which have 
the potential to support multi-modal travel and might therefore have a positive impact on the performance 
of existing transportation systems.  
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1.2 Problem statement and research question 
More than creating new mobility modes, digitalization has actually opened new possibilities for transport 
integration, which could pave the way for more sustainable transport systems. Research has shown that the 
more complex a trip is, the more likely people are to use their personal vehicles (Hensher and Reyes, 2000), 
which is currently the only means of transport that allows for door-to-door travel. So, by seamlessly inte-
grating different transport modes, one might decrease the likeliness that individuals will travel with their 
own cars and enhance their shift towards a combination of more sustainable transport modes. Below are 
presented the different solutions for transport integration that have been enabled by digitalization. 
Firstly, digitalization has enabled the development of Advanced Travel Information Systems (ATIS) that aim 
to help travelers in “making better travel choices by providing information regarding the available travel 
alternatives” (Ben-Elia et al., 2013). By integrating digital information from different transportation provid-
ers into one single platform, ATIS enable users to have access to data about station locations, stations’ ge-
ographies, fares, real-time locations of the vehicles or timetables from different transport operators. A well-
known example of such services is provided by trip planners, where users enter their trip origins and desti-
nations and are given information about all the available transport solutions to realize their trips. Depend-
ing on the number of transport operators that have agreed to share their data, trip planners are able to tell 
their users all possible solutions to reach their destinations in great detail. If users are interested in using 
public transport, the trip planner is usually able to tell them where to take the next bus, how much it will 
cost, where to transfer to the metro line, and so on. By providing information, ATIS aim to make non-car 
based transportation modes more attractive and potentially support the modal shift from private car travel 
to more sustainable mobility modes. 
Secondly, digitalization has also enabled the integration of different payment systems of a complex trans-
portation network into a single fare system, through a dedicated device, often referred to as “smart cards”. 
The number of cities that adopted smart cards in the last decade, mostly supported by RFID technology, has 
grown exponentially. From only a handful of smart-card-based urban transportation systems in the early 
2000s, hundreds of cities have now selected this option. Successful stories of early smart card development 
include cities like London, Hong Kong, and Seoul. Payment systems in these cities support transfers across 
transportation modes, ease traffic flow at ticket gates, and enable public authorities to obtain data about 
public transportation use (Park and Kim, 2013). In other words, payment integration also has the potential 
to make non-car based transportation modes more convenient, as well as more pleasant for the users, and 
to support modal shift. 
Thirdly, digitalization is capable of supporting the merger of the two above-mentioned integration schemes, 
in so-called integrated mobility platforms (IMPs), where users have basically access to information, like with 
a trip planner, but are also given the opportunity to directly book their trips from different transport pro-
viders through a single app. By combining information and ticketing integration, those kinds of solutions 
appear as a real opportunity to induce modal shift from private cars to more sustainable transport modes. 
Last but not least, digitalization has paved the way for the unfolding of the Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) 
concept, which should be understood as a more advanced version of IMPs, where MaaS operators basically 
provide their users with mobility packages that bundle all imaginable mobility options, and guarantee them 
a mobility solution for whatever trip they intend on taking, rendering privately owned cars not necessary 
anymore to meet their mobility needs. By allowing the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes (smart cards, IMPs and MaaS), digitalization has opened new opportunities to tackle automobility, 
by supporting a shift from car ownership to mobility usership, and hopefully helps pave the way for the 
post-car paradigm.  
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Given their ability to potentially contribute in reducing the number of cars on city roads, and thus their 
public interest, it is natural that ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes have triggered the interest of 
public actors. However, the development of such schemes require new skills and knowledge that are not 
inherent to public organizations. On the other hand, the private sector has already demonstrated its will-
ingness to provide such schemes. Nevertheless, leaving the whole development of ICT-supported integrat-
ed mobility schemes to the private sector might also be harmful from a system perspective, as the private 
sector, driven by business interests, might be more interested to create a market where there actually is 
more mobility, not less (Docherty et al., 2017). There is a need for smart cards, IMPs, and MaaS to be suc-
cessful; that is, to succeed in delivering public value, to be built with mass transit at the center (Currie, 
2018), which ultimately requires new forms of cooperation between the private and public sector and, 
more specifically, new governance structures (Smith et al., 2017). More particularly, as the organization of 
transport usually falls under the responsibility of public authorities (Banister, 2001), one may wonder what 
role they are playing in the development of those new solutions, as there seems to be no common posture 
that public authorities are adopting worldwide. The development of ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes is occurring, but the only question public authorities should ask themselves is whether they want 
to be a part of it to frame it, or leave it to the hands of private developers that might not have sustainability 
and public policy targets in mind when proposing their solutions.  
Although ICT-supported integrated mobility solutions are quite disruptive in nature, they should ultimately 
be understood as an opportunity and not as a threat (Marsden and Docherty, 2013; Marsden and Reardon, 
2018), which will only be seized if public authorities manage to engage with the private sector through in-
novative governance schemes. Ultimately, documenting the type of governance structure under which ICT-
supported integrated mobility systems have developed might help other cities to better engage down this 
path, which is why the following research question has been adopted for the present research endeavor.  
Research question: How are public authorities governing the development of ICT-supported inte-
grated mobility systems? 
The answer to this research question will build on three cases3 of development of such systems in European 
cities, in order to make other public authorities around the world aware of what has been already done, 
how it was done and what part of it was a success, thus hopefully helping smoothen the development of 
future ICT-supported integrated mobility solutions. 
1.3 Personal motivations 
Here the main motivations underlying the choice of topic for this dissertation, as well as different elements 
having reinforced it are presented.  
I have always been interested in new and disruptive technologies, and more specifically in the array of solu-
tions they could bring to our societies. Our world, particularly my own generation, has been considerably 
impacted by digitalization, and I was highly motivated to understand how the public sector could extract 
the most out of a phenomenon – transport digitalization – that was being led by the private sector. How 
could transport digitalization be shaped in order to benefit the many, rather than a handful of private ac-
3 The research strategy employed in this dissertation is detailed in the methodological chapter (Chapter 3).
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tors? How to avoid lock-ins from which it will be hard to revert from in decades? How to avoid digital 
transport solutions to follow the same trajectory that society followed with the development of the car, 
from wonder to subservience and dependence? Helping public authorities get it right and avoid repeating 
the mistakes of the past when it comes to the adoption of disrupting technologies was one of my main per-
sonal motivations underlying the present thesis. 
I have also always been passionate about cities. Having been born and raised in Paris, I was quickly fascinat-
ed by the dynamics of urban systems. How could such systems function, given their internal levels of com-
plexity and diversity? Why would people be attracted to live in cities, given their continual level of chaos? 
The bigger the city was, the more intriguing this question became for me. My parents gave me the oppor-
tunity to see quite a few buzzing cities while travelling. And I was always hit by the same simple question 
regarding cities – “How on earth do they work?” – which reinforced my fascination for them. More specifi-
cally, I was always interested in transportation in cities, and their dynamics, as I always believed they repre-
sented the crux of cities’ functioning. However, more than just being interested in understanding cities as 
well as the role of public authorities into transport digitalization, I was interested in making a change. I 
wanted my research to be useful and help move towards a more sustainable society. I wanted to choose a 
concrete subject, because I did not want to write a PhD only for the sake of science. I wanted my findings to 
be quickly usable by decision makers and contribute to ultimately improving the everyday life of people. 
While I can assume to have partially addressed the two above-mentioned categories with this dissertation, 
it is perhaps too early to assess the success for the third category. However, I truly hope that public authori-
ties will look at this work and gain insights from it before engaging in the development of ICT-facilitated 
integrated transportation systems and follow my recommendations.  
Here I must underline the importance of the IGLUS (Innovative Governance of Large Urban Systems) project 
at EPFL in helping me gain a better understanding of challenges associated with urban transportation sys-
tems. The IGLUS project was an Executive Master’s program launched in 2014, aimed at teaching urban 
practitioners governance and management of urban infrastructure systems, which I managed from 2015 to 
2016 during the first year of my PhD studies. It brought together practitioners and academics from various 
fields, such as political science, architecture, engineering, economics, public administration and business, 
interested in learning about governance of urban systems. Students, who were older and more experienced 
than I was at that time, and whom I was supervising, were given the opportunity to learn from academics 
and practitioners, from the public and the private sectors to discuss governance of five urban infrastructure 
systems: energy, housing, water, green infrastructures, and of course transportation. It is by organizing 
those modules, going on-site, observing with my own eyes, and learning from all those experts, that I un-
derstood why I wanted to focus on mobility. The program was organized in six two-week modules that took 
place in some of the world most vibrant cities, and each focused on one particular urban challenge. IGLUS 
students (and their coordinators; that was, me) would travel to Mexico City and Guadalajara to focus on 
social urban challenges, Dubai to look at urban environmental challenges, Istanbul to understand urban 
cultural challenges, Seoul to get insights on urban technological challenges, New York and Detroit to look at 
financial and economic challenges of cities, and Dortmund to focus on metropolitan challenges.  
In Mexico, which is one of the biggest cities in the world, that has grown tremendously during the last cen-
tury, I could understand how damaging the lack of public transport services be for a city, and the social 
consequences of having an institutionally fragmented transport sector. In Dubai, where the city had devel-
oped along a two-times-seven-lanes road, also known as Sheikh Zayed road, I became aware of how trans-
portation infrastructures could become lock-ins for cities. I was shocked to discover that missing a highway 
exit in the city center of Dubai could result in a 15 km detour, which also made me understand how the 
urban form of a city would influence the development of the public transport system, and unfortunately fail 
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in making it attractive. The city in which I most clearly understood the extent to which private cars could be 
destructive for cities was undoubtedly Detroit. There, I understood the capacity that cities had to become 
dependent on cars, so much that it would make them collapse from the inside. It is really in Detroit that I 
understood how auto-destructive the concept of automobility could be for cities, and how harmful the idea 
of car ownership could be for society in general. In Seoul, I understood the opportunities that ICTs were 
bringing to transportation, and in particular how ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes could contrib-
ute in reducing private motorized travel. 
I should also mention that my participation in the IGLUS modules helped me convince myself that the sub-
ject of digitally integrated mobility was relevant. Going all over the world with IGLUS comforted me in the 
thinking that my research was actually worth doing, timely, and would have an impact for cities, either now 
or in the near future. For example, I could see that the solution would have a positive impact in Mexico. The 
city is indeed already equipped with a developed public transportation network, as well as informal 
transport system, but it is quite fragmented, and not always as easy to use as one would wish. Simplifying 
the ticketing and information system for all modes of transport would be a real advance in making shared 
transport modes more successful in the Mexican capital city. Of course, there are lots of different initiatives 
to be conducted in parallel, but the one of ICT-supported integrated mobility is definitively worth looking 
at. Similarly, digital integrated mobility would have an important impact in polycentric metropolitan regions 
that already have a developed public transportation system. Dortmund is part of the Rhine Ruhr region, and 
commuting between the different nucleuses of this metropolitan region is really frequent for inhabitants. 
However, local transportation systems are not always well integrated with regional transportation systems, 
which makes car travel look sometimes more convenient and easy to use. Here again, where shared 
transport solutions are available but not well integrated, digital integration of transportation modes can 
have a real advantage. The IGLUS experience also helped me understand that what I was looking at would 
not be a magic bullet for every city around the globe. For example, I understood that it would be pointless 
to try implementing it in cities like Detroit or Dubai, where no performant public transportation systems 
exists, and where dwellers are much more dependent on their cars than anywhere else. But what I could be 
sure of after having attended six modules of the IGLUS Executive Master’s program was that public authori-
ties are somewhat lost in the whole transport digitalization wave, and although they acknowledge the ben-
efits that such solutions might bring, many of them are slow to move and sometimes reluctant to do so. 
Given the diversity of cities that were in the IGLUS portfolio, it made me confident that the research ques-
tion I was planning to adopt could serve a great number of cities around the world. Of course it would have 
its limitations, as it will be detailed later, but it could help make cities better places to live in. 
During my time as IGLUS program coordinator, I also had responsibility for supervising some of the IGLUS 
students’ master’s theses. This gave me the opportunity to supervise the thesis of transport practitioners 
from major transportation authorities that were interested in working on the governance of urban trans-
portation systems. The variety of backgrounds of those students, as well as the plurality of subjects they 
were interested in exploring, also allowed me to look into transport-related themes that I might not have 
crossed otherwise. Although not directly related to my PhD topic, I learned a lot from the IGLUS master 
theses I supervised and I am grateful to those IGLUS graduates who agreed to work with me. 
Having been able to co-edit with Prof. Matthias Finger a book focusing on the governance of smart trans-
portation systems, also comforted me in my choice of research. The book (Finger and Audouin, 2019) fo-
cuses on new governance structures for automated, electric, shared and integrated mobility, and gave me 
another opportunity to learn more about how modern societies are embracing (or sometimes not) tech-
pushed disruptions happening in the transportation sector. I could see that for all that is happening in the 
mobility scene, digitally integrated mobility systems are a way to re-harmonize transportation systems, and 
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must be looked at by all public authorities in major cities, encountering disruptions in their long established 
transportation sector. I am grateful to everyone who contributed to this work and I learned a lot from 
them.  
Last but not least, I should mention an episode of my personal life that might have boosted me in the 
choice of my topic. When I started my PhD, I did not have a driving license and was therefore not fully 
aware of the various shades of the automobility concept, especially why humans were so attached to cars 
and why automobiles had become the ultimate symbol of social success. In order to better understand it 
(and also because I was going to need it for some planned holidays where no other mobility options where 
available), I decided to start my “driving license journey” during the second year of my PhD. Getting a driv-
ing license in Switzerland is a fairly lengthy exercise. First, the whole process takes about eight months, 
assuming that you obtain your driving license at the first attempt. It then costs about 2500 CHF, which is 
quite expensive compared to the monthly income of a PhD student. Last but not least, you have to com-
plete quite some steps before being finally able to take the exam, such as passing the first aid certification, 
theory classes, and a lot of driving lessons, which is very time-consuming. Getting my driving license was 
not the smoothest journey I undertook, as I could not really feel myself in synch with my driving instructor. I 
would always remember when driving on a highway where we were almost the only ones, and when we 
were going fast enough from my point of view, he told me: “Come on, put the pedal to the metal, enjoy 
yourself!”. Although I did not enjoy accelerating for the sake of it, it made me realize the extent to which 
people were attracted to speed, and to this false notion of freedom, from which they would become en-
slaved. I did not feel any excitement going faster than other drivers and risking my own life, nor challenging 
the speed limit, but I understood at that point that I would never be as fascinated by cars as my driving 
teacher was. More specifically, it made me aware of how important it was to make others understand and 
realize how dangerous the concept of automobility was, and to make public authorities discover ways of 
potentially exiting it. I also realized how lucky I was to live in a city (Lausanne, Switzerland) where I did not 
need a car to meet my mobility needs and where I could do everything with public transit, human-powered 
mobility modes, and ride-booking services. I finally got my driving license (at the first attempt), but instead 
of seeing it as a reason to buy a car (as many young people still do), I swore to myself that I would do every-
thing in my power not to buy a car for the rest of my life. This is why I became so passionate about ICT-
supported integrated mobility schemes, which hold the promise of making car-ownership useless.  
Below, the research objectives of this thesis, as well as the potential contributions to the literature are de-
tailed. This chapter ends by ultimately shedding light on the main concepts used in this thesis and the struc-
ture of the present report. 
1.4 Research objectives and contribution 
1.4.1 Research objectives and contributions to practice 
As explained above, digitalization is massively impacting transportation systems, and might be a game-
changer in terms of their sustainability, by enabling new modes of mobility and, more specifically, potential-
ly reducing the need for urban dwellers to own cars. Nowadays, public authorities are somewhat over-
whelmed by digitalization (da Rosa and de Almeida, 2017), being pushed by the private sector, and need 
pointers in order to know where to go and to reap the full benefits of this thoroughgoing transformation. It 
is possible that if public authorities lose this window of opportunity brought by the digitalization of trans-
portation (Marsden and Reardon, 2018), things might well evolve only in the interests of the private sector, 
which appears to have lower interest when it comes to sustainability of cities. As digitalization is pervasive 
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and it seems that no cities will be saved from it, public authorities need concise and thoughtful recommen-
dations in order get the digital integration of their transportation systems right and avoid technological and 
social lock-ins, as history has showed us with our love of the automobile. Therefore, the major objective of 
this thesis is to come up with a list of recommendations, to help public authorities frame the development 
of digitally integrated transportation systems so that they benefit the many and ultimately pave the way for 
the post-automobility system. Those recommendations primarily target mature cities, but will of course be 
of interest for cities that will reach such stage of development in the future. Talking about getting the digi-
talization of transportation right for some cities in developing countries might be well perceived as putting 
the cart before the horses. However, those cities will evolve, probably quicker than one would expect, and 
will be soon confronted with issues that more mature cities are facing nowadays. 
1.4.2 Potential scientific contributions 
The contribution of this thesis is threefold.4 First of all, it aims to contribute to the literature on transport 
integration. Indeed, as it will be explained, most of this literature has been interested in looking at the im-
pact of transport integration on the performance of existing transport systems. However, very limited re-
search has been conducted to look at the processes leading to transport integration and the development 
of integrated transport schemes. Secondly, it seeks to contribute to the transport governance literature. 
Most of this literature has been interested in measuring the impact of particular governance tools on the 
performance of transport systems. But limited research has been conducted to understand the politics of 
development of a particular transport technology such as ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. 
Thirdly, this thesis aims to contribute to the socio-technical systems transition literature. Much of the re-
search done into that field has looked at the development and diffusion of specific technological innova-
tions (EVs, shared mobility, etc.), but almost none has looked at the development of ICT-supported inte-
grated mobility schemes.  
1.5 Clarification of the main concepts 
In this thesis are used a number of terms that might be understood differently depending on the reader’s 
background and professional orientation. It seems important to clarify the meaning of each of those terms 
in order to avoid misunderstandings and confusion. Thus, below, a definition of each of those concepts is 
provided. The terms are ranked alphabetically below. 
Digitalization is, according to the Collins English Dictionary the process by which information is transformed 
to become easily read by computers.5 It is an important concept to bear in mind in this thesis as all the in-
novations looked at are basically enabled thanks to digitalization of transportation. 
Governance refers to “the system through which a kind of order is achieved among several actors who are 
interacting with each other about a common issue (which is of mutual interest for the involved parties) even 
though they might have conflicting interests” (Razaghi and Finger, 2012: 7). 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are defined as a “diverse set of technological tools and 
resources used to communicate, and to create, disseminate, store, and manage information” (Blurton, 1999: 
1). It is thanks to ICTs that the entire digitalization process is occurring.  
4 This is explained in more detail in the Literature Review chapter (chapter 2) 
5 https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/digitize (accessed September 15th 2017)
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Innovation can be simply and broadly defined as “the generation, acceptance and implementation of new 
ideas, processes products or services” (Thompson, 1965: 2). For that matter, ICT-supported integrated mo-
bility schemes, by their novel nature, can be understood as innovations. 
Institutions refer to “the rules of the game in a society” (North, 1990: 3), including both formal (laws en-
forced by the state) and informal rules (codes of conduct, conventions). It is important to highlight that 
institutions in this work do not refer to organizations, as may be the case in other literatures.  
Integrated mobility platforms (IMPs) can be defined as unique platforms that integrate information and 
payment systems from different transportation providers, through the use of the ICTs, allowing users to 
instantaneously book their trips, and pay at their point of use. IMPs do not guarantee their users freedom 
of mobility, which is why they are different from the Mobility-as-a-Service concept, and thus not used inter-
changeably in this thesis. 
Lock-ins can be defined as a state in which an individual or an entity might not be able to evolve because of 
past decisions it has made. For example, the Paris subway ticketing system relies on turnstiles, which can be 
understood as a lock-in regarding mobile ticketing. Indeed, the Paris transportation authority would need to 
change all of its turnstiles to make them able to read mobile tickets. 
Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) is defined in this thesis as formulated by the father of the concept, Sampo 
Hietanen; that is, as a “co-operative, interconnected eco-system, providing mobility services reflecting the 
needs of customers, met over one interface and are offered by a service provider bundled in to a package – 
similar to mobile phone price-plan packages” (Hietanen, 2014: 3). MaaS must not be used interchangeably 
with IMPs (defined above), although this is often done in practice. 
Mobility refers to the “ability to move or be moved freely and easily”6 (Oxford Dictionary). Thus, it does not 
represent the action of moving or being moved, but rather the possibility to access geographic places inde-
pendently of time.  
Multimodality is used in this thesis interchangeably with the term intermodality. The concept of multimo-
dality refers to a combination of “more than one transport service for making a trip, being combinations of 
private transport and public transport services or combinations of public transport services” (Van Nes, 2002: 
9).  
Path-dependency refers to “the causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence” (Pierson, 
2000: 252). In other words, path-dependency appears when the array of choices an entity (or individual) is 
limited by choices it/he/she has made in the past, even though those past decisions might no longer be 
valid or relevant.  
Public authorities. refer to “government or public administration, including public advisory bodies, at na-
tional, regional or local level (…) performing public administrative functions under national law, including 
specific duties.”7  
Smart cards are plastic pocket-size cards with an embedded chip, which can store and in most of the cases 
process data, through RFID technology (Pelletier et al., 2011). They are very often used for automated fare 
collection systems across different transportation modes by public transportation authorities. In this thesis 
the term smart cards is used to talk about smart transportation cards. 
6 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/mobility (accessed on September 15th 2017) 
7 http://inspire.ec.europa.eu/glossary/PublicAuthority, accessed on September 14th 2017 
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Socio-technical systems are systems in which technological components and people are in interaction and 
influence one another, within a given environment (Ropohl, 1999). Urban transportation systems rely on 
technical components (vehicles, traffic signs, infrastructure, ticketing systems, information systems, fuel 
systems, etc.), as well as human components (urban dwellers having specific mobility needs and behaviors) 
that interact with one another, which is why they are considered as socio-technical systems. 
Systems are can be seen (Ackoff, 1997: 421–422) “as a set of two or more interrelated elements of any kind 
(…) Therefore, it is not an ultimate indivisible element but a whole that can be divided into parts. The ele-
ments of the set and the set of elements that form a system have the following three properties:  
 Every possible subgroup of elements in the set has the first two proper ties; each has a non independent
effect on the whole. Therefore, the whole cannot be decomposed into independent subsets. A system
cannot be subdivided into independent subsystems.
 The properties and behavior of each element, and the way they affect the whole, depend on the proper-
ties and behavior of at least one other element in the set. Therefore, no part has an independent effect
on the whole, and each is affected by at least one other part.
 The properties, or behavior, of each element of the set have an effect on the properties or behavior of
the set taken as a whole.”
Transport integration should be understood in this thesis as the “pursuit of synergies” (May and Roberts, 
1995) and the removal of barriers between different transportation modes, to favor multimodality. 
Transport, according to the Oxford Dictionary, is defined as the action of taking or carrying “people from 
one place to another by means of a vehicle aircraft or ship.”8 It originates from the Latin words “trans” 
(meaning across), and “portare” (to carry). Transport must not be confused with “mobility”, and this thesis 
intends to respect this differentiation. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured in six main chapters. After the introductory chapter (Chapter 1), which aimed to set 
the stage and present the thesis’ main research question, readers are provided with a review of the three 
main bodies of scientific literature that this thesis aims to contribute to (Chapter 2): (i) transport integra-
tion, (ii) transport governance, and (iii) socio-technical transition studies. 
Chapter 3 then presents the methodology adopted to answer the research question this thesis focuses on, 
as well as the research strategy, the case selection, data collection, data analysis, and case analysis process-
es employed. Chapter 3 will also provide readers with the overall research design, as well as the necessary 
steps taken by the researcher to ensure the quality of the research, and finally the way research ethics were 
considered in the dissertation. 
In Chapter 4, the three longitudinal descriptive cases studies this thesis builds on are presented, which con-
stitutes the empirical material of the present research endeavor. The chapter starts with (i) the case of 
smart cards development in London, followed by (ii) the case of IMP development in Vienna, (iii) the case of 
Mobility-as-a-Service unfolding in Helsinki. 
8 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/transport (accessed on September 15th 2017)
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In Chapter 5, the three cases are analyzed using two different conceptual frameworks. The cases are first 
analyzed using a framework that builds on the governance and innovation management literature (i). In a 
second time the three cases are comparatively analyzed using a framework building on the socio-technical 
transition literature (ii).  
The thesis concludes with Chapter 6, in which the results of both analyses are combined into a list of rec-
ommendations geared at policy makers interested in framing the development of ICT-supported integrated 
mobility schemes, to make the most out of those. Contributions to scientific literature are also emphasized. 
This last chapter also sheds light on the limitations of the present research endeavor and ultimately pro-
poses leads for future research to be conducted. 

Literature review 
In this chapter, I begin by presenting the way I selected the three different bodies of literature to be 
reviewed for the present research endeavor. Then, I review the literature on transport integration to highlight 
its shortcomings vis-à-vis this thesis’ research question. In a third section, I review the literature on transport 
governance to shed light on the lack of research existing on the study of the governance of development of 
ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. In a fourth section, I review the literature focusing on the mobili-
ty transition studies and again show that almost no research has been undertaken about the subject I aim to 
explore. In a fifth and last section I sum up the existing research gap of the three reviewed bodies of litera-
ture and highlight how the present research might contribute to those. 
2.1 Introduction 
As explained in the introductory chapter, this thesis aims to answer the following research question: How 
are public authorities governing the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes? This chapter 
aims to show that this question has not yet been treated and that the topic is currently under-researched. By 
highlighting the lack of research existing on the topic, this chapter also aims at shedding light on the poten-
tial contributions this thesis might make to the scientific literature. 
To emphasize the research gap surrounding the research question, several bodies of literature have been 
reviewed. First, it is important to explain how those bodies of literature were selected. To build this litera-
ture review chapter, a so-called “cascade approach” was adopted. From the review of one body of literature, 
and more specifically from the analysis of what this literature did not cover, other bodies of literature were 
determined and reviewed, and so on. In other words, the literature selection process has actually been or-
ganized as a sequence, where the justification of looking into a particular literature actually came from the 
presentation of the shortcomings of the previously reviewed literature. Hence, it was only after having re-
viewed the first body of literature that the second body of literature could be selected; and only after the 
second body of literature was reviewed the third body of literature could be identified.  
The first term of the research question looked at in the literature selection process was “integrated mobili-
ty”, which resulted in the review of the literature focusing on transport integration. Given the lack of re-
search in this literature focusing on research questions close to the one this thesis seeks to address, the 
literature focusing on transport governance was reviewed, motivated by the words “public authorities gov-
erning”. Again, due to the lack of studies looking at the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes in the transport governance literature, a third body of literature focusing on system innovations, or 
sociotechnical transitions, and more particularly on the mobility transition was identified and reviewed, 
motivated by the terms “development of ICT-supported [solutions]”. Still, a very limited number of studies 
looking specifically at the governance of development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes were 
identified. 
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Consequently, this chapter is organized as follows. First, the literature focusing on transport integration is 
reviewed. This sub-part concludes by highlighting the research gap existing in this literature that is to say 
lack of research looking at the governance of development of smart cards, IMPs and MaaS. Secondly, the 
literature focusing on transport governance is reviewed before again highlighting the research gap existing 
about the study of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes unfolding. Thirdly, is reviewed the literature 
on socio-technical system transitions, and more specifically on the so-called mobility transition, to again 
show that no studies from that literature have yet looked at the governance of development of smart cards, 
IMP and MaaS. In a fourth and last part, the lack of research existing about the processes of development of 
ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes in all the three bodies of literature reviewed in this chapter is 
summarized, and potential contributions of the present thesis to literature on transport integration, 
transport governance and socio-technical transitions are highlighted.  
2.2 Transport integration literature 
Transport integration has been described as “one of the most important means to advance sustainable 
transport and sustainability more generally” (Givoni and Banister, 2010: 1). Consequently, it has generated 
a lot of interest from transport scholars. Transport integration can be understood in several different ways 
(Janic and Reggiani, 2001). For many scholars, transport integration can be understood as a scale, com-
posed of different steps (Hull, 2005; Potter and Skinner, 2000). The first of those steps relates to modal 
(sometimes called functional) integration, which is concerned with enabling multimodal (sometimes called 
intermodal) journeys, by combining different travel modes so they become complementary to one another 
in order to offer a robust alternative to private motorized travel. The second step, known as integrated 
transport and land-use, refers to the integration of transport and planning in order to influence transport 
behaviors and potentially reduce the need to travel. The third step, known as social integration, essentially 
concerns the integration of all possible stakeholders into transport policy making. The last step, referred to 
as integrated transport policy, deals with the integration of environmental, economic, and transport poli-
cies in order to maximize the performance of transport systems.  
ICT-supported integration schemes, which are the prime focus of this thesis, mainly deal with the combina-
tion of different transport modes; that is, modal integration. Thus, while the importance of the three most 
advanced steps of the transport integration ladder (integrated transport and land use; social integration; and 
integrated transport policy) is acknowledged, only the literature focusing on modal integration will be re-
viewed in this section. First is reviewed the sub-literature focusing on traditional modal transport integration 
steps. Then, the sub-literature focusing on ICT-supported integration solutions is reviewed. In a third time, 
the barriers and challenges listed in the literature in order to move towards modal integration are summa-
rized. Finally the shortcomings of the transport integration literature vis-à-vis the research question this 
thesis seeks to answer are summarized and the second body of literature constituting this literature review 
chapter is introduced. 
2.2.1 Traditional modal integration 
The lack of integration between different transport modes has often been identified as one of the biggest 
issue for the definition of an alternative to private motorized transport (Pitsiava-Latinopoulou and Iorda-
nopoulos, 2012). To tackle this issue, the concept of intermodal transport (sometimes also called mixed-
mode commuting or multimodality) has been proposed. Defined as “the use of more than one mode of 
transport within one journey” (Givoni and Banister, 2010: 5), intermodal transport has often been present-
ed as a possible way to offer a door-to-door alternatives to private motorized traffic, and for its potentially 
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positive environmental impacts and efficiency gains, and as a way to cope with growing transport flows 
(Bontekoning et al., 2004). As the term suggests, intermodal transport implies the integration of different 
transport modes with one another within a journey. Consequently, the term modal integration has been 
proposed as a means of achieving intermodal transport. 
Below, the sub-literature that has focused on modal transport integration approaches that were historically 
employed (termed traditional modal integration) before recent developments in the ICTs is reviewed. In 
particular are reviewed works that have been focusing on the notions of physical integration, network inte-
gration, timetable integration and fare integration. Then, studies that have looked specifically at ICT-
supported integration solutions (defined as digital integration) are reviewed. Finally, a summary of the main 
barriers emphasized by scholars in terms of reaching modal integration, both for traditional and digital in-
tegration steps is given. 
 Physical integration
Physical integration is perhaps the first step to modal integration and existed well before the term began to 
be used by academics. It relates to the design and planning of the physical elements of the transportation 
network in order to facilitate intermodal journeys, which has been acknowledged to be beneficial to non-
private motorized transport ridership (Givoni and Rietveld, 2007). The concept has been used for the archi-
tectural design of transport stations in order to enable users to physically transfer from one transport mode 
to another. Examples of physically integrated transport infrastructures are transport hubs that are actually 
nodes of a given transportation network (that is, where different transport routes intersect), such as park 
and ride (P+R) facilities, or light-rail stations located on bus routes and where transfers from one to the 
other are physically possible. Quantitative research has been conducted in order to understand the impact 
of physical integration on existing transportation systems. For example, Kuby et al. (2004) used data from 
US cities to demonstrate that P+R facilities and light-rail stations that were connected with other bus routes 
were positively correlated with increased light-rail ridership. Quantitative and qualitative research has also 
been conducted to understand what were the key success factors to have a performing transport hub. For a 
comprehensive view, see the book edited by Monzon and Ciommo (2016) entitled City-HUBs: Sustainable 
and Efficient Urban Transport Interchanges. According to Ubbels and colleagues (2013), the key physical 
factors for a successful transport interchange are the position of the hub in the transportation network, its 
surrounding urban environment, the possibility for all users (elderly, children, disabled, people with large 
luggage) to access the place, easy way-finding and barrier-free accessibility. Looking at interchanges in Ath-
ens, Pitsiava-Latinopoulou and Iordanopoulos (2012) concluded that the probability of having people trans-
fer from one mode to another in a transport hub was linked to the number of public transport modes serv-
ing it, of course, but also to the spatial location of each mode’s platforms and their physical connectivity. 
Hine and Scott (2000) added that the quality of the waiting environment, the levels of security, and the 
quality of signage were also to be considered in the assessment of the effectiveness of a transport inter-
change. Last but not least, research has been undertaken to better understand the factors of appreciation 
of the population for physical integration of transport. According to Hernandez et al. (2016), focusing on the 
case of a transport hub in Madrid, an interchange is more likely to be successful, from the population’s 
perspective, depending on its level of comfort, the number and variety of shops, as well as the readiness of 
the interchange in case of emergency situations. Looking at the physical integration of bike infrastructure 
and public transport, Pucher and Buehler (2009) showed that in some major US cities, there was growing 
demand for bike-and-ride facilities (creation of bike parking at public transport stations or installment of 
bike-carrying elements in buses or train), which was usually unsatisfied, sending a clear signal to decision 
makers to build more of those. The need to physically integrate bicycles and BRT was also emphasized by 
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Deng and Nelson for the case of Beijing (2013). However, scholars have also highlighted the need to consid-
er network integration when considering physical integration, as having one without having the other 
would not make sense. 
 Network integration
Network Integration is closely related to physical integration and is concerned with the design of the overall 
transport network so that modes become complementary to one another. Network integration specifically 
deals with the classification of transport routes, across different modes, into different categories. This way, 
the capacity of each branch of the transportation network is decided depending on their function (feeder or 
trunk routes), avoiding over- or under-dimensioning the transportation network branches’ capacity. A 
growing number of public transport scholars have focused on the impact of network integration on the 
overall efficiency of the public transport system. For example, Hidalgo (2009) looked at network integration 
as part of the bus reform in Sao Paulo and concluded that network integration could lead to reduced travel 
times for users, and increased attractiveness of the public transport system. Similar results were reached 
for Allen’s (2013) study of Seoul bus reform. Similarly, the lack of network integration has been pointed out 
as a cause for network inefficiencies. For example, Wright (2011) stressed the importance for public author-
ities to redesign their entire bus network when introducing bus rapid transit (BRT) systems. According to 
Wright, it is very likely that BRT systems will under-perform if no network-integration is conducted with the 
existing transportation system. 
 Timetable integration
Research has also been conducted on timetable integration, which is acknowledged for having an effect on 
transfer times, total travel times, and therefore on the likeliness of people to undertake intermodal jour-
neys. For example, it has been assessed by the NSW Ministry of Transport (2008) that waiting and transfer-
ring times were among the main reasons why citizens would be reluctant to combine several modes when 
commuting. Similarly, Litman (2010) demonstrated that public transport users spent approximately 10–30 
percent of their travel time waiting to board for their next connections, which highlighs the potential bene-
fits of better timetable integration. Thus, research has been conducted to emphasize the effects of timeta-
ble integration from a system-wide perspective. For example, Buehler and Pucher (2011) showed that the 
regional coordination of timetables in Germany contributed to an increase in public transport ridership. 
Similar results were found by Cascetta and Pagliara (2008), looking at the development and integration of 
the regional metro system in Naples.  
 Fare integration
Last but not least, scholars have conducted research on fare integration. Defined as the integration of fares 
on a given public transportation system, fare integration is supposed to “cut barriers to transit access, en-
courage participation in monthly pass programs, and potentially serve as new revenue sources for transit 
agencies” (Goldman and Gorham, 2006: 267). As for other modal integration steps, academics have been 
mainly interested in understanding the impact of fare integration on public transport ridership. An early 
study from Pucher and Kurth (1995) focusing on Germany, Switzerland, and Austria concluded that fare 
integration could be held responsible for increasingly attracting public transport riders, and for participating 
in stabilizing, if not increasing, public transport ridership. Looking at Madrid, Matas (2004) found that the 
implementation of an integrated fare system was synonymous with a 15 percent increase in underground 
trips and over 7 percent in bus trips. Abrate and colleagues (2009) studied the impact of fare integration 
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implementation in Italy and found that it was positively associated with increased public transport patron-
age. Looking at Haifa in Israel, Sharaby and Shiftan (2012) showed that fare integration was also associated 
with increased public transport patronage. Last but not least, Hirsch et al. (2010) demonstrated that the 
introduction of integrated fare systems, supported by the magnetic strip MetroCard in New York, resulted 
in 20.3 percent increase in public transport ridership on weekdays and 24 percent on weekends from Janu-
ary 1997 to June 1999. Research was also conducted to understand the economic benefits of integrated 
fare systems. In that regard, Opurum (2009), for example, demonstrated that the introduction of the Met-
roCard in New York could allow siginificant savings for the public transport authority. 
As mentioned in the introduction, digitalization has been (and is still) massively impacting transportation, 
resulting in a whole new array of modal integration possibilities. Those solutions have triggered a lot of 
interest from transportation scholars, as it will be explained below. 
2.2.2 Digital integration 
ICTs can be seen as having created a twofold disruption of the transportation sector (see figure 2.2.1). On 
the one hand, they have enabled the creation of new transportation solutions, such as car-sharing, car-
pooling or ride-booking, relying on the exchange of data between transport providers and users (Audouin 
and Finger, 2019a). Although some of those transport solutions have existed for several decades, it is really 
with the advent of ICTs that they have become so popular (Shaheen et al., 2009; Chan and Shaheen, 2012). 
Consequently, research has been carried out to understand the impact of those solutions on existing trans-
portation systems. For a detailed view of how ICT-supported mobility modes impact people’s mobility, see 
Meyer and Shaheen (2017). On the other hand, ICTs have supported the creation of the so-called data-layer 
(Finger and Razaghi, 2017), constituted of different data from various transport operators (newly developed 
thanks to ICTs, or old ones that have jumped into the digital transport wagon) and users, as well as dedicat-
ed algorithms, on top of which new services can develop including new modal integration solutions. Those 
new digital integration solutions, that are constitute togeteher ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, 
are smart cards, IMPs, and ultimately what is referred to as Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS).  
Figure 2.2-1: Impact of digitalization on transport services (author's elaboration) 
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Those different levels of digital integration basically depend on two inherent components: digital integrated 
ticketing, and digital integrated information systems, on which research has been undertaken and is re-
viewed below. 
 Smart Cards
Smart cards can be seen as the first of those digital integration schemes. Also referred to as electronic tick-
eting, e-ticketing or smart card automated fare collection (SCAFC) systems, smart cards are able to store 
and process data, making them suitable for identification, authorization, and payment (Pelletier et al., 
2011). By turning power and data signals into high-frequency electricity and being able to receive electro-
static bonds from the reader (Park and Kim, 2013), smart cards utilize radio waves to transfer and receive 
data from an RFID tag or label through a dedicated reader. Although, in theory, smart cards might not be 
linked with an integrated fare systems (Douglas, 2009), this is rarely the case in practice. Hence, smart cards 
are often referred to as a more advanced version of the traditional fare integration strategies (Goldman and 
Gorham, 2006). Supposed to increase user convenience by integrating tariffs through the transportation 
network (Estache and Gómez-Lobo, 2005) and cut fare collection costs for transport authorities (Pelletier 
and al., 2011), these “re-usable tickets” (Blythe, 2004) have triggered a lot of interest from scholars from a 
wide array of sectors.  
As smart cards are supposed to enhance multimodality, research was conducted to understand the extent 
to which this was actually the case. For example, looking at data from the Oyster card in London, Seaborn et 
al. (2009) found that at least 23 percent of underground journeys taken by Oyster users were actually com-
bined with bus segments, thus confirming the hypothesis that smart cards were enabling multimodal travel. 
Academics have also been interested in understanding the impact of smart cards on existing public trans-
portation systems. For example, Shockley et al. (2016) showed that the introduction of smart ticketing sys-
tem in Los Angeles was positively associated with reduced dwell times for buses, enabling increased travel 
speeds, and hence encouraging increased ridership. Research has also been conducted to understand the 
impact of smart cards on travel behaviors. To that effect, Ellison et al. (2016), looking at Sydney, found that 
despite some differences between social groups, most subjects tended to switch from cars to public 
transport, and trains in particular, after the introduction of a smart card. Still, according to those authors, 
the introduction of the Opal card in Sydney has produced a decrease of around 10 minutes in the length of 
car trips per person per day. However, scholars have also pointed out the difficulty of clearly relating smart 
card implementation to increased ridership and car use reduction, as other factors can also be held ac-
countable. Although Ellison et al. (2016) had no doubt that smart cards are more beneficial than traditional 
paper tickets, the real impact of smart cards on ridership still needs to be better explained. For example, 
according to Joslin and Morris (2013), although Metrorail ridership increased in Miami between 2008 and 
2012, following the introduction of the EASY smart card, it is difficult to isolate the effect of smart card im-
plementation from other factors such as improved economic climate or increased fuel prices.  
Most of the added value of smart cards compared to traditional fare integration is acknowledged to rely on 
what could be done with all data gathered through automatic fare collection systems. Researchers have 
highlighted the opportunity to use smart card to extract data to ultimately measure transit supply and de-
mand indicators (Trépanier et al., 2009). Specifically, smart card data have been presented as potentially 
enabling managerial activities for public transport authorities. Pelletier et al. (2011) emphasized the poten-
tial of smart cards to provide transport authorities with data to ultimately calculate performance indicators 
(operational management), adjust levels of service, upgrade the network (tactical level), and plan accord-
ingly (strategic management). Similarly, Slavin and colleagues (2009) showed that data from automated 
fare collection systems could be used to grasp a better understanding on travel behaviors in large transit 
41 
systems, and potentially help make better predictive models. Ortega-Tong (2013) demonstrated that smart 
card data could also be used by public authorities to better understand who was using their services. By 
looking at the data from Oyster use in London (frequency of travel, journey start time, activity duration, 
origin frequency, travel distance, and mode choice), the author managed to differentiate between eight 
different user clusters, from everyday regular users to weekend occasional users, or weekday rail occasional 
users, for example. Lathia and Capra (2011) showed that smart card data could also be used as a way to 
assess the population’s response to a specific travel incentive, again illustrating the richness of the analysis 
that could be made out of smart card data.  
 Integrated Mobility Platforms (IMPs)
While digitalization has enabled new integrated ticketing schemes (smart cards), it has also favored the 
integration of information coming from different transport providers, which has ultimately led to the devel-
opment of integrated mobility platforms. Thus before looking in depth at research conducted on IMPs, the 
sub-literature focusing on information integration is first reviewed. 
Traveler information has existed for a very long time and has served two important functions (Le Squeren, 
1991). On one hand, traveler information is known to potentially minimize public transport inconvenience, 
by allowing people to plan their trips and accomplish them accordingly to their plans. On the other hand, 
traveler information might be utilized as a way to promote more environmentally friendly alternatives to 
the use of private cars, and potentially help making regular car-users shift towards more sustainable modes 
of transport. Traveler information is known to have deeply evolved thanks to digitalization. ICTs are seen as 
having enabled the development of advanced travel information systems (ATISs) that aim to help travelers 
in “making better travel choices by providing information regarding the available travel alternatives” (Ben-
Elia et al., 2013). In particular, ICTs have enabled the development of real-time information (RTI) that pro-
vides confidence and reassurance to travelers (Beecroft and Pangbourne, 2013) and can be potentially dis-
played on two different medias. On one hand, it can be displayed on signage stops, stations or interactive 
kiosks. On the other hand, RTI may be displayed on smartphones or other web-based services, for example 
through public transport trip-planner apps. According to Brazil and Caulfield (2013: 93), “Unlike previously 
available information sources, smartphone technology enables users to access individual and trip specific 
information both pre-trip and en route in real time”. Studies have looked at the social acceptance of such 
services. For example, focusing on the use of “On the Go” interactive information kiosks in New York, Kam-
ga et al. (2013) found that such systems were used most at transit hubs accommodating large numbers of 
travelers, and that they participated in giving a positive impact of the public transport agency. However, the 
authors pointed out the risk of those systems widening the digital divide, as they required older generations 
to get familiar with their use. Research was also carried out to understand the impact of such services on 
transit ridership. Looking at New York, and isolating external factors such as modifications in service, 
change in fares or other independent socioeconomic factors, Brakewood et al. (2015) found that the im-
plementation of a web-based RTI system could result in increased bus ridership figures. 
But while digitalization has also supported the creation of innovative mobility modes, few traveler infor-
mation systems have integrated their related information with public transport information (Kenyon and 
Lyons, 2003). Similarly, few apps have been developed to compare driver information with public transport 
information, which could potentially help car users shift to more shared modes of transport (Lyons, 2001). 
As a result, so-called meta-journey planners (sometimes referred to as integrated multimodal travel infor-
mation [IMTI]), supposed to integrate information from both public and private transport solutions, have 
developed and been studied. For example, research has been conducted in order to understand the cus-
tomer expectations of IMTI (Grotenhuis et al., 2007). Given that those IMTI are relatively new, very few 
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studies have analyzed the impact of IMTI on modal shift from car to shared mobility modes. Pronello et al. 
(2017: 2683) looked at the Optimod app in Lyon and found the app did not “produce any change in the use 
of car, motorcycles, bicycles and bike sharing”. The authors also discovered that soon after the app’s intro-
duction, only a few users were actually using it on a daily basis. In their opinion, this is mainly due to the 
fact that the app users were Lyon residents and were therefore used to certain trips, such as commuting, 
which meant they did not need an IMTI system to accomplish most of their journeys. As Ben-Elia and Avin-
eri (2015) would put it, the low success of IMTI might well be due to experiential information (EI), which is 
the kind of information that people gain by learning and experience. It has also been shown that the will-
ingness to pay of customers to have access to travel information is generally relatively low (see, for exam-
ple, Wolinetz et al., 2004). Ultimately, Lyons (2006) stated that while the ICTs have supported the develop-
ment of multimodal information systems, the impact of such systems on people’s mobility behavior is far 
from evident. There does appear to be a lack of evidence to prove the ability of ATIS to support modal shift 
towards more sustainable transport modes. For Lyons et al. (2012), as most of the travel undertaken by 
people is local and routine, ATIS are not consulted as often as one might think. Even though there might be 
a better initiative for people to travel, people are used to their travel routines and are quite reluctant to 
change behaviors. In other words, people seems to be “adopting ‘good enough’ travel options rather than 
optimum (utility-maximized) solutions” (Lyons et al., 2012: 280), even in the digital transport era. 
The second interesting feature of integrated mobility platforms pertains to their ability to integrate pay-
ment for different transport solutions (payment integration), as well as to integrate transport tickets from 
different transport providers (ticketing integration). IMPs are sometimes referred to as multimodal infor-
mation and ticketing systems (MMITS), combined mobility services (CMS), or combined integrated mobility 
platforms (CIMP). Those integrated mobility platforms are basically digital platforms, accessible on 
smartphones, where users are given the possibility to enter their trip origin and destination, choose be-
tween different private and public transport options available to realize their journeys (which can be a 
combination of several modes), pay on the app, and get the ticket necessary to use each of the transport 
modes they have booked. Research was conducted to understand the public acceptance of IMPs, and its 
impact on people’s mobility habits. Geis and Schulz (2016) looked at the European project “All Ways Travel-
ling” and found that public acceptance was generally high, but associated with a relatively low intended 
behavioral change. According to the authors, IMPs might even produce a reverse effect on car users, mak-
ing them keener to use their cars than shared mobility modes. Looking at the UBIGO field operational test, 
Sochor et al. (2015) found that 93 percent of the surveyed participants were satisfied with the proposed 
solution, and 97 percent were interested in continuing to use it.  
As the term IMP is frequently – and incorrectly – used interchangeably with MaaS, we now look more deep-
ly into the MaaS literature in order to shed light on the differences between the two concepts, which are 
not very clear at the moment. Because there is not an extensive body of literature available on the subject 
due to the novelty of the topic, both practitioner and academic literatures about MaaS are reviewed below. 
 Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS)
Although the subject of MaaS has not been on the table for a long time, it has gained significant momentum 
amongst transportation experts. Initially introduced to the public at the 2014 Intelligent Transport Systems 
(ITS) European congress in Helsinki, the subject first gained the interest of transportation practitioners be-
fore becoming one of the most up-to-date subjects for transportation scholars. Leading transportation 
journals such as Journal of Transportation Research Part A, Research in Transportation Economics, and 
Transport Reviews have all published papers about MaaS in the last two years. There has also been a grow-
ing number of special issues focusing on MaaS in esteemed transport journals, such as Transportation Re-
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search Part A, Transportation Research in Business and Management, and Travel Behaviour and Society. 
Most reputed transport conferences have all added a MaaS track in their recent editions, including the Eu-
ropean Transport Conference (ETC), Transport Research Arena (TRA), and the Transportation Research 
Board (TRB). Last but not least, one might observe the unfolding of academic conferences entirely dedicat-
ed to MaaS, such as the 1st IcoMaaS9 (international conference on Mobility as a Service) that happened in 
Tampere (Finland) in November 2017. 
The term MaaS is actually somewhat older than one might think. It was first used, in the transport field, in a 
bachelor thesis from Twente University from 2008, to present a system of carsharing that could help solve 
traffic issues in the Netherlands (Poolen, 2008). Although the solution proposed at that time was closer to 
car-pooling than the idea of digitally integrated mobility, the author already had in mind to develop a solu-
tion that would favor mobility usership over car ownership.  
Originating from the new category of model, enabled by cloud computing, known as Everything-as-a-
Service, referred to as XaaS, such as Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) or Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) 
(Banerjee et al., 2011), the term MaaS was first used by academics from the telecommunication sector, to 
describe a mobile wireless network that can have its building blocks opened up and controlled by third-
party entities, enabling the birth of new type of services. In the transport sector, the term is acknowledged 
for unfortunately suffering from a clear definition (Jittrapirom et al., 2017). It has been used in some studies 
to define what should actually be defined as IMPs (e.g. Sochor et al., 2015). In some other studies, MaaS 
refers to a new transport paradigm, being an evolved version of the IMPs (Ruutu et al., 2017). Other per-
spectives on defining MaaS have adopted a rather scalar approach, with different MaaS “levels” (Sochor et 
al., 2017; Kamargianni et al., 2016). For others, Mobility-as-a-Service is actually about service level agree-
ments (SLAs) (Catapult, 2016), meaning that the MaaS operator will guarantee its customers a mobility 
solution from anywhere to anywhere at any time, which is not the case with IMPS, which only bundle dif-
ferent transport solutions into one single package, but do not guarantee their users that they will have ac-
cess to a mobility solution whenever and wherever they need. 
Research has been conducted to highlight the potential benefits associated with MaaS. For example, in a 
report co-financed by the European Union, Civitas (2016) presented MaaS as having the potential to cut 
transport costs for users, improve transport system efficiency and ultimately tackle congestion. According 
to POLIS, MaaS is presented, if realized successfully, as a way to potentially “reduce environmental impacts 
and provide customized mobility options and better accessibility to people with disabilities or reduced mobil-
ity” (Polis, 2017: 7). As summed up by KPMG (2017), MaaS might well have the potential to change entirely 
the way people travel, and how transport is organized.  
Scholars have also been trying to highlight key elements for MaaS to become a success; that is, MaaS suc-
cess factors. Basing their arguments on the fact that necessary changes for MaaS to happen are of systemic 
nature, Kamargianni and Matyas (2017) proposed a business ecosystem that would make it possible to do 
so, gathering transport operators, data providers, platform providers, ICT infrastructure, insurance compa-
nies, as well as universities and research institutions. For Heikkila (2015), key success factors for MaaS to 
thrive are cooperation among all stakeholders, legislation and regulation, as well as subsidization proce-
dures. In order to see MaaS realized, Ambrosino et al. (2016) proposed the development of flexible and 
shared use mobility (FSUM) agencies, with the aim of coordinating traditional with ICT-facilitated transpor-
tation providers and integrating their data into a single data-layer. According to Giesecke et al. (2016), the 
likeliness of MaaS becoming a reality relies on four factors: the need to specify and adapt the actual 
9 http://www.tut.fi/verne/icomaas/ accessed on November 14th 2017. 
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transport offer; the possibility for end users to cut costs using MaaS while keeping an equal level of conven-
ience; the need to encompass traditional with ICT-supported transportation modes; and the need for MaaS 
to be economically, socially and environmentally sustainable. Li and Voege (2017) made a list of criteria to 
be considered in order to develop MaaS in a city. Those include the need for a city to have an adequate 
public transport system, to already have an electronic ticketing option for public transport, and to have all 
transport providers willing to open their data in a standardized form, as well as accepting electronic pay-
ments. In a study commissioned by the Finnish Ministry of Transportation and Communication, Casey and 
Vallovirta (2016) recommended using public procurement, new regulation models, and developing policies 
towards open interfaces and data in order for MaaS to become a reality. Karlsson et al. (2017) also pro-
posed a framework for analyzing institutional conditions for MaaS to succeed, at the macro, meso, and 
micro levels. According to those authors, legislation and taxations are the most important institutional con-
ditions at the macro level; the coordination among stakeholders, the integration of physical infrastructure, 
the development of the cloud infrastructure, clear business opportunities and appropriateness of business 
models are key aspects at the meso level, and subjective norms are important institutional conditions at the 
macro level. Still looking at Sweden, Smith et al. (2018a) stated that it is only by defining a regulatory ‘sweet 
spot’, driving innovation, and securing public benefits that MaaS will be able to successfully come to life. 
However, as MaaS schemes are still in their infancy, no data is easily available to understand the impact of 
MaaS on existing transportation systems. Thus, most of the papers found focusing on this topic should be 
considered more as viewpoints or opinion papers than pure scientific evidences. For example, Hensher 
(2017) presented his views on how traditional bus contracts would need to evolve if MaaS goes live one 
day. He argued that the question of whether we will need mode-specific contracts in the future rather than 
mobility contracts will need to be asked if MaaS becomes a reality. For Hensher (2017), in order to harness 
the full sustainability potential of MaaS, and avoid another “icing on the cake”, public transportation will 
need to be combined with new mobility modes on the future MaaS offer, even though it is not very clear 
how this will be done. Rantasila (2015) has been interested in understanding the impact that MaaS would 
have on land use. He claimed that MaaS could increase the efficiency and attractiveness of public transport 
in urban areas, which might create new transport hubs, and increase the value of the land surrounding 
those. However, this would imply better coordination among public authorities, and between public and 
private sectors. Based on a prospective evaluation of the readiness of Australia for MaaS, Somers and Eldaly 
(2016) developed a MaaS-readiness index, based on urban density population in, and availability of differ-
ent transportation modes and usage rates in cities, for other cities that would be interested engaging on 
this path. Some scholars have also looked at the position of traditional actors of the transportation sector 
vis-à-vis MaaS. For example, Mulley et al. (2018) found that there was high enthusiasm among community 
transport organizations to jump on the MaaS bandwagon in Australia. While most studies on transport in-
tegration have tried to understand its impact on existing transportation systems, research has also been 
conducted to understand the main barriers towards it, as discussed below. 
2.2.3 Barriers towards integrated transport systems 
A lot of research has sought to highlight the barriers towards transport integration as transport integration 
has been described as particularly complex to reach (Schöller-Schwedes, 2010; Timmermans, 2003; Potter, 
2010). In particular, May and colleagues (2006) identified four main barriers to go towards transport inte-
gration: legal, financial, political, and cultural and technological. Those four perspectives and associated 
research are reviewed below. 
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Scholars have pointed out barriers of legal or institutional nature towards transport integration. Under this 
perspective, transport integration is acknowledged to be difficult because of legal responsibilities split be-
tween different actors, reducing the ability of public authorities to foster integration. For example, it has 
been acknowledged that transport integration was dependent on country’s institutional contexts and on 
how the transport sector was organized. Edwards (2013) showed that the deregulation of the transport 
industry in Newcastle, which was synonymous of institutional disintegration between the metro and bus 
networks, resulted in a decrease of about 10 million metro passengers per year, as it made both modes 
compete with each other instead of being complementary to one another. Schöller-Schwedes (2010) and 
Potter (2010) both stated that a transport industry based on competition between transport operators was 
more likely to go against integration than in favor of it. Supporting this idea, Lyons and Harman (2002) 
showed that the institutional fragmentation of the UK transport industry could be seen as a barrier to the 
creation of multimodal traveler information systems; that is, to information integration. Comparing the 
development and implementation of smart ticketing systems in Seoul and Bogota, Audouin and Finger 
(2018b) concluded that the more important the institutional reform introduced along the smart card, the 
greater its impact would be, highlighting the importance of institutional contexts when implementing ICT-
supported integrated mobility solutions. According to Holmberg et al. (2015), the main barrier for MaaS to 
become reality is institutional and lies in the willingness of public transport authorities to get into the MaaS 
wagon, given the monopolistic position they have occupied for years. More recently, Smith et al. (2018b) 
investigated the position of public and private actors regarding the existing barriers hampering the devel-
opment of MaaS in west Sweden. According to those authors, public-private collaborations are essential to 
see MaaS succeed, but are unlikely to happen due to public actors’ internal processes and bureaucracy. 
 Financial barriers
Secondly, research has pointed out barriers of a financial nature. That is the case when budget restriction is 
a reason for not moving towards transport integration. For example, May et al. (2001) showed that the lack 
of funding was the main bottleneck in infrastructure development for physical integration for 80 percent of 
the 54 European cities they surveyed. In a report commissioned by the Conference of European Roads Di-
rectors (CEDR), König et al. (2016) proposed two main business models for MaaS operators to overcome 
financial barriers, being the Merchant and Agency models. In the former, the MaaS operator is supposed to 
get its margin thanks to the discount it would receive by buying transport tickets in large volume to 
transport operators and selling them at cost price. In the latter, the MaaS operator would be selling tickets 
at a slightly more expensive price to its customers in order to get a margin on each of the sold tickets. How-
ever, the report remains vague on which of those two business models is most likely to be successful in 
future market developments. To tackle the financial barriers, the MaaS Alliance (2017) proposed that initial 
investments be provided by public administrations interested in going into MaaS. 
 Political and cultural/social barriers
Third, transport academics have highlighted the importance of political and cultural barriers towards 
transport integration. Such cases occur when a dedicated transport integration measure or technology 
encounters resistance from the population, or low political support. For example, the lack of political deci-
sion was highlighted as a barrier to go towards ICT-supported integration solutions. Ruutu et al. (2017) built 
a system-dynamics model to assess the impact of certain policies on MaaS development and adoption and 
found that policies promoting open interfaces and data transferability agreements among MaaS operators 
might help accelerate platform adoption and reduce the risk of a winner-take-all scenario. Resistance from 
 Legal and Institutional barriers
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the population was shown to be a barrier to modal integration. For example, McDonald (2000) showed that 
the likeliness for a smart card system to really take off was actually dependent on the willingness of public 
transportation users to embrace the technology and use it. In particular, issues of privacy and security have 
been pointed out as potentially influencing people’s willingness to use those, and hence their successful 
implementation. Social acceptance was also highlighted as a factor of success for the development of MaaS 
schemes. In September 2017, the results were released from a survey study conducted on 1125 Finns by 
the Finnish digital business consultancy firm Solita.10 The study showed that MaaS had a long way to go 
before becoming legion, especially given the current (low) awareness of the population for the concept and 
their likeliness to fully embrace it. According to the study, only 16 percent of the population sample (sup-
posed to represent the overall Finnish population) had ever heard of the MaaS concept and only one out of 
three Finnish car-owners would be willing to give up their cars if a complete MaaS offer was available. Ka-
margianni et al. (2018) used survey data to show that social acceptance had to be considered in order for 
MaaS to succeed. In particular, the authors showed that MaaS was more likely to be easily accepted by 
younger (urban) people than other social groups. 
 Technological barriers 
Last but not least, researchers have stressed the need to consider technological barriers to transport inte-
gration, meaning that there is no available technology to support this integration measure, or that the 
technology is vulnerable and thus presents risks for the different stakeholders supporting it. While this is 
not really pointed out as an issue nowadays for traditional modal integration, there is considerable litera-
ture showing the technological barriers to moving towards digital integration solutions. For example, re-
search has been conducted to highlight the potential security breaches of smart cards. According to Berini 
Sarias (2013), most smart card systems, which are based on MIFARE family of chips, are particularly vulner-
able to hackers. Markantonakis et al. (2009) listed the main types of attacks that could be conducted on 
smart card systems, as well as countermeasures to those. Garcia et al. (2012) proposed a tool that is able to 
crack RFID protocols a hundred times faster than regular RFID readers, in order to detect RFID breaches and 
ultimately propose solutions to them. Morbitzer (n.d) recommended that RFID smart card developers use 
public cryptographic standards to avoid hacks. In Morbitzer’s opinion, keeping a cryptographic algorithm 
secret is not going to prevent pirates from hacking it, and might well actually go into the opposite direction. 
Research has also been conducted to showcase the potential vulnerability of IMP and MaaS schemes. 
Callegati et al. (2016), for example, highlighted the need to pay attention to data provenance, data trust-
worthiness, and service maliciousness when designing the service. Yuan et al. (2016) and Hu et al. (2015) 
have proposed frameworks to help build more robust and resistant MaaS systems, while trying to preserve 
the flexibility of the MaaS solution. Nakashima et al. (2017) proposed the use of ambient intelligence pro-
cesses to support MaaS technical breaches. 
2.2.4 Critiques and research gap 
Most of the research looking at traditional modal integration development and implementation has been 
more interested in understanding the impacts of such schemes than in how they are coming to life. Re-
search on “how to go towards integration” has been conducted more from a technical approach. For exam-
ple, due to the mathematical nature of developing integrated schedules for transit networks, optimization 
scholars have been interested in the topic. For a review of different models proposed for the design of in-
10 As of the date of publication of the present thesis, the results of this study had not been published officially. We contacted 
the author of the study and explained what we were looking at in our research, and he kindly agreed to share the survey data 
with us.  
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termodal integrated timetables, see Mohaymany and Gholami (2010) or Guihaire and Hao (2008). However, 
it seems that almost no studies have paid attention to the governance structures that have supported the 
birth of modal integration schemes. Exceptions include Kim and Dickey (2006) and Pucher et al. (2005) for 
the study of Seoul bus reform, where network integration and ticketing integration where introduced; Caris 
(2015) for a comparison of bus reforms between Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo; and Munoz and Gschwender 
(2008) for an analysis of the failure of the Santiago bus reform, where network integration and ticketing 
integration were introduced. While most studies on traditional modal integration acknowledge the benefits 
of modal integration, there seems to be a research gap in terms of how to make modal integration happen, 
and the roles of each of the involved stakeholders in the process. As explained below, it appears this cri-
tique is also valid for studies looking at digital integration solutions. 
While most of the studies of smart cards have praised the benefits of automated fare collection systems (Li 
et al., 2018), few studies, particularly in the transport sector, have looked at processes of development and 
implementation of smart cards. In transportation studies, most of the research has focused either on the 
impact of the smart card solution on modal share, or on its acceptance by different social groups, or on 
what could be further derived from the utilization of this technology. Exceptions to this include studies of 
the development of smart ticketing schemes in Hong Kong (Poon and Chau, 2001) or in Seoul and Bogota 
(Audouin and Finger, 2018b). Again, there seems to be a research gap when it comes to the study of the 
processes having supported the birth of digital modal integration solutions. More specifically, there seems 
to be almost no studies focusing on the governance processes and policy development that have led to the 
implementation of smart cards in urban transportation systems. This critique is also valid for the last two 
digital integration schemes; that are MaaS and IMPs. The analysis of the role that public authorities played 
in the development of MaaS in Sweden and Finland by Smith et al. (2018a) may be an exception to that 
statement. However, given the potential social, economic, and environmental benefits that those solutions 
shall bring, if realized correctly, one might be interested in understanding the governing processes support-
ing the birth of those solutions, in order to potentially replicate those.  
So first, it appears there is a need to conduct empirical research on the governance structures supporting 
the birth of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. Second, there is a need to look at other bodies of 
literature that might have looked at the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, unlike 
the transport integration literature. Given that what is really missing are studies looking at the role of the 
different stakeholders (and in particular of public authorities) into the development of digital integrated 
mobility schemes, it appears relevant to look at the transport governance literature. Thus, in the next sub-
chapter (2.3) the transport governance literature is reviewed.  
2.3 Transport governance literature 
There is a consensus among academics that the organization of transport should fall under the responsibility 
of public authorities. However, the academic perspective on the role that public authorities should play in 
policy making and public service provision (including in transportation) has evolved greatly over the last few 
decades. Indeed, it is acknowledged for having shifted from a government to a governance perspective 
(Rhodes, 1996). Thus, is first reviewed the paradigm shift from government to governance before examining 
the literature on transport governance. This subchapter is divided into three main sections. It first looks at 
the evolution of the research perspectives on the role that public authorities should play (in general, not for 
transportation) in policy making and public service delivery. Secondly, it looks at the transport governance 
literature. Last but not least, it highlights the main research gap of the transport governance literature vis-à-
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vis this thesis’ research question and introduces the last body of literature relevant to the present research 
endeavor. 
2.3.1 From Government to governance 
As briefly mentioned above, scholars generally agree that there has been a paradigm shift from government 
to governance when it comes to the perception of the role of governments in public policy making and ser-
vice delivery. In order to better understand what this shift means, and the main differences between the 
two approaches, this section starts by looking at the “traditional” perspective of study of governments, be-
fore looking at the newer perspective, known as the governance perspective.  
Looking specifically at what “government can properly and successfully do” (Wilson, 1887:197), public ad-
ministration science has historically been the main perspective for looking at policy-making and public ser-
vice delivery. Under this approach, organizations following heavy hierarchical structures and well-
established bureaucracies were felt to be more efficient in their activities than organizations that did not 
(Ostrom and Ostrom, 1971; Simon, 1976). Traditional public administration understood public authorities as 
sole governing actors and, most of the time, as exclusive public service providers (Finer, 1941). However, this 
“traditional” approach to the study of government has faced major criticism. The politics-administration 
dichotomy paradigm, which lies at the core of public administration science, and for which policy formula-
tion and its execution are thought to be independent tasks, suffered from a lot of skepticism among academ-
ics. For example, it has been described as untenable (Roberts, 1994), or “naïve, at best” (Henry, 1987: 41). 
For many scholars, this dichotomy had no reason to exist, as administrators and policy makers are basically 
in constant interaction (Svara, 2001; Peters, 1989). According to Simon (1998), although people are not al-
ways able to make the most rational decisions, they often seek to maximize their personal utility, which 
translates in the political domain as the maximization of power. So, regardless of whether they are policy 
makers or administrators, people working in the public sector are greatly interested in maximizing their utili-
ty, thus questioning the validity of the axiom along which administration and politics are dissociated. Conse-
quently, it was quickly agreed among government scholars that the politics-administration dichotomy was 
no longer relevant and that new approaches were needed to look at the role of governments in policy mak-
ing and public service delivery.  
All of the criticisms of the traditional approach to the role of public authorities were summed up by Waldo 
(1984). By presenting public administration as facing a crisis of identity and arguing for a paradigm shift vis-
à-vis the role of public authorities, Waldo (1984) proposed the New Public Administration (NPA) approach, 
which centered around the notions of social equity and gave less importance to bureaucracy. Although most 
scholars started to agree that public administration was going through an existentialist crisis, few of them 
embraced NPA. Many government scholars preferred another “new” approach. 
Along with common problems that public administrations in developed countries started to face, such as the 
shortage of public funds and distrust of populations in government, and the new type of management tech-
niques developed in the public sector in the 1980s, under the Thatcher administration in the United King-
dom, and the Reagan administration in the US, a new perspective to the study of the public sector emerged 
– commonly referred to as public management (Hughes, 2012). This new approach, which some defined as a
new paradigm (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), basically aimed to rethink the answers to the following ques-
tions: What should government do or not do? What should the public sector be responsible for? How can
the public sector collaborate with the private sector in order to improve the quality of life of people and
ease the public sector’s economic burden?
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The main idea behind this new approach, which Hood (1991) coined new public management (NPM), was 
that the public sector should no longer be the only actor involved in all aspects of public affairs, especially 
public service provision. According to Hood (1991), NPM relied on seven key principles: the disaggregation of 
units in the public sector; greater competition in the public sector; greater discipline and parsimony in re-
source use; the adoption of private-sector styles of management practices; hands-on professional manage-
ment; the definition of explicit standards and measures of performance; and greater emphasis on output 
controls. The NPM approach has also been presented as the “steering not rowing” approach (Osborne, 
1993), or as an answer to the “hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes, 1994). This new narrative highlighted the 
need for public authorities to “do more with less without cutting [their] hands and feet” (Osborne, 1993: 
350). In particular, it promoted privatization and diminution of public intervention; the transfer of some 
central and local government functions to dedicated agencies; and the transfer of some central government 
functions to the EU level. The NPM approach is known to rely on three main pillars being liberalization, pri-
vate sector participation (PSP), and regulation, all three of which are supposed to enable higher efficiencies 
in public service delivery, as well as cost reductions for the benefit of users and taxpayers.  
Liberalization can be understood as the “abolishment of reserved areas and the opening of markets for new 
operators” (Finger and Jaag, 2016: 4). It is acknowledged to encompass a set of measures to enable competi-
tion in sectors that were once dominated by heavily regulated monopolies (mostly state-owned enterprises). 
Liberalization is often used interchangeably with the term deregulation (see, for example, Domberger and 
Piggott [1986]), but while the latter is industry-specific, the former deals with a general trend where the 
public sector tend to remove barriers across all economic sectors and adopt a more liberal approach. 
PSP actually refers to means of involving the private sector in government activities (Kay and Thompson, 
1986), which encompasses concepts of privatization, contracting out and public–private partnerships (PPPs). 
Privatization refers to “the process of transferring ownership (…) from the public sector (government owned) 
to the private sector” (Finger and Jaag, 2016: 4). According to Brada (1996), privatizations occur through 
three distinct processes. Firstly, privatizations of state-owned enterprises can happen through share issue 
privatizations (SIP); that is, via public share offerings made on capital markets. Secondly, privatization might 
occur through mass privatization, consisting, for example, of the free allocation of assets to the population 
through the distribution of vouchers. Thirdly, privatization can occur through asset sales, where government 
exchanges its owned asset for an explicit cash payment. Contracting refers to the outsourcing of public ser-
vices provision, initially done by public service departments, to external contractors (Mulgan, 1997). The 
outsourcing is generally done through short-term contracts and is expected to produce efficiency gain 
thanks to induced economies of scale, increased competition among suppliers, and changes in labor practic-
es (Ferris and Graddy, 1982). Finally, PPPs (sometimes referred to as P3s or 3Ps in the literature) refer to 
“operation[s] of some sort of durability between public and private actors in which they jointly develop prod-
ucts and services and share risks, costs, and resources which are connected with these products" (Van Ham 
and Koppenjan, 2007: 598).  
Last but not least, regulation refers to the “entirety of legal constraints on economic activity” in a given eco-
nomic sector (Finger and Jaag, 2015: 3). Regulation’s prime aim is to target and solve market failures, which 
are defined as “failure of a more or less idealized system of price-market institutions to sustain desirable 
activities” (Bator, 1958:351), and which might be caused by market power, externalities, information asym-
metries, or consumption of public goods (Finger and Jaag, 2016; Keohane and Olmstead, 2016). Four kinds of 
regulatory instruments are usually used in the utilities sector (Albon, 2000). Rate of return regulation (also 
referred to as ROR, cost-plus or cost-based regulation) essentially aims to set the rate of return that the 
utility company can earn on its assets. Price caps aims to set the prices that a utility company can charge, 
which will be adjusted yearly based on the rate of inflation and other economic factors, in order to control 
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prices. The purpose of revenue capping is to set a ceiling on overall revenue. Finally, yardstick regulation 
(also known as benchmarking regulation) aims to push utilities to reduce their costs by inducing them to 
compete with one another. 
While research was conducted to emphasize the above-mentioned benefits of NPM (e.g. Savas, 1991; Meg-
ginson and Netter, 2001), many scholars have tried to demonstrate that the NPM approach was perhaps not 
the definitive answer to the public administration “crisis of identity”, especially vis-à-vis policy-making and 
public service provision. For example, liberalization has been criticized for jeopardizing public values of utility 
sectors such as reliability, safety, and affordability of the service (Jørgensen and Bozeman, 2002). Liberaliza-
tion was also shown to introduce important coordination problems between stakeholders and to potentially 
increase systemic risk (Laperrouza, 2009). In their book entitled Privatization, how to avoid too much of a 
good thing, Beisheim et al. (2005) warned about the dangers of privatization, which when conducted by 
weak public authorities could lead to corruption, lack of attention to the needs of the poor, increases in 
prices, and sometimes safety issues. Privatization was also said to favor business secrecy, the absence of 
participation or consultation of the stakeholders, and a lack of transparency in the decision-making process 
(Swyngedouw, 2005). Contracting was highly criticized, particularly by transaction cost economists (e.g. Wil-
liamson, 1985) for its cost for public authorities that could sometimes be so important that they would 
overwhelm the savings from contracting out (Prager, 1994). Contracting was also criticized for being more 
efficiency-oriented than service quality-oriented (Nalbandian, 2005), for ultimately being responsible for a 
vanishing of accountability of public authorities (Boston, 1995), and for favoring corruption (Albalate et al., 
2017). In a similar fashion, PPPs were criticized for lacking clarity and flexibility (Bloomfield, 2006; Hart, 
2003) and regulation was pointed out for increasing costs (Winston, 2000).  
To sum up, the time during which NPM was seen as panacea did not last long. For example, Dunleavy et al. 
(2006) described NPM as no longer being anything “new” and for having led to increased complexity, frag-
mentation, and to the rise of populist parties. NPM was also criticized for having reduced the consumer-
citizen/government relationship to a simple buyer/seller interaction, and thus for not being able to grasp the 
complexity of policy making and public service delivery (Pollitt, 1993). For De Vries and Nemec (2013), NPM 
should be considered passé and not well suited to tackling modern problems such as sustainable growth. 
Overall, NPM was, like traditional public administration, criticized for not being capable of addressing wicked 
problems (Head and Alford, 2008). In his article “The Rise and Demise of New Public Management”, 
Drechsler (2005) presented NPM as an ideology that it was possible to believe in in 1995, hard to agree with 
in 2000, and that no one should adhere to since 2005. Consequently, new approaches to look at the role of 
the public sector in policy making and public service provision developed, to answer the crisis of identity that 
the public management approach was also going through. Denhardt and Denhardt (2000), for example, pro-
posed the theory of new public services (NPS), which promoted, among other things, the need for govern-
ments to serve rather than control, referred to as the “serving not steering” approach, in reference to Os-
borne’s “steering not rowing” term. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) proposed the Neo-Weberian State (NWS) 
approach, which promoted a more citizen-centered organization of policy-making and public service deliv-
ery. McGuire proposed the Collaborative Public Management (CPM) theory, which aimed at “facilitating and 
operating in multi-organizational arrangements in order to remedy problems that cannot be solved – or 
solved easily – by single organizations” (2006: 33). All of those new approaches to the study of government 
might actually be bundled under the emerging governance paradigm. 
The word governance originates from the Greek verb κυβερνειν (kybernein), which was used to describe the 
skippering of a ship or the driving of a vehicle (Campbell and Carayannis, 2012) and gained visibility in the 
1980s when used to depict the politics of international organizations such as the World Bank or the IMF 
(Bottici, 2014). In that context, the term was mainly used to describe the dynamics of the new globalized 
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world, and the role that international organizations would play in it (Weiss, 2000). As used at that time to 
basically describe the kind of order orchestrating decisions at the supra-national level, the term progressive-
ly gained interest among scholars interested in the study of government and of the public sector. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, the term has been used widely, and not always with the same meaning (Stoker, 
1997). It is possible to distinguish two perspectives bundled in the governance approach.  
On one hand, governance is related to policy development by governments and public service delivery 
(Mayntz, 2003). Friedmann (2012: 4) assessed that “governance refers to the social processes by which bind-
ing decisions for cities and city regions are taken and carried out”. Similarly, Wangel (2011: 881) stated that 
“Governance as structure concerns which actors are included and how these are organized, e.g. if the steer-
ing is done through hierarchical or horizontal organizations”. Under that first perspective, the state is 
acknowledged for losing its capacity for direct control and replacing it with a capacity for influence (Peters 
and Pierre, 1998). In other words, public authorities are not considered impotent, but rather as actors con-
stantly bargaining with other actors of the governance system (private or third sector). Under that perspec-
tive, governance is believed to happen in the “shadow of hierarchy” (Scharpf, 1994); that is, with public au-
thorities always present and influential and no longer as sole governing actors. In order not to choose be-
tween governance and government, and avoid “Governance without government” polemic, Bulkeley and 
Kern (2006) suggested focusing on the type of governing approach adopted by public authorities. Towards 
the same goal, Hooghe and Marks (2003) proposed the multi-level governance framework (MLG), which 
aimed to specifically analyze governance structures and governing mechanisms. The MLG is acknowledged 
for having provided researchers with a robust analytical tool to look at “‘arrangement’ of policy-making ac-
tivity performed within and across politico-administrative institutions located at different territorial levels” 
(Stephenson, 2013: 817). According to their framework, governance is known to either happen under type I 
or type II. Type I governance follows a hierarchical structure and is composed of a limited number of general-
purpose jurisdictions, on a limited number of levels, that usually have clearly delimited boundaries, and 
whose actions are not intersecting with one another. Type II governance is characterized by a higher number 
of task-specific jurisdictions, operating across different levels, sometimes overlapping but benefiting from an 
important degree of flexibility and adaptability. While type I MLG is sometimes referred to as a Russian-doll 
(or “Matryoshka”) decision making process, supported by a limited number of authorities at each level, type 
II is presented as “a puzzle made up of many functionally specific pieces, each providing services or solving 
problems” (Stephenson, 2013: 821).  
On the other hand, the term governance has been used to cover a much broader concept that not only re-
lates to the reform of the public sector and the idea of governing of the state. For example, Williamson 
(2005: 43) used the term to define “the means by which to infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and 
realize mutual gain”. According to Kickert, governance defines “the achievement of a balance between gov-
erning actors” (Kickert, 1993: 195). For Ostrom (1996: 1073), governance refers to the concept of co-
production, which she defined as being “the process through which inputs used to produce a good or service 
are contributed by individuals who are not in the same organization.” 
Adopting either of those two perspectives induces adopting a systemic approach and looking at actors, their 
interactions, and institutions influencing how actors interact with one another (Stoker, 1997). Concerned 
with better defining governance, Ansell and Gash (2008) proposed the idea of collaborative governance, 
which they defined as a “governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-
state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative 
and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (p. 554). From that 
school of thought, public authorities are known for initiating the dialogue with non-state actors, and for 
involving non-state actors in policymaking and implementation. Particular emphasis is placed on the history 
52 
of public–private collaboration, incentives developed by the public sector to get non-state actors involved, 
and leadership of the initiating actors.  
As seen above, there has been a shift regarding the understanding of the role that public authorities should 
play in policy making and implementation. This shift from government to governance is synonymous with a 
whole new understanding of what public authorities should and should not do. This shift has had a massive 
impact on academic understanding of the role that public authorities should play in the transport sector. 
Consequently the following subsection looks at the transport governance literature, before summarizing its 
main shortcoming vis-à-vis the present research endeavor. 
2.3.2 Transport governance 
Transport is acknowledged to have been historically dependent on governments (Docherty and Shaw, 2012). 
As the understanding about the role of public authorities has evolved from a government to a governance 
perspective, the understanding of how transport should be organized has also evolved. Hence, an increasing 
number of studies have acknowledged the importance of governance in the organization of transportation 
systems (Banister, 2008; Hull, 2008; Schiller et al., 2010). For example, according to Tsay and Herrmann: 
“cities cannot construct sustainable transport systems alone. Creating these systems requires the simultane-
ous cooperation, construction, and funds of multiple actors, including the national government” (2013: 10). 
Consequently, transport governance research has developed to understand the role of the different actors 
involved in the organization of transport activities, as well as the impact of governance mechanisms on 
transport system performance. Those studies can be categorized into two different groups: transport gov-
ernance studies looking at the link between governance and performance, and transport governance studies 
concerned with politics and political aspects of transport policy and transportation service provision. 
 Governance and performance
Given that liberalization, PSP, or regulation are often presented in the literature as governance tools 
(Brudney et al., 2005; Hodge and Greve, 2010; Braithwaite et al., 2007), scholars have been interested in 
assessing their impact on transportation system performance. Ultimately, those studies aim to better assess 
whether public authorities should collaborate with the private sector when it comes to transport service 
delivery and transport infrastructure development, and if so, how. 
For example, scholars have been interested in understanding the impacts of liberalization on the perfor-
mance of specific liberalized utility sectors formerly organized as regulated monopolies. Empirical research, 
mostly quantitative, has been conducted in many countries that have gone down this path. For example 
Alamdari and Morrell (1997) studied the liberalization of airline markets in Europe and the US and found 
that liberalization led to productivity increase, resulting in labor cost reduction. Finger (2014) looked at the 
liberalization of rail in five European countries and concluded that liberalization had different impacts de-
pending on the governance and institutional context of each country. For example, while rail liberalization 
led to increased patronage in UK, it also became synonymous with decreased safety and cost increases. Fin-
ger argued that there was insufficient scientific evidence to assess systematically the impacts of liberaliza-
tion on the performance of the system. Academics have also sought to understand the pace of liberalization 
of certain transportation sectors. For example, according to Boskovic and Bugarinovic’s (2015) study of the 
development of liberalization of the railway system in Southeast Europe, no country will be able to grasp the 
full potential of liberalization if no dynamics are coordinated among different states that are part of the 
same geographical region. Similar research was conducted to evaluate the results of transport privatization. 
Using social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA), Pollitt and Smith (2002) assessed that the privatization of British 
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Rail actually led to increased efficiencies and increased output quality. Using data envelopment analysis 
(DEA), Cullinane et al. (2005) showed that the privatization of the container port industry on a global scale 
did not lead to the increased efficiency of the sector.  
Research has also assessed the results of PSP in the transport sector, particularly for contracting and PPPs. 
Analyzing a mixed delivery system of bus service in Barcelona, Bel and Rosell (2016) found that, taking trans-
action costs into account, public firms had lower delivery costs than private companies. Looking at bus ser-
vices delivery in Catalonia, Pina and Torres (2001) concluded that private management was no more efficient 
than public management. Examining the impact of specific contracts on the cost of subsidies for bus con-
tracts, Hensher and Wallis (2005) used data over 20 years and from several different countries and found 
that competitive tendering, unlike its underlying assumption, was not systematically linked with reduced 
costs of subsidies, which might be more the case under negotiated performance-based contracts (PCB). Ac-
cording to them, PCBs are a better match to deliver value for money and maximize the benefits of subsidies 
to society as a whole than traditional contracting. According to Hensher and Stanley (2010), most contract-
ing of urban bus services during the past 20 years have not fulfilled their objectives, often due to their lack of 
transparency and accountability. The two Australian academics recommended the development of trust 
between the purchaser and contractor in order to ensure greater efficiency of contracting, highlighting the 
need for contracts to include new clauses to enable changes and variations to happen. Looking at the Neth-
erlands, Koppenjan (2005) emphasized the subdued results of using PPPs in transportation infrastructure 
development. The author also underlined the importance of having the public and private parties interact in 
the different stages of a PPP, in order to develop trust and facilitate joint image building as well as enrich the 
project content. The failure of PPPs to be economically efficient in transportation infrastructure develop-
ment was also highlighted by Monteiro for the case of Portugal (2005). 
Last but not least, studies of the economic dimensions of transport governance have also been interested in 
looking at the impact of regulation on transportation systems efficiency. Many studies have examined the 
impact of economic regulations on performance of transport systems. Looking at Madrid and Emilia-
Romagna, Button (1999: 436) concluded that “regulations can influence the economic efficiency of urban 
public transport”. Focusing on long-distance transport services in Norway and Sweden, Alexandersson et al. 
(2010) highlighted the potential of regulatory measures to have an impact on patronage or efficiency. In the 
context of the Norwegian bus industry, Dalen and Gomez-Lobo (2003) showed that the adoption of a yard-
stick type regulation was synonymous with reduced operating costs. Research has also looked at the impact 
of regulatory measures in developing countries. For Brazil, Golub (2009) found that regulating informal 
transport was not going to have an important welfare impact. This was supported by Sohail et al. (2016), 
who stated that self-regulation, through the formation of dedicated associations, encompassing transport 
users as well as transport providers, might be a better way to reach efficiency than traditional regulatory 
mechanisms in emerging economies. 
 
 Politics and political aspects of transport governance 
 
Transport governance studies have also focused on the politics of transport policy and planning. From that 
perspective, scholars have been interested in discovering how the distribution of power and legitimacy 
among different stakeholders affects the development of transport policies and ultimately their successful 
implementation. For example, Aldred (2012) showed that cycling in the UK suffered from the hollowing of 
the state, which was synonymous with cycling policy being made by either private or voluntary organiza-
tions. Burnham (2006) looked at the evolution of transport governance in London and concluded that having 
transport strategy and delivery falling under the responsibility of the mayor was the most effective and most 
suitable way to answer citizens priorities and needs, but not really efficient in monetary terms. Scholars have 
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also been interested in understanding the role of specific mechanisms and tools into transport governance. 
For example, the development of trust, the involvement of all concerned stakeholders, as well as the devel-
opment of partnerships between public bodies at the local and national levels have been acknowledged as 
key for the successful development and implementation of transport policies (Hansen, 2006). The adoption 
of collaborative stakeholders’ dialogue (CSD) and participatory processes has also been acknowledged for 
being an effective governance tool for the successful implementation of transport policies (Baumann and 
White; 2012; Kim and Dickey, 2006) and for making it possible to depoliticize discussions between stake-
holders and widen perspectives. Citizen participation has also been highlighted as an effective tool to pro-
duce more inclusive and satisfactory transport policies (Gil et al., 2011; Matthews, 2001), but has been criti-
cized for being grounded in political expediency (Bickerstaff and Walker, 2001). Both public and political 
support have also been emphasized as critical factors in the success of certain transport policies, such as 
congestion charge development (Börjesson and Kristoffersson, 2015).  
Most of the studies looking at transport governance from a political perspective have focused on the gov-
ernance of sustainable transport policy. For example, looking at the translation of climate change targets 
into action in the transport sector in the UK, Bache et al. (2015) highlighted the importance of not relying on 
meta-policies only, and on developing policies at lower territorial levels. Some scholars have also used the 
MLG framework11 to look at the governance of sustainable transport policy making. According to Bulkeley 
and Betsill (2005), for example, sustainable transport policies are more likely to be designed under type II 
than type I MLG, highlighting the need for public authorities to develop new governance structures, surpas-
sing traditional governance schemes, in order to face contemporary societal challenges. While Marsden and 
Rye (2010) agreed that type I institutions might not be able to lead the definition of sustainable transport 
policies, they questioned the likeliness of type II institutions to do so, given their lack of power.  
Some studies have looked at the governance of integrated transport and land use. For example, in the con-
text of Chicago, Merk (2014) highlighted that institutional fragmentation was a major challenge to go to-
wards an integrated transport and land use system. Using Melbourne and Perth as case studies, Legacy et al. 
(2012) highlighted that having an agency in charge of both transport and land use did not always lead to 
integration of transport and land use, but that developing networked governance and strong regulations was 
sometimes more effective. Lindseth and Reitan (2007) took the case of the land use and transport forum, 
developed in Kristiansand, Norway, to demonstrate the power of horizontal governance structures in pro-
ducing transport policy discourse change.  
2.3.3 Critiques and research gap 
As seen above, many publications focusing on transport governance are concerned with analyzing the im-
pact of some governance mechanisms on the transport system efficiency. Most of those studies are quanti-
tative in nature. Few studies have been concerned with analyzing governance mechanisms from a political 
perspective, adopting a qualitative approach and paying particular attention to the historical processes that 
led to changes. The few studies that match that description are mainly concerned with looking at sustainable 
transport policy making. Very few studies have looked at governance of integrated transport systems. Excep-
tions include studies focusing on the governance of integrated transport and land use, cited above, or inte-
grated transport policy; see, for example, Preston (2010). It seems that virtually no studies have looked at 
the governance of modal (transport) integration. 
In the same vein, apart from the ones mentioned below, very few studies have looked at the governance of 
ICT-supported (smart) mobility solutions. Exceptions include Dowling and Kent (2015), who did so to analyze 
11 Presented in part 2.3.1. 
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the development of carsharing in Sydney. According to them, the willingness and openness of public actors 
to converse with private transport providers can be understood as an important success factor for the de-
velopment of shared mobility. Similarly, Audouin and Neves (2017), Harding et al. (2016), and Edelman and 
Geradin (2015) have been interested in looking at how regulation could be used by public authorities to 
embrace ride-booking services in existing urban transportation systems. Docherty et al. (2017) looked at 
how governance structures would need to change in order for smart mobility solutions developed by the 
private sector to deliver as much public value as possible. They emphasized the need for public authorities to 
adopt long-term thinking in order to develop the right governance structures. Apart from those studies, 
there seems to be a profound research gap when it comes to the study of the governance of digital transpor-
tation systems, and in particular to the study of the governance of smart cards, IMPs and MaaS develop-
ment.  
One of the possible main reasons for the existing research gap could be the fact that governance literature is 
mainly static and adopts a rather top-down perspective. Indeed, while governance literature is interested in 
looking at the complex network of relationships between actors for the development and implementation of 
policies and for public service delivery, it seems to fail to look at bottom-up processes. Given the very low 
number of publications looking at the governance of new mobility modes, it seems the governance literature 
might need to be combined with another body of literature to fully understand the governance of new mo-
bility. 
Taking into account the environmental, social, and economic benefits they might bring, ICT-supported inte-
grated mobility schemes can well be seen as innovations. But the governance literature has been rather 
weak on looking at innovation development. While the above-mentioned literatures have been effective for 
examining the role of public actors in policy making or public service provision, they have barely looked at 
the impact of governance mechanisms on innovation development (Halvorsen et al., 2005). Exceptions in-
clude studies of the link between liberalization and innovation (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011), economic regula-
tion and innovation (Winston, 2000; Ross and Yan, 2015; Bauknecht, 2011; Stefanadis, 2003), as well as PSP 
and innovation (Beisheim et al., 2005). Otherwise, the governance literature has not paid a lot of attention 
to the processes supporting the birth of innovations.  
In order to tackle this research gap, there seems to be a need to combine the governance literature with 
another, yet to be defined, stream of literature. For that matter, the socio-technical transition literature 
might be a good candidate. Indeed, this literature is focused on the governance of transition of socio-
technical systems, and transport can be understood as a socio-technical system. Furthermore, there are two 
additional reasons why the transition literature might be a good fit. Firstly, the transition literature (also 
called governance of transition) brings a dynamic perspective to governance studies by looking at the gov-
ernance of socio-technical transitions. Secondly, the transition literature pays attention to bottom-up pro-
cesses; that is, to transitions that are the result of innovations. Thus, transition studies, that are presented 
in the following sub-chapter (2.4), might tackle the critiques of the governance literature that is overly static 
and top-down-oriented.  
2.4 Transition studies 
As mentioned above, transport can be understood as a socio-technical system that is constantly evolving 
(Auvinen and Tuominen, 2014). Therefore, by looking at the literature specifically focusing on transitions of 
socio-technical systems (more often referred to as the transition literature), one might find studies that have 
focused on similar topics to the one explored in the present thesis. The following subchapter is divided into 
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three sections. First, it seeks to review the transition literature and present the five main transition frame-
works that are used by transition scholars. Then, it reviews studies that have applied transition frameworks 
to transportation. Finally, it highlights the main shortcomings of the transition literature vis-à-vis this thesis’ 
research question.  
2.4.1 Transition frameworks 
The transition literature builds on evolutionary economics and science and technology studies. Scholars from 
that branch have been interested in looking at technological transitions (TT), or systems innovations; that is, 
“major technological transformations in the way societal functions such as transportation, communication, 
housing, feeding, are fulfilled” (Geels, 2002: 1257). Those societal functions are organized as socio-technical 
systems, which originates from the concept of large technical system (see Hughes, 1983). In a general sense, 
socio-technical systems are defined as consisting of “(networks of) actors (individuals, firms, and other or-
ganizations, collective actors) and institutions (societal and technical norms, regulations, standards of good 
practice), as well as material artifacts and knowledge” (Markard et al., 2012: 956). The concept builds on 
systems theory, which sees “systems as composed of autonomous yet interdependent parts that mutually 
interact as part of a purposeful whole” (Whitworth, 2009: 394). Ultimately, so-called transition scholars have 
been concerned with the study of the governance of transition; that is, with the governance structures that 
support the shift from one socio-technical system to another. In particular, most of the attention in transi-
tion research has been given to the transitions towards sustainable socio-technical systems, more commonly 
referred to as sustainability transitions (Ulli-Beer, 2013). According to Markard et al. (2012), four different 
frameworks, or approaches, have been developed in transition research to look at socio-technical transi-
tions. These are strategic niche management, transition management, technological innovation systems, and 
the multilevel perspective. The coherence framework is added to this list as it can also be used as a lens to 
study system innovations development. 
 Strategic Niche Management (SNM)
In broad terms, SNM is defined as “the creation, development and controlled break-down of test-beds for 
promising new technologies and concepts with the aim of learning about the desirability, and enhancing the 
rate of diffusion of the new technology” (Weber et al., 1999). It can be used either as a research model or a 
policy tool (Loorbach and Van Raak, 2006) for the management of technological innovations in their early 
days. Advocates of the SNM approach highlight the importance of creating technological niches for the incu-
bation of new technologies for sustainable development in order to enable, in a protected environment, the 
co-evolution of the technology with user practices and regulatory structures (Schot and Geels, 2008), and to 
then use the result of the experiments for policy making. Interactions between stakeholders happening in 
technological niches are described as happening in the context of a socio-technical regime (or under a meta-
production function), defined as “the whole complex of scientific knowledge, engineering practices, produc-
tion process technologies, product characteristics, skills and procedures, established user needs, regulatory 
requirements, institutions and infrastructures’’ (Hoogma et al., 2002: 19). The regime itself is known to be 
included in a “landscape” comprised of material and immaterial societal factors (van Eijck and Romijn, 2008). 
From the SNM perspective, technological innovations are known to go through a journey from technological 
niches to market niches, ultimately leading to a regime shift (Schot and Geels, 2008). Ultimately, the SNM 
approach can be understood as a bottom-up framework, focusing on the development of innovations in 
niches, and their progressive diffusion in the existing socio-technical regime in order to make it more sus-
tainable. It is ultimately described as a necessary strategy for public authorities to manage the transition 
process to more sustainable socio-technical regimes (Kemp et al., 1998).  
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 Transition Management (TM)
Transition management (TM) can also be used either as a research model or a policy tool (Loorbach and Van 
Raak, 2006). It is defined as a “form of process management against a set of goals set by society whose prob-
lem solving capabilities are mobilized and translated into a transition programme, which is legitimized 
through the political process” (Loorbach and van Raak, 2006: 5). TM implies the definition of interim objec-
tives based on a long-term vision shared by the actors involved in the process, sometimes referred to as 
“back-casting”. TM scholars have highlighted the usefulness of this incremental approach to ensure a socio-
technical transition is done “right”; that is, that it offers as much collective benefit as possible (Rotmans et 
al., 2001). In other words, TM aims to influence “the direction and speed of transitions by coordinating and 
enabling the processes that occur at different levels in a more systemic and evolutionary way” (Kemp and 
Loorbach 2006: 109). Particular importance in TM is given to the concept of transition arenas, defined as the 
institutional setting that offers an informal space to a small group of change-agents from diverse back-
grounds (businesses, government, research institutes, citizens), known to be visionaries or forerunners 
(Kemp and Loorbach, 2006; Roorda et al., 2012). TM is organized in a four-step process (Voß and Borne-
mann, 2011). The first step of the process deals with the creation of the transition arena. The second step 
refers to the development of the arena’s vision and transition agenda. During the third step, experiments 
and projects aimed at fostering how new technologies might be used in society are conducted in order to 
better understand the benefits and drawbacks of available options. In the last step, the three first steps are 
evaluated. Throughout the process, learning mechanisms are acknowledged to be of significant importance 
(Loorbach and van Raak, 2006).  
 Technological Innovation Systems (TIS)
The third transition framework, referred to as technological innovation systems (TIS), looks at the determi-
nants of technological innovations. This approach builds on the systems of innovation (SI) literature, which 
emerged in the 1980s as a new school of thought to look at the underlying processes that determine innova-
tion, rather than at their consequences. In broad terms, SI are defined as “all important economic, social, 
political, organizational and other factors that influence the development diffusion and use of innovations” 
(Edquist and Johnson, 1997: 14). The SI approach pays particular attention in its analysis to organizations 
(the players or the actors) and institutions (the rules of the game), and more specifically to the interactions 
between organizations, between institutions and organizations, and between institutions (Edquist, 2001). 
The SI approach has been developed at different levels. It was first developed at the national level with na-
tional systems of innovation (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993), before the development of regional systems of 
innovation (Doloreux, 2002; Iammarino, 2005) and sectoral systems of innovation (Malerba, 2002). Ultimate-
ly, the notion of technological innovation systems (TIS) emerged, which is known to differ from NSI, RSI, and 
SSI by the fact that instead of being bundled to a geographic region or a specific industry, they are defined 
around a particular technology or set of technologies (Carlsson, 2003). TIS builds on the concept of a techno-
logical system defined as “a dynamic network of agents interacting in a specific economic/industrial area 
under a particular institutional infrastructure and involved in the generation, diffusion, and utilization of 
technology” (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991: 94). Particular interest in TIS analysis is given to actors, net-
works, and institutions. The performance of a TIS – that is, its ability to support the emergence and diffusion 
of technological innovation – depends on seven so-called “abilities”; namely: the ability to develop and dif-
fuse knowledge, to incentivize actors to join it, to enhance entrepreneurial experimentation, to support 
market formation, to mobilize resource, to acquire legitimacy, and to develop positive externalities (Bergek 
et al., 2008). In the TIS literature, public authorities are known to be involved in knowledge exchange with 
companies during knowledge diffusion processes, in the development of niches through procurement poli-
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cies for market formation, and ultimately in the creation of regulatory frameworks for the new technology in 
order to support new business models (Planko et al., 2017). 
 Multilevel Perspective (MLP)
The fourth transition framework, is the multi-level perspective (MLP), which aims to provide an analytical 
tool to the study of socio-technical transitions. Under the MLP perspective, which builds on SNM, socio-
technical transitions are thought to occur through an interplay of three key layers (Geels, 2002). At the bot-
tom lies the niche level, in which radical (often technological) innovations are created, and where socio-
technical transition processes are known to start. Those niches, which represent the micro-level of the 
framework, are protected from normal market selection processes and act as technological innovations 
incubation rooms (Schot, 1998). Three processes are acknowledged to be determinant in the success of 
niches: the alignment of actors’ expectations, network formation, and learning processes (Schot and Geels, 
2008). In the middle lies the socio-technical regime level, in which organizations (actors) interact under a set 
of rules (institutions). Several regimes interact in this layer, also called patchwork of regimes, where incre-
mental innovations usually emerge (Geels, 2002). The top level is the socio-technical landscape level, which 
includes the environment, and its related variables, that might impact the regime and the niches. Technolog-
ical trajectories, defined as “the pattern of ‘normal’ problem solving activity (i.e. of ‘progress’) on the ground 
of a technological paradigm” (Dosi, 1982: 152), are also known to be embedded in the landscape layer. Ac-
cording to Geels (2002), landscapes change much slower than regimes. Those three key layers are organized 
under a certain hierarchy. But this hierarchy is not static and might actually be perceived as heterarchy. Ac-
cording to Peter and Swilling (2014), heterarchies are flexible “flat” hierarchies that accommodate hierar-
chical shifts, such as a niche becoming part of a regime or hierarchical changes within one of the three con-
ceptual levels. The main difference between the MLP and SNM approaches is that, for the latter, the success 
of a technological innovation depends not only on processes within its technological niche, but also on the 
alignment of processes within the niche, regime, and landscape layers, and the related presence or absence 
of a “window of opportunity”. 
 Coherence/Alignment framework
The last framework reviewed here is entitled coherence framework, which aims to evaluate the perfor-
mance of network industries (such as transportation) as a function of the alignment between technology and 
institutions (Finger et al., 2015). The framework acknowledges that infrastructure systems are “co-evolving” 
as a result of evolution in technologies on one hand and institutions on the other (Finger et al., 2010). In 
particular, while the theory stipulates that technologies evolve from a centralized to decentralized state, 
institutions are acknowledged to evolve from “government to governance”. For the proponents of that 
framework, innovations are known to occur as a result of the misalignment of technology and institutions 
(Crettenand and Finger, 2013). Thus, technological innovations might emerge as a result of institutional 
changes and, similarly, institutional innovations might emerge in reaction to technological changes. Three 
kinds of actors are defined under this approach (Finger et al., 2010). First, there are institutional actors, ca-
pable of defining institutional conditions that will influence the behaviors of other actors. Second are tech-
nological actors, which are able to foster technological innovations. Finally, there are market actors that 
emerge as the institutional context evolves towards a governance state. For Finger et al. (2010), the combi-
nation of all the above-mentioned actors ultimately creates the dynamics that lead to technological or insti-
tutional changes.  
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Due to the multiplicity of transition frameworks and their related focuses, various attempts have been made 
to compare the different approaches; see, for example, Coenen and Diaz-Lopez (2010) or Ulli-Beer (2013). 
While the MLP and TM seem to have a broader perspective on socio-technical regime shift, TIS and SNM are 
more concerned with what is happening at a more micro level (niches), or around a specific technological 
innovation. Attempts have also been conducted to link the existing different conceptual frameworks. For 
example, Geels (2004) has tried to do this for SSI and MLP. Markard and Truffer (2008) proposed a frame-
work linking TIS with MLP. Schot and Geels (2008) highlighted the usefulness of the MLP to complement the 
SNM approach. Hekkert et al. (2007) proposed a representation of how the different systems of innovation 
relate to one another. Weber and Rohracher (2012) highlighted the need to incorporate transition studies 
insights into policy frameworks that rely heavily on innovation systems approaches, to be better suited to 
deal with long-term societal challenges. Last but not least, Bauwens (2015) combined the coherence frame-
work with the MLP perspective. Although the MLP framework has not been the oldest transition framework 
in use, it is currently the most widely used one for looking at sustainability transitions. As described below, 
transition frameworks have been used extensively to look at the transition towards a sustainable socio-
technical transport system. 
2.4.2 Application to transport studies : the mobility transition 
While transition frameworks have been used in energy studies to examine the transition from the current 
fossil-based energy system to renewable energy systems (usually referred to as energy transition), they have 
also been used a lot in transportation studies,12 which has paved the way for a considerable amount of em-
pirical research. Mobility transition has been defined within the field of sustainability transition as potential-
ly the hardest case because of the “many stabilizing mechanisms and secular trends that point in the direc-
tion of more, not less, mobility” (Geels et al., 2012: xiii).  
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, transportation is a socio-technical system that is currently orga-
nized under the automobility regime, synonymous with single-occupant fossil-fuel powered private cars, 
supported by a range of institutions and infrastructures, dominating space, and responsible for massive envi-
ronmental resource consumption (Sheller and Urry, 2000). Conscious of the need to break away from the 
(unsustainable) automobility regime, research has been conducted to look at how to enhance the transition 
from the automobility regime towards a “post-car” regime. In other words, research has been undertaken to 
look at the development and diffusion of system innovations in the transport sector, defined as “novel forms 
of providing transport services that are innovative in terms of technology, organisation and user behaviour, 
and require both new components and system architecture” (Weber et al., 2014: 540). For that matter, sus-
tainability transition scholars have been using transition frameworks to understand the dynamics of the so-
called “mobility transition”. Many academics have highlighted the break away from automobiles as the ma-
jor challenge in moving towards sustainable transport systems. As detailled below, research has been con-
ducted to look at the mobility transition as a whole, but also to look at the development of particular com-
ponents of the mobility transition such as alternative propulsion engines, alternative fuels, dedicated sus-
tainable mobility solutions, and finally non-technological innovations. 
Some studies have examined mobility transitions in general. For example, Geels (2005) used the MLP to look 
at the transition from horse-drawn carriages to automobiles in the USA. For Geels, the success of internal 
combustion engine automobiles in evolving from technological niches to market niches and finally to re-
gimes (unlike electric or steam-powered cars) can be understood as the result of changes at the landscape 
12
The link between transition frameworks and transportation studies is actually stronger. It is acknowledged that some transition frameworks 
have actually been developed to look at transport. For example, according to Ieromonachou (2004: 78) “Strategic Niche Management has 
been developed in the context of transport technology projects”.
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level (inclusion of entertainment, excitement, and fun values in popular culture), and the development and 
competition with the electric tramway regimes. Research was later undertaken to look at the on-going tran-
sition towards low-carbon transport systems. Using MLP, Geels (2012) investigated the mobility transition in 
UK and the Netherlands and concluded that although the automobility regime is still dominant, some tech-
nological niches (green propulsion technologies and ITS) are gaining momentum, which might lead to a shift 
towards a low-carbon regime. According to Wells and Nieuwenhuis (2012), the stability of the automobility 
regime is heavily dependent upon car manufacturers. Looking at the UK and Sweden, and using MLP, Nykvist 
and Whitmarsh (2008) showed the importance of hybridisation mechanisms between areas of innovation to 
generate a regime shift. According to Moradi and Vagnoni (2018), a shift from the current regime might be 
possible if non-dominant sub-regimes (public transport and human powered transport sub-regimes) reach a 
stable state, which might be possible if they gain more support from regime actors.  
Although most of the research on the whole mobility transition has been conducted with the MLP, some 
scholars have also used transition management. Looking at policy development for sustainable transport 
through the lens of the transition management framework, Kemp et al. (2011) criticized Dutch authorities 
for being overly focused on short-term technological fixes and not developing a coherent future vision for 
transport, thus raising serious doubts about their ability to steer the mobility transition. Some scholars have 
also been interested in using transition frameworks to propose scenarios of evolution for mobility. In their 
book entitled Automobility in Transition? A Socio technical analysis of sustainable transport, Geels et al. 
(2012) presented the automobility regime as relatively stable but not as strong as it used to be. From the 
three scenarios they highlighted for the future of transportation, the one proposing the greening of cars (but 
not a redefinition of the role of the car) is presented as the most likely to happen. The scenario entitled In-
termodal urban transport (relying on the development of intermodal journeys) is presented as less likely 
because of its higher dependence on government willingness to support it. Köhler et al. (2009) developed a 
simulation model, building on system dynamics and agent-based modelling, and using MLP as a theoretical 
framework, to assess transitions to sustainable mobility. Using UK data, the authors foresaw a shift towards 
ICE and hybrid vehicles in the next 10 to 30 years, and finally a dominance of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles after 
2030. According to them, the product-service shift (shift from ownership to usership) is unlikely to happen, 
indicating that the demise of the private car might take a very long time to happen. Marletto (2014) sug-
gested the use of a socio-technical map to propose transition pathway for mobility. For the author, three 
pathways exist: the AUTO-city (individual cars are still dominant, but are getting more electric), the ECO-city 
(increased reliance on non-car modes of transport), and the ELECTRI-city (new electric vehicles and smart 
grids). However, it is likely that the former will prevail if no clear-cut policies are developed in favour of the 
second one. Schwannen (2015) looked at the development of low-energy mobility modes in Oxford and 
Brighton. He concluded that although such solutions are being developed in both cities, they are not (yet) 
producing a regime shift due to their categorization as incremental (and not radical) innovations. 
Given the importance of the fuel system in the automobility regime (Urry, 2008), studies have sought to 
understand how to enhance the transition towards non-fossil fuel system. Suurs and Hekkert (2009) used a 
TIS approach to look at the dynamics of the biofuels innovation system in the Netherlands. They concluded 
that the Dutch biofuels innovation system has not been successful mainly because most of the TIS functions 
were not fulfilled. Looking at the development of alternative transport fuels in Sweden and also using a TIS 
approach, Hillman and Sanden (2008) concluded that in order to be effective, policies must take into account 
and somehow balance all the dynamic forces within the TIS. Using a SNM approach, Ulmanen et al. (2009) 
concluded that Sweden developed biofuels more successfully than the Netherlands mainly due to a better 
niche management strategy, protection measures (tax reduction), as well as the institutionalization of a pro-
biofuel discourse.  
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As ICE cars lie at the heart of the automobility regime, research has been conducted to look at the develop-
ment and diffusion of non-ICE cars. For example, Schot et al. (1994), using SNM and looking at the Nether-
lands and California, proposed three strategies for the development and diffusion of Electric Vehicles. Ac-
cording to the authors, experiments in Niches and technology nexus development might help prevent the 
drawbacks of a technology forcing strategy. Looking at Europe and using MLP, Berkeley et al. (2017) stated 
that although EV development has been pushed by a landscape influenced by environmental and energy 
security pressures, their wider take up was actually dependent on the development of dedicated policies by 
governments. Using MLP, Ryghaugh and Skjølsvold (2018) showed that the on-going successful transition 
towards electric mobility in Norway was actually the result of incentives introduced to nurture what many 
hoped would be the next Norwegian industrial adventure and not, at that time, to stimulate mass market 
demand. Looking at Sweden, Nilsson et al. (2012) showed that different patterns of governance, which could 
be motivated by the position of the technology within or outside the socio-technical regime, led to different 
sustainable transport innovation development. For example, according to those authors, international levels 
and market-based governance are more likely to support the development of biofuels, whereas the devel-
opment of hybrid vehicles is more likely to be supported by industry-led and cognitive governance. Using an 
MLP-based approach, Van Bree et al. (2010) derived different scenarios for the replacement of ICE by bat-
tery electric vehicles (BEV) or fuel-cell vehicles (FCV), from two different transition seeds, being either the 
increase of environmental stresses, or the increase in (conventional) fuel prices. Looking at the evolution of 
electric mobility from a socio-technical transition perspective, Dijk et al. (2013) concluded that electric vehi-
cles have crossed a threshold in 2005 and that their share in personal mobility is very likely to increase in the 
coming years. Along with high oil prices and stronger carbon constraints, Dijk et al. presented the develop-
ment of mobility operators and car sharing as factors that have supported the growth of electric mobility in 
the past and will potentially continue to do so in the future. Focusing on Stockholm, Nykvist and Nilsson 
(2015) used the MLP to analyze why EVs, despite a favorable environment, did not take off. They concluded 
that EVs could not develop mainly because of the lack of niche experiments, which was caused by the behav-
ior of certain regime actors, such as the Swedish automotive industry, who supported the development of 
hybrids over EVs, and of public authorities being supportive of ethanol and not EVs. 
Transition frameworks were also used to look at the development of human-powered mobility solutions as 
part of transition towards sustainable mobility systems. For example, as the bicycle has been presented as 
“intermediate technology, between the horse and car” (Genus and Coles, 2008: 1440), research has been 
conducted to look at its impact on the evolution of transportation. Using MLP, de Boer and Caprotti (2017) 
showed that while cycling was fully integrated in the transport regime in Amsterdam, it was still lying at the 
niche level in London. The authors argued that to make cycling part of London’s socio-technical transport 
regime, effective policy-making and successful advocacy were to be developed at the regime level, and the 
niche needed to open up to a wider demographic. Using MLP and focusing on Johannesburg, Morgan (2017) 
showed that the materialization of a bicycle culture never happened, because no windows of opportunity 
were created during the process of development of dedicated bike lanes. Birtchnell et al. (2017) also used 
MLP to explain how the development of electric scooters in Australia was inhibited by the incumbent auto-
mobility regime, and how electric scooters, in the socio-technical transition jargon, could contribute to the 
process of niche development. Research using transition frameworks was also carried out to understand the 
process of development of dedicated sustainable transport solutions. For example, using the MLP frame-
work, Tuama (2015) showed that the success of the public bike-sharing scheme in Dublin could be seen as 
the result of successive positive feedback loops having happened in the regime layer. Hynes (2016) used the 
MLP to show that the failure of telework to take off and become more than a niche in Ireland was due to 
several factors. Among them, he listed the inability to enroll additional actors in the telework niche, and the 
resistance of the incumbent regimes, being the traditional work regime and automobility, as well as the 
absence of policies from regime actors supporting the development of telework. Some more recent MLP-
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based works have examined the development of new innovative mobility solutions. For example, Reichen-
bach and Puhe (2017) used MLP to analyze the take-off of ropeways as a new travel mode in Germany and 
came to the conclusion that their development was mainly hindered by routines part of the incumbent pub-
lic transport regime. Other studies have also investigated the development of car-pooling (Pekarskaya, 
2015), car-sharing (Bloome, 2016; Noll, 2017), or even automated vehicles (Clark et al., 2016; Fraedrich et 
al., 2015). 
Although developed to look at technological innovations development, SNM has also been used to look at 
non-technological innovation development. One of its uses has been to investigate transport policy devel-
opment. For example, Ieromonachou et al. (2004) used SNM to look at the development of travel demand 
management policy. Coming up with the concept of strategic policy niche management (SPNM), they argued 
that introducing policies and supporting technologies simultaneously might pave the way for a regime shift 
towards more sustainable transport system. In a similar fashion, Shove and Walker (2010) used transition 
frameworks to look at the successful implementation of the congestion charge in London. 
2.4.3 Critiques and research gap 
As seen above, transition frameworks have been widely used in transportation studies to look at the devel-
opment of technological innovations and their impact on the transition towards sustainable transport sys-
tems. From the above review of the literature on socio-technical transitions, it appears that most of the 
research making use of transition frameworks in transportation studies has indeed investigated the overall 
mobility transition, or the paths of development of specific technological innovations (non-ICE vehicles, al-
ternative fuels). To date, very little research has used transition frameworks to look at the development of 
the intermodality regime. In the few studies that have done so, intermodality is described as being a “niche 
caught between two regimes”, where no organizations (yet) assumes responsibility for seamless door-to-
door travel (Parkhurst et al., 2012; Kemp et al., 2011). Similarly, almost no research has examined the devel-
opment of ICT-supported mobility schemes. Exceptions include Audouin and Finger (2019b), who used a 
framework combining the coherence framework and the system of innovation approach to look at the de-
velopment of smart ticketing schemes in London, and Smith et al. (2018a), who looked at the governance of 
MaaS using transition management and the MLP.  
Therefore, it seems there is an urgent need for more empirical research into the development of technologi-
cal innovations aimed at intermodality, such as ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. The following 
sub-chapter (2.5) sums up the existing lack of research vis-à-vis this thesis’ research question in the three 
above-reviewed bodies of literature, before finally presenting how the present research endeavor might 
contribute to each of those streams of literature. 
 
2.5 Conclusion and summary of potential contributions 
This chapter has highlighted that this thesis’s research question has so far been under-researched in three 
bodies of literature: transport integration, transport governance, and mobility transition. Below, I explain 
how I believe that the present thesis can contribute to those three bodies of literature.  
As explained earlier, most of the research conducted on transport integration has been concerned with the 
understanding of the impact of transport integration on existing transport systems, in economic, social, or 
environmental terms. However, very little research has been conducted to understand the processes leading 
to the development of integrated transport schemes, and even less has sought to understand the role that 
public authorities played in it. Given that this thesis specifically aims at examining the processes of develop-
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ment of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, I believe it will empirically contribute to the literature 
on transport integration/Mobility-as-a-Service. 
Similarly, it appears there is an extensive body of literature focusing on transport governance. Unfortunate-
ly, most of this literature has focused on analyzing the impact of some governance mechanisms on transpor-
tation systems performance. A smaller body of literature, within the transport governance literature, has 
been interested in looking at transport governance from a political perspective; that is, the role of different 
stakeholders in the development of transport projects or transport policy. However, it appeared that no 
studies focused on the governance of transport integration. More importantly, very few studies have inves-
tigated the governance structures that have supported the birth of ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes, and even fewer have been concerned with looking particularly at the role of public authorities in 
the process of development of smart cards, IMP and MaaS. Thus, again, I believe the present study should 
contribute to the growing literature focusing on the politics of transport governance.  
Last but not least, it seems the literature focusing on the mobility transition; that is, with understanding how 
some technological innovations might enhance the transition towards a more sustainable transport system, 
is important. However, most of this research has focused either on the overall mobility transition or on the 
development of some specific technologies, such as non-ICE engines, alternative fuels, non-car mobility solu-
tions, or shared mobility modes. It appears that almost no research within the field of transition studies has 
concentrated on intermodal transport or on the development of technologies supporting transport integra-
tion. Thus, I believe that by answering my research question, I might also be able to bridge this existing gap 
and contribute to the literature on socio-technical transitions. 
It is pertinent now to ask how I aim to do this, which I will explain in detail in the following methodology 
chapter (chapter 3). 

Methodology 
In this chapter, I present the research strategy I have been using in this doctoral dissertation and 
provide some justifications about the methodological choices made to answer my original research question. 
I begin by presenting the epistemologies/ontologies under which I set myself, as well as the theoretical per-
spective I have adopted in this research project, and explain why I have taken such a position. I then present 
the research methodology that I have been using in this dissertation. In the third part, I justify my decision to 
adopt a case study approach as research strategy, before going into more detail regarding the case selection, 
data gathering and data analysis and case analysis processes. The fourth part explains my understanding of 
my role as researcher in this research project and how I have addressed ethical issues in this thesis. The fifth 
part explains how I have tried to ensure research quality, before the sixth and final part sums up the overall 
research design of the thesis. 
3.1 Epistemology, ontology and theoretical perspective 
According to Crotty (1998), the design of a research project actually depends on the researcher’s 
worldview. More specifically, it depends on the researcher’s epistemological and ontological positions, 
which influence the choice of methodology; this, in turn, has an impact on the research methods chosen to 
conduct the research project. Thus, this chapter starts by presenting my epistemological/ontological stanc-
es, before detailing the theoretical perspective that was adopted for this research project.  
Epistemology is know as “the nature of the relationship between the knower or would-be knower and what 
can be known” (Guba and Lincoln, 1998: 108). In other words, epistemology is concerned with how 
knowledge is acquired. According to Crotty (1998), there are three main epistemological positions a re-
searcher can adopt: an objectivist, subjectivist and constructionist one. Under the first approach (objectivist 
epistemological position), the researcher believes that knowledge exists “out there”, under the form of a 
single and objective truth, independent from human consciousness, and that it is his/her role to discover it. 
Under the subjectivist epistemological position, the scientist believes that the meaning of objects does not 
emanate from objects themselves, but only from the researcher’s own understanding. Under the construc-
tionist perspective, knowledge is believed not to be discovered (as in objectivism) but constructed as a re-
sult of the interaction between the researcher and the object. The truth, which is not thought of as being an 
“objective truth”, actually depends on the engagement of the researcher and his/her world realities. In my 
case, I believe that our understanding of the reality is constructed through human interaction and depends 
on the different contexts in which the research is undertaken. For example there is no single and universal 
understanding of people’s mobility. People might move for various reasons that are affected by societies, 
social milieus, and the researcher’s point of view. Similarly, there is no single understanding of what public 
authorities should be doing vis-à-vis transport digitalization. It might depend on the context we look at, the 
time period and many other factors. In the present research project, I set myself under the constructionist 
epistemological position.  
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Contrary to Crotty, many researchers emphasize the need to clearly differentiate ontology from epistemol-
ogy. According to Gray (2009), while epistemology can be seen as focusing on the question of what it 
means to know (the nature of knowledge), ontology can be viewed as concerned with understanding what 
things are (the nature of existence). While there are multiple ontological positions, they are acknowledged 
to be organized on a continuum ranging from a realist to a relativist pole (Moon and Blackman, 2014). 
While the realists stipulates that only one reality exists, relativists believe that reality is constructed within 
the human mind, and that reality is therefore relative to each individual experiencing it. Perhaps due to my 
background education in science and engineering, I consider myself closer to the realists than the relativist 
pole. To sum up, I believe there is a single reality out there (realist) but that knowledge about it is con-
structed through human interaction (constructivist) and is not only “discovered”. According to Crotty 
(1998), adopting a realist ontology and a constructivist epistemology turns out to be quite compatible. 
There are various theoretical perspectives that the researcher can adopt, which have developed through 
time. Reviewing all the existing theoretical perspectives would go beyond the scope of this chapter, so only 
the most widespread theoretical perspectives, which can be categorized in five broad categories (Moon and 
Blackman, 2014), are presented. The first category of theoretical perspectives is concerned with undertaking 
research in order to predict things. It has been historically dominated by the theoretical perspective known 
as positivism, which builds on an objectivist epistemology and realist ontology. From that perspective, re-
searchers think that the human and natural worlds are operated within a strict set of rules, which they must 
discover through empirical enquiry and through observations (Gray, 2009). Other theoretical perspectives 
that fall into this first category are post-positivism and structuralism. The second category of theoretical 
perspectives is concerned with understanding things. It is dominated by the interpretivism perspective 
(sometimes referred to as antipositivism), which lays on a constructionist epistemology. Within this category 
are comprised several theoretical perspectives, known as hermeneutics, phenomenology, and symbolic in-
teractionism. From the interpretivism perspective, researchers believe that interpretations of reality should 
be made from culture and history. In more detail, interpretivists see “the world as too complex to be reduced 
to a set of observable laws” and believe that “generalizability is less important than understanding the real 
workings behind reality” (Gray, 2009: 33). The third category of theoretical perspectives, which is concerned 
in criticizing and changing things, falls under the umbrella of critical theory (sometimes referred to as partic-
ipatory perspective). Under that perspective, researchers usually select their theoretical framework out of 
an ideology of which they become advocates. Critical theory encompasses theoretical perspectives such as 
feminism or queer theory. The fourth category of theoretical perspectives basically aims to deconstruct reali-
ty as it is known; for example, by using discourse analysis. The last theoretical perspective is known as prag-
matism and does not give as much importance to ontology and epistemology as the other theoretical per-
spectives (Wahyuni, 2012). Specifically, pragmatism is concerned “with applications and solutions to a prob-
lem. Instead of focusing on methods, researchers emphasize the research problem and use all approaches 
available to understand the problem” (Creswell, 2009: 10). In other words, this last theoretical perspective 
seems to be more concerned with solving real-life problems than anything else. 
I proceed by deduction to explain my choice of theoretical perspective. As explained in the introduction, this 
thesis did not aim to make any predictions. Nor did it aim to forecast the role that public authorities will play 
in the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes in the future. While this might help public 
authorities to change their future behavior, I did not aim to predict that behavior. Therefore, the positivist 
perspective could be removed from my options. Also, given that I had adopted a rather constructionist epis-
temology, adopting a positivist perspective could not be a good match, as it lays on an objectivist epistemol-
ogy. Similarly, the present research did not aim to change how things are or to empower a particular subject 
or group of subjects. Therefore, the critical theory perspective could also be removed from my available 
options. Last but not least, this research project did not aim to deconstruct a specific reality. ICT-supported 
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integrated mobility schemes are just coming to life, so one might say that there is nothing to deconstruct as 
things are only being constructed. Thus, it seems I only had the choice between the pragmatic and interpre-
tative theoretical perspectives for the present research project. However, although I was interested in solv-
ing an issue (potentially inappropriate behavior of public authorities in the development of ICT-supported 
integrated mobility schemes), I was more interested in understanding a particular phenomenon (the role of 
public authorities in the development of those schemes). Therefore, it seemed natural to go for the interpre-
tivism perspective rather than the pragmatic one. By paying particular attention to “contexts (…) in order to 
understand the historical and cultural settings” (Creswell, 2009: 8) of the phenomenon, interpretivism 
seemed to be more appropriate for the present research project. Furthermore, the choice of the interpre-
tivism approach was also a good match to my ontologies (realist) and epistemologies (constructionist). To 
conclude, the interpretivism perspective seemed to be the best fit to answer this thesis’ research question. 
3.2 Research methodology and research method 
I must now detail the selection of methodology before presenting the research strategy that was adopted in 
this thesis. According to Gray (2009), the choice of research methodology actually depends on the research-
er’s epistemology, ontology, and theoretical perspective. Many research methodologies exist, but reviewing 
them all will again go beyond the scope of this chapter. In particular, it would not be interesting to look at 
research methodologies associated with theoretical perspectives, ontologies, and epistemologies that have 
not been chosen, such as econometric studies, usually used by positivist researchers. Given the nature of the 
present research inquiry, I have adopted a qualitative methodology. Within qualitative methodologies, I did 
not choose action research as being mainly used by pragmatism and critical theory researchers, and not 
fitting this thesis’ research question. From the remaining qualitative research methodologies, I decided to 
set myself under the phenomenological research tradition, for its ability to generate “thick descriptions” of 
phenomena (Gray, 2009). According to Husserl (1970), who is considered by many to be the father of the 
phenomenological tradition, phenomenology aims to describe rather than explain, and usually starts free of 
hypothesis or preconceptions. 
The main research methods used (to gather data) were document analysis and interviews. Documentation 
evidence is described as being relatively stable, unobtrusive, accurate, and as being broad in its coverage, 
while interview data are described as being targeted and insightful (Yin, 2009). Depending on what the re-
searcher aims to retrieve from the interview, researchers can choose between different ways of interviewing 
(Gray, 2009). A first type is referred to as structured interview, where the researcher basically asks pre-
established questions to the respondents and does not allow for important variations, or follow-up ques-
tions. A second type of interviews is so-called semi-structured interviews. Under that scheme, the researcher 
usually prepares a pre-established list of questions, defining the main topics to be examined, but is also 
ready to ask follow-up questions in order to pursue an idea or dig deeper into one of the answers of the 
interviewee. One of the advantages of semi-structured interviews pertains to its flexibility, and its ability to 
explore areas during the interview that have not been thought of in the interview preparation phase. Falling 
under semi-structured interviews are so-called focused interviews (Merton et al., 1990), the main aim of 
which is simply to verify certain facts that have been established by the researcher beforehand. In that set-
ting, the researcher usually appears “genuinely naïve about the topic and allow the interviewee to provide a 
fresh commentary about it” (Yin, 2009: 107). The third and final type of interviews is defined as unstructured 
interviews (sometimes called non-directive interviews), where the researcher usually has an open conversa-
tion with the respondent that is not supposed to reflect on any preconceived theories. As the main reason 
for using interviews was to find missing information, and corroborate facts, I opted for semi-structured in-
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terviews. Having now detailed my choices of epistemological and ontological positions, as well as the theo-
retical perspective, research methodology and research methods adopted, I now detail the research strategy 
that has been used, which was the case study research strategy. An overall representation of my methodo-
logical stream is represented in Figure 3.2.1. 
Figure 3.2-1: Research stream employed in this thesis (inspired from Moon and Blackman [2014] and Gray [2009)]  
3.3 Research strategy 
Here is presented the overall research strategy adopted for the present research project, which was a case 
study research strategy. The case study approach should indeed not be considered as research method, nor 
research methodology, but rather as a research strategy (Yin, 1981) or research approach (Chadderton and 
Torrance, 2005). In this sub-chapter, I explain why I have chosen this particular research strategy, before 
going into more details and explaining my case design, case selection, data gathering, and data analysis pro-
cesses. 
3.3.1 The case study as a research strategy 
A case study strategy was used, because of its usefulness to look at complex processes, and its suitability to 
look at phenomenon that cannot be clearly separated from their contexts (Yin, 2009). In particular, the case 
study approach was adopted because of its practicality to obtain a holistic understanding of a particular 
phenomenon (Gummesson, 1991). According to Meredith (1998), there are three valuable outputs of select-
ing a case study approach. First, it allows the researcher to study a particular phenomenon in depth, in its 
natural setting and context, and to generate theory from its understanding. Second, it allows the researcher 
to answer why-, what-, and how-types of research questions. Last but not least, it makes it possible to con-
duct investigations where the dependent and independent variables are still not known, and where there is 
very limited knowledge about the phenomenon studied. Yin (2014) added that selecting a case study ap-
proach is relevant when the researcher has no control over the behavioral elements and events studied, and 
that the phenomenon being looked at is contemporary and happening in a real-life context. 
All the above-mentioned criterions led me to choose the case study as research strategy to conduct the pre-
sent study. First, it appeared clear that I did not have any control over the behavior that public authorities 
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adopted in the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. Second, the development of ICT-
supported integrated mobility schemes is happening now and can thus be classified as a contemporary phe-
nomenon happening in a real-life context. Third, the phenomenon of interest and the context were hard to 
dissociate in the present study. It seemed almost impossible to separate the behavior of public authorities in 
the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes (phenomenon of interest) from the context 
of the study (political and economic context, transport digitalization trend). Fourth, I had formulated my 
research question as a how-research question, for which case studies are a relevant research strategy to 
adopt. Finally, transport digitalization is just beginning. There is really not a lot of research focusing on this 
issue, and even less focusing on the governance of transport digitalization. As seen in the literature review 
(Chapter 2), the novelty of the phenomenon meant that there is very limited evidence about the role that 
public authorities are playing in transport digitalization. Hence, one might not even be sure what to consider 
as dependent or independent variables. Therefore, the case study approach again seemed to be the best 
research strategy to answer this thesis’ research question. 
One might be tempted to ask why other research strategies would not have matched the present research 
project. To answer this question, the classification established by Yin (1984) to determine the type of re-
search to endorse for a research project is used. It would have made no sense to go for an experiment re-
search strategy, as that requires having control over behavioral events. Similarly, adopting an archival analy-
sis or history research strategy would not have been useful given the contemporary characteristic of the 
phenomenon studied. There were some question marks about adopting a survey research strategy, but giv-
en the importance of the context in the present study, and the fact that interviews appeared to be a most 
efficient way to collect in-depth data, I ultimately opted for the case study research strategy. 
It is worth emphasizing that the case study strategy is a well-used approach in the three streams of literature 
where this thesis aims to contribute. Given that the transportation sector is deeply linked with its environ-
ment (political, social, economic, geographical), it is not always easy to clearly separate between the phe-
nomenon of interest and its overall context. Therefore, transport research has an existing history of using 
case studies as research strategy. In the transport governance literature, the case study strategy has also 
been used, for example, to look at citizen participation in transport policy development (Gil et al., 2011), or 
at the diffusion of new mobility modes in particular contexts (Shaheen et al., 2010). Finally, it is perhaps in 
the transition literature that the case study has been used most. It has been widely used to gain knowledge 
about the complexities of how transport-related system innovations develop (see, for example, Geels, 2005). 
Thus, my decision to opt for the case study strategy, while not highly innovative, is in line with the research 
strategies employed in the three above-mentioned literatures. 
3.3.2 Case design 
Different types of case studies exist, and one might wonder which one was used for the present study. Yin 
(1984) differentiated between three types of case study. First, researchers might decide to undertake ex-
ploratory case studies if the purpose is to better understand a new phenomenon and generate new theories 
(Baskarada, 2014). In particular, exploratory cases are used when existing theories are not able to provide a 
satisfactory explanation of a particular phenomenon. Secondly, researchers might decide to undertake ex-
planatory case studies. Under that approach, the main goal is to explain a particular phenomenon, and more 
particularly to highlight a causal relationship that it might not be possible to emphasize with other research 
strategies. Explanatory case studies are used to test pre-established theories; that is, for theory testing 
(Baskarada, 2014). Finally, researchers might decide to undertake descriptive case studies if their goal is to 
portray a precise phenomenon, describe a sequence of events, and emphasize the underlying mechanisms 
of the studied phenomenon. Given that the aim of this study was not to test theory, doing explanatory case 
studies did not seem to be the right approach to adopt. As exploratory research is usually employed in order 
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to generate propositions (and in certain cases theories) to be tested at a later stage, I also thought it would 
not be the best approach to answer this thesis’ research question. Consequently, it appeared the present 
study should instead fall under the descriptive approach, as I knew from the beginning that I was interested 
in studying the role of public authorities in the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, 
and not explaining in great detail the reason for their behaviors. Hence, by deduction a descriptive case 
study approach was selected. 
Having explained the type of case study selected, it is now important to present the choice of case study 
design. Different case study designs have been proposed by Yin (2003). In total, there are four possible de-
signs, depending on what is being analyzed (number of units of analysis), and to what extent (number of 
cases undertaken by the researcher). The design is defined as holistic when there is a single unit of analysis, 
and embedded when there are several. Respectively, the design is defined as multiple when several cases 
are investigated and single when the investigation is only focused on one case. Consequently, four case 
study designs are available to researchers (Gray, 2009). The first is the single embedded case design, where 
only one case is investigated but through different units of analysis. The second one is the single holistic case 
design, where only one case is investigated in a holistic manner, which is mainly used in theory testing. The 
third is the multiple embedded design, where the same different units are analyzed across different cases. 
The final one is referred to as the multiple holistic case design, where multiple cases are analyzed in their 
whole, in order to replicate the findings from one case to another and potentially generalize to a theory. A 
summary of the different case study design available to researchers is given in Figure 3.3.1. 
In the present research project, I was interested in understanding the role of public authorities in the overall 
process of development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. I was not interested in looking at the 
different perspectives existing (such as from private, citizens, or public sector) about the role that public 
authorities should play from different perspectives, and thus had no reason to have different units of analy-
sis; that is, opt for an embedded case design. What was of interest for me was the case in its entire form, 
which is why I selected a holistic design. Then, given that I wanted to reach some degree of generalizability, I 
felt it was important to compare the findings from different cases, and thus opted for multiple cases. Look-
ing at multiple cases was indeed important for me, as the way transportation activities are organized is high-
ly dependent on the surrounding context. Looking at just one case would not have allowed me to generalize 
and develop propositions and recommendations. Thus, the case study design adopted can be resumed as 
multiple holistic, or as collective case design (Stake, 1995). 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994: 25), in a holistic design, the case actually is “the unit of analysis”. 
Therefore, since my cases depict the processes of development of ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes in different contexts, I believe the unit of analysis in each case is the process of development of ICT-
supported integrated mobility schemes. Given that technological development processes (for the develop-
ment of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes) ultimately rely on actors (Geels, 2005), particular atten-
tion was given, to the different actors involved, their actions and interactions with one another.  
Stake (1995) provides another categorization for case studies that might be relevant to mention. According 
to him, a researcher can decide to conduct either intrinsic or instrumental cases. The choice to undertake 
intrinsic case is basically driven by the desire to learn about this specific case, and not by the desire to use 
the case to answer a research question. On the contrary, the choice to undertake instrumental cases is driv-
en by the belief that this case will provide the researcher with elements that might potentially enable 
him/her to answer a previously established research question. Although the three cases were selected be-
cause of their uniqueness (there are not that many other cases of ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes development), the motivation to select them was rooted in a greater desire to gain understanding 
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about a particular problem; that is, about the role that public authorities play in their development. Thus, 
the three case studies presented in this thesis should be categorized as instrumental rather than intrinsic.  
Figure 3.3-1: Types of case-study design (adapted from Gray [2009]) 
3.3.3 Case selection 
While quantitative approaches usually rely on the high number of cases, selected randomly to allow general-
ization to a larger population, case selection in qualitative research requires more attention. Due to the low 
number of cases investigated in qualitative inquiries, cases need to be selected “purposefully” (Patton, 2002: 
230), in order to reduce selection bias as much as possible. From all the different case selection techniques 
proposed by Patton, I opted for the theory-based sampling; that is, for a case sampling that is based on theo-
retical constructs. As mentioned in the literature review chapter, ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes 
can take various forms. Given that I was interested in understanding the role that public authorities played 
in it, I had to develop a framework allowing us to differentiate between different forms of ICT-supported 
integrated mobility schemes. Therefore, I developed a case-selection theoretical framework that was named 
the “new transport integration ladder”, and that is presented below. The framework builds on theory but 
also on logic, and on my personal experience. Once again it is important to shed light on the experience I 
obtained when managing the IGLUS Executive Master at EPFL. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, I 
could see, in my capacity as manager of the program, good (and bad) examples of transport integration from 
around the world (Seoul, New York, Dubai, Detroit, Istanbul, Barcelona, Dortmund, Mexico City, Guadalaja-
ra), which ultimately helped us establish the present framework. 
As seen in the literature review chapter, transport integration can actually be understood as a ladder, rang-
ing from modal integration all the way up to integrated transport and land use, as well as integrated 
transport policy. The first step of this framework basically deals with physical integration (Hull, 2005), as it 
would not make sense to have timetable, fare, or network integration if people were not able to physically 
transfer from one mode to another. A transport system might be completely integrated in terms of fare, 
network and ticket; if people are not able to physically transfer between vehicles of different modes or op-
erators, it does not make any sense. The second step deals with network integration. It comes second as 
physical integration is a pre-requisite for it, even though it is itself a pre-requisite for other integration steps. 
For example, what would be the point of coordinating timetables if modes were physically connecting but 
were not planned to accommodate the transport demand and offer (no capacity coordination). After time-
table integration, which is the third step, comes fare integration (Preston, 2010), which comes on top of the 
three previous integration steps mentioned. The same approach is adopted to conceptualize ICT-integrated 
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mobility schemes. On top of those three modal integration steps, logically, come ICT-supported integrated 
mobility schemes. It would not make sense to have such schemes if the previous steps were not in place 
already (Li and Voege, 2017). The first of those ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, and thus the 
fourth of the transport integration ladder, can actually be understood as smart ticketing, which should be 
followed by integrated mobility platforms (fifth step), and ultimately MaaS (sixth step) (Kamargianni and 
Matyas, 2016; Sochor et al., 2017). The main difference made between IMP and MaaS relies on the fact that 
IMP are just the integration of multi-modal information and ticketing systems, whereas MaaS is a more ad-
vanced step aimed at providing its users with a mobility solution for whatever they intend on doing. Unlike 
IMP providers, MaaS providers make the promise to their users that their car will become useless by bun-
dling into packages mobility solutions and a service promise, in exchange for a monthly fee.  
After the ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes come, logically, the more advanced integration steps. 
As smart cards, IMPs and MaaS might also provide public authorities with data about what is happening in 
their transport systems (Pelletier et al., 2011), they should be seen as a pre-requisite, or enablers, for the 
definition of integrated transport and land use models, as well as integrated transport policies. From experi-
ence through the IGLUS master, many public authorities were complaining about not being able to define 
effective integrated transport policies due to their lack of data. ICT-supported integrated schemes might be 
a way to tackle the issue, which is why those should come between traditional modal integration steps and 
the more advanced stages of transport integration (integrated transport and land use and integrated 
transport policy). Figure 3.3.2 provides a graphical representation of the “new” transport integration ladder 
framework. 
Figure 3.3-2: The "new" transport integration ladder (author's elaboration) 
Based on that framework, the three case studies, that are basically processes of development of the three 
steps of the ICT-supported transportation integration ladder, were selected. The first case focused on a pro-
cess of development and implementation of smart cards, the second case on the development of IMPs, and 
the third one on the deployment of MaaS schemes.  
Cases are also known to have boundaries that help the researchers define what should and should not be 
studied (Patton, 2002). Although Miles and Huberman (1994: 27) argued that a case boundary is never “as 
solid as a rationalist might hope”, they proposed several kind of boundaries, such as its physical location or 
temporal extent. It was therefore important in this research project to set the boundaries in order to select 
the cases. The first boundary set was a geographical one at the city/metropolitan level. Thus, I was only in-
terested in ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes that developed on the city scale, not on other scales 
(regional or national scales). The second boundary set dealt with the time period studied. Given that the 
development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes is rather recent, I decided to consider a 10 to 15-
year time period to select the cases to be explored. Thus, one could view the three cases studies as process-
es of development of the three steps of the ICT-supported transport integration ladder in specific cities. 
Having done this, I decided on other criteria that would help to select the cases. The first criterion was to 
select cases that had similar contexts, in order to compare them with one another, following Miles and Hu-
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berman’s “comparable cases” strategy (1994: 176). I was first tempted to look at Seoul for the case on smart 
cards, given that their smart card solution is seen by many as a best practice, and that I had studied the case 
in depth for my master’s thesis at Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul. However, South Korea’s political, eco-
nomic and social context is very particular, and I would have had difficulties comparing it with contexts from 
other cases. I would also have faced data gathering issues as I did not speak Korean and would have needed 
a translator, which was not materially possible because of the associated costs. Therefore, I decided to take 
three case of studies in Europe, and more specifically, located in countries member of the European Union, 
so they would all share the same (or at least comparable) economic, social, and institutional contexts. 
Looking at Europe, the number of cases that I could have undertaken for the smart card case was still im-
portant. Indeed, many cities at that time already had a smart ticketing system in place. However, I wanted to 
take the most innovative case for smart card development in order to gain more insights on the role that 
public authorities played in it. I chose London as it was regarded as a highly successful smart ticketing system 
in Europe (Mayes, 2017). London’s smart card, which is known as the Oyster, is regarded globally as a pio-
neer in smart ticketing. However, my choice to look at London was also motivated by the fact that a new 
smart ticketing system was being developed from 2012, to complement the Oyster one. Named CPC (stand-
ing for contactless payment card), the system aimed to enable all contactless payment bankcard holders to 
use their CPC as a payment method for public transport in London, even removing the need for Londoners to 
use an Oyster card in order to use public transport. This innovation appeared as something worth looking at, 
and fitting with the smart card step of the transport integration ladder. Given that CPCs had only been im-
plemented at that time in London, I decided to undertake some preliminary research to ensure sufficient 
data was available. It is recommended that the researcher makes sure that the case will allow him to have 
sufficient access to data before deciding to undertake it (Gray, 2009; Crowe et al., 2011). Being satisfied with 
the amount of data I could find online about the development of the Oyster and CPCs in London, I decided to 
select the London case for the smart card development case. 
For the IMP and MaaS case studies, unfortunately, I did not have many options to choose from. At the time 
this study was undertaken (summer of 2015), there seemed to be only two cases available to look at the 
development of IMP in Europe: one in Lyon and one in Vienna. However, after undertaking some preliminary 
search and encountering some difficulties in gathering data for the Lyon case (Optymod), I thought I would 
have less trouble exploring the Vienna case, and thus decided to definitively select Vienna as my IMP case. In 
particular, the availability of data about the SMILE project, which is considered as the major IMP developed 
in Vienna, motivated me to choose the Austrian capital city. A similar situation occurred for the selection of 
the MaaS case. When I started this study, there seemed to be only two cases available to look at the devel-
opment of MaaS in European cities: Helsinki and Gothenburg. However, after making a preliminary check on 
the amount of data available to explore both cases, I decided to focus on the Helsinki case. This choice was 
also made after I realized that a lot of research was being conducted on the UBIGO project that happened in 
Gothenburg (by a research group at Chalmers University), which meant that I would potentially have more 
difficulty accessing the data than I would with a “virgin” (that is, un-researched) case. My decision to opt for 
Helsinki and Vienna was also motivated by the fact that already knew that public authorities had adopted 
different approaches in both projects. From preliminary searches, it appeared that the SMILE project was 
indeed initiated by the public sector while the development of MaaS in Helsinki was (apparently) being 
pushed by non-state actors. Being concerned with finding cases where public authorities would have differ-
ent behavior – that is, heterogeneous cases (Patton, 2002) – this comforted me in my choice. Thus, I had my 
three case of studies: London for the smart card case, with a focus on the development of the Oyster and 
CPC; Vienna for the IMP case, with a focus on the development of the SMILE project and IMP projects having 
followed it; and Helsinki for the development of the MaaS case. A graphical representation of my case selec-
tion process is available in Figure 3.3.4. 
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Figure 3.3-3: Case selection (author's elaboration)
Having now explained how we selected our case studies13, we will now detail our data gathering process, as 
well as emphasize the way we constructed our case studies. 
3.3.4 Data gathering process 
The choice of the case study research strategy allows the researcher to use a wide combination of data 
sources, such as documentation, archival records, interviews, physical artifacts, direct observations, and 
participant-observation (Baxter and Jack, 2008). To build the case studies I have mainly used qualitative da-
ta, from two main sources being documentation and interviews. More precisely, I have first gathered docu-
mentation data to constitute a data basis for my cases, which I then complemented, when necessary, with 
interview data, depending on the information that was missing. Along the document analysis process, I pre-
pared an interview questionnaire, the final version of which is available as Appendix 2. The definition of the 
interview grid followed the case protocol and original research question.14 Squires (2009) argued that quali-
tative researchers might employ interpreters or translators in cases where the interviewees’ first language is 
not English or where their level of English is so low that it might negatively impact data retrieval. However, 
given that all interviewees spoke good English (which I was able to assess when conversing with them in 
English via email to set the interview date), and due to logistical issues (insufficient time and funding to hire 
a Finnish and German interpreters and translators), I chose to conduct all of my interviews in English, which 
is believed to allow information retrieval in a more effective way than translation (Grabe, 1988).  
The interview grid, which was the same for all interviewees, was divided into two main parts. The first part 
focused on the role of the interviewee’s organization in the development of the ICT-supported integrated 
mobility scheme studied. Interviewees were invited to talk about how their organization was involved in the 
early days of development of the solution and on their perceptions of how the studied innovation had de-
veloped over time. The second part of the interview was reflective and aimed to discuss with interviewees 
how the studied innovation could have developed differently. I first used the interview grid for the Helsinki 
case, which proved successful, and then decided to re-use it by slightly improving it for the Vienna case. In 
particular, the interview grid for the Vienna case interviewees had fewer contextual questions and was more 
“straight to the point” with interviewees. Despite allowing me to gather data that I could not find online, I 
13
Another approach could have been to only treat one case and do it much more in depth, by analysing it from various perspectiv es. In other 
words I could also have gone for a single embedded case, where I would certainly have explored the case of Helsinki, as it was this case that 
motivated this whole research project. However I decided not to engage down this path as it was my opinion too much risky from a research 
point of view. When I started this research project, the Helsinki case was not doing so well, and could have « collapsed » before the end of my 
PhD thesis. I therefore took the decision to look for other cases to derive insights from different contexts and avoid relying on a single case for 
which the outcome was very uncertain. This is why i developped the « new transport integration ladder » as case selection framework. Still, 
the Helsinki case was explored in more details in Audouin and Finger (2018a).
14 I could improve the interview grid thanks to the feedback received along my participation to the methodological seminar “The Research 
Interviews in Political Science” offered by the Doctoral Program in Political Science at UNIL (December 2016).
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found that conducting interviews was also a way for me to validate some data I could find online (triangula-
tion). Below, I explain the data collection and case construction process for the three case studies in more 
details.  
 Helsinki case study
For the Helsinki case, I started by gathering documentation data from the summer of 2016 to December 
2016, mainly through the use of online search engines. Multiple kinds of documentation data were used to 
constitute the basis of the Helsinki case study: written reports, newspaper articles, scientific publications, 
and press releases. I should also mention that the use of social media was very helpful in gathering docu-
mentation data. From the beginning of the PhD journey, I had subscribed to several involved stakeholders’ 
webpages on LinkedIn and Facebook in order to monitor their activities regarding the development of MaaS 
in Helsinki. This was for me a way to get the latest published reports on the subject and gather thoughts 
from involved stakeholders and potentially learn about decisions made by important actors. I then decided 
to put all the historical events (extracted from documentation thanks to document analysis) that I believed 
were important on a time scale. Given that I was interested in understanding the role of public authorities in 
the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, I decided to classify the different actions of 
public authorities based on their level of decision-making (supra-national, national, regional/local). When 
this time scale of events was ready, I was then able to assess what information I was missing, and the list of 
organizations involved in the development of the ICT-supported integrated mobility scheme, from whom I 
could potentially get additional information. Based on the preliminary case report, I thus established a list of 
organizations to get in touch with, in order to set a date for an interview, and potentially gather the infor-
mation I was missing.  
The contacts for the interviews were initiated through two distinct channels. In August 2016, I had the 
chance to participate to a Summer School organized by Aalto University (in Espoo, in the Helsinki Metropoli-
tan Area) about the management of complexity in transportation systems. During the summer school, I had 
the opportunity to discuss with the different participants about my research. Luckily, one of the participants, 
who was a PhD student at Aalto University, was also a full-time employee of the Helsinki Metropolitan 
Transport Authority (HSL), who later introduced me to a relevant contact to conduct an interview with. Peo-
ple at HSL also kindly introduced me to another company involved in the development of MaaS in the Hel-
sinki Metropolitan Area called SITO (consulting company). During my first stay in Finland I also met a repre-
sentative of a leading transport consultancy companies (Ramboll) who was delivering a lecture in the sum-
mer school. I was able to briefly present my research topic and have the representative agree to an inter-
view by the end of the year. I also took advantage of my participation in the Aalto Summer School to con-
duct my first interview with a member of Maas Global, a leading company developing a MaaS service in Hel-
sinki, thanks to a formal introduction to its CEO by my supervisor, Prof. Matthias Finger. 
In October 2016, I reached out to the chairman of the board of MaaS Global via LinkedIn, requesting an in-
terview, to which he kindly agreed. I conducted a Skype interview in October 2016 and I submitted to him a 
list of actors I was planning to get in touch with, which I thought would cover the stakeholders involved in 
the development of MaaS in Helsinki. The list included public authorities, transport authorities, transport 
operators, technology companies, consulting companies, and taxi dispatch centers, lying at different spatial 
governance scales. Once he agreed to my list, I reached out to all these people through email. When I did 
not have the appropriate email addresses I reached out to people on LinkedIn, sending them a short mes-
sage (200 words) regarding my intentions to get in touch with them regarding my research. I was pleased to 
receive a high percentage of positive answers to my LinkedIn requests, allowing me to get in touch with the 
interviewees via email, sending them a one-page summary of my research and asking if they would be will-
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ing to be interviewed by December 2016. Out of the 12 organizations I had reached out to in October, I re-
ceived nine positive answers for an interview and two negative answers. Only one of the organizations did 
not answer my request. Apart from one interview carried out during the Aalto Summer school, as mentioned 
above, and one Skype interview carried out in October, nine interviews were conducted in person between 
December 12th and December 15th 2016 in Helsinki. One interviewee also decided to answer the questions 
by email, and one additional interview was carried out on via Skype in January 2017, accounting for a total of 
13 interviews. Interviews lasted from 45 to 90 minutes and were all audio-recorded. Given the highly dynam-
ic nature of MaaS in Helsinki, I continued following its development closely, mainly using social media and 
newsletters to which I had subscribed. As the project took a new turn in the beginning of 2018, I decided to 
conduct three additional interviews, which took place via Skype in March and April 2018. Those interviews 
lasted from 35 to 60 minutes and were also all audio-recorded and transcribed. In total, 16 interviews were 
carried out for data gathering for the Helsinki case from August 2016 to April 2018, which lasted from 35 to 
90 minutes. The list of interviewed organizations, and their related codes used in this thesis, is available in 
Appendix 1. 
 Vienna case study
From September to December 2016, we (with Prof. Finger) hosted a master’s student from the Management 
of Energy and Sustainability Master program at EPFL (MES) who completed a semester project within our 
lab. As part of his coursework, the student had to validate a 10 ECTS research project for which I was as-
signed as supervisor Thanks to the flexibility of Prof. Finger, I was able to choose the topic of this master 
student semester project and proposed him to work on the case of an integrated mobility platform devel-
opment and implementation. Soon after the beginning of the semester, the student and I agreed to realize a 
study of the development and implementation of the SMILE project in Vienna. The student was expected to 
answer the following research question: What are the main challenges related to the development of an 
integrated mobility platform? I had deliberately given him a rather “broad” research question, as my main 
interest in his work was to have an overview of the case study and stakeholders in order to already gather as 
much data as possible about the Vienna case study. The master’s student used data from multiple sources, 
such as written reports, policy documents, newspaper articles, and press releases gathered from the Inter-
net. He finally received the grade of 5 out of 6 for his report. However, given that I could not use the report 
as it was for the present thesis, I started myself to gather reports, newspaper articles, scientific publications, 
and press releases from online sources in January 2017, in order to triangulate and to obtain new data. I also 
used social media to monitor the activities of particular stakeholders in the development of integrated mo-
bility platforms in Vienna Metropolitan Area. Similarly to the Helsinki case, I established a timescale to look 
at the development of IMPs in Vienna in order to establish which organizations were involved in the devel-
opment of the ICT-supported integrated mobility scheme, so that I could establish a contact list and contact 
them to conduct interviews. 
The contacts for the interviews were initiated in late March 2017, based on the result from the documenta-
tion data collection and analysis, and the master’s student’s report. Furthermore, as I had conducted the 
Helsinki interviews beforehand, I was aware of the kind of interviewees I wanted to have for the Vienna 
case. Thus I started to look for relevant contacts in each of the organization I had selected. One difficulty I 
confronted was that some of the people involved at the time of development of the SMILE project had 
changed positions since then (the project stopped in 2014). I reached out to all these actors through email or 
LinkedIn (as for the Helsinki case) about my intention to get in touch with them regarding my research. 
Again, I was quite happy to receive a high percentage of positive answers to my LinkedIn requests, allowing 
me to get in touch with everybody via email, sending them a one-page summary of my research project (the 
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same sent to Helsinki interviewees) and asking if they would be willing to be interviewed in May 2017. Of the 
19 organizations I reached out to in March 2017, I received 12 positive responses for an interview, one nega-
tive answer, and did not hear from the remaining six organizations, although I did send a follow-up email. 
Twelve in-person interviews were conducted in Vienna from May 15–20, 2017. Two interviews were then 
carried out by Skype and telephone in late May 2017. Interviews lasted from 45 to 75 minutes and were all 
audio-recorded. In total, 14 interviews were carried out for the Vienna case. The list of interviewed organiza-
tions and the related codes used in this thesis is available in Appendix 1. 
 London case study
For the London case study, the data gathering process was slightly different from the two other case studies 
as I did not conduct interviews and used only documentation data. In Fall 2015, I had the opportunity to 
supervise four master’s students from the Management of Energy and Sustainability Master program at EPFL 
(MES) for a semester project with us, within the IGLUS (Innovative Governance for Large Urban Systems) 
initiative. Similarly to the Vienna case, I was able to choose the topic of their semester project and proposed 
them to work on a case of integrated transport system development and implementation. Soon after the 
beginning of their semester, we agreed to realize an in-depth study of the unfolding of contactless payment 
cards in London. The research question the students had to answer for their project was the following: How 
did London integrate EMV contactless payment cards into the transportation network and what were the 
results? As with the Vienna project, I had deliberately given them a rather “broad” research question, as my 
main interest in their work was to have an initial overview of this case study and to gather as much data as 
possible about the development of the solution studied. The four master’s students used data from multiple 
sources, such as written reports, policy documents, newspaper articles and press releases gathered from the 
internet and from contacts they initiated with involved stakeholders. They received the grade of 5.5 out of 6 
for their report. 
After building the Helsinki and Vienna case studies, I came back to the London case study in Spring 2017 and, 
using the report of the four master’s students, continued to “nurture” the London case study. I first had to 
double-check and triangulate all the information displayed in the students’ report before starting to gather 
complementary information by myself, from reports, newspaper articles, and press releases as well as social 
media. As most of the data was available through the public authorities’ websites and a lot of research had 
been conducted on the London Transportation System, the raw data we (with the students) could gather for 
the London case appeared to be particularly rich compared to the cases of Helsinki and Vienna, which relied 
on a combination of documentation and interview data. Consequently, given the richness of the London 
case, which relied only on documentation data, I decided not to conduct any in-person interviews as I felt I 
already had enough information to answer the thesis’ research question at a future stage.  
3.3.5 Data analysis, case construction and case structure 
For all three case studies I applied document analysis (Bowen, 2009) to documentation data to retrieve the 
main key events having impacted the development of the three ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. 
This allowed me to build a comprehensive basis that I later complemented with data extracted from the 
conducted semi-structured interviews for the Vienna and Helsinki cases. As mentioned, all interviews were 
audio-recorded and transcribed and analyzed using a qualitative data analysis software (MaxQDA). Here, 
codes related to particular events were developed on the interviewee’s answers. Using open and then axial 
coding (Saldaña, 2009), I initially retrieved 152 quotes that I coded and then cross-checked, to finally come 
up with a reduced list of event-related codes for each case study. These were then placed on a timeline, 
which helped us complement the comprehensive case basis that I had established earlier with grey litera-
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ture. Having created those timelines, I directly started to develop the case study narrative. I did not go 
through the intermediary case record stage, as it is often presented as an optional step in case study re-
search. Overall, I followed the case construction process proposed by Patton (2002: 450), who stated that, in 
“many studies, the analyst will work directly and selectively from raw data to write the final case study”.  
I must now justify my decision to adopt a historical structure in the narrative of the cases and explain how I 
then constructed the three case studies. According to Baxter and Jack (2008), the presentation of the case 
study – that is, the case study report – is of high importance and it should enable the reader to have a full 
understanding of the phenomenon presented. Although the literature has suggested various methods for 
reporting a case study, scholars usually refer to the six categories proposed by Yin (1994). Case study reports 
can first adopt a linear structure that actually follows the traditional structure of scientific writing (introduc-
tion, methods, results, discussion). Researchers can decide to structure their case study reports following a 
comparative design, where the same issue is looked at from different points of view. Case study reports can 
also present the evidence in chronological order. One might decide to follow a theory building structure for 
its case report, where each new section of the report corresponds to a new part of the theory being devel-
oped. Case study reports might also follow a “suspense” structure, where the conclusion is presented at the 
start and the explanation is then developed during the rest of the case. Last but not least, researchers might 
decide to adopt an unsequenced structure for their case reports, where the order in which the evidence is 
presented does not really matter.  
However, not all structures work with all kind of cases. According to Yin (2003), the type of case chosen (ex-
planatory, exploratory, descriptive) might determine the case report structure. For example, explanatory 
cases are associated with linear-analytic, comparative, chronological, theory building, and suspense case 
structures. Exploratory cases are associated with linear-analytic, comparative, chronological, and theory 
building case study structures. Descriptive cases are associated with linear-analytic, comparative, chronolog-
ical, and unsequenced structures. Given that a descriptive approach was selected, I could narrow down my 
choice to four case structures. As I was interested in understanding the role of the public authorities in the 
overall process of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes development, I thought that the chronological 
approach was the best fit. The chronological case structure is acknowledged for not only being descriptive 
but also implicitly providing readers with insights into linkages and causes (Gray, 2009), which was quite a 
good match, as the purpose of the project was to understand how exactly public authorities behaved in the 
development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, and implicitly why they behaved as such. Below 
is presented the literature that was used for the case analysis. 
3.3.6 Case analysis 
As stated by Tellis (1997: 15), “the analysis of case study is one of the least developed aspects” of the case 
study approach. However, it is a crucial step into the research process, as it enables the researcher to ulti-
mately provide answers to the original research question. Conducting an analysis on a case provides an op-
portunity for the researcher to make it richer. More especially, it gives the researcher the ability to make its 
case a “thick description” of the phenomenon studied (Geertz, 1973). According to Yin (2003), three strate-
gies exist to analyze case studies. First researchers might decide to analyze their cases by “relying on theoret-
ical propositions”, which is the most common case study analytical strategy. Under that strategy, researchers 
are known to analyze their case study along specific propositions (that together constitute a conceptual 
framework) having been withdrawn from the scientific literature. Secondly, researchers might decide to 
analyze their case studies by “thinking about rival explanations”. Under that setting, researchers develop 
rival explanations from the propositions withdrawn from the literature or based on their observation con-
ducted in the data collection process to analyze the case(s). Finally, researchers might decide to develop a 
case study description to analyze their cases. However, this last strategy is mainly used when the researcher 
79 
has difficulty identifying the relevant literature, which did not apply to this research project. Similarly, ana-
lyzing by developing rival explanations is mainly used for case study evaluation, which was not the purpose 
of the present research endeavor. As I already had in mind the literatures to use for the analysis, it appeared 
normal to opt for a case analysis strategy framed by theoretical propositions. This decision is in synch with 
Tellis (1997), for whom the selection of the descriptive case study as a research strategy must go hand in 
hand with the selection of some theory to compare the case to in the analytical phase. Thus, the streams of 
literature used in the analysis are presented below. 
From the literature review chapter, it appeared two streams of literature could be used to analyse the case 
studies. On one hand, one could use the socio-technical transitions literature to look at the role of public 
authorities in the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. On the other hand, one might 
view it through the lens of the (urban) governance literature. While both approaches seemed to be legiti-
mate to answer this thesis’ research question, I explain why I have decided to finally use both and not select 
one or the other.15   
As mentioned in Chapter 2, transportation can be understood as a socio-technical system, grounded into the 
damaging automobility regime, in need of a transition towards a more sustainable state. With new vehicle 
technologies and travel demand management schemes, solutions enabling “shift from products to services” 
are presented as potentially contributing to this socio-technical transition (Nykvist and Whitmarsh, 2008). 
Falling directly under this category, ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes (such as smart cards, IMPs 
and MaaS) might therefore be well understood as potential system innovations that have the ability to en-
hance the mobility transition. In particular, looking at the development of such schemes through the multi-
level perspective on sustainability transition approach (MLP) appeared to be one of the most systematic 
ways to do this. By structuring socio-technical transition as the result of interaction between three structural 
layers (niche, regime, landscape), by proposing success factors for the uptake of technological innovations, 
and by suggesting different transition pathways, the MLP does provide the researcher with a systematic way 
of looking at socio-technical transitions.  
Similarly, one could argue that the best option would have been to use the governance literature to look at 
the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. By looking at “the system through which a 
kind of order is achieved among several actors who are interacting with each other about a common issue” 
(Razaghi and Finger, 2013: 7), the governance approach seemed to offer a valid approach to answer this 
thesis’ research question. However, instead of choosing one or the other approach, I decided to use both. I 
argue that combining both literatures was also a way to tackle some of their shortcomings and answer the 
recent calls of academics to do this, especially to look at the on-going evolution of the transport sector 
(Berkeley et al., 2017; Hoffmann et al., 2017).  
While transition studies (and the MLP) place a lot of importance on the interactions of the niche, regime, 
and landscape layer, they have been criticized for not sufficiently looking at the roles and strategies of the 
actors involved, the interactions between actors and institutions, and to power and politics (Geels, 2011; 
Farla et al., 2012). Although transition frameworks acknowledge that different actors are involved in socio-
technical transitions, and that transitions actually happen through the interaction of social groups (Geels, 
2011), they often fail to distinguish between the levels at which they are operating (Avelino and Wittmayer, 
2016). Although there have been some attempts to remedy to this shortcoming, those have remained mar-
ginal and incomplete to specifically focus on the role of public authorities in a particular phase of the transi-
tion process. By specifically differentiating between different levels of decision-making (national, regional, 
15
 The conceptual frameworks used to structure the analysis are presented at the beginning of the analytical chapter (Chapter 5)
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local), and paying attention to actor’s engagement and influence (Stephenson, 2013), the governance litera-
ture seemed to be able to tackle the above-mentioned shortcomings of the transition literature. Another 
point where the MLP has received criticism is for favoring bottom-up more than top-down changes (Te-
menos et al., 2017). According to Berkhout et al. (2004: 62), the MLP approach tends to “emphasize process-
es of regime change which begin within niches and work up, at the expense of those which directly address 
the various dimensions of the sociotechnical regime or those which operate ‘downwards’ from general fea-
tures of the sociotechnical landscape”. However, this “weakness” could also be tackled using the governance 
literature, as it has been acknowledged for favoring horizontal analysis of interactions between actors (Ste-
phenson, 2013). Finally, transition frameworks have been criticized for lacking a geographical dimension 
(Hodson and Marvin, 2010; Coenen et al., 2012; Whitmarsh, 2012). On the contrary, the governance litera-
ture is clearly rooted in a geographical context, which is why combining it with the MLP could potentially 
make the best of both worlds.  
In sum, it seems that one might withdraw some synergies from the combination of both approaches. On one 
hand, the governance literature might bring some insights to understand the role of public authorities (and 
actors’ agency) into technological innovation developments and socio-technical transitions. On the other 
hand, the transition literature might provide the researcher with tools to look at technological innovation 
development and diffusion with its structuration into layers and its “bottom-up” system innovation journey. 
Finally, the governance literature might also provide a geographical dimension to the study of technological 
innovation development. This is why it was ultimately decided to use both perspectives, as they seemed to 
be complementary. Hence, a “governance analysis” and a “transition analysis” were conducted on the three 
case of studies in parallel, to have different insights withdrawn and ultimately combine both in some rec-
ommendations geared at policy makers.16  
Having presented the case analysis strategy (relying on theoretical propositions from the governance and 
transition literatures), it seems worth presenting the analytical technique used to analyze the case studies. 
According to Yin (2003), five different analytical techniques exist to analyze case studies. First, cases can be 
analyzed through pattern matching. This approach basically consists of comparing the observed pattern 
(described in the case) with a predicted pattern, emerging from the theory, and consequently validating or 
refining the theory accordingly. Secondly, researchers might decide to analyze cases with an explanation 
building technique. In such cases, researchers analyze the case by building plausible explanations about the 
case. Third, a case might be analyzed through time series analysis. Under that approach, data are traced over 
time in order to ultimately compare predicted patterns with actual patterns. Fourth, one might decide to 
follow a logic model for the analysis, which actually combines the pattern matching and time series analyti-
cal techniques (Gray, 2009). Fifth, cases might be analyzed with a cross-case synthesis, which is particularly 
relevant for the analysis of multiple case studies as it makes it possible to “draw cross-case conclusions 
about the objects of interests and their outcomes” (Stjelja, 2013: 10). Given that I selected a multiple holistic 
case design, I naturally decided to select the cross-case synthesis to analyze the three different case stud-
ies.17 For the case analysis, I went back to the interview data and retrieved, using selective coding (Saldaña, 
2009) some 830 quotes (397 quotes for the governance analysis and 433 quotes for the transition analysis), 
from which I selected a few quotes to ultimately illustrate the findings in the analytical chapter (Chapter 5).  
Below, I now explain my understanding of my role as researcher and the way I have handled ethical issues in 
this research project, as both are important elements to consider in a qualitative study. 
16 The governance and the transition conceptual frameworks are presented in the analytical chapter of the thesis (Chapter 5)
17
 The case analysis process per se (and the supporting conceptual framework) is presented in great detail at the begining of the analytical 
chapter (Chapter 5). 
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3.4 Role of the researcher and ethical considerations 
I now shed light on my understanding of my role as researcher in the current research endeavor. While the 
role of the researcher in quantitative studies is known to be quasi inexistent, things are acknowledged to be 
quite different in qualitative studies. Unlike quantitative research, where the researcher is described as be-
ing external to the data studied, and as having (theoretically) limited impact on them, data in qualitative 
research are known to be mediated through the human brain, and the result of a joint construction between 
the researcher and research participants (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). Given this fact, it appears important for 
researchers using qualitative approach to clarify their roles in order to make their research credible (Unluer, 
2012). Researchers can usually categorize themselves as insider or outsider researchers (Bonner and 
Tolhurst, 2002). In the latter case, the researcher is known to belong to the group that is the focus of the 
study, whereas in the former case, the researcher is described as not belonging and being external to the 
group under study. While I agree that such extreme categorizations might prove useful in theory, I join Breen 
(2007) in not clearly categorizing myself under one or the other category. Although I might think of myself as 
outsider researcher since I was not working in any of the organizations intervieweed in this thesis and did 
not have any activity that would concretely contribute to the development of ICT-supported integrated mo-
bility schemes, it is hard to say that I did not have any insider role. I believe that by interviewing some of the 
actors I also somehow contributed to the development of the projects. As several interviewees acknowl-
edged it, the very act of answering my questions was also a way for them to take a step back and perhaps 
see the “big picture”, which might potentially have contributed to making things move forward. Therefore, 
although I did not have an active role in the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, I 
believe I still had a somehow passive role, which is why I might also potentially think of myself as insider 
researcher. According to Ellis and Bochner (2000: 743), as qualitative researchers “we are inside what we are 
studying”. To conclude, I therefore agree with Breen (2007) that the role of the researcher should be con-
ceptualized on a continuum where I would set myself closer to the outsider than the insider pole.  
Having emphasized the understanding of my role as researcher, I turn to the ethical positions I adopted in 
this research project. According to Gray (2009), ethical principles are acknowledged to fall under four main 
categories: the need to avoid harm to participants, to ensure informed consent of participants, to respect 
the privacy of participants, and to avoid the use of deception. In this thesis I have tried as much as possible 
to address those four categories, all along the different phases of the research, as detailled below. 
The word “harm” can be understood in various ways, but in research ethics it is generally linked to physical, 
mental or emotional harm (Gray, 2009). Given that I did not conduct any physical experiment, as it was not 
needed for the present research, I do not believe I have caused any physical or mental harm to participants 
(interviewees). As most of my questions focused on the organization level, rather than on their personal 
experience, I also believe to have avoided any emotional and mental harm. According to Sundman (1998), 
harm can also be caused when the participants are disturbed because of the research. This could be the 
case, for example, when interviews are rescheduled multiple times because of the lack of organization of the 
researcher, creating a disturbance in the interviewee calendar and personal life. However, I tried to remain 
as flexible as possible when scheduling interviews. During the data collection phase, I always tried to ac-
commodate the interviewee’s needs over my own. However, I must mention one case where I might have 
caused some disturbance to one of my interviewees in Vienna. In this case, I became confused between two 
different interviewee’s addresses, leading to me going to one address when I was supposed to be at anoth-
er. As I was leaving Vienna on the same day, I had to reschedule the interview, which fortunately was not a 
problem for the interviewee. In some cases, I also had to do numerous follow-ups, either by email or over 
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the phone, to set an interview date. While my follow-ups may have caused minor stress for the interview-
ees, those should not be considered as having caused major harm. 
Ensuring informed consent of research participants is often referred to as an important ethical aspect when 
conducting a research study and refers to the provision to research participants of all necessary information 
about the research project, so that they have all the information they require to decide whether they want 
to be part of the study (Gray, 2009) or potentially withdraw from it. Although there is a discussion about 
what should constitute informed consent, especially when research participants are from ‘vulnerable’ 
groups (e.g. Crow et al., 2006), ensuring informed consent in its traditional form is usually synonymous, for 
the researchers, with letting research participants know about the purpose of the research, about who will 
be conducting it and who else is participating in it, about the kind of information being sought, about the 
time required and the identity of the people who will have access to the data, and ultimately about the ano-
nymity of participants (Gray, 2009). I believe I have addressed most of the above-mentioned requirements 
with my research participants. Before the interviews, all interviewees were emailed a one-page summary 
about the research project, which clearly stated its goals and my motivations. At the beginning of each inter-
view, I again explained the purpose of my research and motivations in case people had not read the one-
pager. Before starting the interview, I also explained the interview was entirely anonymous, and that I was 
the only one involved in the project – that is, that this project was my PhD dissertation and that I was work-
ing alone on it – and that it was not embedded in any bigger research project. By saying that I was the only 
one involved, I was also implicitly saying that I was the only person who had access to the data. Given that I 
was not asked about who else was going to have access to the data, I never thought usefull to specify to the 
research participants that no one else would have access to the data. Regarding the information about who 
were the other research participants, I informed the participants that other stakeholders of the transport 
sector of the city I was in were also going to be interviewed, but without giving the names of those people, 
as interviews were anonymous. If the research participants insisted on knowing the identity of other inter-
viewees, I usually gave them the name of some interviewee’s organizations, but never revealed the name of 
the other interviewees. Participants were also aware of the time required to conduct the interview, as I had 
informed them of this by email upfront. 
By preserving the anonymity of the participants (for example, by using codes for quotes used in this thesis), I 
believe I have addressed the issues about the respect of privacy of my research participants. None of the 
questions I asked could be considered “personal”. Indeed, I always sought to learn about the organization’s 
role or actions, rather than the participants’ experiences. However, as Gray stated (2009: 74), “even though 
attempts might be made to preserve the anonymity of individuals, it is by no means always impossible for 
people to be identified”. For example, I have spoken to people from very small organizations, and given the 
number of employees in those organizations, expert readers might have guessed whom it was I talked to. 
For most of my interviews, I made research participants aware that they might be “discovered” by readers 
who looked closely at the quotes and were familiar with the context of the study (such as colleagues or col-
laborators); fortunately, this did not discourage them from answering my questions. 
Finally, researchers must avoid the use of deception when conducting their study. Deception can be de-
scribed as “the transmission of information that implicitly encourages another party to make incorrect con-
clusions” (Boles et al., 2000) and might include misrepresentation, lying, or bluffing. In my case, deception 
could include presenting a false statement from another interviewee in order to make the research partici-
pant react in a specific way, and then using his or her reaction as if it was something that naturally occurred. 
While I sometimes used quotes from other interviews to generate interview reactions, I never used false 
quotes or any unethical method that would generate a biased interviewee reaction. 
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3.5 Ensuring research quality 
According to Morse et al. (2002), criteria used to ensure rigor depend on the different theoretical perspec-
tives adopted by the researcher. While the notions of internal validity, external validity, reliability, and objec-
tivity have usually been associated with the positivistic paradigm, Guba (1981) proposed four new criteria to 
ensure rigor of qualitative inquiries: credibility, transferability, dependability, and conformability. Having 
myself undertaken a qualitative inquiry, I follow Guba’s categories to assess the rigor of the present work 
and ultimately the research quality of this thesis. 
By assessing the credibility criteria (which corresponds to internal validity criterion for positivists), research-
ers seek to address the following question: “How congruent are the findings with reality?” (Merriam, 2009: 
213). To address that question I have used several techniques that are acknowledged for contributing to the 
credibility of a research project. For a full referencing of those techniques, see Shenton (2004). For example, 
I have used triangulation, when possible, between multiple sources of information (documentation, inter-
views) to corroborate the veracity of some facts. The fact that the information was first found for the Lon-
don and Vienna case by master’s students and that I had to double-check the validity of that information by 
finding other sources can also be seen as having contributed to the validity of the study (involvement of 
several researchers). I also submitted the present research project to peer scrutiny, through presentations at 
brownbag seminars, conferences, practitioners’ forums, or summer schools or journals. I also had multiple 
debriefing sessions with my research supervisor. Last but not least, I provided thick descriptions of the phe-
nomenon of interest, with many details, which should also have helped improve the credibility of the pre-
sent research endeavor. The credibility of a research project is also linked with the researchers’ ability to 
reach data saturation, which is attained when it is no longer possible to obtain additional new information 
(Guest et al., 2006). It is acknowledged that researchers might face an issue in knowing if they have reached 
a saturation phase because no practical guidelines for data saturation exist, and data saturation basically 
differs from one research design to another (Guest et al., 2006). Having been able to interview the main 
stakeholders involved in the development of ICT-based integrated mobility schemes in Vienna and Helsinki, I 
believe I did everything I could to gather all possible information available. According to Bernard (2012), data 
saturation might be reached by interviewing additional people that would not be normally considered. Given 
that I conducted such interviews for the Vienna and Helsinki cases, I also believe I have taken the point of 
data saturation into consideration in this study. 
The transferability (which corresponds to external validity/generalizability for positivists) of a research pro-
ject is itself assessed on the ability that one might have to transfer the result of the study to other situations. 
However, it is acknowledged that the transferability of findings in qualitative study is often hard to obtain 
(Shenton, 2004). The present study is no exception to that statement and also has limited transferability18. It 
would be presumptuous to say that this thesis’ findings would be accurate for all cities around the world. 
The lack of transferability of this thesis’ findings is highly dependent on the importance that the context 
plays in each of the case studies. Consequently, I have made a lot of effort to depict with as many details as 
possible the context of each of the cases, as recommended by Guba (1981).  
When similar results are obtained when running the project in the same conditions, with the same methods, 
and same participants, the research is acknowledged to have a high dependability. In order to ensure this, 
researchers are required to carefully describe their research design and implementation, the operational 
18
The transferability of the present research endeavour is further discussed in the Conclusion chapter (chapter 6).
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details of data gathering, and assess the effectiveness of the methods used in their inquiry. Having done this 
in the present chapter, I believe I have done everything in my power to guarantee my project’s dependabil-
ity. The final criterion used to evaluate the trustworthiness of a research project is confirmability. A project 
has high confirmability when the work’s findings are basically “the result of the experiences and ideas of the 
informants, rather than the characteristics and preferences of the researcher” (Shenton, 2004: 72). Again, 
confirmability can be ensured by using triangulation to reduce the investigator bias, which I have done, as 
previously explained. Shenton (2004) also preconized researchers to recognize the shortcomings of the re-
search methods used in the inquiry to increase confirmability, which will be done with greater details in the 
conclusive chapter of this thesis (Chapter 6). 
3.6 Overview of research design 
Here I sum up the overall research design adopted in this thesis (see Figure 3.6.1). Before doing so, it might 
be tempting to apply another categorization to the present research. According to Saunders (2009), every 
research project can be located on a continuum ranging from basic to applied research. While basic research 
aims to develop universal principles and expand knowledge, applied research seems more concerned with 
proposing solutions to existing organizational problems and improving understanding of specific organiza-
tional issues. While I hope that this thesis’ findings contribute to expanding knowledge, I believe that the key 
aim of the research undertaken in the present thesis is to get a better understanding of a specific organiza-
tional problem. As explained in the introduction, public authorities around the world nowadays are unsure 
about the role they should play in the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. There-
fore, they need solutions to decide, which is what the present thesis aims to propose. Hence, I believe this 
research should be considered as being applied research more than basic research.  
This research project started with a broad research question in mind (Chapter 1). From the very beginning, 
and perhaps also motivated by my experience as IGLUS project manager and my research interests in gov-
ernance (also shared by my supervisor), I was interested in exploring the governance of ICT-supported inte-
grated mobility schemes. Having looked at this potential subject from different angles, I finally decided to 
focus specifically on the role of public authorities in the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes. This perspective was welcomed by experts of the transportation sector when discussing it at vari-
ous events such as forums, brownbag seminars or conferences. Transport practitioners have often highlight-
ed the need to have a study focusing on the role of public authorities in the development of MaaS schemes, 
which is probably why they were supportive of the idea. However, to convince myself that this subject was 
worth studying for my PhD, I needed to be sure that it would also contribute to the scientific literature. Con-
sequently, I conducted a literature review of the literatures potentially associated with this thesis’ research 
question (Chapter two). I then decided on the methodology and research strategy to be used to answer my 
research question (Chapter 3). 
A deeper analysis of the (transport integration) literature allowed me to establish my case selection frame-
work that I used to select the London, Vienna, and Helsinki case studies. I then ran the three cases in parallel 
(Chapter 4), which are structured as follows. As Baxter and Jack (2008: 555) stated: “it is important that the 
researcher describes the context within which the phenomenon is occurring as well as the phenomenon it-
self”. Consequently, I have given particular importance to the context of the three different cases, which is 
visible in the way they are organized. I started by describing in as much detail as possible the political, eco-
nomic, and transport context of the three cases, before presenting chronologically in detail the development 
of transport systems and of the ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes studied. I then conducted two 
parallel cross-case analyses (Chapter 5), through two theoretical frameworks (governance and transition) 
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emerging from my review of the literature on transport governance and system innovations. By combining 
both analyses, I was then able to draw up a list of recommendations for public authorities interested to see 
ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes emerge, which are summed up in the conclusion (Chapter 6). In 
the conclusion I also shed light on the limitation of this thesis and propose new leads for research to be con-
ducted on ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. 
In the next chapter (Chapter 4), the three cases of studies will be presented. The order in which they are 
presented – London, Vienna, and Helsinki – follows the case-selection framework19.  
Figure 3.6-1: Overall research design (author’s elaboration)
19
i.e. the “new transport integration ladder”, presented in subchapter 3.3.3 
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Case studies 
In this chapter, the three case studies selected along the so-called “new” transport integration lad-
der, are presented. To begin, I describe the case of the Oyster and contactless payment card development in 
London from 2002 to 2018. In a second time, I present the development of integrated mobility platform in 
Vienna with through the SMILE and follow-up projects from 2007 to 2018. Finally, I conclude this chapter by 
depicting the unfolding of MaaS in Helsinki from 2009 to 2018, with a focus on MaaS Global’ solution, Whim. 
The three case studies follow the same structure. Firstly, a thorough description of the case context is given. 
Particular attention is given to the politico-economic context at the national and local level, the transport 
governance context, as well as about the technical and institutional developments of the urban transport 
system. Then a historical and chronological description of the development of the studied solution is provid-
ed. At the end of each case, a graphical representation of the main events that led to the development of the 
studied innovation is given in order to summarize the case studies. The supporting technology of the studied 
innovation is also described in dedicated text boxes at the end of each case. 
4.1 London case study 
In order to fully understand the context in which the development of Oyster and contactless payment cards 
has occurred in London, this subchapter starts by providing the reader with the political and administrative 
organization of the United Kingdom at the national level, before deep-diving into the local level. Then, the 
historical development of London’s transportation system from the beginning of the 20th century to today is 
presented. In a last time, the reader is walked through the key events that led to the development of innova-
tive ticketing systems in London, namely the Oyster cards and contactless payment cards. 
4.1.1 Context 
4.1.1.1 National level 
 Current situation
In 2015 the United Kingdom had a population of 65.11 million people (ONS, 2016a). With 17.7 percent of the 
population being aged between 0 and 14, 64.6 percent between 15 and 64, and 17.7 percent being older 
than 65, ageing population is an actual phenomenon in the UK (Eurostat, 2015). It is estimated that the UK 
population will increase by 9.7 million inhabitants over the next 25 years, reaching 74.3 million in mid-2039, 
making it the fourth-fastest-growing population in Europe (ONS, 2015a), and the most populated European 
country by 2050 (Eurostat, 2017). It is also estimated that 41 percent of the projected increase over the next 
25 years will come from net migration, while 49 percent will come from natural increase (ONS, 2015a). With 
83 percent of its population living in urban areas, the UK is one of the most urbanized countries in Europe, 
and above the OECD average of 80 percent. The country has long been more urbanized than the European 
average, as can be seen in Figure 4.1.1. 
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Figure 4.1-1: Urbanization evolution in UK compared to EU (author's elaboration based on WB data) 
In 2015, the UK’s GDP per capita was US$41,779, just over the OECD average of $40,791 and the EU average 
of $38,621 (OECD, 2016). Although the UK was hit hard by the 2008 financial crisis through a long recession, 
it has recovered well since 2013. According to the OECD, “structural reforms have strengthened work incen-
tives and supported a business-friendly environment, thus sustaining one of the most flexible economies in 
the OECD” (OECD, 2015: 8). Regarding mobile penetration, it is estimated that there were some 91.7 mobile 
broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in the UK, slightly lower than the OECD average of 95.1 (OECD, 
2016c). The UK was ranked 19th in the 2016 Human Capital index ranking (WEF, 2016) and 20th in the 2016 
Global Gender Gap index (WEF, 2016). In 2014, the UK was presented as having good social indicators over-
all. Indeed, the UK scored better than the G7 country average regarding subjective well-being, personal se-
curity, environmental quality, civic engagement and governance, social connections, health status, jobs, and 
earnings. However, the UK was ranked below the OECD average regarding relative poverty. It also performed 
worse than the G7 average regarding education and skills, work and life balance, housing and income, and 
wealth (OECD, 2015). Furthermore, the UK ranked second worst among OECD countries, just after the US, 
regarding income inequalities. It is also expected that the UK economy will most probably suffer from its 
withdrawal from the European Union (OECD, 2016a), directly following the referendum of June 2016 in 
which 52 percent of the British population voted in favor of the “Leave” solution, paving the way for the so-
called “Brexit”.  
Below, the administrative structure of UK is presented, in order to better understand how public authorities 
are embedded into the local urban governance system. 
 The English administrative system
The United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system. It comprises four countries: 
Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and England. The UK does not have a single document framing the struc-
ture of the state. In other words, it does not have a codified constitution, but rather various texts, judicial 
decisions, and practices that are understood as constitutional documents (Cabinet Office, 2011). The state is 
headed by a hereditary monarch, currently Queen Elizabeth II (since 1952), while the prime minister heads 
the UK government. 
The Parliament is comprised of two entities: the House of Commons, with 650 democratically elected mem-
bers of parliament, and the house of Lords, composed of 629 life peers, 91 hereditary peers and 24 clergy 
(Boyle, 2011). Since 2011, House of Commons members have been elected for a maximum period of five 
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years, which can be shortened if a motion for general election is decided by two-thirds of the seats of the 
Commons or if a motion of no confidence passed by the government goes through. The monarch usually 
appoints the leader of the winning political party as prime minister. Ministers are then appointed by the 
monarch, upon the recommendations of the prime minister, given that they are members of either house of 
Parliament (House of Commons, 2015). The government is accountable to the monarch as well as the Par-
liament. 
The main functions of the UK parliament are to carefully check and challenge the work of the government, 
to make laws, to control national expenditures, as well as to debate the important issues of the day (Cabinet 
Office, 2011). All parliamentary acts go through parliamentary procedure often referred to as “ping-pong”. 
Both chambers must agree on a bill in order for it to succeed and changes proposed in any of the chamber 
must be accepted by the other chamber in order for the bill to pass. When agreement cannot be found, the 
House of Commons may be able to have the “last word” and pass the bill. All the bills that are passed must 
then receive royal assent to become law.  
The local government structure in England is quite complex. England is divided between 228 two-tier local 
authorities and 125 single-tier authorities. The 228 two-tier local authorities are made of 27 county councils, 
encompassing 201 district councils that have distinct functions. The 125 single-tier authorities are made up 
of unitary authorities, 32 London boroughs and 36 metropolitan boroughs, which handle all local govern-
ment functions (Sandford, 2017). All these entities are divided into wards from which councilors are elected. 
London has a status that does not fit the traditional English administrative decoupage. The British capital 
city, usually referred to as Greater London, is made up of 32 London boroughs as well as the county of the 
City of London. The Greater London Authority (GLA), constituted of the democratically elected Mayor of 
London and 25 members of the London Assembly, governs Greater London. As the metropolitan level is 
quite important for the organization of transport in London, particular attention will be given later, regarding 
how metropolitan governance has evolved in London over the last decades.  
 British politics at the national level
Here is described how political life is organized in the UK. The first two presented political parties have his-
torically dominated the British political landscape, but smaller and more “local” political parties have been 
gaining momentum on the political chessboard. 
 The Conservative Party (also referred to as the Tories) sits at the center-right of the political
spectrum. It defines itself as supporting “policies that grow the economy as a whole, generating
new jobs and higher wages for everybody” (Conservatives, 2015: 13).
 The Labour Party sits at the center-left of the political ladder and aims to create a country
that “works again for working people” (Labour Party, 2015: 6).
 The Liberal Democrat Party lays at the center of the political spectrum and aims to build a
fair, free, and open society for the UK.
 The Scottish National Party is perhaps one of the strongest of the local political parties. Sit-
ting at the left of the spectrum, the SNP aims to secure Scotland’s interests in Parliament.
 The Democrat Unionist Party represents Northern Ireland’s interests in Parliament. It lays
on the right of the political ladder
 The Green Party of England and Wales sits at the left of the political spectrum and puts en-
vironmental protection as one of its core values.
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 The United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP) sits on the far right of the political spectrum
and is known for defending values such as border control, self-governance, and patriotism. It is
perhaps the most euro-skeptical of the UK political parties.
Many other smaller local political parties are trying to be represented at the national level. These include 
Plaid Cymru (Wales), the Ulster Unionist Party, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, the Scottish Green 
Party, and the Green Party in Northern Ireland. Although British politics have been considered as polarized 
between the Tories and the Labour Party for a long time, scholars have observed a depolarization in the last 
20 years and a convergence between the elites of the two dominant political parties (Adams et al., 2012). 
Still, it seened important to briefly summarize the results of the general elections and successive national 
governments from the beginning of the 21st century. 
Following 18 years of domination of the Conservative party, under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from 
1979 to 1990 and then John Major from 1990 to 1997, the general election of 1997 marked the return of the 
Labour Party in the British government. Indeed, the progressive evolution of the Labour into “New Labour” 
after the accession of Tony Blair as party leader in 1994 helped the Labour Party increase its popularity. The 
Labour party defeated the Tories in the 1997 General Election, with an outstanding 165 seats majority in the 
House of Commons (Margetts, 1997). The Labour Party won 419 of the 659 available seats, compared to 165 
for the Conservatives and 46 for the Liberal Democrats. Following that election, the Queen appointed Tony 
Blair as chief of the government and he formed his Labour government. During Blair’s first term as Prime 
Minister (1997–2001), John Prescott, the deputy prime minister, occupied the position of secretary of state 
for transport in the newly created Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR). Under 
Prescott’s secretariat, four different politicians occupied the position of minister of state for transport. They 
were: Gavin Strang from May 1997 to June 1998, John Reid from July 1998 to May 1999, Helen Liddell from 
May 1999 to July 1999, and Gus Macdonald from July 1999 to June 2001. 
In 2001, the UK General Election saw Labour keep its net majority in the House of Commons with 414 seats, 
despite losing five seats to the Liberal Democrats (52 seats), while the Conservatives won the remaining 166 
seats. Norris (2001) described this victory as an apathetic political landslide and the second historic victory of 
the Labour Party in general elections. Blair remained prime minister and formed a new government, ap-
pointing Stephen Byers as the secretary for the newly created Department of the Environment, Local Gov-
ernment and the Regions (DLTR). During that time, John Spellar served as minister of state for transport. In 
2002 the Department for Transport (DfT) was created, for which Alistair Darling took the lead until 2006. 
Under Darling’s secretary, Stephen Ladyman, Tony McNulty, and Kim Howells successfully served as minis-
ters of state for transport. 
The 2005 General Election was won for a third time by the Labour Party, but this time by a slight majority. 
The Labour majority that had stood at 160 seats from 2001 to 2005 fell to 66 seats in this election (Labour 
held 355 seats, the Tories 198, and the Liberal Democrats 62). Darling continued to head the DfT until May 
2006, when he was replaced by Douglas Alexander. In June 2007, Prime Minister Tony Blair resigned and 
Labour Party elections were organized, finally won by Mr. Gordon Brown, who became prime minister. Un-
der Brown’s leadership, Ruth Kelly held the position of secretary of state for transport from July 2007 to 
October 2008, with Rosie Winterton as minister of state for transport. Geoff Hoon held the position of secre-
tary of state for transport from October 2008 to June 2009, with Lord Adonis as minister of state for 
transport, and later becoming secretary of state for transport from June 2009 to May 2010. Under Lord 
Adonis’ tenure, Sadiq Khan served as the minister of state for transport. 
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The 2010 General Election witnessed the defeat of Labour by the Tories after 12 years in government. Com-
pared with the 2005 elections, the Conservatives realized a net gain of 96 seats, while Labour lost 90 seats 
and the Liberal Democrats lost five seats (Cracknell et al., 2011). The new House of Commons was constitut-
ed of 306 Conservative seats, 258 Labour seats, and 57 Liberal Democrat seats. Conservative Party Leader 
David Cameron became prime minister and then formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. 
The secretary for transport position was held by Conservatives Philipp Hammond from May 2010 to October 
2011, Justine Greening from October 2011 to September 2012, and then Patrick McLoughlin. 
In 2015 the UK General Election confirmed the domination of the Tories over the other political parties. The 
new house was comprised of 330 Conservative seats, 232 Labour seats, 56 Scottish National Party seats, and 
eight Liberal Democrat party seats. For the first time in history, the Scottish National Party became the third 
most important political party in the House of Commons. Cameron remained as prime minister and formed a 
Conservative Government, ending the coalition with the Liberal Democrats. In 2013, in order to gain more 
votes from the Eurosceptics, Cameron had promised that if its party had a majority in the 2015 general elec-
tions, a referendum would be organized about the future of the UK in the European Union. Following the 
Conservative victory in 2015, David Cameron kept his promise, organizing a referendum, held in June 2016, 
on whether the UK would stay in the EU or leave. Contrary to most predictions, 52 percent of voters chose 
the “Leave” option. Consequently, Cameron, who was in favor of staying in the EU, resigned. Theresa May 
was appointed by the Queen as prime minister and formed a Conservative government, with the difficult 
task of organizing the post-Brexit vote era; that is, the progressive exit of the United Kingdom from the EU. 
Chris Grayling replaced McLoughlin as secretary of state for transport. Figure 4.1.2 summarizes the political 
turnover of UK over the last 15 years. 
Figure 4.1-2: Political turnover in UK from 1997 to present (author's elaboration) 
 NPM and decentralization
To Groot and Budding (2008), NPM came to life in the UK under Margaret Thatcher’s leadership. From 1987 
to 2004, it is estimated that about £40 billion of private capital was invested in 626 projects in 20 different 
public sectors departments across the UK. Roughly half of this expenditure is known to have actually hap-
pened in the UK transportation sector (Gannon, 2005). As it will be detailed later, the transportation sector 
in the UK, and particularly in London has been an ever-evolving playground for the collaboration – not al-
ways successful – of the private and public sectors, resulting in an extremely complex institutional setting. 
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Other UK public sectors have also been impacted by NPM. For example, the UK water and sewage industry 
was entirely privatized in 1999, which resulted in a 46 percent rise in water prices in the same year (Dore et 
al., 2004). The electricity supply industry was also privatized in England and Wales, which Green described as 
the “most complex [privatization operation] that a government has undertaken” (Green, 1991: 245). 
The following subsection starts by presenting some context elements for London, before focusing on the 
historical development of London’s transportation network, both from institutional and infrastructural 
points of view. All the relevant actors involved in the development of smart integrated ticketing solutions in 
London are then presented, before some words are said about the evolution of metropolitan governance in 
the English capital. 
4.1.1.2 Local level: London 
 Current situation
London is the capital city of the UK. In the 2016 Mercer Quality of Life Index, London was ranked 39th posi-
tion, and 11th in the 2009 Green Cities Index by Siemens. London is composed of 32 boroughs plus the coun-
ty of the City of London, which together form the Greater London Territory, as can be seen in Figure 4.1.3. 
Figure 4.1-3: Boroughs of Greater London (author's elaboration based on ONS [2013]) 
Politically, London (or Greater London) is represented by the Greater London Authority (GLA), formed by the 
democratically elected London Assembly and the Mayor of London, whose mandates are detailed below. 
The current Mayor of London is Sadiq Khan (Labour), who was elected in May 2016. Prior to being elected 
mayor, Khan was an MP in the House of Commons from 2009, as well as minister of state for transport from 
2009 to 2010 under Prime Minister Gordon Brown. 
Economically, London is considered, along with Tokyo and New York, to be a so-called Global City (Sassen, 
1991). In 2014, London’s GDP per capita was €59,700, and had a Power Purchasing Standard of 186, while 
the EU28 average GDP per capita in PPS was 100. Greater London is the largest financial center in Europe. In 
December 2016, it had an unemployment rate of 5.5 percent, above the 4.8 percent UK average (ONS, 
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2017). It is relevant to assess the environmental footprint of the Greater London. In 2014, a total of 35,103 
mtCO2eq (metric tons of CO2 equivalent) were emitted within Greater London, with 7304 mtCO2eq (20.8 
percent) coming from transport (including private transportation), 12,556 mtCO2eq coming from domestic 
use, and 15241 mtCO2eq coming from industrial activities. In 2014, each Londoner emitted some 4.2t of 
tCO2eq (ONS, 2016b). 
The population of London has grown rapidly since the end of the 1980s. Following, a 22 percent decrease 
between 1939 and 1988, London population grew from 6.7 million inhabitants in 1988 to 8.4 million in 2011, 
reaching 8.63 million in 2015, its highest number ever. Since 1939, most of the growth has occurred in outer 
London. It is estimated that in 2039, London will have approximately 10.2 million people (GLA, 2015), which 
will account for about 13 percent of the total British population. Figure 4.1.4 shows the population evolution 
in London, Inner-London and Outer London from 1970 to 2015. 
Figure 4.1-4: Population evoution for Greater London since 1970 to 2015 (adapted from ONS [2013])  
In the following part, all the relevant actors linked with the development of intelligent integrated ticketing 
schemes in London are presented, to better understand how they are related to each other and who (when 
applicable) they are accountable to. 
 Actors
 The Greater London Authority (GLA) is composed of the Mayor of London and the London
Assembly, both democratically elected for four years. While the GLA is often described as having
important powers like other local parliaments (Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales,
and Northern Ireland Assembly), this is not the case in reality. The GLA is not defined as other
county councils, which have service delivery responsibilities. Indeed, this applies to the 32 Lon-
don boroughs, which are unitary local authorities that together form the GLA (Sandford, 2017).
The GLA’s budget is set by the Mayor of London and accepted by the London Assembly. It is
funded by government grants, business rates, transportation fares, and council tax.
 The London Assembly is constituted of 25 members and composed of several committees.
Its role is to monitor the actions of the mayor and examine its different strategies in the field of
transport, housing, energy and so on. The London Assembly may amend the mayor’s annual
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budget or a specific mayoral decision, should it obtain a two-thirds majority among its 25 mem-
bers.  
 
 The Mayor of London holds the executive power of the Greater London Authority. In partic-
ular, the mayor is responsible for setting the strategy and vision for London in terms of arts and 
culture, business and economy, environment, fire, health, housing and land, planning, police and 
crime, regeneration, sport, transport, and higher education. He is also expected to attract foreign 
investment as well as international events and conferences to London. He is responsible for set-
ting up the budget for the Greater London (including the Mayor of London, The London Assem-
bly, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authori-
ty, TfL, the London Legacy Development Corporation and Old Oak and Part Royal Development 
Corporation), which for 2017–2018 was approximately £16 billion (Mayor of London, 2016b). 
 
 The Department for Transport (DfT) is the UK government department (ministry) responsi-
ble for organizing transport in England and part of the transport network in Wales, Scotland, and 
Northern Island. It is responsible for policy, strategy, and guidance for roads, rail, buses, shipping, 
and aviation. The DfT also invests in roads and rail network expansion, manages rail franchises, 
and partly funds local public transport authorities (such as TfL). For example, in 2014–2015 the 
DfT spent some £20 billion: 52 percent for rail, 22 percent for local transport, 22 percent for mo-
torways and trunk roads, and 3 percent for other projects (NAO, 2015). 
 
 Transport for London (TfL) is a functional body of the Greater London Authority responsible 
for organizing most dimensions of London’s Transport system and implementing the Mayor’s 
Transport Strategy. TfL was created in 2000 following the creation of the Greater London Author-
ity (GLA). TfL’s 2016–2017 total budget was of £10.4 billion, 46 percent (£4.8 billion) of which 
came from fare revenue, 23 percent (£2.4 billion) from grants, 20 percent (£2.1 billion) from bor-
rowing and cash reserves, 8 percent (£878 million) from other sources of cash, and 3 percent 
(£138 million) from Crossrail funding. The main grant (subsidy) contributors are the DfT and the 
Greater London Authority (TfL, 2016d). Two-thirds of the budget (£6.8 billion) is spent on running 
the network (that is, operational costs) and the remainder on investment (£3.5 billion) (TfL, 
2016e). TfL’s board is appointed by the Mayor of London. For most of the services proposed, TfL 
owns and manages the infrastructure, through various subsidiaries, while it outsources some of 
the service through competitive tendering processes (bus services in particular). TfL is divided in-
to three units being Surface Transport, Underground and Crossrail. The Underground is operated 
and owned by London Underground Limited (LUL), while Crossrail is jointly owned between TfL 
and the DfT and will be operated by a private operator (MTR) when completed. Surface transport 
encompasses the following departments: 
 
 London Bus Services, which is TfL subsidiary managing bus services for Greater Lon-
don. London Bus Services manages contracts awarded to private bus operators 
through a competitive tendering process. TfL owns the bus stops but the private con-
tractors own the bus fleets. London’s bus network is one of the largest in the world, 
comprising approximately 9300 vehicles operating 675 different routes. The largest 
bus operating companies are Go Ahead London, Arriva (Deutsch Bahn), Metroline, 
and London United Busways (RATP). 
 
 Overground is a suburban rail network managed and owned by TfL. It is operated by 
Arriva (DB). 
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 Dockland Light Railway is a light metro that is owned and managed by TfL and oper-
ated by Keolis.
 London River services are managed by TfL and operated by Thames River Services
(TRS).
 TramLink is a tram network owned by TfL and operated by FirstGroup.
 TfL is also responsible for licensing taxicabs, private hire, and minicab services in
Greater London through its Taxi & Private Hire department
Surface transport also encompasses the Emirates Air Line (Cable car), Dial-a-ride (transport 
for disabled people), Victoria Coach Station (medium- to long-distance coach terminal), and 
Walking departments. Finally, TfL owns the ticketing infrastructure across the entire transpor-
tation system (at metro stations, overground stations, buses, etc.). 
 Cubic Transportation Systems is a subsidiary of Cubic corporation, which specializes in inte-
grated payment systems for transport. Cubic Transportation Systems holds the TfL-awarded Elec-
tra contract, and thus handles fare collection operations for London Transportation system,
through the Oyster and contactless payment cards. It has won several international awards for
its development of contactless payment cards as a means of transportation payment. Cubic
Transportation Systems operates fare collection systems in cities such as London, San Francisco,
New York, Chicago, Brisbane, Sydney, and Vancouver.
To fully understand the relationship between public authorities in London, the evolution of metropolitan 
governance within the Greater London Area is given below. 
 Metropolitan governance in London
As the largest and most prosperous city in the United Kingdom, relationships between the central govern-
ment and London’s government, as well as between territorial entities within the Greater London area, have 
not always been peaceful and steady. London is described as having suffered from confused (Travers, 2005) 
and instable government (Thornley, 2003) for the last decades. 
The first institutional body set up for the Greater London was the London County Council (LCC) in 1888, 
which covered all built-up area at that time, except a famous and prosperous tiny territory, located in the 
heart of the urban area, which was already home to financial and international activities and is today known 
as the City of London, which was (and still is) managed by the City Corporation (Thornley, 2003). In 1963, 
under Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s Labour administration, the London Government Act 1963 established 
the Greater London Council (GLC) and redefined the structure of local governments in the capital city. The 
GLC’s main duties were to manage traffic, waste, fire, and ambulance brigades and to maintain roads, within 
the 32 newly established London Boroughs and to coordinate actions with the City of London (Porter, 1998). 
After having been controlled by a succession of Labour and Conservative leaders, the GLC became Labour-
controlled for one last time in 1981, led by Ken Livingstone, who quickly used the GLC as a stage for opposi-
tion and confrontation to UK’s central government, led at that time by the Tory Prime Minister Thatcher 
(White, 2008). The Thatcher government proposed the Local Government Act in 1985, which ultimately abol-
ished the Greater London Council and gave power back to the London Boroughs. 
The victory of Tony Blair (Labour) in the 1997 UK general elections sealed the return of a metropolitan gov-
ernment for the Greater London. Following the publication of a green paper about the restoration of a po-
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tential metropolitan authority, Blair’s government organized a referendum in 1998 on the proposal to create 
a “Greater London Authority” (GLA) for the capital (Travers, 2008), which was accepted by 72 percent of the 
voters. Hence, the GLA, along three statutory organizations (Transport for London, the London Fire and 
Emergency Planning Authority, and the London Development Agency), was created to establish policies that 
aimed to impact London as a whole. The first elected mayor of Greater London (referred to as the Mayor of 
London) was Ken Livingstone (Labour) in 2000, who was re-elected for a second term in 2004. Boris Johnson 
(Tories) was then elected for two consecutive terms, before seeing Sadiq Khan become the newly elected 
Mayor of London in June 2016. 
In the following part the development of London’s transportation system, from an institutional and infra-
structural point of view, is provided. As it will be shown, many of the institutional changes regarding trans-
portation were linked with institutional changes related to metropolitan governance. London’s transporta-
tion system is one of the most complex and developed in the world, which is why its historical development 
has been divided into as many different time periods as possible. It seemed important to deep-dive into the 
evolution of London’s transportation system in order to fully understand the evolution of the associated 
ticketing system, which ultimately evolved into the development of smart ticketing schemes. 
4.1.2 Historical development of London transportation system 
4.1.2.1 From the 1860s to 1933: From fragmentation to unification 
In conjunction with the Industrial Revolution, many railways were built in the UK during the first half of the 
19th century, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as “Railway Mania” (Glover, 2011). The first local rail-
ways established in London were the steam powered London & Greenwich railway in 1836 and the London 
& Blackwall railway in 1840 (Glover, 2011). As with many cities, transport in the first half of the 19th century 
mainly relied on horse-powered carriages, also referred to as omnibuses. From 1855, the London General 
Omnibus Company started buying omnibuses operating in London, and established agreements with the 
remaining ones (Costa and Fernandes, 2011), gradually establishing a monopoly on bus operations in Lon-
don. At that time, bus carriage companies had to request a license from the Metropolitan Police under the 
1869 Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, after which they were free to operate (Hey, 2009). 
To prevent the capital city being over-run with railways, a Royal Commission set up in 1846 recommended 
that the main railway lines would end up at the periphery of central London. With the exception of Charing 
Cross station, this recommendation was respected and enabled the subsequent development of the metro 
network (Glover, 2011). The first metro line construction began in 1860, commonly known as the Metropoli-
tan Railway, which aimed to connect the different peripheral main-line train stations together to decrease 
congestion in Central London (Glover, 2011). The steam-powered Metropolitan Railway opened in 1863 
between Paddington and Farringdon, connecting the surface rail stations of Euston, St. Pancras, and King’s 
Cross (Levinson, 2007).  
At the same time, the first horse-powered tramway lines were inaugurated. However, those did not last long 
as no regulations existed for them. Although the 1870 Tramway Act was supposed to pave the way for the 
rolling out of tramways in London, it never gained attention as it was mainly considered as a solution that 
was more suited for the suburbs than for London’s city center (Wilson, 2013). From the 1870s, several 
tramway lines were privately developed for London suburbs, which were progressively electrified from the 
late 1890s (Wilson, 2013). As of 1911, it is estimated that the London City Council was the owner of an elec-
trified tram network of about 123 miles, bought from numerous commercial companies (Inwood, 2005). 
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However, due to the high cost of infrastructure maintenance and the affordable cost of bus carriage, most 
tram operators stopped operating.  
The second section of the Metropolitan Railway was opened in 1868 from Paddington to South Kensington 
(Porter, 1998). It is estimated that between 1860 and 1869, 219 railway bills were submitted to the Parlia-
ment, only a few of which were approved (Simmons, 1978). The development of the Metropolitan Railway 
was accompanied by the development of the Hammersmith and City Railways. In 1884, by linking the Met-
ropolitan and newly developed district railways, the (soon-to-be) Inner-Circle Line was created (Levinson, 
2007).  
However, because of the cut-and-cover method being used to build the different metro lines, the center of 
London quickly became impracticable, due to construction work. This motivated developers to go towards 
the deep-hole boring method, which had the advantage of carving out routes without disturbing the town 
landscape (Porter, 1998). Because steam engines were not going to be accepted in deep holes tunnels, elec-
tric traction was finally introduced and the “Tube” (as it is commonly referred to nowadays) was born. The 
first tube line to be built was the City and South London Railway, inaugurated in 1890 (Levinson, 2007). This 
was followed by the building of the Central London Railway, which was financially supported by international 
investments (Porter, 1998). The beginning of the 20th century was marked by the arrival in London of the 
American investor Charles Tyson Yerkes, who saw in London rapidly growing population and the need for 
mass transit a “Gold mine” (Franch, 2006: 285). Yerkes is known to be responsible for having built the Baker-
loo, Piccadilly, and Hampstead tube lines, as well as participating in the electrification of London Under-
ground (Franch, 2006).  
Although 1902 marked the beginning of the first motorized buses operations in London by the LGOC (In-
wood, 2005), it also represented an important institutional change. After acquiring London United Tramways 
(LUT), Yerkes created the Underground Electric Railway Company of London (UERL) in 1902, of which he 
became chairman. After some difficult years, the UERL acquired London’s largest bus operators at that time, 
the London General Omnibus company (LGOC), as well as the Metropolitan Electric Tramways and the Cen-
tral and the City & South London Lines (Daniel, 2004). In 1910, all lines owned and operated by the UERL 
were merged and almost all companies started a joint marketing policy under the name “Underground”. In 
order to avoid ruinous competition, companies of the “Underground” also decided jointly on fare levels 
(Glover, 2011). In 1912, the “Underground” bundled all London metro lines together, except the Waterloo & 
City line and the Great Northern line, which were owned by the Metropolitan (Glover, 2011). It was only a 
matter of time before all London Metro lines were unified and integrated under a single brand. 
In 1919, under Prime Minister Lloyd George, the Ministry of Transport was created, which oversaw transport 
as part of the First World War reconstruction efforts. The first minister in charge, Mr. Geddes, who was al-
ready aware of the high fragmentation state of transportation systems nationwide and in favor of nationali-
zation, commissioned the creation of the Advisory Committee on London Traffic, which proposed the crea-
tion of the London Traffic Authority. Because of a lack of funding, the authority never eventuated, but did 
pave the way for the 1924 London Traffic Act, which aimed to regulate bus traffic, as some unregulated op-
erations were taking place (Hey, 2009). 
Since 1863, the London Underground system had been developed exclusively by the private sector; this 
changed in 1933 with the creation of the London Passenger Transport Board, when the London Under-
ground network came under public ownership. In 1933, the London metro system counted eight different 
lines: the District Railway, the Bakerloo Line, the Piccadilly Line, the Central London Railway, the Edgware 
Highgate and Morden Line, the Metropolitan Railway North and South, and the East London Railway. 
98 
4.1.2.2 From 1933 to 1948: Municipalization and London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB) 
In April of 1933 the 1933 London Passenger Transport Act was published, which aimed at the “establishment 
of a Passenger Transport board for an area to be known as the London Passenger Transport Area, which shall 
comprise certain portions of the London Traffic Area and of the districts adjacent thereto, and for the transfer 
to that Board of various transport undertakings and interests; to make other provisions with respect to traffic 
in the said area; and for purposes connected with the maters aforesaid” (1933: 1). Following this Act, the 
newly created LPTB absorbed the London Underground Group (UERL), the Metropolitan Railway (UERL’s 
main competitor) and remaining tramway companies, including London United, which had started introduc-
ing trolleybuses to replace electric trams. All the undertakings were bought up with interest-bearing stock 
(Harris, 2011). For the first time, London’s transportation system was unified under a single body and regu-
lated under the 1924 London Traffic Act.  
In 1935, The LPTB announced the progressive replacement of the trams by trolley buses, mainly for econom-
ic reasons, which was completed in 1952. The same year the LPTB announced the planning of the Under-
ground network extension (Harris, 2011). In 1939, the famous RT I double-decker buses, manufactured by 
the Associated Equipment Company (AEC), a subsidiary of LGOC, were introduced (Taylor and Green, 2011). 
However, the underground network extension was stopped because of the start of the Second World War in 
1939. London’s transportation system was not used much during the war as authorities were trying to save 
as much energy as possible. Due to air raids and the depth at which some of London’s Tubes tunnels had 
been dug, some tube stations were used by civilians as shelters. For example, on September 27, 1940, 
177,000 people spent the night in London Underground stations to be protected from the bombings (Glover, 
2011). 
Figure 4.1.5 summarizes the main institutional and infrastructural developments that occurred in London 
Transportation Systems from 1836 to 1940. 
Figure 4.1-5: Institutional and infrastructural evolution of London's transportation system from 1836 to 1940 (author’s elaboration) 
4.1.2.3 From 1948 to 1962: Nationalization and London Transport Executive (LTE) 
The war was followed by a period of nationalization. In November 1946, a transport Bill was published under 
Clement Attlee’s Labour Government, which led to the creation of the British Transport Commission (BTC), 
taking over all the canal and railway undertakings, including the LPTB (Day, 1972). To assist the BTC, five 
executives were formed (Millward, 1997), including the London Transport Executive (LTE), whose aim was to 
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provide, jointly with the Railway Executive, an “efficient, adequate, economical and properly integrated sys-
tem of passenger transport, by rail and by road, in the London Transport Area” (Glover, 2011: 49). During 
these years, most efforts were put into fixing the damages caused by the war and electrifying the remaining 
steam-powered lines, the electrification of which had been postponed because of the war (Day, 1972). The 
central line was extended to the east and the west, and some of the pre-war projects were re-evaluated to 
be finally abandoned, due to the establishment at that time of the Green Belt surrounding London (Harris, 
2011), based on the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act. The year 1962 marked the end of operations for 
trolleybuses that had been replaced by diesel buses, as well as the end of the LTE (Harris, 2011). 
4.1.2.4 From 1962 to 1969: London Transport Board 
The 1962 Transport Act resulted in the establishment of dedicated public authorities to replace the BTC. In 
particular, it enabled the creation of the London Transport Board (LTB), the British Transport Docks Board, 
the British Railways Board, and the British Waterways Board, all with directed chairmen appointed by the 
transport minister (Transport Act, 1962). The LTB’s mission was to “provide or secure the provision of an 
adequate and properly co-ordinated system of passenger transport for the London Passenger Transport Area 
and to have due regard to efficiency, economy and safety of operation as respects the services and facilities 
provided by them” (Transport Act, 1962: 7). The Act also specified that the LTB would have to cooperate with 
the Railways Board to coordinate services. Not much happened during the LTB era apart from the construc-
tion of the Victoria Line, for which early planning started back in 1943 (Day, 1972). The government gave the 
green light to LTB to start the construction of the Victoria Line (also called Route C) because the tunneling 
would provide many jobs for Londoners (Harris, 2011). The first section of the Victoria Line opened in Sep-
tember 1968, the first new tube route to open since 1907.  
4.1.2.5 From 1969 to 1984: London Transport Executive / LTE (re-municipalization) 
Following the constitution of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1963, and the LTB’s increasing deficit and 
staff shortages, the central Labour government agreed to pass all transport undertakings to the GLC through 
the newly created London Transport Executive (Glover, 2011). According to the 1969 London Transport Act, 
“it shall be the general duty of the Greater London Council (…) to develop policies, and to encourage, organ-
ize and, where appropriate, carry out measures, which will promote the provision of integrated efficient and 
economic transport facilities and services for Greater London” (London Transport Act, 1969: 1). In 1971, the 
green light was given to extend the Piccadilly line towards Heathrow Airport, which was hosting more and 
more passengers. The line extension was finally inaugurated in December 1977 (Glover, 2011). 
The second major underground project that happened during the LTE era was the opening of the first part of 
the Jubilee line in 1979, planned to run from north to south east London, through its center (Taylor and 
Green, 2001). Instead of extending the Jubilee line to the east, a cheaper option was found with the devel-
opment of the Docklands Light Railway (DLR). 
The transportation system was not at its best at that time. Total bus ridership for Central Area routes de-
creased from 1.9 billion passengers in 1965 to 1.4 billion in 1972. In 1974, only two out of five buses were 
driver-only operated, although all were supposed to be (Harris, 2011). From 1963 to 1979, it is estimated 
that costs per bus mile in London rose by a factor of 2.3, while from 1970 to 1982 they rose by more than 68 
percent. In the same period, from 1970 to 1982, it is estimated that the annual grant paid to LTE from cen-
tral government increased from £6.5 million to nearly £85 million – a thirteen-fold increase (Kennedy, 
1996b). At the beginning of the 1980s, friction started to appear between the Labour-led GLC (the LTE) and 
the Tory-led central government.  
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The 1980 Transport Act introduced the possibility for county councils to set up trial areas to test bus deregu-
lation. Although it was concluded at the end of the trials that deregulated bus services were not perfect, all 
the trials demonstrated lower fare, better levels of service, and reductions in revenue support (Poole, 1999). 
In 1983, as political fights were occurring between GLC and the government, and the performance of London 
public transportation system was still low, the central government suggested major changes for the organi-
zation of London’s public transportation system (Hensher, 1991). Figure 4.1.6 shows the institutional and 
infrastructural evolution of London transportation system from 1946 to 1983. 
Figure 4.1-6: The institutional and infrastructural evolution of London Transportation system from 1946 to 1983 (author’s elaboration) 
The 1983 Transport Act obliged Metropolitan Counties and their passenger transport executives to submit 
three-year Public Transport Plans in which they would estimate the costs of providing transport services and 
the anticipated levels of demand (Dodgson and Topham, 1986). Ultimately, the central government, still led 
by conservatives, proposed a White Paper in 1983 (Kennedy, 1996b), which paved the way for nation-wide 
bus deregulation. 
4.1.2.6  From 1984 to 2000: London Regional Transport (LRT) and privatization 
In 1984, the conservative government, led by Mrs. Thatcher at that time, decided to remove the transport 
competency from the GLC’s authority, which eventually announced the abolishment of the GLC that hap-
pened in 1986 (Taylor and Green, 2001). The 1984 London Regional Transport Act constituted London Re-
gional Transport (LRT), whose duty was “to provide or secure the provision of public passenger transport 
services for Greater London” (London Regional Transport Act, 1984: 2) and was to report directly to the sec-
retary of state for transport. The Act also forced the newly created LRT to establish companies to run London 
bus and underground services. Thus, London Buses Ltd. (LBL) and London Underground Ltd. (LUL) were cre-
ated as fully-owned subsidiaries of LRT (Kennedy, 1996a). The 1984 London Regional Transport Act also in-
troduced a system of tendering for bus operations in London. The first tenders, which concerned 13 self-
contained routes in outer London, were set up in 1985, representing 1.2 percent of the LRT bus network 
(Kennedy, 1995). 
This was followed by the 1985 Transport Act, which aimed to amend “the law relating to road passenger 
transport; to make provision or the transfer of the operations of the National Bus Company to the private 
sector; to provide for the reorganization of passenger transport in the public sector; to provide for local and 
central government financial support for certain passenger transport services and travel concessions; to 
make further provision with respect to the powers of London Regional Transport” (Transport Act, 1985). This 
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act is acknowledged to have enhanced the deregulation of bus services throughout the UK, but exempted 
London from doing so. However, still following the 1984 London Regional Transport Act that stipulated mov-
ing towards competitive tendering when possible and relevant, more bus routes were put to tender and 
awarded to the bidding operator that was capable of providing the best service quality at the most cost-
effective price (TfL, 2016c). 
As mentioned earlier, the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) was proposed as an alternative to the completion of 
the eastward section of the Jubilee line, which opened in August 1987, but was insufficient to meet the in-
creasing transport needs to and from the Docklands neighborhood. Thus, the Jubilee line was finally extend-
ed and opened in 1999 (Taylor and Green, 2001). The extension of the Jubilee line was made possible thanks 
to a PPP including central government, LRT, land developers Olympic and Warf, and British Gas (UCL, 2009) 
It is estimated that by 1993, approximately half of London’s bus miles had been awarded through gross cost 
contracts to private operators following competitive tendering process. The other half was operated as a 
monopoly by LBL (Kennedy, 1996). In 1992, LBL divided its operations within 13 subsidiary companies that 
started competing with one another. Fifty percent of LBL’s bus routes were gradually put to tender (TfL, 
2015). In 1994, following a decision from the central government, the 13 LBL subsidiaries were finally sold, 
either through management buyouts or sales to other bus operating companies from outside London or 
abroad (TfL, 2015). Three distinct types of contract have been tendered since 1985: gross cost contracts, net 
cost contracts, and, since 2000, quality incentive contracts (TfL, 2016i). According to White (1990), the Lon-
don bus reform has led to a welfare gain of £42 million per year, and London has been doing especially well 
compared to the full deregulation that occurred in the other British provinces following the 1993 Transport 
Act.  
The rail sector was also significantly impacted during the Thatcher years. In 1992, the DfT released a white 
paper entitled “New opportunities for railways”, which aimed to introduce competition and vertical separa-
tion, and involve the private sector. In the following year the 1993 Railway Act was published, which led to 
privatization of British railways, owned and operated at that time by the public entity British Rail. The rail 
infrastructure was taken over by Railtrack, which was then sold to the private sector. In 1996, the first fran-
chises of passenger train operation were sold to private train operating companies (Finger, 2014). The British 
Rail privatization case is known to be a unique and extreme case of privatization that has benefited patron-
age growth, but also suffered from increased costs and decreased levels of safety (Finger, 2014). 
Considering London Underground Limited’s significant assets and costs compared to its revenue, LUL un-
derwent a wide array of funding initiatives, including private sector participation (Gannon, 2005). In March 
of 1998, following a decision from the UK prime minister, London Underground Limited was split into four 
parts: one operating company (Opsco) and three infrastructure companies – BCV Infraco (standing for the 
Bakerloo, Central and Victoria lines), JNP Infraco (standing for the Jubilee, Northern, and Piccadilly lines), and 
SSL Infraco (standing for the sub-surface lines; that is, the Circle, District, East London, Hammersmith and 
City, and Metropolitan Lines). While Opsco was responsible for operating the trains and running the stations 
and safety, the three Infracos were responsible for funding, renewing, and maintaining LUL’s assets.  
London’s transportation system has gone through various forms of ownership and governance over the last 
century (municipalization, nationalization, re-municipalization, privatization) to finally go under re-
municipalization in 2000 as detailed below. 
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4.1.2.7 From 2000 onwards: the TfL era 
The end of the 1990s marked an important turn in the governance of London’s transportation system. Fol-
lowing 14 years without a democratically elected government for the whole London area, the 1999 Greater 
London Authority Act established the Greater London Authority and Mayor of London, as well as Transport 
for London (TfL) and other administrative bodies. It gave the mayor the rights to “develop and implement 
policies for the promotion and encouragement of safe, integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities 
and services to, from and within Greater London” (Greater London Authority Act, 1999: 89), through the 
development of the Mayor Transport Strategy. Transport for London was officially established in July 2000, 
few months after Ken Livingston was elected as the first Mayor of London, and as a combination of five TfL 
sub-departments: buses, underground, Victoria Coach Station, DLR, and London River services (Glover, 
2011). LUL continued to exist after the birth of TfL. The overall institutional evolution of transport in London 
since 1933 is summarized in figure 4.1.7. 
Figure 4.1-7: Institutional evolution of London Transportation system from 1933 to nowadays (author's elaboration)  
One of the main problems that London Underground faced at the start of the 21st century was securing 
funds in order to maintain and update the gigantic underground infrastructure. Thus, London Underground 
undertook a series of public–private partnerships (PPPs) to secure funding. In 2003, CV and SSL Infraco were 
acquired by Metronet, and JNP Infraco acquired by Tubelines (Gannon, 2005). Under their respective con-
tracts, Metronet and TubeLines were to provide London Underground with trains, stations, and related in-
frastructure according to a set of performance criteria, in exchange for a monthly payment based on their 
performance, which is also known as an infrastructure service charge (ISC). After these PPPs were signed, 
the whole Underground undertaking finally passed to TfL in July 2003 (Glover, 2011). However, based on the 
poor performances of the Infracos, Metronet Rail transferred its assets to TfL in 2008 after going into admin-
istration (TfL, 2008), which was also the case for TubeLines in 2011. To sum up, from 2003 to 2011, the 
whole London underground network went under PPPs, where infrastructure assets were maintained by 
private companies (Metronet and Tubelines), but still owned and operated by London Underground, to final-
ly come back under public ownership as TfL assets. 
In February 2003, the Mayor of London and TfL launched the Congestion Charge Scheme, which aimed to 
decrease congestion in and around central London. It was accompanied by the launch of several methods to 
pay for the charge, such as SMS payment or online payments (TfL, 2004b). In 2007, the congestion charge 
scheme was extended to the west to cover most of Kensington and Chelsea plus Westminster (TfL, 2006b). 
Conservative Mayor of London Boris Johnson finally decided to remove the Congestion Charge Scheme over 
the extended zone in 2011. 
In 2007 the London Overground was launched, which is considered as a successful transformation of unu-
tilized and over-fragmented railway infrastructures (Badstuber and Smales, 2013). This transformation actu-
ally began in early 2004, after the DfT released its white paper entitled “the Future of Rail”, aimed at pre-
senting the organizational and structural changes needed to make the British rail industry better at serving 
its customers as well as improving performance, safety, and controlling costs (DfT, 2004b). This white paper 
also led to TfL gaining responsibilities vis-à-vis rail services in the Greater London area by proposing that the 
Mayor of London become responsible for rail services within the GLA area. Following this white paper, TfL 
took over the Silverlink metro network located in Northern London and invested in new rolling stock, infra-
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structure upgrades, and station refurbishments to increase customer services standards. TfL renamed this 
part of the network Overground, which went live in late 2007. In 2011, TfL then added to the Overground 
network the East London Line and created four additional stations, ultimately forming an orbital rail network 
around London. The development of the overground accounted for £1.5 billion for TfL (Badstuber and 
Smales, 2013). 
Following its 2004 bid, London was selected to host the 2012 Olympic Games. To cope with the growing 
demand that was going to be brought during the Olympics, and the obsolete state of the transportation 
system, the Olympic Delivery Authority created the Olympic Transport plan, which resulted in a £6.5 billion 
investment by TfL around the Olympic Park and across London (Butcher, 2012a). 
In 2007 the DfT released a white paper entitled “Delivering a Sustainable Railway”, which planned to invest 
£5.5 billion in the Thameslink project (Butcher, 2010), with the aim of transforming north–south travel 
through central London by increasing capacity and reducing journey times through the refurbishment and 
expansion of the current Thameslink route through central London (Butcher, 2012b). The project is expected 
to be completed by 2018. On May 15, 2009, Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Conservative Mayor 
of London Boris Johnson inaugurated the beginning of the construction of the Isle of Dogs soon-to-be Cross-
rail station (The Economist, 2009). This project, which is supposed to create a 118 kilometer east–west rail 
corridor running through central London, had been on the table since 1989. After being rejected by Parlia-
ment in 1994 and having faced severe opposition, the project received Royal Assent in July 2008. With an 
estimated cost of about £16 billion, the Crossrail mega-project is the UK’s largest investment ever (Hebbert, 
2012), funded for £7.7 billion by GLA and TfL, including £3.5 from a special tax on London businesses, £5.6 
billion from the DfT, £2.3 billion from Network Rail (formerly known as Railtrack), and the rest from Corpora-
tion of London, Canary Wharf property developer and BAA, which runs most of London airports (The Econ-
omist, 2009). Crossrail is supposed to be completed entirely by 2019 and to deliver a 10 percent increase in 
rail-based network capacity in London. It should be opened as the “Elizabeth Line” in honor of Queen Eliza-
beth. A Crossrail 2 project, also originating from the 1989 Central London Rail study, that would come across 
London from south west to north east, is also in the pipeline (TfL, 2014b). 
In 2010, building on work from the previous mayor, Ken Livingston, newly elected mayor Boris Johnson pro-
posed, as part of the Cycling Revolution project, the establishment of a Cycle Hire Scheme, soon to be re-
ferred to as “Boris’s Bikes”, planned to be functional by summer 2010. It is estimated that the whole cycle 
hire scheme cost was approximately £140 million, over £25 million of which was financed by Barclays Bank 
through sponsorship (CNN, 2010). Santander Bank took over the bike sharing scheme sponsorship in 2015 
for £43.75 million over seven years, which was then composed of 11,500 bikes and 748 docking stations (TfL, 
2015a). As part of the Cycling Revolution project, cycle superhighways were also to be developed in the capi-
tal (TfL, 2010b), at a cost of approximately £400 million (The Guardian, 2008). Figure 4.1.8 shows the use of 
“Boris’s Bikes” since its launch in 2012. 
In 2012, Uber began its operations in London. It is estimated that two years after the launch of the TNC, 
there were 26 percent more licensed cabs in London (The Telegraph, 2015). Taxi drivers have been protest-
ing and striking (The Telegraph, 2015b) since Uber began operating, accusing TfL of being “in bed” with Uber 
(The Telegraph, 2015c). Thus, at the end of 2015 TfL proposed a regulation including a clause to force cus-
tomers to have to wait five minutes between ordering and delivery time (FT, 2016). These proposals were 
finally dropped by TfL, which in 2016 proposed new regulations, including the need for Uber drivers to pass a 
special English test and to have special insurance. Uber has since sued TfL. To fight against Uber and help the 
black cab industry, newly elected Mayor of London Sadiq Khan presented measures that will allow black cabs 
to use some priority lanes used for buses and grant money for replacement of old cabs (The Telegraph, 
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2016a). However, against all odds, TfL decided in September 2017 not to renew Uber’s operating license, 
citing a lack of corporate responsibility of the e-hailing service in London. Uber decided to appeal that deci-
sion and is still allowed to operate until any appeal processes have been exhausted (TfL, 2017a). In June 
2018, Uber finally regained its operating license.  
Figure 4.1-8: Evolution of cycle hires in London from 2010 to 2016  
In 2014, the Car Club Coalition was created in London, constituted of car sharing schemes (Bolloré, car2Go, 
City Car Club, DriveNow, E-Car Club, Europcar, Hertz and Zipcar), London Councils, GLA, TfL and other im-
portant stakeholders, aimed at setting a collaborative strategy among car clubs to accelerate the growth of 
the car sharing market in London (TfL, 2014a). Car sharing is presented in the paper as a real alternative for 
private car use in London and as being able to bring environmental, economic, and social benefits. In January 
2015 London’s Car Clubs had about 135,000 members and is expected to have about 264,000 by 2020 (Frost 
and Sullivan, 2015). 
In November 2015, following a statement from the Chancellor of the Exchequer (equivalent of the minister 
of finance) George Osborne, the DfT announced that its resource budget will be decreased by 37 percent by 
2020. In other words, the DfT’s operational budget is expected to fall from £2.6 bn in 2015 to £1.8 bn in 
2019–20 (The Guardian, 2015). Because of these cuts, TfL’s budget originating from the DfT is to be reduced 
to zero, leaving TfL to fund itself entirely through commercial investment, cuts, and restructuring (FT, 2015).  
In February 2016, during the mayoral campaign, the Labour party candidate, Sadiq Khan, stated that it would 
not allow transportation strikes to happen during his mandate, recalling the 16 strikes that happened during 
mayor Livingstone’s mandate and the 35 strikes that happened during mayor Johnson’s mandate (Daily Tel-
egraph, 2016b). 
“As Mayor what I’d do is roll up my sleeves and make sure that I’m talking to everyone who runs public 
transport to make sure there are zero days of strikes. Sixteen was too many and 35 is a disgrace.” 
In late 2016 and early 2017, after Khan’s election, London’s underground metro system was animated by a 
series of strikes initiated by the Rail, Maritime and Transport (RMT) Union in protest against the suppression 
of nearly 900 jobs and the closure of ticket offices (Labourlist, 2017), directly resulting from subsidiaries cuts 
from the DfT. The RMT Union was officially protesting about a “wholesale breakdown” of industrial relations, 
as well as the closure of ticket offices (Telegraph, 2016). The deletion of 900 staff positions was also pre-
sented as a threat to the tube security since it made the whole metro system under-staffed. Khan was heavi-
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ly criticized as he had promised that there would not be any strikes of the transportation system under his 
mandate (CityAM, 2016).  
In December 2016, TfL published a business plan for 2017/2018 to 2021/2022. The plan stated that fares will 
indeed become the primary source of income for TfL, growing from 70 percent of its budget in 2016/17 to 76 
percent by 2021/22. The plan also stated that fares would not rise and that everything would be done in 
order to protect core investment, modernize the network, and increase its capacity. According to the plan, 
new transport developments such as the Elizabeth line, planned to break ground in 2019/20, will help in-
crease the number of customers, but also that more has to be done to get some of the customers back onto 
the network, particularly regarding bus services (TfL, 2016b). The year 2016 was also marked by the begin-
ning of the night tube service in August, with services all night long on the Central, Jubilee, Northern, Picca-
dilly, and Victoria Metro Lines (TfL, 2016c). Thus, London joined the very small list of cities with an all-night 
metro system, including New York, Chicago, Copenhagen, Melbourne, and Mumbai. Figure 4.1.9 summarizes 
the main institutional and infrastructural developments that occurred in the London Transportation Systems 
from 1984 to the present. 
Figure 4.1-9: Institutional and infrastructura evolution of London Transportation system from 1984 to nowadays (author's elaboation)  
4.1.2.8 Transport in London nowadays 
From 2000 to 2015, 10.4 percent of trips shifted from private transport towards public transport, walking, 
and cycling, which together accounted for 63.8 percent of all trips taken in London (TfL, 2016f). Authorities 
acknowledged a 5 percent shift away from car travel in inner London between 2005/06 and 2015/16, from 
26 percent to 21 percent, benefiting mostly human-powered modes (3 percent) and public transport (2 per-
cent). In outer London, it is estimated that a 3 percent shift away happened from car use, from 50 to 47 
percent, benefiting public transport and cycling, while also reducing walking modal share (TfL, 2016a). In 
general, road traffic has decreased by 10 percent from 2000 to 2015, which accounted for a 21 percent re-
duction in inner London. This is acknowledged to be mostly the impact of the congestion charge launched in 
2003 (TfL, 2016a). In 2015, London’s population was 8.6 million inhabitants, which is 19 percent higher than 
in 2000 and 10.3 percent higher than in 2008. Figure 4.1.10 represents the evolution of modal share in 
Greater London from 1995 to 2015. 
In 2014, 26.6 million trips were made on an average day in London, which was 2 percent higher than in 2013 
and 8.2 percent higher than in 2008 (TfL, 2015c). In 2014, 9.5 million trips (36 percent) were made on an 
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average day using public transportation, 9.8 million (37 percent) using private motorized vehicles and 7 mil-
lion (27 percent) using human-powered mobility modes (walking or cycling). Among the 9.5 million daily 
trips made by public transport in 2014, 4.1 million (43 percent) were made by bus and trams, 2.6 million (27 
percent) using underground and overground and 2.8 million (30 percent) using rail. The modal share is 
summed up in Figure 4.1.11 (TfL, 2015c). 
Figure 4.1-10: evolution of daily average number of trips by main mode of travel from 1995 to 2015 
Figure 4.1-11: modal share in Greater London in 2014 
As shown in Figure 4.1.12, public transport has been growing at a much faster pace than London population 
for the last 25 years. It is also interesting to compare the growth in journey stages on selected modes to the 
population growth in London. In 2012, there were 2.56 million cars registered in London, which is approxi-
mately 300 cars for every 1000 inhabitants. Forty-six percent of households did not own a car, 40 percent 
had one car, 12 percent had two cars and fewer than 2 percent had more than two cars (TfL, 2012c). Accord-
ing to TfL (2015c), the situation regarding per capita car travel follows the peak car use proposed by New-
man and Kenworthy (2011) and has been decreasing recent years, although it has reached a peak in the last 
decade. According to the BBC, there were 309 cars per thousand people in 2015, compared to 325 in 2011 
(BBC, 2016). 
Although the number of cars per inhabitant has been decreasing, congestion is still a big issue in London. 
Congestion costs in London are estimated to be approximately £4 billion a year (Frost and Sullivan, 2015). In 
Q2 of 2016, it is estimated that 85% of riders were satisfied with Metro services (TfL, 2016g) as well as with 
bus services (TfL, 2016h), which was the target set out by TfL. Customer satisfaction regarding reliability was 
85/100, while staff behavior ranked 88/100 and value for money ranked 74/100 (TfL, 2016c). 
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Figure 4.1-12: growth in journey stages in Greater London on selected modes from 2001 to 2015 
4.1.3 Evolution of Climate Policies 
In order to have a better understanding of what was planned regarding transportation in UK to reduce car-
bon dioxide emissions, the main policies at the national, and local levels regarding climate change are sum-
marized. For a full review of UK climate change policies, see Bowen and Rydge (2011). 
In 2000, the Department for Environment Transport and Regions released the Climate Change Program, 
which sought to go further than the Kyoto Protocol. That report set a goal of reducing carbon dioxide by 20 
percent below 1990 levels by 2010 (DETR, 2000). In 2002 the UK Emission Trading Scheme was released, 
following by the EU ETS, developed in 2005, which integrated the former (Sustainable Prosperity, 2012). In 
2003, the Blair government published an Energy White Paper, which presented how the UK planned to rede-
fine itself as a low-carbon economy. In particular, the White Paper set a target of reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions by 60 percent by 2050 (DTI, 2003). In 2004 the London Plan was released, which aimed to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions by 23 percent compared to 1990 levels by 2016 (Mayor of London, 2004). 
In 2005, Blair used the UK’s presidency of the EU and the G8 to boost multilateral efforts on climate change 
(Sustainable Prosperity, 2012). The 2006 Climate Change Program set the target of reducing UK greenhouse 
gas emissions by 23–25 percent against 1990 levels by 2010; that is, only half the reduction formulated in 
the Kyoto protocol (Defra, 2006). Regarding the transport sector, the Government acknowledged in the re-
port that it was supportive of “a range of measures, called ‘smarter choices’ which are aimed at helping peo-
ple choose sustainable travel options” (2006: 69). 
Following the 3*20 package set by EU leaders in 2007, the Climate Change Act (first introduced in 2005) 
came into effect in 2008, instituting binding reduction targets for carbon emissions of 34 percent by 2020 
and 80 percent by 2050, compared to 1990 levels (DECC, 2008). This is known to be the first binding reduc-
tion target published by any country (Sustainable Prosperity, 2012). This was followed by the release of a 
white paper in 2009 that planned to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 18 percent by 2020 compared to 2008 
levels, and getting 40 percent of the electricity from renewables by 2020 (DECC, 2009a). During the same 
year, the 2008 revision of the London Plan was published, which presented less ambitious targets than the 
2004 London Plan. Through Policy 4A.2 on reducing carbon dioxide emissions, it planned a 15 percent reduc-
tion compared to 1990 levels by 2010, 20 percent by 2015, 25 percent by 2020, and 30 percent by 2025 
(Mayor of London, 2008). 
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In 2009, the Carbon Budget Order was accepted, which planned different emission reduction packages to-
wards the 2050 goal. It proposed three carbon budgets, as follows: the first carbon budget aimed at a 23 
percent carbon reduction in the 2008–2012 period; the second carbon budget aimed at 29 percent carbon 
reduction in 2013–2017; and the third carbon budget aimed at 35 percent for 2018–2022 (DECC, 2009b), all 
compared to 1990 levels. In 2011 was voted the fourth carbon budget, which aimed at a carbon reduction of 
50 percent by 2025 (Garton-Grimwood, 2016). In 2011 mayor Boris Johnson announced, in his Climate 
Change Mitigation and Energy Strategy, targets to reduce CO2 emissions drastically in the following decades. 
The policy aimed to reduce CO2 emissions by 20 percent compared to 1990 levels by 2015, 40 percent by 
2020, 60 percent by 2025, and at least 80 percent by 2050 (Mayor of London, 2011). This objective was also 
written down in the 2011 London Plan. 
In 2015 at COP21 in Paris, 195 countries, including the UK, adopted the so-called “Paris Agreement”, which 
aimed at “Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” (UNFCCC, 
2015: 3). In line with the Paris Agreement, the Committee on Climate Change proposed the fifth carbon 
budget (Garton-Grimwood, 2016), which was voted for during the summer 2016.  
Figure 4.1-13: evolution of climate change policies at national and local levels from 1997 to nowadays  
4.1.4 The development of Smart Transportation Cards in the London Metropolitan Area 
Here, the main actions at the national, national and local level that have potentially played a role in the de-
velopment of the Oyster card and of the contactless payment cards (CPCs) in London are summarized. The 
time period covered is from the mid-1980s to nowaday. 
In 1981, led by Ken Livingstone, the Labour party won the Greater London Council elections, overturning the 
Conservative Party administration in place at that time. One of the key transport policies developed by the 
Labour administration in 1981 was the “Fair Fares” policy, which introduced a system of zonal charging aim-
ing at reducing public transportation fares substantially for users (Harris, 2011). However, as fares were only 
artificially reduced, one of London’s boroughs filed a high court auction to see the policy declared unlawful, 
and finally won, which created a 92 percent fare increase that negatively impacted all users and, conse-
quently, patronage on London public transport (Glover, 2011). 
In 1983, the London Travelcard was launched, which allowed users to have unlimited access to public 
transport, for a given daily, monthly or yearly fee, and unlimited free transfer from one mode to another, 
and between routes of the same mode (Booze&Co, 2009). According to White, the introduction of the Trav-
elcard redefined the product: “The public transport user perceives a payment for the use of the system as a 
whole, with individual journeys at zero marginal cost (…) [With the Travelcard] Perception of cost is placed on 
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a similar footing to that of the private car” (1984: 134–135). This first Travelcard was being supported by a 
concentric ring fare structure into six different zones. It re-introduced a 25 percent fare decrease, putting 
the fare half-way between pre and post the unsuccessful “Fair Fares” episode (Glover, 2011). Depending on 
the zonal coverage of the Travelcard, users could also travel from one zone to the other. The Travelcard was 
the first integrated fare system implemented in London. The fare system was changed again in 2000, when a 
flat fare for buses was implemented across the entire London bus network. 
In 2000, the DfT released the 2000 Transport Act which made the first steps in the development of a legal 
framework towards the development of integrated ticketing schemes. For example, it urged each local 
transport authority to “develop policies for the promotion and encouragement of safe, integrated, efficient 
and economic transport facilities and services” (DfT, 2000: 66). This paper came along with the 10 years plan, 
aiming to invest over £180 billion over the next 10 years in projects to reduce congestion and pollution, 
which foresaw the spread of smart cards across the country.  
In 2001 the first Mayor Transport Strategy (MTS) was released, the key proposals of which were to freeze 
bus fares, limit underground fares, introduce smart cards, and simplify ticketing across all transportation 
modes in London, including national rail (GLA, 2001). At the end of 2001, TfL presented its 2002/2003 busi-
ness plan (TfL, 2002a), which aimed at: 
1. Improving the system safety and customer security
2. Improving the financial efficiency
3. Reducing traffic congestion and increasing public transport usage and network capacity
4. Improving network reliability and service delivery quality
5. Improving network integration and support of local authority initiatives
6. Improving access to the transport system.
In 2002, to help achieve initiatives 3, 5, and 6, TfL presented its 2003–2004 business plan that included a 
ticketing and boarding strategy to “achieve faster boarding, passenger convenience, and efficiency savings 
consisting of three elements: introduction of cashless operation in Central London, expansion of cashless 
operation across the whole bus network by 2008 and, in parallel, the progressive introduction of articulated 
buses with open boarding” (TfL, 2002b). 
4.1.4.1 The Oyster era 
“No other change or innovation so dramatically changed passengers’ lives or willingness to use the sys-
tem. Oyster had a bigger impact on bus usage than the frequency improvements, in my opinion. Given 
the complexity of the Tube fare structure, the development of Oyster on the Tube was a world best 
management change.” Tim O’Toole – Chief Executive at firstGroup (Begg, 2013) 
As seen above, the London Underground has gone through a range of financing schemes involving the pri-
vate sector to find ways of funding its system, given the substantial size of its network and value of its assets. 
Among the wave of privatization that happened in the 1990s, the RFID supported Oyster card stands as one 
of the private finance initiatives (PFIs) done at that time. For a full list of PFIs that happened at that time, see 
Gannon (2005). Thus, in August 1998, following two smart card trials having happened in 1992 and 1994 
(Taylor and Green, 2001), a £1.1 billion, 17-year PFI contract was signed between London Transport Execu-
tive and Transys (Gannon, 2005), a consortium made up of several technological providers whose main ac-
tors were Cubic and HP Enterprise Services (TfL, 2010a). The card was supposed to support flat fares of the 
bus system and zonal fares used on the underground system. It aimed to make the overall system more 
efficient by reducing queues at metro station gates as well as cutting fare collection costs for TfL. 
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While the ticket barriers, machines, validators, and the like were being installed during 2002 by Transys, TfL 
staff were already able to use Oyster cards at that time. In 2003, as part of a new system, the Oyster card 
was launched for annual and monthly tickets. At that time, it relied on the NXP/Philips’ MIFARE Classic mi-
crochip and could store 1024 bytes of data, using NXP’s own proprietary 48-bit encryption technology (Mul-
ler, 2016). In 2004, TfL launched the Oyster Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) system (TfL, 2009b), which was initially 
named “pre-pay”. The idea behind the card was to offer an alternative to season tickets for who would pay 
for their journeys at the point of use. Users could top up money on their card (up to £90) whenever needed. 
In 2005, daily capping was introduced on the Oyster (TfL, 2005). 
The 2004 London Plan, prepared by the Mayor of London, encouraged a modal shift and proposed the de-
velopment of a “well-integrated public transport” to offer “alternatives to car use” (Mayor of London, 2004 
:19). During the same year, the DfT presented its Future of Transport Strategy, where it promoted integrated 
ticketing as a means of attracting more people into public transportation (DfT, 2004a). In 2005, TfL an-
nounced its plan to enable the use of Oysters as an e-wallet, enabling users to pay for low-value items in 
shops with their oyster (Smart Card News, 2005), as was already the case with smart transportation cards in 
Hong Kong or Seoul. Unfortunately, this idea was finally dropped and Oysters could never be used as e-
wallets. In 2006, TfL again announced new fare packages in order to boost Oyster usage (TfL, 2006a). The 
PAYG system was progressively extended to National Rail in the Greater London area during 2007 and 2010. 
In April 2007, the Mayor of London launched a massive diffusion campaign, giving out 100,000 free Oyster 
cards so that vulnerable groups of people could start using the service (TfL, 2007). 
In 2008 there were three major incidents involving the Oyster card. Following a long period of criticism re-
lated to the security of the Oyster card, computer scientists from Germany and the US managed to break the 
Oyster card encryption and gain access to all Oyster cards’ data (Muller, 2006). This was followed by the 
hack of Mifare Classic by Dutch scientists, who managed to clone oyster cards and travel freely on London 
Transportation System (Sparkes, 2008). Then, in 2008, some 78,000 Oyster smart cards became dysfunction-
al, which forced TfL to issue more than 40,000 new ones with the same balances. Later, approximately 
200,000 PAYG cards became corrupted. The two shutdowns cost TfL about £1 million in lost fares (FT, 2008). 
After these two events, TfL gave notice to terminate the current contract with the TranSys consortium (TfL, 
2010a). The same year, TfL hired the consulting company Deloitte to migrate the Oyster system to Linux to 
prevent future hacks (ZDNet, 2008). Following a long period of negotiations between TfL and train operating 
companies (TOCs) between 2006 and 2009, an agreement was finally reached on 16 October 2009 between 
TfL and the TOCs to allow Oyster PAYG readers to be installed at all National Rail stations in London (TfL, 
2011). In response to criticism regarding the security of the first Oyster cards, TfL decided to change the 
supporting technology behind Oyster cards, choosing the MiFARE DESFire EV1 technology, which was sup-
posed to be more robust than its predecessor (Muller, 2016). 
Zoom on the Oyster 
Technology: The Oyster card is a pocket-sized integrated circuit with a memory chip and a micro-
processor chip. It works with radio-frequency identification (RFID) technology, which provides the 
energy needed to run the microprocessor from the electromagnetic field created between the 
reader and the chip. Oyster can be used in two ways. It can contain a travel card, for which cus-
tomers pay a fixed fare per month and then have unlimited travel or it can be used as pay-as-you-
go (PAYG). For the PAYG, customers must top up money on their cards (online or with cash at 
charging stations). This money is then stored on a dedicated bank account. Oyster users must tap in 
and out when using rail service. When tapping in, data is first transferred from the card to the 
reader, so the reader can verify whether the oyster card contains a valid Travelcard or enough 
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PAYG balance (credit). Data indicating that the customer is starting his/her journey is then trans-
mitted from the reader to the card and stored in the card. When tapping out, data indicating where 
the customer started his/her journey is transferred from the card to the reader. Thus, readers have 
data about the start and end of the journey that will be used to calculate the total length of the 
journey and the respective exact fare. The data are then stored in the readers and sent to TfL cen-
tral servers by batches, which is responsible for a roughly 24 hours delay in TfL being able to exploit 
the data. Computation on travel length and exact fare is made by the central servers. TfL’s acquir-
ing bank then requires the transaction to be made from the bank associated with Oyster, and indi-
viduals’ Oyster cards data (transaction and time) are retained by TfL for eight weeks (Muller, 2016). 
When using bus services, users are only asked to tap-in, as the fares are flat. In this case, the Oyster 
card sends information to the reader to let it know whether it contains enough credit or a travel 
card, as well as the time of boarding. Based on this data, TfL’s acquiring bank then requires the 
transaction to be made from Oyster’s bank. 
Functionality: The main functionality of the Oyster Card is to enable through-ticketing. The system 
does not integrate any transport planning functionality or booking service; it is just a card to be 
used for ticketing. 
Transport modes integrated: CPCs are accepted as a ticketing means for all transport modes pro-
vided by TfL (bus, metro, overground, DLR), as well as for commuting trains within Greater London.  
4.1.4.2 The contactless payment card (CPC) era 
“I travel a lot to London and [CPCs] have been one of the best implementation and progresses …that is a 
very small thing (…) but really, that makes all the difference. That is so much easy to use.” (IH11) 
In 2006, TfL launched the Future Ticketing Project (FTP). It aimed at making TfL gain a deeper understanding 
of the costs of fare collection associated with the Oyster card, and learn about other emerging payment 
technologies, to ultimately assess the likelihood of them reducing costs borne by the Oyster system. It is 
estimated that, in 2005/2006, revenue collection costs for TfL accounted for 14 pence out of every pound 
collected (TfL, 2016j). During this period, TfL closely worked with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) to assess different scenarios of payment and event implemented a mobile phone pilot payment sys-
tem (London Assembly, 2011).  
In September 2007, Barclaycard issued a credit card named OnePulse, which was a Visa contactless credit 
card embedded with the functionality of TfL’s Oyster card (TfL, 2007b). Since that date, Barclaycard, a sub-
sidiary of Barclay, one of UK’s leading Banking group, has been TfL’s acquiring bank. In 2009, the DfT pub-
lished its Smart and Integrated Ticketing Strategy, which aimed to have all of the UK’s main urban centers 
equipped with smart ticketing schemes by 2015, and along with the ITSO specification, create a standardized 
nationwide smart ticketing network. CPCs and other technologies were already mentioned in the document 
as a way to “remove the need to queue to buy a ticket ever again” (DfT, 2009:1). 
In 2009, the mayor delegated to TfL the responsibility of drafting the MTS (TfL, 2009a). After public consulta-
tion and few modifications made by the London Assembly, in particular by the Transport Committee, the 
mayor approved the MTS in May 2010 and set the strategy for transports in London up to 2031 (Mayor of 
London, 2010). The MTS comprised of three different parts: the first part set the context and made an intro-
duction to the challenges London transport system would soon have to face. The second part set out the 
different policies and the proposals in order to apply the latter, and the third part stated how the strategy 
would be delivered. Through MTS Policy Number 10 (Mayor of London, 2010), TfL, with the help of the DfT 
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and other stakeholders, was asked to improve the efficiency of the transport system. One of the proposals 
(Proposal 123) for the application of this policy is the use of new technologies to improve the cost and effi-
ciency of fare collection (Mayor of London, 2010).  
In 2009, a business case was presented to the board of TfL, proposing a five-step development process for 
the implementation of CPCs. While the two first phases dealt with the introduction of CPCs in buses in 2012, 
and underground in 2012–2013, weekly capping was to be introduced in 2013 and the Oyster card of the 
time was to be decommissioned by 2015 (London Assembly, 2011). On January 2, 2010, the Oyster PAYG 
was extended to all 350 National Rail stations in London. This constituted the largest expansion of the Oyster 
network since its launch in 2003 (TfL, 2010a). In 2010, the contract between Transys and TfL officially came 
to an end. TfL terminated the PFI contract by exercising a break option in the contract (TfL, 2010a). TranSys 
took on £190 million of debt from a consortium of lenders, which was scheduled to be paid off over the term 
of the 17-year Contract; that is, by 2015. TfL then paid off the PFI debt on February 26, 2010 to finally deliver 
£4 million debt interest savings for TfL (TfL, 2010a). Transport Trading Limited (TTL), a subsidiary of TfL, en-
tered into a new contract with Cubic, namely the Future Ticketing Agreement (FTA). The FTA aimed at (TfL, 
2014c): 
 Giving TfL full access to all intellectual property rights needed to operate the system and to run a
competitive procurement
 Allowing TfL to use third parties or in-house teams to provide services where this provided value for
money
 Providing for flexible hand-back arrangements to allow for another party to take over the services
 Providing for TTL ownership of the system assets and control of the money spent on refreshing
these assets
The FTA contract also established that Cubic would be fully responsible for TfL’s fare collection services from 
August 2010 to August 2013. Part of Cubic’s responsibility under this new contract was to design and supply 
a new card reader that could support both the old model of Oyster transactions and the new EMV contact-
less payment system.  
In order to find the technological solutions that would fit best this system, TfL hired three consulting compa-
nies: Storm Consulting, Hyperion, and NCC Group. Storm Consulting helped TfL develop a new reader archi-
tecture that would allow the system to be transferred to a back office so that neither the card nor the reader 
had to hold fare information. Within six months, the consultants developed a proof of concept and proto-
type. Using those, TfL made the business case for the £75 million project, which was later approved by TfL’s 
board and the Mayor of London. This modular proof of concept was later adopted and adapted by Cubic 
when it designed the final version of the reader. Hyperion Consulting worked on developing a new reader 
prototype that could work in this new system. Finally, NCC Group was hired to ensure the reader complied 
with PCI DSS standards (NCC Group, 2015). In 2011, the London Assembly Transport Committee launched an 
investigation into the benefits of implementing CPCs in London transportation system. The Transport Com-
mittee reached out to a series of stakeholder to comment on the matter. The text was commented by, for 
example, Visa and the consumer association Which? (Mayor of London, 2011). Based on its investigation, the 
Transport Committee edited in 2011 a set of non-binding recommendations to TfL for the implementation of 
CPCs (London Assembly, 2011).  
By 2012, TfL had issued more than 43 million Oyster cards since its introduction. Oyster also accounted for 
more than 80 percent of all journeys on public transport in London (TfL, 2012a). In September 2012, the 
OnePulse card was discontinued to new users. Barclaycard announced in February 2014 that all OnePulse 
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functionality would cease after June 30, 2014. In 2012, TfL invested £12.8 million in launching the first phase 
of the Future of Ticketing Project; this consisted of enabling the acceptance of CPCs on buses, which went 
live on December 2012 (TfL, 2012b). In 2012, the DfT released a follow-up report restating its willingness to 
move towards smart ticketing, particularly by working closely with ITSO to have transport ticketing schemes 
compatible over the country, and potentially with other cities worldwide (DfT, 2012b). In a policy paper enti-
tled “2010 to 2015 government policy: local transport”, the DfT also confirmed the provision of £15 million 
for the development of smart ticketing schemes across the UK, as well as a £45 million investment to extend 
smart ticketing across London and the south-east of England through the South East Flexible Ticketing (SEFT) 
program (DfT, 2012a). 
In 2013 the DfT released the Door-to-Door Strategy, in which it stated its previous and future actions to im-
prove the efficiency of the UK transport system. The plan was divided into four chapters, including a dedi-
cated part on smart ticketing (DfT, 2013). More precisely, in this chapter the DfT promoted its ITSO on Pres-
tige (IoP) project, the goal of which was to make CPCs developed by Cubic for London compatible with ITSO 
standards. The IoP project, which was worth £70 million and funded by the UK government, was finally com-
pleted in the autumn of 2014 (DfT, 2014).  
In 2014, after a competitive bidding process, TfL awarded the “Electra Contract” – the new contract for 
managing and maintaining TfL ticketing system (Oyster and CPCs) – to Cubic Transportation Systems Ltd. TfL 
thus renewed the partnership with Cubic for an additional seven years. The contract is worth around £660 
million and is expected to bring savings (mainly from fare collection) of £11 million per year compared to the 
previous FTA contract (TfL, 2014f). The Electra contract aimed to move from a closed (Oyster) to an open-
loop system, enabling Oyster to continue functioning, while other devices could also be accepted for pay-
ment (CPCs). In 2013/14 TfL invested another £56.8 million to extend the integration of CPCs to TfL’s other 
transport services and introduce daily and weekly capping, which went live in September 2014 (TfL Data-
base). In October 2014, mayor Boris Johnson launched a new scheme, called “A Penny for London”, to col-
lect charitable donation from contactless card payments on the tube to raise money for disadvantaged 
young people in London. Each time a CPC of the scheme would be used, one penny would be deducted and 
transferred to the Mayor’s Fund for London and other charities, whose focus was on helping disadvantaged 
people (The Guardian, 2014). For the mayor at that time (The Telegraph, 2016d):  
“Penny for London is a big, bold idea that will revolutionize the way we give to charity (…) The latest 
contactless technology is going to help transform the lives of thousands of young people across the capi-
tal (…) Enabling people travelling around the city to pool their pennies could potentially add up to hun-
dreds of thousands of pounds. And the best thing about it is just how simple it is. Just sign up and 
swipe.” 
In 2014, the mayor released the 2050 London infrastructure plan and its supporting transport paper. Once 
again, integrated ticketing was presented as a key innovation to help developing the transport system of 
tomorrow. The plan stated the mayor’s willingness to also provide “seamless information and integrated 
systems for users” (Mayor of London, 2014: 203). In 2015 Boris Johnson continued promoting the CPCs. He 
said: “It’s been an astonishing 12 months with so many Londoners embracing contactless technology on our 
transport network. It is clear passengers love using the payments to travel, and why on earth not – it’s quick, 
it’s easy and ensures you get the best fare. It’s yet another example of how we continue to invest in the latest 
technology to make getting around the capital as easy as possible” (TfL, 2015b). Last but not least, 2014 
marked the year when it became no longer possible to pay with cash on London Buses. Through eth-
nographics and interviews, Pritchard et al. (2015) studied the impact of this decision on populations and 
concluded that even if there was much to gain from cashless payments, the complete withdrawal of cash 
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could have social impacts, such as increased fear from citizens regarding surveillance or vulnerability of citi-
zens from hacks. 
In summer 2015, CPCs and Oyster became accepted on Southeastern’s high-speed service between St. Pan-
cras International and Stratford International. At the end of 2015, WiFi was installed on 100 additional metro 
stations in London, bringing the total to 250 stations equipped with Wi-Fi, provided by private companies 
(TfL, 2016). In late 2015, TfL commissioned the travel company 2CV to research the business opportunities to 
develop the very first TfL ticketing app. The app, developed by Cubic, was finally released in September 2017 
and allowed Oyster users to get information about current balance on their oyster cards as well as top-up 
their oysters virtually using their credit cards online (CBR, 2017). Through the app users were also able to 
check their travel history for the past eight weeks. In December 2016, it is estimated that there were 102.7 
million CPCs in use in the UK, of which 70.1 million were debit cards and 32.6 million were credit cards. This 
represented a 25.8 percent yearly increase (UK Card Association, 2017). In February 2017, Barclaycard re-
tained its contract as TfL acquiring bank for another seven years (with possibility of a three-year extension) 
(Peyton, 2017). The contract accounts for approximately £380 million. 
Smart cards (Oyster and CPCs) are currently the only accepted means of payment for public transportation in 
London. Figure 4.1.14 represents the evolution of the number of journeys on the TfL network for which us-
ers used CPCs.  
Figure 4.1-14: evolution of the number of journeys processed by TfL using CPC (based on data from TfL) 
In 2015/106, CPCs accounted for 26 percent of all PAYG tube and rail journeys, while accounting for 23 per-
cent of all bus trips (TfL, 2016). The Oyster card accounted for the remaining percentage. It is estimated that 
TfL’s cost of fare collection dropped from 14 percent to 9 percent after the introduction of CPCs, moving 
towards the objective of limiting them to around 6 percent (L.E.K, 2016).  
In 2016, TfL and Cubic agreed to develop a license, worth £15 million, for the use of London's contactless 
ticketing system technology by other cities worldwide, and have already made a proposal to implement the 
technology to Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) in New York (UITP, 2016). In late October 2016, TfL an-
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nounced that credit cards, and more specifically contactless payment would be allowed on all London black 
cabs, ending a long period in which the only way to pay for a taxi in London was with cash (TfL, 2016a).  
Zoom on CPCs 
Technology: Contactless payment cards are credit cards that have been equipped with a micropro-
cessor and internal memory in order to be able to communicate with smart card readers through 
RFID technology. CPC chips are able to handle, store, and grant access to data on the device in 
which they are embedded through the interaction with the card readers, as well as perform inter-
nal functions such as encryption (Smart Card Alliance, 2006). The reader used by TfL is the Tri-
Reader 3, which was developed in conjunction with Cubic Transportation Systems Ltd. and Vi-
VOtech. It is a retrofitted version of the previous TfL readers used for Oyster Cards. It enables the 
use of the Oyster cards as well as CPCs issued by banks. These operate in an “open-loop” system, 
meaning it accepts payment devices that are not issued specifically by TfL. As a result, the readers 
do not need to hold information about fares, as these are calculated in a central location to which 
the information is sent (back office). Whenever a contactless bankcard is used, the reader authenti-
cates the card and generates a simple zero-value transaction, which is sent to the back office. This 
allows the readers to be very simple as they do not need to perform the computations.  
When a CPC is used, the reader sends the data to the Payment Gateway (1), which in turn encrypts 
and sends it to the acquiring bank (TfL’s bank) for authorization (2). The data is then sent (3) by the 
acquiring bank to the card-issuing bank (customers bank) through the card payment network. After 
having checked the availability of balance or credit limit, the issuing bank either authorizes the 
transaction or declines and notifies the acquiring bank (4), still through the card payment network, 
which then sends the data back to the payment gateway (5). The card scheme (Visa, MasterCard, 
American Express) receives a fee from the merchant for utilizing its network. If authorized by the 
bank, the data is then tokenized and sent to the Business Logic Processing center of the back office 
(6), which then determines, based on previously established standards, whether that card can be 
used to pay for TfL services. If it determines that it cannot, the card is added to the Deny List (7a). 
This list is fed to all readers every 10 minutes, so that the next time this card is used it will automat-
ically be rejected. If a credit card is eligible to be used at TfL, the zero-value transaction is stored 
(7b). Since the bus fares are flat, there is no need to tap out on the buses. When tapping out on 
rail, the location, date and time data are stored so the distance traveled and resulting exact fare 
can be calculated. At the end of the day, all these transactions are retrieved and the appropriate 
fare is calculated. The system then generates a one-time fare for all the trips made during the day 
(8), which is then charged to the customer bank once the acquiring bank request the funds from 
the issuing bank (9). The issuing bank receives a fee (transaction fee) from the acquiring bank when 
the former realizes the transaction. This fare is calculated using similar fares than those used for 
Oyster journeys, with some additional capping (TfL, 2014e). The process is summed up in Figure 
4.1.16. 
Functionality: The main functionality of a CPC is to enable through-ticketing. The system does not 
integrate any trip planning functionality or booking service. 
Transport modes integrated: CPCs are accepted as a ticketing means for all transport modes pro-
vided by TfL (bus, metro, overground, DLR), as well as for commuting trains within Greater London. 
Since January 2017, CPCs have also been accepted as a means of payment in black cabs. 
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Figure 4.1 15: Data and monetary flows (author's elaboration based on TfL (2014e)) 
Figure 4.1-15: Data and monetary flows (author's elaboration based on TfL (2014e))
Figure 4.1.16 summarizes the overall development of Oyster and CPCs in London. The following sub-section 
presents the development of IMPs in Vienna, which is the second case study at the center of this thesis.  
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Figure 4.1-16: development and implementation of digital ticketing systems in London (author's elaboration)  
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4.2 Vienna case study 
Vienna is the capital of Austria. In order to fully understand the context in which the development of inte-
grated mobility platforms has occurred, this subchapter starts by detailing the political and administrative 
organization of the country at the national level, before the same is done for the local level. Then the histori-
cal development of Vienna’s transportation system (from the beginning of the 20th century to the present) is 
reviewed. Finally the key events that led to the development of integrated mobility platforms in Vienna 
(from the mid-2000s to 2017) are reviewed. 
4.2.1 Context 
4.2.1.1 National level 
 Current Situation
In 2016, Austria had a population of 8.68 million people (WKO, 2016) and it is estimated that the country will 
have 9.6 million inhabitants by 2040 (EC, 2014). With approximately two-thirds of its population living in 
urban areas in 2015, Austria is not the most urbanized state within the EU. The percentage of the Austrian 
urban population has actually been steady over the last few decades, as it was of 64.7 percent in 1960 and of 
65.9 percent in 2015. The average percentage of EU citizens living in cities actually overtook the Austrian 
average in the late 1960s, which is quite unusual. Figure 4.2.1 shows the evolution of the urban population 
in the EU and in Austria from 1960 to the present. 
Figure 4.2-1: Urbanization evolution in Austria compared to EU (based on WB data) 
In 2016, Austria’s GDP per capita was €36,608, which is above the EU average of €30,815. Although Austria 
has suffered from the 2009 financial crisis, it has never fallen into recession. In 2016, Austria averaged 1.6 
percent growth, and it is estimated that growth will be 1.7 percent for 2017 (WKO, 2016). In 2016, Austria 
had an unemployment rate of 5.9 percent, slightly higher than that of the UK (5.0 percent). Austria’s GDP 
comes mainly from the tertiary sector (70.7 percent), followed by the secondary sector (28 percent) and the 
primary sector (1.3 percent) (WKO, 2016). 
Regarding connectivity of the population, in 2015 there were 78.2 mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 
inhabitants in Austria, lower than the OECD average of 91.7 per 100 inhabitants (OECD, 2016c), and lower 
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than the UK average. Austria ranked 53rd in the 2016 Global Gender Gap index (WEF, 2016) and 12th in the 
Human Capital index (WEF, 2016). Compared to other OECD countries in 2015, Austria is located in the mid-
dle third for jobs and earnings, housing conditions, environmental quality, health status, education and skills, 
and subjective well-being; in the top third when it comes to social and family environment as well as income 
and wealth; and in the bottom third regarding child well-being (OECD, 2015). 
 The Austrian administrative system
Austria is a federal country made up of nine different states, referred to as “Länder”. The head of the state is 
the federal president, who is elected every six years and cannot be elected more than twice. According to 
the Austrian Constitution, the federal president is able to dissolve the National Assembly and state parlia-
ments, and appoints the federal chancellor, who is the head of the Federal Cabinet; that is, the chief of the 
federal government, which is composed of 12 federal ministers.  
At the federal level, the Parliament consists of two chambers: the National Council, also called Lower House, 
and the Federal Council, called the Upper House. The National Council is directly elected every five years and 
made up of 183 members. The Federal Council is composed of 61 members representing the Austrian states 
on a federal level and is elected every five to six years, according to proportional representation. Ultimately, 
the Federal Council is known to have much less power than the National Council. Following National Council 
elections, the federal president usually appoints the leader of the victorious political party as the federal 
chancellor, who does not have any term limit per se, but must resign if the Parliament passes a vote of no-
confidence. Each of the nine Austrian states also has a parliament, called the Landtag, which is elected every 
five to six years depending on the Lander Constitution, which legislates on non-federal matters. The party 
that wins the most votes at the Landtag elections is then in charge of appointing the state governor, who is 
sworn in by the federal president. 
At the lower level are municipalities, which are independent administrative bodies in charge of issuing gen-
eral regulations and provide public services to their citizens at the city level. Municipalities are organized as 
follows. The main decision-making body of Austrian municipalities is the Municipal Council, which is elected 
by the citizens of a municipality every five years. It is responsible for adopting the municipality budget and 
handling finances. The members of the Municipal Council elect from their peers the Municipal Board (also 
called City Council or City Senate), commonly referred to as Municipal Government. The Municipal Board is 
then chaired by the mayor, who is either elected by direct suffrage, or elected by the Municipal Council.  
 Austrian politics at the national level
Although Austria has been known to be one of the most stable and robust European party systems for many 
years (Müller 2006), things have evolved quite a lot in the last decade, especially with the rise of far-right 
political parties (Aichholzer et al., 2014) and the entry of new parties in the national Parliament. Below the 
main political parties in the Austrian political landscape are presented: 
 The Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), which might be considered conservative, emerged in
1945 from the former Christian Social Party and lies at the center-right of the political spectrum.
 The Austrian Social Democrats (SPÖ), which originates from the Social Democratic Worker’s
Party of Austria, lies at the center-left and has dominated the Austrian political landscape, to-
gether with the SPÖ, since the end of the Second World War.
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 The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) is a populist right-wing party that originated from the
League of Independents in 1949 to gather former Nazis and war returnees. It is often cited as a
threat to Austrian democracy (Luther, 2000).
 The Green Alternative, also referred to as “The Greens”, is the Austrian green party. Created
in 1986, it has not been heavily represented at the federal level, but has been gaining momen-
tum in local and European elections.
 The Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), created in 2005 and originating from the FPÖ,
sits at the far-right of the political spectrum.
 The New Austria and Liberal Forum (NEOS), created in 2014, is a merger of the Liberal Fo-
rum, which itself originated from FPÖ, and of the Young Liberals, a liberal party in Austria. One
might consider it as a liberal party.
To better understand Austrian politics, it seemed important to summarize the evolution of the presidential 
and parliamentary elections at the national level for the last decade. It is important to note that until the 
1990s, the FPÖ (far right) never really appeared as an important party. Since then the populist Austrian party 
has gained momentum and must now be considered as important as the two other historically dominant 
parties (ÖVP and SPÖ).  
The rise of the FPÖ started in 1990, when the FPÖ, led by Jorg Haider, almost doubled its number of seats in 
the National Council, gaining most of them from the ÖVP. The increase of the FPÖ at the expense of the ÖVP 
continued until the 1999 parliamentary elections, when the FPÖ finished second and the ÖVP third. The 
1999 parliamentary election marked the end of an era. From 1986 to 1999, federal chancellors had always 
come from the SPÖ, but this changed in 2000, when for the first time in a long time, Mr. Schussel (ÖVP) was 
appointed federal chancellor, despite the previous parliamentary elections having been won by the SPÖ. To 
be able to govern, Schussel formed a coalition government with the FPÖ.  
In 2006, general elections were held for the National Council and the SÖP beat the ÖVP by a narrow margin 
of 1 percent. Without a majority, however, both parties decided to form a coalition government, bringing an 
end to almost six years of ÖVP/FPÖ coalitions and recalling the SPÖ/ÖVP coalitions used in the past, from 
1947 to 1966 and from 1987 until 2000 (Fallend, 2009). After a long period of negotiations, a new chancellor 
from the SÖP was finally sworn in, in January 2007. However, this coalition broke down in 2008 following 
disagreements between SPÖ and ÖVP leaders about European policy. As a result, anticipated elections were 
organized. The SPÖ and ÖVP came out victorious again, although witnessing a net progression from the FPÖ, 
picking from their electorates. Werner Faymann (SPÖ), the former federal minister of transport, was sworn 
in as federal chancellor and a coalition government with the ÖVP was proposed. 
Five years later, in 2013, National Council elections were held that were later described as a political earth-
quake (Dolezal and Zeglovits, 2015). The two major political parties (SPÖ and ÖVP) had never scored as low, 
while the FPÖ realized a net increase again. Two new parties, the liberal NEOS and the populist “Team Stro-
nach”, also entered the Austrian parliament. Because SPO and ÖVP still had a parliamentary majority by 
collaborating, they kept the coalition in place and Faymann remained federal chancellor. 
In 2016, Faymann stepped down as the SPÖ party leader, leading to the nomination of Mr. Haupl, then 
Mayor of Vienna, as new party leader. However, given the preference of Haupl to continue being the Mayor 
of Vienna, the president ended up swearing in Christian Kern (SPÖ), at that time CEO of the Austrian Federal 
Railways (ÖBB), as new federal chancellor, and he also became new SÖP party leader. Figure 4.2.2 shows a 
graphical representation of the last parliamentary elections in Austria. 
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As the federal president does not have much power in reality, and the position is often described as “cere-
monial”, the history of past presidents is not given here, as not really relevant. However, it is important to 
recall the 2016 presidential election to understand the rise of the FPÖ as a political party, and the fact that 
more and more Austrian voters seem to be tempted by the far right. In the second round of the Austrian 
presidential election, held in April 16, Mr. Van der Bellen ran as an independent, but member of the Green 
party, against Mr. Hofer from the FPÖ. The results of the second round were extremely tight, with Van der 
Bellen receiving 50.3 percent of the votes, compared to 49.7 percent for Hofer. The election was finally an-
nulled by the Austrian Constitutional Court as there had been irregularities in the count of the vote for sev-
eral constituencies (Oltermann, 2016) and rescheduled for December 2016. In the new election, Van der 
Bellen received 53 percent of the votes compared to 47 percent for his rival. The election of Hofer would 
have been the first election of a far-right candidate as the head of a Western European state. 
In May 2017, the stability of the coalition in place (ÖVP-SPÖ) was questioned after the resignation of Vice 
Chancellor Mitterlehner (ÖVP), which occurred following disputes within the coalition government (FT, 
2017). Ultimately, a new National Council election was held in October 2017. The ÖVP finished first with 62 
seats, followed by the SPÖ (52 seats) and FPÖ (51 seats), demonstrating again the rise of the populist party. 
ÖVP leader Sebastian Kurz was ultimately sworn in as Federal Chancellor by December 2017 and proposed a 
coalition government with the FPÖ. 
Figure 4.2-2: Austrian parliamentary elections from 1999 to nowadays 
 NPM and decentralization
Compared to other European economies, Austria is located in the lower bound of utilities and state-owned 
enterprises privatization (Belke and Schneider, 2003). Sectors that are usually organized in natural monopo-
lies were slow to liberalization before the 2000s, but this finally started due to EU pressure (Aiginger, 1999). 
The most prominent example of liberalization and deregulation of Austrian network industries can be ob-
served in the electricity sector, which was pushed by the right-wing government (ÖVP-FPÖ coalition) at that 
time and resulted in the development of regional monopolies (Hofbauer, 2006). The rail sector was officially 
liberalized in 1998 but is still known to be heavily dominated by incumbent actors (OECD, 2013).  
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4.2.1.2 Local level: Vienna 
 Current Situation
With 1.8 million of inhabitants as 2015, spread over 23 districts, the City of Vienna is Austria’s largest and 
capital city, accounting in 2016 for 21.2 percent of the total Austrian population (WKO, 2016). The popula-
tion of Vienna has evolved significantly over the last century. In 1910 the city was home to about 2.1 million 
people (Bohm, 1998), making it one of the most populated cities in Europe at that time. However, the popu-
lation shrank importantly because of the First and Second World Wars and its population dipped to 1.6 mil-
lion people as of 1945 (Bohm, 1998). The population continued to shrink till the 1990s, when it reached 1.49 
million inhabitants (Buehler et al., 2017a) and has increased again since then.  
Vienna is part of what is often referred to as the Viennese Metropolitan Area, which constitutes surrounding 
municipalities from neighboring states of Lower Austria and Burgenland. The Vienna Metropolitan area was 
home to 2.4 million people as of 2013 (City of Vienna, 2015e). The increase in Viennese population, as well 
as the Viennese metropolitan population is mainly due to migration from newly integrated countries in the 
European Union (Cox, 2009).  
Politically, Vienna holds both status of city and Lander, which is unique in Austria. Like all Landers, it func-
tions with a unicameral parliament (the Vienna Landtag), composed of 100 members, that in this case serves 
both as Municipal Council and State Legislature (Buehler et al., 2017a). Due to the double status of the city 
of Vienna, as Lander and state, the city’s mayor is also the state governor and de facto is not directly elected 
by the Viennese citizens in municipal elections. He is chosen from the Viennese Landtag majority and sworn 
in by the federal president. Vienna’s highest executive body is the Vienna Provincial Government, which is 
headed by the governor/mayor and formed by 12 city councilors. 
Vienna is a socialist city. From 1945 till 2010, Vienna always had SÖP mayors as well as SÖP transport minis-
ters. The current SÖP mayor, Mr. Haupl has been in office since 1994. Since 2010, however, the SÖP has 
entered a coalition with the Green Party, putting an end to its historical coalition with the ÖVP. As a result, 
Ms. Vasilikou from the Green Party has held the vice-mayor chair in charge of transport since 2010 (Buehler 
et al., 2017a). Figure 4.2.3 maps the different jurisdictions within the city of Vienna. 
Figure 4.2-3: map of Vienna and its 23 districts (adapted from Viennamap360.com) 
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Vienna is often noted as having the top ranking on the well-known Mercer index for quality of life (Buehler 
et al., 2017a). It also ranked well on the Siemens Green City Index, achieving fourth position in 2009. Eco-
nomically, Vienna has a GDP of €47,300 per capita, which has remained stable from 2014. In comparison, the 
GDP per capita of surrounding landers, part of the Viennese Metropolitan Area, in 2013 were €31,100 for 
Lower Austria and €26,100 for Burgenland. The Viennese economy is mainly dominated by Services (85.5 
percent of the 2014 gross value added) and industry (15 percent) (City of Vienna, 2016). The unemployment 
rate in 2015 was 13.5 percent, which is higher than the national average of 9.1 percent (WKO, 2016). 
From an environmental point of view, in 2013 (latest data available) each Viennese citizens emitted 2.8 
tCO2eq (City of Vienna, 2016e). Motorized traffic was estimated to have caused about 40 percent of 
Viennese C02 emissions (City of Vienna, 2015a).  
 Actors
Local public transport in Vienna has long been characterized by public ownership and political responsibility, 
and there is no sign that this will change in the near future (Kostal et al., 2014). Below are presented all the 
actors having been involved in the development of IMPs: 
 The Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology (BMVIT) is the federal ministry re-
sponsible for transport policy, applied research and technology development. In terms of trans-
portation, the BMVIT is in charge of policy, as well as planning, organizing and providing a finan-
cial base for railway and urban public transport services (ICF, 2016). In Austria, transport services
are contracted out based on the federal law on tendering (Bundesvergabegesetz), the federal
law on licenses for operators of bus services (Kraftfahrlinien Gesetz), and the general law on the
organization of local public transport (ÖPNRV law). The BMVIT also owns the Austrian Federal
Railways (ÖBB).
 The Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG) is the national funding agency for industrial
research and development in Austria and was founded on September 1, 2004. It is owned by the
Ministry of Transportation (BMVIT) as well as the ministry of Science, Research and Economy
(BMWFW). Through tenders, it grants donation to applied research projects, up to 80 percent of
the project costs, that fit the focus areas and strategic goals preliminary established by the
BMVIT and the BMWFW. In the field of mobility, the FFG usually releases two to three call for
proposals a year, with a budget of €12–15 million.
 The Climate and Energy Fund (Klima und Energi Fund) is the Austrian fund for climate and
energy, founded in 2009 by law. It belongs to the Ministry of Transportation (BMVIT) and the
Ministry of Environment (BMLFUW). Through tender, it administrates funding to projects that
help reaching the short- and long-term goals of the federal government in terms of greenhouse
gases emission reduction, energy consumption reduction, as well as diversion from fossil fuels
and increase in renewable energy production. It has three focus areas: research and develop-
ment, mobility, and market penetration of green technologies. Its total annual budget fluctuates
from €100–150 million.
 Austria Tec is the technology agency of the Ministry of Transport Innovation and Technology
(BMVIT), founded in 2005. Their activities range from policy advice to the operation of infrastruc-
ture or services and supervision of specific smart mobility projects.
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 The City of Vienna oversees policy and planning and is composed of 70 municipal depart-
ments referred to as Magistrat (MA). Magistrats are bundled under the responsibility of one of
the 12 City Councilors that sit in the Viennese Provincial Government (Landtag). Transport-
related responsibilities are shared among three city councilors:
 Ms. Vassilakou from the Green Party is the vice-mayor and executive city councilor
for urban planning, traffic and transport, climate protection, energy and public partic-
ipation, who entered the local government after the 2010 municipal elections. Under
Vassilakou’s watch lies the MA18, in charge of transport planning.
 Ulli Sima, from the SÖP, executive city councilor for the environment and Vienna
public utilities.
 Renate Brauner, from SÖP, executive city councilor of finance, economic and interna-
tional affairs.
 The Wiener Stadwerke (WS) is the City of Vienna public utility company. It is 100 percent
owned by the City of Vienna and is one of Austria’s largest companies. It has a turnover of about
€2 billion. It is organized into different subsidiaries. The most important subsidiaries are Wien
Enegie, in charge of supplying energy to Viennese citizens, Wiener Netz, an electricity and natu-
ral gas distribution operator, Wiener Linien in charge of providing public transport services, and
WIPARK, in charge of operating car garages over Vienna.
 The transport authority of the city of Vienna is Wiener Linien (WL), which is 100 percent
owned by Wiener Stadtwerke. It operates under a contract with the city of Vienna. The WL owns
the tracks, stations and vehicles and its main tasks are to operate buses, trams, and underground
railways, and to manage traffic (planning routes and timetables, coordinate activities, sales and
marketing, quality management system, etc.). As part of its duty in managing the system, Wiener
Linien operates the five metro lines, 29 lines of light rail/tram services, and approximately one-
third of the 115 bus lines. Wiener Linien is responsible for setting fares, although those need to
be harmonized within the regional transport association for East Austria (VÖR). Wiener Linien al-
so puts part of the bus routes out for competitive tendering. Wiener Linien receives its income
from transport fare revenue and from subsidies. All of the subsidies that WL receives come from
the city of Vienna when it comes to operational expenses (fixed amount every year) and invest-
ment in infrastructure such as stations and vehicles (variable). For the construction of new un-
derground tracks, WL receives half of the funding from the City of Vienna and the other half from
the Austrian Federal Government.
 Upstream is a company founded in 2016 as an outcome of the SMILE project. It is 51 per-
cent owned by the Wiener Linien, and 49 percent by the Wiener Stadtwerke. Its main purpose is
to use previous experiences to build  digital tools for mobility. Upstream currently receives most
of its budget from the Wiener Stadtwerke and Wiener Linien and is expecting to be able to fi-
nance itself within the next 3–5 years.
 The ÖBB (Österreichische Budesbahnen) is the federal railway company and is fully owned
by the federal government. ÖBB is organized in different subisidiaries. ÖBB Personenverkehrs,
which is an ÖBB subsidiary, takes care of passenger transport, by operating about 4000 trains a
day, 3600 of which are local transport (commuting trains). ÖBB, for example, operates the Vien-
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na S-Bahn. ÖBB Infrastruktur operates and manages the train infrastructure over Austria, which 
is owned by the federal state. The ÖBB rail network length in 2013 was 4859 km, 72 percent of 
which was electrified (Emberger, 2017).  
 iMobility was founded in 2015 as an outcome of the SMILE project. It is a joint venture be-
tween the ÖBB, and a famous Austrian Venture Capitalist Fund called Speedinvest.
 Fluidtime is one of Austria’s leading suppliers of IT systems for integrated mobility, since
2004. The company develops and operates user-friendly software solutions and mobile services
in the fields of integrated mobility and traffic data management. Fluidtime specializes in the de-
velopment and design of information, ticketing, and booking systems. It is 75 percent owned by
Kapsch, a leading Austrian company in the field of telematics.
 CityBike is the first bike-sharing scheme that was implemented in Vienna, back in 2003. It is
provided by the advertising company Gewista and is the largest bike sharing system currently in
place in Vienna, with 120 stations and some 1500 bikes. In 2016 it provided more than 1 million
rides and had about 800,000 registered users.
 Car2go is a subsidiary of Daimer AG providing free-floating carsharing services in about 30
cities across Europe and North America, including Vienna, which regularly ranks in car2go’s top
five cities worldwide, in terms of number of rentals and average number of rentals per cars.
Since 2013, it has provided 700 gasoline-powered cars over a business area of 101 km2, covering
all 23 districts of Vienna, at least partially. After having created a car2go account online, car2go
customers are able to book shared-cars through a single click on the car2go app on their
smartphones. They are also able to see on the app what cars are available around them and
check the fuel gauge or battery state of charge of surrounding vehicles. There are approximately
125,000 registered car2go users in Vienna.
 ETA is a consulting company with approximately 10 staff, which was founded in 1994 in Vi-
enna and historically specialized in environmental management. In recent years, ETA has been
increasingly involved in the urban transportation sector, dealing with integration, shared, auto-
mated, and electric mobility projects.
 Taxi 31300 is one of the main Viennese taxi companies. Created in 1969, first as a family
business, Taxi 31300 operates as a taxi dispatch center, bundling services from about 700 taxis
and 2500 active drivers.
 Metropolitan governance in Vienna
As both a city and a lander, Vienna does not have any additional administrative layer to deal with the issues 
happening at the metropolitan level. Being surrounded by the Land of Lower Austria, and close to the Land 
of Burgenland, the PGÖ (PlanungsgemeinschaftOst) was created to coordinate and prepare regional plans as 
well as cross-border issues (Patti, 2017). In 2006, the Stadt Umland Management (SUM) was also created as 
an association between the City, the Land of Vienna and the Land of Lower Austria to ensure communication 
and co-ordination among different planning institutions (Patti, 2017). 
Many European countries consider Austria to have best practice when it comes to metropolitan coordination 
for transportation systems, as regional transport associations, gathering the different involved stakeholders, 
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have been created all over the country. In the case of the Viennese Metropolitan Region, the VÖR 
(Verkerhrsverbund Ostregion), established in 1974, deals with timetable and tariff coordination across the 
metropolitan region. The VÖR also orders public transport from the main railway, bus, and tramlines operat-
ing in Vienna (Jansen, 2017). VÖR also pays compensation to the operators for revenue losses due to inte-
grated fares. It is 44 percent owned by the state of Vienna, 44 percent by the state of Lower Austria, and 12 
percent by the state of Burgenland. The VÖR catchment area is approximately 3.6 million inhabitants. The 
VÖR chairman is a SPÖ member of the Vienna City Council, while the vice-chairman is an ÖVP member from 
Lower Austria Landtag. However, the VÖR is often described as ineffective at designing solutions for the 
entire metropolitan area, due to internal political conflicts. 
Due to its proximity with the neighboring Slovak capital of Bratislava, Vienna has also been presented as 
being part of a wider Vienna–Bratislava metropolitan region, which is recognized as a functional entity by 
the European Union (Schremmer, 2003). Again, however, one can witness the lack of cross-border metropol-
itan governance institutions (Sohn and Giffinger, 2016), especially when it comes to transport. Below the 
historical development of the Viennese transportation system is presented to better understand the context 
in which integrated mobility platforms have developed in recent years. 
4.2.2 Historical development of the Viennese Transportation System 
Since its creation, the city of Vienna has developed as a compact monocentric city, using mixed land use, 
leaving little room for private cars (Buehler et al., 2017a). Urbanist Otto Wagner is acknowledged as having 
shaped Vienna as it is known today and using urban planning techniques to promote and facilitate move-
ments of people on the streets. The Austrian capital city is often considered urban planning best practice. 
Paal (2003) argued that the city of Vienna had developed through five distinct phases, which are detailed 
below, along with key transport infrastructure development in each of those phases. 
4.2.2.1 Founder’s period (1857–1914) 
Following the demolition of the historical city walls and moats by Austro-Hungarian Emperor Franz Joseph of 
Austria in 1850, and the establishment of the Bauzonenplan to frame the land development of Vienna, the 
late 1860s marked the beginning of the professional public transport era in Vienna. Indeed, it was during 
that time that the first horse-powered tramway was introduced, between Schottenring and Hernals Streets. 
This was followed in 1867 by the awarding of the first license by the City of Vienna to legally transport pas-
sengers. The tramway industry continued its growth, and the Neue Wiener Tramway-Gesellschaft (the New 
Vienna Tramway Corporation) was founded in 1872, which started to expand the tramway system into Vien-
na’s suburbs (Kostal et al. 2014). The development of the tramway network underwent a major change in 
1897, when the electrification of Vienna’s tramways was commissioned; this was largely completed by 1903 
(Wiener Stadtwerke, 2015). At that time, the entire tramway network, which had been privately owned and 
operated until then, came under public ownership after the takeover by Vienna Mayor Mr. Lueger, who 
established the Stadt Wien-Städtische Straßenbahnen in 1903 (City of Vienna-City Tramways) (Kostal et al. 
2014). 
1898 marked the opening of the Metropolitan Railway, which paved the way for the Viennese metro system 
as it is nowadays. The steam-powered metropolitan railway at that time was operated by the Federal Rail-
ways. Following what happened to trams, this Metropolitan Railway was electrified in the beginning of the 
20th century. Following the establishment in 1881 of the precursor of bus services with the Erste Pfer-
destellwagen-Gesellschaft (First Horse-Drawn Bus Corporation), the bus network underwent further devel-
opment at the beginning of the 20th century before being incorporated into the City Tramways company in 
1922 (Frank, 1960).  
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4.2.2.2 Intermediate war period (1918–1934) 
The inter-war period was marked by intensive communal housing development as well as the establishment 
of the land development plan. During those years, expropriation was established by law to facilitate urban 
development (Paal, 2003). 1922 marked the last year of operation of steam-powered tramways, which were 
all electrified after that date (Emberger et al., 2013).  
4.2.2.3 Post-war period (1945–1970) 
The city of Vienna was severely damaged during the Second World War, after which the city underwent a 
major phase of reconstruction. Many buildings were demolished and reconstructed and the city was consid-
erably expanded (Paal, 2003). The Wiener Stadtwerke was founded in 1949 as a merger of different munici-
pal companies, including the municipal transportation company (City Tramways). The city’s tramway system, 
which was one of the largest in the world prior to the war, also went under major restoration projects and 
could only reach its pre-war level in 1950 (Kostal et al. 2014). As the city was experiencing important post-
war growth, it was decided in 1954 to undertake the construction of the Vienna Metropolitan Railway (S-
Bahn) as a part of reconstruction of the national railway network. Although already planned in 1955, the S-
Bahn took quite some time to become a reality as a lack of funding caused delays (Kostal et al. 2014). The 
first junction of the Viennese S-Bahn was inaugurated in 1962 (Wiener Linien, 2014). In 1969 construction of 
the Vienna U-Bahn (underground) began, voted by the governing Social Democrats, which had been also 
supported by the Conservative Party (ÖVP) since the 1950s (Pirhofer and Stimmer, 2007).  
4.2.2.4 Consolidation (1971–1989) 
In 1974 the Verkehrsverbund Ost-Region (VÖR) was established, which is thought to have contributed in 
increasing PT ridership during a period of rising vehicle ownership (Pucher and Kurth, 1996). The 1970s were 
also marked by infrastructure projects that have contributed to lock private car use in the capital of Austria. 
In 1978 an urban motorway was opened, which at that time was intended to relieve the crowded city center. 
However, this motorway had the opposite effect as it worsened traffic conditions, air quality, the local econ-
omy and increased congestion in downtown districts (Knoflacher, 2007). 
The 1970s and 1980s were marked by the development and implementation of the municipal plan for urban 
development (STEP84), which aimed to rediscover the inner city and implement urban renewal projects 
(Paal, 2003). It also marked the further development of the Viennese urban rail. The first U-Bahn line was 
inaugurated in 1978 and completed by 1982 by two other lines, forming at that time a 30km U-Bahn net-
work (Hofling, 2010), which was expanded to 41 km during the 1980s to finally reach its current size of al-
most 80 km, along five lines and 101 stations, in 2015 (Prillinger, 2015).  
In the 1980s, the City of Vienna Transport Plan set the groundwork for the development of the bike network. 
A dedicated position was then created by Mayor Helmut Zilk in 1990 to pursue the development of the bike 
network. In 1993, parking management was implemented in Vienna’s First District (Buehler et al., 2017a) 
with the aim of better managing parking in the most central and crowded district in Vienna. The 1980s were 
also marked by the beginning of pedestrian-friendly policies to help reduce car use. Street calming strate-
gies, such as limiting vehicle speed to 30 km/h and encouraging mixed usage of streets were implemented, 
but more at the district than the city level (Buehler et al., 2017a). 
4.2.2.5 Internationalization (1990–nowadays) 
The Austrian federal constitution does not require Austrian municipalities to develop urban mobility plans, 
so it is up to each municipality to deal with its traffic. The city of Vienna has understood this for a long time 
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and has taken this issue seriously. To tackle car dependency, in 1994 the City of Vienna established an urban 
mobility plan entitled “Wiener Verkehrskonzept 1994” (STEP94), which included the extension of the U6 line, 
the construction of the U3 line, new parking charge schemes, as well as the development of the bicycle net-
work (Emberger, 2006). 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the City of Vienna has adopted a new planning strategy aimed at position-
ing itself better on the international scene. From a transport point of view, the public transport system con-
tinued expanding, potentially thanks to the 1991 Austrian Master plan, which aimed to make public 
transport more attractive (Emberger, 2017). Major institutional changes also occurred. In 1999 Wien’s utility 
company, managing transport, energy and other services, Wiener Stadtwerke, was corporatized and trans-
ferred to a newly established joint-stock company, Wiener Stadtwerke Holding AG, which was fully owned 
by the City of Vienna. Wiener Linien GmbH and Wiener Linien GmbH & Co KG were specifically founded as 
Wiener Linien subsidiaries responsible for transport activities (Kostal et al. 2014). In the late 1990s Wiener 
Linien experienced NPM approaches when starting to put some of the Viennese bus network routes to com-
petitive tendering (Hermann, 2006). Today it is estimated that at least a third of the bus routes in Vienna are 
still operated by Wiener Linien, and the other half by other bus operators, such as Postbus (a 100 percent 
owned subsidiary of ÖBB), Dr. Ricard, Blaguss or Zulkin.  
In 2003 the first Transport Master Plan for Vienna (Jansen, 2017) was developed, which laid down transport 
and traffic development for the next 20 years. Among other measures, the 2003 Transport Master Plan, 
entitled Smart Moves, targeted, by 2020, to reduce motorized individual traffic to 25 percent of all trips, 
increase bicycle traffic share to 8 percent, increase public transport share from 34 percent to 40 percent, 
and invert the modal split for public transport vs. motorized individual traffic across municipal borders from 
the current 35/65 percent to 45/55 percent (City of Vienna, 2014b). It also planned the development of 
park-and-ride facilities at the city’s limits (City of Vienna, 2003), to encourage people to shift from personal 
cars to public transport when entering Vienna’s urban core. 
Since 2005, the city of Vienna has also conducted a major transit-oriented development project with its 
Aspern Development project. Located on Vienna’s former airfield, the project connected to the city center 
via public transportation (U2) since 2013, is expected to host 26,000 new residents by 2030, as well as busi-
nesses and recreational services at a walking distance, in order to reduce the temptation of residents to use 
private motorized vehicles. 
The biking culture dynamics continued in 2003, when the first bike-sharing system, called CityBike, was inau-
gurated (Buehler et al., 2017a). The advertising company Gewista, which had close ties with French Advertis-
ing company JCDecaux, was awarded by the City of Vienna a contract to build and operate a bike sharing 
system for the next 10 years. The first 60 stations were financed from advertising, while the next 60 stations 
were financed by the City of Vienna. The system currently accounts for 120 stations and approximately 1500 
bikes. Vienna was the first large-scale bike-sharing system worldwide, which paved the way for the roll-out 
of renowned bike sharing schemes across Europe, such as Velib’ in Paris or Velov’ in Lyon. From 1990 to 
2014, it is estimated that the size of the bike network was multiplied by a factor of six, from 190 to 1200 km. 
Also, 2003 saw the development of the first Vienna Urban Mobility Plan, which aimed to reduce the C02 
emission per person originating from the transport sector by 5 percent, increase the security of the trans-
portation network, increase the capacity of the tram network by expending it, increase the efficiency of the 
transport network by giving right of way to public transport, and replace the tram rolling stock with ultra-low 
floor trams (Emberger, 2006). 
The year 2010 represented a turn in transport policy in Vienna. In that year, following the municipal elec-
tions, Maria Vassilakou became deputy mayor of Vienna in charge of planning, transport, climate change, 
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energy and public participation. Since then, Vassilakou has attempted to develop more sustainable transport 
policies. For example, she proposed reducing the price of the annual public transport ticket to €100 before 
coming back on her proposition and finally setting the annual ticket price at €365, symbolically at €1 per day 
(Buehler et al., 2017a). Vassilakou has also pushed cycling higher on the Viennese political agenda. 
In December 2011 the carsharing service car2go started in Vienna, which initially proposed 350 free-floating 
cars. The size of the fleet quickly increased to 500 by April 2012 and 700 by the end of 2013. The roll-out of 
car2go services has also been possible thanks to an agreement made with the city of Vienna along which 
car2go has to pay an annual fee of €2500 per car to the city to allow its cars to be parked anywhere in Vien-
na. This represents significant income for the city of Vienna as well as an interesting agreement for the car-
sharing operator. Following an inquiry from the ÖVP City Council members, a study was commissioned by 
the City of Vienna in 2012 to understand the impact and acceptance of carsharing services in Vienna. After 
two years of data collection, the results, released in 2015, showed that each carsharing vehicle was synony-
mous with a reduction of five private cars, and that carsharing did not take any customers away from public 
transport. In the meantime, DriveNow, a joint venture by BMW and car rental company Sixt, started provid-
ing free-floating car-sharing services in 2013 and nowadays provides some 500 vehicles to its users in Vien-
na. 
In 2011, as part of the Model Regions of Electric Mobility program from the Climate and Energy Fund, Wie-
ner Stadtwerke Holding AG was awarded a contract to develop the “e-mobility on demand” (eMoD) Model 
region for Vienna. Undertaken by a consortium led by NeuMo, a subsidiary of the Wiener Stadtwerke, the 
project resulted in the installation of 350 charging stations, the testing of electric buses on some public 
transport routes, as well as research about behavioral use of electric vehicles (Klima und Energiefonds, 
2015). The project ran from 2012 to 2015. 
Initiated in 2011, the Smart City Vienna Framework Strategy was presented to the public in 2014, aiming to 
guide Vienna through the 21st century and help the Austrian capital achieve growth while reducing resource 
consumption. The document proposed a list of rather broad objectives in terms of climate impact reduction, 
innovation development, and improvement of the quality of life. In terms of mobility, the strategy’s objec-
tives are the following (City of Vienna, 2014a): 
 Increase human-powered mobility modal share; decrease the number of trips done by private mo-
torized traffic to 20 percent by 2025 and less than 15 percent by 2050; maintain the percentage of
trips realized by public transport.
 By 2050, all motorized individual traffic within the municipal boundaries is to make do without con-
ventional propulsion technologies.
 By 2030, commercial traffic originating and terminating within the municipal boundaries is to be
largely CO2-free.
 Reduce energy consumption by passenger traffic across municipal boundaries by 10 percent in
2030.
Surprisingly no ICT-supported tools are promoted to reach those targets, and no mention is made of integra-
tion and/or intermodality. 
Following the Smart City Vienna Framework Strategy, the City of Vienna proposed in December 2014 a new 
Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan (SUMP). The plan targeted to reduce by 2025 the use of individual motor-
ized vehicles to 20 percent of all trips, and to reduce by 20 percent the energy consumption associated with 
transport activities. It also targeted a 30 percent increase in the share of citizens walking and cycling more 
than 30 minutes per day, for example by planning the development of more long-distance cycling routes 
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(City of Vienna, 2015d). Prepared as a response to the Smart City Framework Strategy, the new SUMP 
stressed the need to develop multi-modal transport from door-to-door as well as incentivize Viennese citi-
zens to share rather than own: 
“The citizens of Vienna do not need to own cars to be mobile. Cars can readily be hired if needed. Bi-
cycle sharing systems supplement public transport.” (City of Vienna, 2015b: 10) 
The plan also underlined the need for closer networking of mobility players, as well as joint marketing of 
various services. The Smart City Vienna Framework strategy was also followed in 2015 by the publication of 
the E-mobility Strategy of the City of Vienna, which proposed measures for the electrification of vehicle 
fleets as well as the installation of the required charging infrastructure. However, the strategy stayed vague 
on ways to get there, as it specifically underlined that EVs should neither benefit of any special parking rule, 
nor be able to use public transport lanes (City of Vienna, 2015a). Again, nothing is mentioned about integra-
tion of EVs to other transportation modes, or about intermodality. 
In the last few years, the City of Vienna has been working on metro extension and modernization. While 
modernization of the U4 started in 2014, an extension of the line U1 to the south is to be completed by 
2017, of U2 to the south by 2028, as well as of U5 (City of Vienna, 2016d).  
Regarding non-conventional passenger transport, Uber started operations in Vienna in February 2014. While 
it has not yet been subject to any particular regulation, the City of Vienna voted in April 2017 for a new regu-
lation aiming at regulating ride-booking services more heavily. The “Wiener Landesbetriebsordnung für das 
Taxi und Mietwagen-Gewerbe” (LBO), which came into effect in January 2018, requires ride-booking drivers 
to have a special license.  
In 2016 the Smarter Together project was launched, an EU-funded project in collaboration with the cities of 
Lyon and Munich that aims to implement innovative smart city concepts combined with urban renewal 
strategies at the district level. Many partners from different horizons are collaborating under this project, 
such as Wiener Stadtwerke and its subsidiaries, several municipal departments, but also private companies 
such as Siemens, Sycube, and Caruso. In terms of mobility, Smarter Together proposes the construction of 
“mobility points,” which are physical points that integrate different modes of transportation (such as public 
transport with e-bike sharing or car sharing), supposed to fit users’ needs (City of Vienna, 2016a). A summary 
of the institutional and infrastructural evolution of transportation in Vienna can be seen in Figure 4.2.4. 
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Figure 4.2-4: institutional and infrastructural evolution of the Viennese transportation system from 1860s to present  (author’s elaboration) 
4.2.2.6 Transport in Vienna presently 
Through various policies and measures, the City of Vienna has succeeded in reducing car use by 13 percent 
over the last 25 years. From 1990 to 2014, car use went from 40 percent to 27 percent of daily trips, public 
transport increased from 29 percent to 39 percent, and bike trips increased from 3 percent to 6 percent, 
while pedestrian trips held steady at 28 percent of daily trips (Buehler et al., 2017a). Figure 4.2.5 shows a 
summary of the evolution of modal shares (percent) for the Vienna Metropolitan Area. 
Figure 4.2-5: modal share evolution in Vienna metropolitan area from 1993 to 2012 (adapted from Buehler et al. 2017b) 
Although private motorized transport constituted the first travel mode in the 1990s, it was overtaken 
by public transport in the early 2000s. Private motorized transport was even overtaken by walking in the 
2010s. In 2015, 954 million people were transported by WL services (WL, 2016). SBahn, which is 
provided by the Austrian Federal Railways, also accounts for a significant share of trips within Vienna. 
Despite the absence of clear data, we learned from that SBahn represented about 20 percent of public 
transport ridership (IV7), as represented in Figure 4.2.6. 
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Figure 4.2-6: modal share in the city of Vienna in 2016 (author’s elaboration, based on data from City of Vienna [2016]) 
Although private car ownership increased steadily from the 1960s to the 2000s, from about 90 cars to 
395 cars per 1000 inhabitants (Buehler et al. 2017b), the rate of private motorization has been 
decreasing in recent years. As of December 31, 2016, there were 685,570 cars registered in Vienna and 
698,968 annual public transport passes issued. Thus, for the first time in history, the number of public 
transport passes ex-ceeded the number of registered cars (City of Vienna, 2016c). The evolution of the 
number of annual season tickets holder is quite impressive, as Figure 4.2.7 below shows: 
Figure 4.2-7: evolution of the number of public transport yearly passes in Vienna (author’s elaboration, based on data from WL [2015; 2016]) 
Due to the wide penetration of seasonal tickets, single tickets only represent 11.6 percent of WL revenue 
(WL, 2016). In 2016, Vienna had the lowest car ownership rate among all Austrian provinces, with 372.5 cars 
per 1000 inhabitants (City of Vienna, 2016c). This is significantly lower than in the 2000s and approaching 
the 1990s level of 375 cars per 1000 inhabitants (Buehler et al. 2017a). Regarding the amount of space used 
by transport infrastructure, roads occupy 14.4 percent of Vienna’s land surface (City of Vienna, 2016).  
However, it is important to note that these data are related to the City of Vienna alone and do not take into 
account the whole Viennese Metropolitan Area. Although the transportation system in Vienna city center 
does not seem to rely any longer on the use of personal cars, it is not the case for citizens living in the outer 
Vienna, and not true at all for citizens living in the Viennese suburbs. Most people living in the suburbs still 
use their personal vehicles to commute to the city center.  
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Eurostat estimate that while there were some 381 cars per 1000 inhabitants in Vienna in 2014, there were 
609 and 640 cars per 1000 inhabitants for Lower Austria and Burgenland, respectively. It was also estimated 
that there were 2.1 public transport vehicles per 1000 inhabitants in Vienna, compared to only 1.1 and 0.9 
public transport vehicles per 1000 inhabitants for Burgenland and Lower Austria, respectively (Eurostat, 
2016). Figure 4.2.8 below shows the evolution of private car ownership rate for the states of Vienna, Lower 
Austria, and Burgenland, and one can observe that the three states are not following the same path when it 
comes to reduction of the number of motorized vehicles per 1000 inhabitants. While the numbers are going 
down for Vienna, they are clearly increasing for the two other surrounding states that are part of the 
Viennese Metropolitan area. 
Figure 4.2-8: Evolution of the number of passenger cars per thousand inhabitants for Vienna, Lower AT and Burgenland (adapted from WKO 
[2016]) 
Thus, the situation seems to be very different considering the whole metropolitan area. This is also valid for 
modal share as can attest figure 4.2.9. 
Figure 4.2-9: spatial variability of modal share between Vienna city center, periphery and suburbs (adapted from Buehler et al. 2017b) 
However, there are very few recent available data that take into account commuters who come from the 
neighboring states of Lower Austria and Burgenland. It is estimated that up to 500,000 cars commute to 
Vienna from neighboring states on a daily basis. 
“When I come to work, I can see that on the highway entering Vienna, two-thirds of the plates are 
not from [here] (…) People working here [in Vienna] and from the outer parts have company cars so 
they have a Vienna plate, but they are from Burgenland. There are even more people commuting by 
car than you think.” (IV10) 
Thus, modal share figures are quite different for the Viennese Metropolitan Area than for Vienna itself. In 
2010, approximately 80 percent of commuting trips (from Viennese suburbs to Vienna city center) were 
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made by private motorized vehicle, compared 20 percent by public transport, mainly through the SBahn 
(Prenner, 2015). The traffic figures that are proudly announced by the City of Vienna do not take commuting 
into account, which is definitively part of the problem. 
4.2.3 Evolution of climate policies 
Here the evolution of climate change policies at the local and federal levels is given and summarized in figure 
4.2.10. In comparison with other European countries (such as the Nordic countries), Austria has not been 
quick to define and implement Agenda 21 (ICLEI and difu, 1999). In Vienna, the Agenda 21 process only 
started in 1997 and faced important issues regarding its implementation at the whole city level. As a result, 
it was only implemented for some of the 23 Viennese districts.  
One might consider the first national climate change policy to be the 2002 Austrian Strategy for Sustainable 
Development, proposed by Austrian authorities to comply with UN requests. The strategy proposed to de-
crease energy intensity by 1 percent per year, increase the share of renewable energy by 1 percent per year, 
and decrease greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 13 percent until 2008–2012, following the Kyoto protocol 
(Martinuzzi and Steurer, 2003). However, the strategy was criticized for lacking a clear implementation plan 
(Martinuzzi and Steurer, 2003). Although the plan did include a dedicated part on transport, it did not set 
any specific targets for transport-related CO2 emission reduction (BMLFUW, 2002). 
In 1999, the City of Vienna started its climate action program, entitled KLIP. The first version of the KLIP, 
named KLIP I, aimed to limit transport-related CO2 emissions to a 5 percent increase by 2010 compared to 
1987 levels, as well as to increase human-powered mobility modal share and car-pooling activities (Magnin 
and Lacassagne, 2003). KLIP II was accepted in 2009 by the Vienna City Council and proposed a 21 percent 
reduction of GHG emission per capita by 2020 compared with the 1990s levels. In terms of transportation, 
KLIP II continued to promote human-powered mobility modes and public transport against private car use, 
but without setting new emission reduction targets for transport. It also emphasized the need to better 
combine mobility modes with one another in order to better fit Viennese citizens’ mobility needs (City of 
Vienna, 2009). 
In 2004, the Ministry of the Environment created the Klimaaktiv initative, which aimed to develop standards, 
train professionals, and create a network of professionals involved in sustainable development. In particular, 
the initiative planned to offer consultation and financial support to municipalities in different fields, includ-
ing mobility management (Eltis, 2016). Following the definition of the 3*20 targets by EU leaders, the Cli-
mate and Energy Fund was founded, which aimed to fund initiatives that would help achieve national cli-
mate change targets. In 2011, the Austrian Climate Protection Act was passed, establishing the National 
Climate Protection Committee (NCPC) and a National Climate Protection Advisory Board (NCPAB). However, 
the Act failed to provide new GHG emission reduction targets. The Austrian Climate protection Act was 
amended in 2013, but again failed to adopt ambitious GHG reduction targets. According to Tobin (2015), the 
failure of the Austrian State to define bolder climate targets can be explained by its lack of alternative for 
energy production, direct consequence of the 1978 referendum, in which a majority of the population voted 
against nuclear power production.  
In 2014 the Smart City Wien Framework Strategy was adopted, which sought a 35 percent CO2 emission 
reduction by 2030, as well as an 80 percent CO2 emission reduction by 2050, both compared to 1990 levels. 
The strategy also aimed to have between 20 percent of the energy consumed in Vienna come from renewa-
bles by 2030, and 50 percent by 2050. The strategy ultimately planned for all individual motorized traffic 
vehicles to be fossil-fuel free by 2050 (City of Vienna, 2014a). 
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In 2017 the new Austrian Energy and Climate Strategy, which aimed to propose new measures to fit EU tar-
gets and honor the Paris Agreement, was supposed to be released. However, the definition of this document 
was delayed due to the resignation of the vice chancellor, Mr Mitterlehner (ÖVP), in May 2017, as well as 
the victory of the ÖVP at the National Council elections in October 2017. Quite a few measures are expected 
to concern transport in the document, such as the promotion of shared and integrated mobility modes to 
help reach climate goals.  
Figure 4.2-10: evolution of climate change related policies at the local and national levels (author’s elaboration) 
In the following part, we review the main events having had an impact in the development of Integrated 
mobility platforms in Vienna. 
4.2.4 The development of integrated mobility platforms (IMPs) in the Vienna Metropoli-
tan Area 
In conjunction with the Austrian General Transport Plan, the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation, and 
Technology (BMVIT) published in 2002 the Transport Telematics Offensive 2002+, which aimed to promote 
telematics and integrated transport management to shape transport flows more efficiently as a whole and 
ultimately reduce congestion and travel times (BMLFUW, 2002). The early 2000s also saw the development 
of several federal research programs that aimed to support the development of intelligent mobility services, 
such as Move or IV2S (Intelligent Transport Systems and Services). Within the IV2S initiative, the Impulse 
program I2 focused specifically on the development of transport telematics and ITS, in order to create for 
example “up-to-date traveller information systems” or “innovative mobility and transport concepts with 
modern approaches in regard to intermodality” (BMVIT, 2006: 13). In total, about 95 projects focusing on ITS 
and intermodality were recommended for funding. For example, the I2 program funded the Con.takt pro-
ject, aimed at securing bus and rail connections, by allowing time of arrival information to be exchanged 
between those two modes of transport and displayed to users. Also funded by the I2 program was the trip 
planner proposed by the Vienna Spirit project in 2003, which combined information for personal motorized 
transport and public transport (Bruntsch and Rehrl, 2005). 
In 2004, the Telematics Master Plan Austria – Telematics Applications for Traffic and Transport was pub-
lished, which sought to define a set of measures where telematics would be used to optimize, improve, and 
increase the safety of transportation networks. The Austrian ITS efforts were then concentrated into a single 
federal agency created for this purpose in 2005: AustriaTec (BMVIT, 2011). This was followed by the creation 
in 2006 of the ITS Vienna Region, as part of the VÖR, which gathered together the landers of Vienna, Lower 
Austria and Burgenland. The ITS Vienna Region covers an area of about 3.5 million people and can be under-
stood as a collaborative body in charge of ITS for the entire Viennese Metropolitan Region. With an annual 
budget of about €1 million, ITS Vienna Region aims to promote a shift from private motorized travel towards 
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more environmentally friendly and sustainable means of transport (City of Vienna, 2014b). The IV2S funding 
initiative was followed by the IV2SPlus funding initiative, which was intended to fund innovative transport 
and mobility solutions from 2008 to 2012 (BMVIT, 2009). This funding program was followed 2012 by the 
development of the Mobility of the Future program, which aimed at “identifying and refining creative new 
ideas based on technological, social and organizational innovations” (BMVIT, 2012: 7). The mobility of the 
future program benefited from an annual budget of about €15 million. 
In 2011 the first Austrian ITS Action plan was presented. The plan stressed the need to define a single 
framework to guarantee the interoperability of ITS services, in terms of data collection, processing, mainte-
nance, and service (BMVIT, 2011). The plan also identified six areas of actions for the implementation of the 
strategy, one of which was the “informed travellers” area that would comprise “measures that supply traffic 
information to the individual travellers and offer booking and invoice services” (BMVIT, 2011: 12). Ultimately, 
the Austrian ITS law, in compliance with the 2010 EU ITS directive, was adopted in 2013 (Aifadopoulou et al., 
2014). In 2012 the BMVIT developed the “ICT of the Future”, which sought to fund projects with ambitious 
use of ICTs. Although some of the projects focused on mobility, such as projects focusing on autonomous 
vehicles, none of the projects presented in the project reports focused on integrated mobility platforms 
(BMVIT, 2015).  
As detailed below, the development of digital transport solutions has been pushed by three different actors 
(the ÖBB, the VÖR, and the Wiener Linien) for whom we detail the different actions below.  
4.2.4.1 The Pre-SMILE era 
 The ÖBB way
In 2007, the ÖBB launched “Scotty”, which started as a web-based route planner delivering door-to-door 
information, based on timetable data from all public transport operators in Austria. This was followed in the 
summer by the launch of a pilot project called “platform stewards”, which had dedicated trained ÖBB em-
ployees support travelers on-site, providing them with information on timetables and connections (ÖBB, 
2007). A Scotty app was made and released to the public in 2011. It is still one of the most used apps for long 
distance travel in Austria (IV9). 
In the late 2000s, the ÖBB also developed a web ticketing service, before launching in 2013 the ÖBB official 
ticketing app for smartphones. Surprisingly, the app was not merged with Scotty at that time and customers 
had to use separate apps for information and for ticketing. 
“A few years ago, we started a ticketing app (...) It was first an on-line service and then they built an 
app. But they did not link that to the information app. They did not integrate it to Scotty which was 
strange. Looking back it was not a good idea, but it is how it developed.” (IV9) 
In October 2010, initiated by the ÖBB, started the eMORAIL project, which explored new ways to integrate 
electric mobility services with public transport, especially for commuters. The project received funding from 
the Climate and Energy Fund as part of the electric mobility flagship project in 2011, and supported the de-
velopment of electric vehicle charging points in selected railway stations, as well as the development of the 
eMORAIL app, that could be used to access information about availability, current battery status, and range 
of the electric cars, PT real-time timetable information, as well as to make vehicle bookings. The pilot project 
was conducted over three railway stations in the Vienna Metropolitan area, as well as two railway stations in 
the Graz Metropolitan area. Users had to pay a monthly fee including a commuter ticket, a public transport 
ticket at their destination, as well as the use of the electric vehicles (Klima und Energiefonds, 2016). The pilot 
project ended in December 2013 and paved the way for a concrete implementation in selected railway sta-
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tions over Austria, but not in the Viennese Metropolitan area, in 2017. The ÖBB’s interest in integrated mo-
bility started thanks to the eMORAIL project. 
“We started the whole idea of integrated mobility with the electric mobility hype. Thanks to eMO-
RAIL, ÖBB realized that if you want to be part of the electric mobility bubble, you have to go for inte-
grated mobility systems (…). It does not matter who does the first or last mile, so we started to say 
that we did not want to be the ones that are only doing the long distance, but wanted to be the mo-
bility provider for the whole chain. That was the idea.” (IV9) 
 GIP and VAÖ
From 2006 to 2009, largely funded by the Climate and Energy Fund, the GIP (Graph Integration Platform) 
was developed. This was a nation-wide platform that gathered databases and geographic information sys-
tems from various transportation infrastructure managers and operators. The GIP digital map of transport 
was supposed to gather all kind of information, including safety-relevant implementation, such as accident 
data, and be regularly updated by the different transport operators and infrastructure managers.  
In May 2011 a cooperation agreement for the Verkehrauskunft Österreich (VAÖ) project was concluded to 
establish a uniform, non-discriminatory intermodal online traffic information platform across Austria (IV14). 
The project, funded by the Climate and Energy Fund, brought together the ASFINAG (a publically-owned 
company in charge of highways in Austria) with different regional transport authorities, broadcast systems, 
the Austrian Automobile touring club, as well as the ÖBB. All project partners signed a data exchange 
agreement in October 2010. However, the ÖBB then decided to stop its collaboration as it was finding it 
difficult to engage in the development of a non-discriminatory trip planner. 
In September 2012, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der österreichischen Verkehrsverbund-
Organisationsgesellschaften (ARGE ÖVV) was founded by the different regional transport authorities of Aus-
tria, including the VÖR, to carry on the project of a nation-wide data platform for transportation (IV14). The 
ARGE ÖVV finally presented the VAÖ 1.0 (first nationwide data platform), which at that time was using static 
data and relied on the GIP, at the ITS World Congress in Vienna in October 2012. The project entered a sec-
ond phase in May 2013, relying on real-time data. 2014 saw the release of VAÖ 2.0, which relied on real-
time data. This platform laid the groundwork for the Austrian transport digital infrastructure, on which other 
services could develop, such as new routing apps and so on. The VAÖ platform is currently managed by VAÖ 
GmbH, a company created by ASFINAG, ARGE ÖVV, ÖAMTC (Austrian Automobile Touring Club), BMVIT, and 
the ÖBB.  
In late 2012, based on VAÖ 1.0, the ITS Region Vienna released a first version of its trip planner for Vienna 
Metropolitan Region, called AnachB.at (Menzel and Bohm, 2014). Among other things, it encompassed in-
formation from Austrian Highways operator ASFINAG, the ÖBB, Wiener Linien, and traffic information from 
the City of Vienna and Austrian Police. In 2014, a more elaborate app, called the AnachB/VÖR app, was 
launched in collaboration with VÖR and supported by the VAÖ 2.0 platform. 
 The Wiener Linien (WL) way
In September 2003, celebrating 100 years of its existence, WL implemented an SMS ticket on its network, 
called the Wiener Linien HANDY Fahrschein (IV1). It is acknowledged as one of the first public transport op-
erators to have proposed such a service in Europe. Back then, the service offered customers the possibility 
to buy a day-ticket, allowing for unlimited use of public transport, for a fee of €4.20. The transaction was 
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made through the electronic payment platform Paybox (now part of the ABN AMRO bank group) and paid by 
the customer at the end of the month via his/her monthly mobile phone bill. 
In 2007, WL launched its online ticket shop (IV1) for a range of tickets including day-tickets, three-day tick-
ets, weekly ticket, and special tourist tickets. Customers could pay for their tickets online and then print 
them at home. In the same year WL also conducted a pilot study to explore the possibilities of NFC technol-
ogies for ticketing. In 2009, WL launched its trip-planner app entitled Qando, which it had developed jointly 
with VÖR and the technology company Fluidtime (IV1). Qando encountered a lot of success and hence re-
ceived a best practice award from UITP. The app is still being widely used in Vienna, as it processes an aver-
age of about 2.5 million route requests a day. 
In 2011, WL released its Strategy 2020 (IV1). In the document, the WL stated its willingness to become a 
central point of contact in the context of mobility inquiries in order to strengthen its market position. The 
same year WL launched its ticketing app, which first allowed users to display tickets preliminarily bought 
online, and then allowed users to directly buy tickets from the app. Surprisingly, when the ticketing app was 
released it was not integrated to the existing routing information app Qando, apparently for organizational 
reasons: 
“We got two apps, one for routing and one for ticketing, and the main reason for that [was] organi-
zational. We have one CEO in charge of finance, market and IT, and one CEO in charge of operations 
and infrastructure. Thus, the routing information app is coming from one, whereas and the ticketing 
app from another.” (WL) 
In late 2011, as part of the Open-Government initiative from the City of Vienna, WL decided to progressively 
open some of its data. In June 2013, geographic data of public transport stops (buses, tramways, under-
ground) were released, followed by the opening of real-time departure data, as well as bus route data (In-
terview WL). To access those data, which are published online under the CC BY license, interested develop-
ers need to register to the Open Data Portal of the City of Vienna. It is estimated that dozens of apps have 
since been developed by third-party developers.20  
4.2.4.2  The SMILE era 
 Development process
In June 2011, the Climate and Energy Fund released its call for the third Austrian Electric Mobility Flagship 
project, which aimed to fund projects that would contribute to the roll-out of electric mobility in Austria 
(IV11). More specifically, the call looked at projects that would enhance the “development of interoperable 
mobility information, electric mobility offers and electric mobility billing by public transport service providers 
and operators and their integration in a functioning system environment by using linked ICT systems” (Klima 
und Energiefonds, 2011: 11).  
At that time, the Wiener Stadtwerke approached the ÖBB to create a consortium to respond to the Climate 
and Energy Fund’s call (IV9). The Wiener Stadtwerke had long had this idea of developing an integrated mo-
bility scheme, but decided to join forces with the ÖBB in order to develop a nation-wide integrated mobility 
20 In Spring 2017, WL had still not provided Google with the required APIs to have public transport information available on Google Maps. 
People who are used to finding their way around in foreign cities using Google Maps might thus be forced to download Austrian apps to have 
access to public transport information in Vienna. 
139 
platform, and not only something for the City of Vienna (IV9). The idea was to develop an integrated mobility 
platform as a research project in order to determine what was doable and achievable. The ÖBB quickly 
agreed to pursue this path. 
“Wiener Stadtwerke came to us. They were thinking about creating a card that could be used for all 
PT in Vienna, but then thought it should not only be for Vienna and considered approaching ÖBB. So 
they wanted to make a joint project with the two biggest Austrian mobility providers, which was a 
good approach to make this project a success. This is how it started.” (IV9) 
ETA and IC Consulenten, two Viennese consulting firms, were quickly hired to help put together a consorti-
um, which was ultimately constituted of Wiener Stadtwerke, Wiener Linien, Wien Energie, WienIT, ÖBB 
Holding, ÖBB Infra, ÖBB Personenverkher, iC consulenten, Fluidtime, NTT Data, TU Wien, Quitessenz, tbw 
research, ETA, and NeuMo. The consortium started to get in touch with other mobility providers to integrate 
them into the platform. Car2go, Taxi 31300, and CityBike quickly joined the project (IV6, 13), as did other 
public transport authorities from other Austrian cities such as Graz Linien or Linz Linien. Most mobility part-
ners were enthusiastic about participating in the SMILE project, as it was a way for them to learn about IMPs 
as well as maintain a good relationship with the Viennese Public Transport company. 
“I think it is for us absolutely an interesting thing. Every presentation of our cars, in every possible 
environment is interesting, especially combined with public transport. We want to be in there. We 
want to be seen there. That is for sure (…). We are doing it because we want to have a good relation-
ship with the city and the public transport companies.” (IV13) 
“We said yes because it was interesting for us. Such things can really have an added value (…) The 
idea for ordering to paying with one fingerprint, is a really ‘sexy’ thing (…) We were very enthusiastic 
from the beginning.” (IV6) 
“We are not to be used alone, as citybike, but you always use citybike in some kind of combinations 
or together with other needs, which is why it made sense for us to join the SMILE project.” (IV10) 
Having partnered with other mobility providers, the consortium applied to the electric mobility flagship pro-
gram, with the SMILE project. Because it was proposing a solution that would better integrate electric mobil-
ity to the existing transportation system, the consortium was ultimately awarded a grant of €2.9 million in 
December 2011.  
“There are three basic components in electric mobility, which are the vehicle, the infrastructure and 
the user. We [The Climate and Energy Fund] wanted to fund projects that had this holistic under-
standing of electric mobility (…) [The SMILE consortium] came up with this ICT/app approach that 
would enable people to plan their trips and have access to different transport solutions. And we 
wanted something that supported electric mobility (…) so it went through.” (IV11) 
The consortium later responded to a call for funding from the FFG, for which it was also awarded funding 
(IV12). While the strategy was implemented from early 2012, the system and app were built in 2013. A pilot 
phase eventually took place from January to December 2014 and involved 1000 test users. The estimated 
total cost of the project was approximately €6.7 million  (Wiener Stadtwerke, 2013). Throughout the project, 
the operative project management team, comprised of Wiener Stadtwerke, Wiener Linien, and the ÖBB, met 
on a monthly basis. The strategic project management team, comprised of Wiener Stadtwerke, Wiener 
Linien, the ÖBB, ETA, and ICconsulenten, also met monthly. The steering committee, which was made up of 
Wiener Stadtwerke and all consortium partners, met twice a year. The Climate and Energy Fund and the 
steering committee met every six months and reported every 9–13 months. 
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While the SMILE project is acknowledged for having developed quite smoothly in general, there has been 
some areas that have posed problems among stakeholders. The different expectations from the involved 
stakeholders, as well as the great variety of employees working on the SMILE project, coming from different 
professional backgrounds, is acknowledged to have slowed the project: 
“It was a lot of coordination. A you can assume, those people did not only have SMILE on their plates, 
so they had their usual jobs and SMILE on top of it, which was a little bit conflicting sometimes. In 
SMILE we had to think big, look forward on how to reach our goals. It was a lot of different lan-
guages. There were lawyers, IT, consultants, designers … So different kind of people, with different 
mindsets. They all had to be focusing on the same goal to finish the project and have a final product 
that the people would like.” (IV3) 
Legal difficulties of setting up the SMILE project, particularly in terms of liabilities in cases of use of non-
public transport mobility services was also mentioned as something difficult. 
“If you clicked on our general terms and conditions in their app, we needed to be sure that, in case of 
trouble, we had a legal connection. If the customer, for example, said, ‘no I have never accepted 
those terms and conditions, and the bike is gone and it is not my problem’, we needed to be able to 
do something. If the liability was not clearly given to this person from a legal standpoint, it was not 
OK.” (IV10) 
The availability of proper dedicated funds for every stakeholder involved in the project was also mentioned 
as a barrier. Only the organizations that were part of the consortium received financial compensation. All 
other partners that joined the project and were not part of the original consortium had to pay for their own 
costs and could not benefit of any subsidy. 
“We did not receive any money for this project. Every step, every minute our staff was working on 
this project, we had to pay from our pocket. The interface work for example was done by our soft-
ware company, so we had to pay for them.” (IV6) 
Although the technicality of the SMILE solution is not cited as the main bottleneck for the development of 
the project, it is acknowledged as having raised some issues: 
“A bigger challenge was the technological one (…) Ticketing, for example, is not only based on one 
system, but on four of five systems, and getting all them work together on this common goal was 
quite challenging. So the only real tough challenge was I would say technological. So far it was quite 
easy for the rest.” (IV3) 
It was also mentioned that the SMILE engine, as it was during the project, was not financially sustainable; 
that is, it was not making enough profits to cover its costs. However, this was not seen as a difficulty because 
the project was a research project and did not intend to find a profitable business case. Nevertheless, the 
business model played a role in deciding what would be the outcome of the project. 
Zoom on the SMILE product 
Technology: From a technological point of view, the SMILE product integrated four types of APIs (ap-
plication programming interfaces), provided by the partners of the project. It integrated the APIs of 
the routing partner VAÖ, for routing services; the mobility providers, for real-time timetable and lo-
cation information, and for some of the mobility providers’ payment, booking or pre-registration ser-
vices; the service partners for payment services; and the geo-information partner for mapping ser-
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vices. In addition to this back-end (constituted of the integration of the four above-mentioned types 
of APIs), a front-end was also integrated, which was actually an app, being the only contact point 
with users. Figure 4.2.11 represents the technical architecture of the SMILE Integrated mobility plat-
form. 
Functionality: The SMILE product had four main functionalities: (i) It enabled users to plan their trips 
(trip-planning function) by proposing all possible transport options imaginable to travel from one 
point to another; (ii) It enabled users to book mobility services in advance (booking function); (iii) It 
provided users with electronic tickets (ticketing function); (iv) it proposed a monthly billing service. 
Transport modes integrated: The SMILE product integrated a wide array of transportation solutions 
including public transport (bus, trams, metro), national rail services, commuting rail services, car 
sharing, bike sharing, taxis, parking services, and electric car charging services. However, not all 
transport solutions had the same level of integration. Although public transport and rail services 
were fully integrated, users could not access car sharing and bike sharing services directly (only with 
the SMILE app), as those services required the users to go partially through their channel. 
Figure 4.2 11: Technical architecture of the SMILE IMP (Author’s elaboration)  
Figure 4.2-11Technical architecture of the SMILE IMP (Author’s elaboration)
 Results from the pilot phase
The pilot phase of SMILE began on May 8, 2014, when all project members were invited to download and 
test the app on their personal smart-phones for their journeys. The test-user base was then expanded in July 
2014 when employees from the different partners of the project were also invited to test the app. The ex-
ternal pilot operation started in November 2014. People who registered as pilot users were then able to 
download the app from the Google Play Store and use it freely on their smartphones. Seventy-eight percent 
of the test users were males, 81 percent lived in Vienna, and 53 percent were between 20 and 40 years old 
and held a higher education degree, which is known to more or less correspond to the category of Viennese 
early adopters (SMILE, 2015).21 Through the three different pilot phases, it is estimated that over 1000 dif-
ferent people tested the app. In total, pilot users spent over €4200 on approximately 40 taxi rides, 434 Wie-
21 http://smile-einfachmobil.at/pilotbetrieb_en.html, accessed 8 June 2017. 
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ner tickets, 261 ÖBB tickets, and 80 car2go rides. It is also estimated that citybike benefited from about 100 
new registrations from the SMILE app during this year of pilot tests. For many of its stakeholders, the SMILE 
project showed that a cooperation among so many stakeholders, each of whom had their own interest in 
joining the project, could be successful.  
However, the SMILE project raised a series of questions that have been responsible for the non-continuation 
of the project and more importantly, the end of the cooperation between the two companies (the ÖBB and 
the Wiener Stadtwerke) that had been leading the project. 
4.2.4.3 Post-SMILE era 
The end of the SMILE project was followed by a short period of uncertainty on how the project would move 
on and how the main stakeholders would decide to pursue their cooperation. Ultimately, two main IMP 
projects emerged from the SMILE pilot, each led by the SMILE project leading organizations, being the Wie-
ner Stadtwerke and the ÖBB. The “divorce” between those two public companies, which provide by far most 
of the public transport rides in Austria, has been seen as a lost chance. 
“WL and the ÖBB wanted to do their own things. Now we have two solutions. That was not the best 
way to do it from my perspective. It would have been better if they had stick together (…) I think in 
my opinion it would make more sense to have one.” (IV13) 
“Unfortunately, it broke up as the two main project leaders decided to have different strategies, 
which I think was worse for end users. It would have been better to have it sustain. (…) It was ready 
for a full success story. It could have been much more successful, if the partnership was extended.” 
(IV2) 
While the Wiener Stadtwerke decided to focus more on the back-end and to invest into the development of 
an IMP as a digital and public infrastructure, the ÖBB adopted a more commercial approach that would 
avoid them losing a direct link with their customers, as it will be shown below. 
“We (ÖBB) first talked to Wiener Stadtwerke to make a joint venture, but it did not work out, be-
cause our strategic positions were quite different. We thought it had to be commercially sustainable, 
whereas the WS was thinking they were building a digital infrastructure for mobility, which should be 
funded with public money. And for us we though a startup should do it, that would have commercial 
vision and interests. This is why we have not pursued things together.” (IV9) 
 The Wiener Stadtwerke way
In March 2015 the Wiener Linien released the WienMobil Card, a mobility card that added to the annual 
transport ticket possibilities for users to access bike (citybike) and car sharing (Drivenow) schemes, to pay in 
taxis from the 31300, 40100, and 60160 companies, as well as for parking or for electric charging services 
(IV1). When registering the WienMobil card (which cost €377, or one euro per month more than the annual 
public transport ticket implemented by vice-mayor Vassilakou), users needed to enter their banking details, 
so mobility service fees (such as car sharing, bike sharing, taxis, parking, or charging) could directly be de-
ducted from their bank accounts at the end of each month. However, due to a low number of cards sold in 
the first years of the project, the Wiener Linien decided to stop the operation of the WienMobil Card in 2017 
(IV1). 
Soon after the end of the SMILE project, in May 2015, the Wiener Stadtwerke, through its subsidiary Neue 
Urbane Mobilitat Wien (NeuMo), announced the development of an integrated mobility solution, without 
143 
the ÖBB, with the Beambeta project, still in collaboration with Fluidtime and other mobility providers (IV2). 
This was a continuation of the SMILE app that used a large part of the original code and back-end and had 
many of the same mobility providers on board (Wiener Linien, car2go, Taxi 31300, CityBike, Wipark, Graz 
Bike, Nextbike, Linz Linien) but from which the ÖBB functionalities were deleted (IV2). 
“The Wiener Stadtwerke wanted to use the outcome of SMILE, so created the Beambeta, which was 
a re-branding, which was basically SMILE but getting rid of the functionalities of the Austrian Rail-
ways.” (IV2) 
The app went live for Android OS in July 2015 and, like SMILE, enabled users to have information about dif-
ferent mobility solutions to get from one point to another, as well as to book and pay directly on the app for 
some mobility services. In early 2016, Upstream Gmbh was created as a subsidiary, for which Wiener Linien 
would hold 51 percent of the shares and Wiener Stadtwerke 49 percent. The leader of the SMILE project for 
WS was ultimately appointed CEO of Upstream. 
Upstream’s approach is slightly different from that of the SMILE operating unit. While SMILE’s operating unit 
was in charge of providing the back and front ends, Upstream’s primary focus was on creating the digital 
infrastructure (back-end) that would enable the integration of information, routing, booking, and payment 
from different mobility providers, on top of which applications can be created (IV1, 3).  
“The core competence of Wiener Stadtwerke is infrastructure, also in the physical aspect. So the de-
cision was to go in the infrastructure layer even from the digital side (…) The platform was ready in 
September 2016, and in parallel we started for searching for different ways to use the platform, so 
let’s call it business models.” (IV3) 
Upstream is also developing apps (front-end) on top of their digital infrastructure (back-end), when mandat-
ed to, for which they also receive revenues. One of them is the WienMobil app, ordered by the Wiener 
Linien, which presents the same functionalities as the SMILE app but is organized slightly differently. Indeed, 
in the WienMobil app, the operating actor (Upstream) acts as a broker and not as an agency like the SMILE 
operating unit used to do. Thus, Upstream is no longer in charge of the clearing and hence does not have to 
bear financial risk. A pilot for the WienMobil app was released in November 2016 and the full app was re-
leased on June 8, 2017. A web-service for WienMobil is also planned for 2018. As of May 2017, this app 
could not allow its users to book ÖBB tickets and therefore had a lower geographic coverage than the SMILE 
app.  
In parallel, Upstream also launched an IMP for the city of Graz, which uses the same data infrastructure 
(back-end). In 2017, Upstream also released the application “JO Bin Schon da!”, which targets companies 
interested in changing the mobility behavior of their employees by awarding them mobility points in func-
tion of the travel mode they use for their business-related trips. Mobility partners for this B2B solution (for 
Upstream) are the Wiener Linien, Taxi 40100, Taxi 31300, car2go, DriveNow, and Ibiola. 
Upstream has been supported by some actors, who consider it a good way to create the data infrastructure 
and keep it into public hands, while not being part of the public administration and thus being able to move 
quickly and adapt to markets. 
“This digital platform in the background is new, and it is in public hands with Upstream. I think it is a 
good approach. It may be a problem with all the data going around to have the platform in the 
hands of a private company, and better to have it in public hands, close to the authority and not 
somewhere in California. (…) Maybe some other services provided by private companies can come on 
top of it, but the platform should be publicly owned.” (IV7) 
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“I think it is good to have the public authority being the aggregator and being in the middle of the 
thing (…) The city of Vienna is interested in increasing the quality of life of its citizens. They are not 
focused on making profit, but are focused on the people.” (IV6) 
“I think the idea of setting up Upstream as an own company is the right way to do it. Companies out-
side the public administration scheme are easier and faster to adapt to new situations and react on 
new developments.” (IV13) 
Some other actors have raised concerns regarding the sustainability of the Upstream solution, not so much 
in terms of income as in terms of scaling their solution up, and have a nation-wide solution for Austria, ra-
ther than a solution focusing only on Vienna, let alone the Viennese Metropolitan area. 
“How can it scale up? This will be a question. If Upstream focuses on transferring or selling the tech-
nology to other cities, and if it works better over there than in Vienna, they will have serious issues. 
On the other hand, if the service in Salzburg for example is not as good as the service in Vienna, they 
will also have issues. So it is good to start and for this pilot phase. But you need to have another con-
cept for the next scale-up phase.” (IV4) 
 The ÖBB way
In May 2015, the ÖBB partnered with an Austrian Venture Capitalist fund specialized in tech start-up, called 
Speedinvest, to fund iMobility, which is 49 percent owned by the Austrian railways and 51 percent by Speed-
invest (IV9). The idea behind this partnership was to benefit from Speedinvest’s experience in the tech sce-
ne, as well as from the ÖBB’s experience with the SMILE project. To avoid starting from scratch, in the sec-
ond half of 2015, iMobility bought a start-up that was developing a routing information app called Next-stop. 
The Nextstop app was then rebranded “WegFinder” and launched in April 2017. In the summer of 2017, the 
app provided users with routing and intermodal information, but did not yet allow them to buy tickets 
through the app, although partnerships were established with ÖBB, Westbahn, Citybike, car2go, the City 
Airport Train, and Uber. Having partnered up with the VAÖ, iMobility also had access to information of the 
Wiener Linien for local public transport. Furthermore, as the ÖBB is affiliated to sell local public transport 
tickets, users should be able to buy public transport tickets once the ÖBB is integrated within Wegfinder. 
iMobility has adopted a different business model than Upstream as it has opted for a B2C approach, rather 
than B2B, thus aiming to get most of its incomes from commissions taken on each sold tickets; that is, fol-
lowing an affiliation model. 
“There are big differences between the two approaches. The Wiener Stadtwerke approach is more 
an ‘“enabling approach’, driving more some indirect revenue streams, and fulfilling a service, while 
we are more a kind of ‘over the top’ provider, which has a kind of affiliation model in behind. That is 
a completely different model. We are more on the consumer side, but building our own back end, 
while they are more coming from the back-end perspective. It is currently the overlap we have in 
those two activities.” (IV9) 
iMobility would be interested in having ÖBB shut down the Scotty app and ÖBB ticketing app, to transfer 
those customers onto Wegfinder and achieve a critical mass, so that iMobility would become financially 
sustainable. Overall, iMobility has been more criticized than the Wiener Stadtwerke app, for being less dy-
namic, lacking support from its own investor (the ÖBB), and for the rather risky business model it has adopt-
ed: 
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“Upstream came up rather quickly, whereas iMobility slept for quite a while. They bought this 
Nextstop app, which already existed on the market but they only launched it five weeks ago. Two 
years after the termination of SMILE they woke up. Before that I did not know what was happening. 
Now they have a private investor as well. From the functional point of view, it is basically an infor-
mation app, nothing more. There are some ticketing functionalities, but even not the ÖBB tickets. 
You can buy Westbahn tickets, but not ÖBB tickets, which is a bit ironic and funny.” (IV5) 
“The ÖBB thinks it has to work on its own and finance itself. I am not sure if this is a good decision. 
They now have an app, Wegfinder. And this was interesting, because you were able to buy tickets 
from the WestBahn, which is a competitor of ÖBB, but not from ÖBB. It was interesting. It is a project 
on its own. We will see. One app will be much nicer than the other one. They wanted to collect every-
thing, but now everybody is collecting everything.” (IV10) 
Figure 4.2.12 summarizes the main development related to IMP in Austria and Vienna from 2011 to the pre-
sent.
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Figure 4.2-12: development of IMPs in Vienna from 2011 to nowadays (author’s elaboration)  20
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Figure 4.2-13: development of IMPs in Vienna from 2011 to nowadays (author’s elaboration) 
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4.3 Helsinki case study 
In order to fully understand the context in which MaaS has developed this subchapter will detail the political 
and administrative organization of the country at the national level, before diving into the local level. Then, 
the institutional and infrastructural development of transportation in Helsinki from the beginning of the 20th 
century to the present will be presented, before the key events of the development of MaaS from 2009 to 
2017 are highlighted.  
4.3.1 Context 
4.3.1.1 National level: Finland 
 Current Situation
Finland is evolving as a parliamentary representative democratic republic and multi-party system. In 2015 
the country had a population of 5.487 million people, making it the 23rd least populated country of the EU 
(Eurostat, 2016) and the one with the lowest population density, with an average density of about 18 people 
per km2 (WB, 2015). Starting around the 1950s, Finland urbanized quite rapidly compared to many other 
European countries. From 1950 to 1995, the Finnish urban population grew from 2 million to 3.5 million 
people. It is estimated that, in 2015, 85.1 percent of the Finnish population was living in urban areas, ac-
counting for 4,592 million people (World Bank, 2015), 40 percent of which lived in the six biggest urban ag-
glomerations (Sjobolm, 2011). Ninety percent of the Finnish territory is considered to be an “out-migration” 
territory (Loikkanen et al., 1998). Figure 4.3.1 depicts the evolution of the urban population in Finland in 
comparison to the EU average. 
Figure 4.3-1: evolution of urban population in Finland compared to EU from 1960 to 2014 (author’s elaboration from WB data) 
With 16.3 percent of the population being aged between 0 and 14 years old, 63.2 percent being between 15 
and 64 years old, and 20.5 percent older than 65 years old, the ageing population phenomenon is a rising 
concern in Finland. By 2050 it is estimated that 27.3 percent of the 5.9 million people living in Finland will be 
older than 64 (Statistics Finland, 2016). From an economic standpoint, the OECD sees Finland as having en-
joyed important economic progress for the past decades, which has led to high quality of life, education, 
skills, environmental quality, and personal security (OECD, 2016). In 2015, Finland had the 17th highest GPD 
per capita in the OECD, at USD42,268, which is slightly higher than the OECD average of USD40,791 and the 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
19
60
19
63
19
66
19
69
19
72
19
75
19
78
19
81
19
84
19
87
19
90
19
93
19
96
19
99
20
02
20
05
20
08
20
11
20
14
p
e
rc
e
n
t
Finland
European Union
148 
EU average of USD38,621 (OECD, 2016). Despite a high level of well-being, the OECD describes the Finnish 
economy as “weak”, with a very few start-up being created and limited growth of young firms. Rising public 
debt is also considered as a threat to the Finnish economy. Finland is known to have suffered significantly 
from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and is recovering from it slowly. 
Finland generally ranks quite high on renowned international indexes. In 2015, Finland was ranked first in 
the Human Capital Index and described as “the best-performing country in the world when it comes to build-
ing and leveraging its human capital potential, taking the top spot on the Under 15 and 25–54 Age Group 
pillars and scoring in the top 10 for the remaining age groups” (WEF, 2015: 9). Finland was ranked second 
(behind Iceland) on the Global Gender Gap Index (WEF, 2016). Inequalities in Finland are among the lowest 
within the OECD (OECD, 2016). Housing conditions are better than the OECD average and health conditions 
are similar to OECD average. Finland is also known to have a well-connected population. In 2015, it is esti-
mated that there were some 139.4 mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in Finland, which is 
much higher than the OECD average of 91.7 per 100 inhabitants (OECD, 2016c). 
 History and evolution of the Finnish administrative system
Since its independence in 1918, Finland has been a constitutional republic, where the Parliament and the 
president of the republic are directly elected by the people. The president is elected every six years and has 
the mission of approving the laws passed by the Parliament and budget of the state. Furthermore, the presi-
dent appoints the prime minister, as well as the ministers, themselves proposed by the prime minister. The 
Finnish Parliament is constituted of one chamber of 200 members elected for four years by direct, propor-
tional, secret ballot. The Parliament’s mission is to enact laws and vote the State budget. According to the 
Finish constitution, local authorities can organize their municipal administrations freely. Their only require-
ment is that they must have a municipal council, a municipal executive board, an auditing committee, re-
sponsible for auditing finances and an election committee, responsible for organizing elections (Sjobolm, 
2011).  
Finish local government is known to be a one-tier system. Finnish municipalities are responsible for provid-
ing local services as well as welfare services to their residents. The most important statutory obligations for 
Finnish Municipalities are social welfare, health care, education, environmental protection and technical 
infrastructures (Sjobolm, 2011). Because local governments provide a wide range of services, Finland is often 
characterized as a decentralized unitary state (Loughlin, 2000). Although the membership of Finland to the 
EU in 1995 strengthened the role of meso-governments slightly, as part of EU requirements (Kettunen and 
Kingla, 2005), Finland still lacks an all-purpose organization and democratic representative entities at the 
regional level, which puts significant pressure on local authorities (Sjobolm, 2011). To tackle that issue, in 
2005 the central government launched the Municipal and Service Structure Reform to ensure a higher quali-
ty of service provision by local governments. The reform promoted voluntary mergers between municipali-
ties and, as a result, the number of municipalities was reduced to 384 at the end of 2008. Ultimately, 17 
urban regions covering 102 Finnish municipalities were defined (Sjobolm, 2011). Finnish municipalities are 
organized under a council-manager government, where the highest decision-making body is the municipal 
council (elected every four years by the citizens), which then votes for a mayor every seven years. However, 
since 2017 the city mayor, directly elected by the citizens for a four-year term, has replaced the city manag-
er. 
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 Finnish politics at the national level
Below is describd the organization of the political landscape in Finland. There are six main political par-
ties involved in politics in Finland that evolve both at the local and national levels (Deloy, 2015): 
 Founded in 1990, the Left Alliance is perhaps the party that lies the most to the left of all
the political parties. It promotes greater job security for workers and environmental values.
 Created in 1899 as the Workers’ Party of Finland, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) lies at
the center-left of the political landscape and considers itself as in favor of a fair society, a sup-
portive state, and a sustainable future.
 Created in 1987, the Green League lies on the left of the political continuum and most often
puts the protection of the natural environment as a priority in its agenda.
 The National Coalition Party, (NCP) also called the Conservative Assembly (KOK), was found-
ed in 1918 as is defined as a conservative and liberal and pro-European party; it lies at the cen-
ter-right of the Finnish political spectrum.
 The Centre Party, founded in 1906 as the Agrarian Party, sits on the right of the political
scale and focuses on the interests of the rural population, promoting decentralization.
 The True Finns Party is the populist and nationalist party, known to be Eurosceptic and lying
to the far right. It was formed in 1995 from the ashes of the Rural Party, which was originally
created in 1959.
 Directly originating from Finland’s political history, the liberal Swedish People’s Party (SFP),
created in 1906, aims to represent the interests of the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland.
Due to the plurality of political parties, Finland’s politics are known to be highly fragmented and the most 
polarized political system among Nordic Nations (Mattila and Raunio, 2002). Hence, Finland is often pre-
sented as a country of “surprising political coalitions” (Alho, 2011). Political coalitions, as much on the local 
as the national scale, are indeed very frequent in Finland. Below the results of the successive parliamentary 
elections for Finland since 2003, as well as the different people who have occupied the function of transport 
ministers are presented, to illustrate the high political turnover of governments. 
Parliamentary elections were held in Finland in 2003. The Centre won the most votes (24.7 percent), fol-
lowed by the SDP (24.5 percent), the NCP (18.6 percent), the Left Alliance (9.9 percent), the Green League 
(8.0 percent), the SFP (4.6 percent), and the True Finns (1.6 percent). The chief of the Centre Party at that 
time, Ms. Jäätteenmäki, was appointed as prime minister by the president and decided to form a coalition 
government with the SDP and SFP. Ms Luhtanen (SDP) was appointed transport minister. However, Jäät-
teenmäki had to resign from her political party shortly after her election due to a political scandal linked with 
the Iraq War, called at that time the Iraq-gate (Downs and Riutta, 2005). In October of the same year, Mr. 
Vanhanen became head of the Centre Party and was subsequently appointed as prime minister. Vanhanen 
kept the coalition government and Luhtanen in her position as minister of transportation and communica-
tions, but she was replaced in September 2005 by Susanna Huovinen (SDP). 
In April 2007, parliamentary elections were held again. The Centre Party again finished first (23.11 percent), 
followed by the NCP (22.26 percent), the SDP (21.44 percent), the Left Alliance (8.82 percent), the Green 
League (8.46 percent), the SFP (4.61 percent), and the True Finns (4.05 percent). Vanhanen kept his position 
as prime minister but proposed a different coalition government, with members from the NCP, the Green 
League, and the SFP. In June 2010, Vanhanen step down as the head of the Centre Party and was replaced by 
Ms. Kiviniemi, minister for public administration and local government in Vanhanen’s government, and 
freshly elected as president of the Centre Party. 
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New parliamentary elections were held again in April 2011. The NCP finished first (20.4 percent) for the first 
time in many years, followed by the SDP (19.1 percent), the True Finns (19.1 percent), the Centre (15.8 per-
cent), the Left Alliance (8.82 percent), the Green League (7.3 percent), and the SFP (4.3 percent). Acknowl-
edging the defeat, Vanhanen (Centre) stepped down and Mr. Katainen (NCP) was appointed as prime minis-
ter. He proposed a coalition government with the SDP, Left Alliance, Green League, and SFP. In 2012, Mr. 
Niinisto (NCP) was elected president, replacing Ms. Halonen (SDP), who had held the position since 2000. In 
2014, Katainen stepped down, having been chosen to become European commissioner, and was ultimately 
replaced by Alexander Stubb (NCP). 
However, the NCP did not succeed in maintaining its newly gained place. The 2015 parliamentary elections 
were won by the Centre Party (21.1 percent), followed by the NCP (18.2 percent), the True Finns (17.7 per-
cent), the SDP (16.5 percent), the Green League (8.5 percent), the Left Alliance (7.1 percent), and the SFP 
(4.9 percent). Stubb subsequently resigned from his position and Sepia (Centre) was appointed prime minis-
ter. For the first time, a coalition government gathering political actors from the Centre, True Finns, and NCP 
was proposed (The Guardian, 2015). However, in June 2017, following the election of Jussi Halla-Aho as the 
head of the True Finns party, considered to lie at the right of the already far-right party, the Finnish prime 
minister announced the end of the coalition with the True Finns.  
Figure 4.3.2 summarizes the evolution of the political landscape from 2003 to illustrate the important politi-
cal turnover in Finland. 
Figure 4.3-2: evolution of Finnish political landscape from 2003 to nowadays (author’s elaboration)
 Decentralization and New Public Management 
The Finish welfare state and its administrative institutions emerged from the 1940s to the 1990s, definitively 
taking shape in the 1960s and 1970s, slightly lagging behind the establishment of welfare states in the 
neighboring Nordic countries. Since its independence, Finland has followed the Nordic administrative tradi-
tion by being a unitary state with a strong local government (Sjobolm, 2011), providing a wide range of pub-
lic services. Finnish public services follow a model based on corporatism, professionalism, Weberian public 
bureaucracy, and transparency based on the rule of law and political consensus (Valkama and Anttiroiko, 
2014). 
New public management, which was seen at that time as a solution to the economic challenges that Finland 
was facing, especially the so-called “Great Recession” of the early 1990s (Kuusi, 2015), as well as the heavi-
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ness of the Finish administrative system that accounted at that time for 60 percent of the GNP expenditures 
(Salminen, 2003), has had a clear influence on the evolution of public services provision in Finland. Decen-
tralization, deregulation, outsourcing, and adoption of purchaser-provider models started to be used in Fin-
land at that time (Rose and Stahlberg, 2005). Corporatization of Finish state agencies and enterprises started 
in the 1980s and was followed by privatization, which happened on a case-by-case basis; that is, not part of 
any national privatization program. As a result of privatization, the number of state employees decreased 
from 215,000 to 125,000 from 1988 to 2006 (Valkama and Anttiroiko, 2014). However, the number of mu-
nicipal employees did not change a lot during this period. Privatization did not occur at the local level as 
much as it did at the national level, although corporatization of local public service provision was a popular 
method of reorganization at that time. From 1997 to 2004 the number of municipally owned companies in 
Finland grew by 40 percent (Valkama and Anttiroiko, 2014). 
Given the great number of tasks that Finnish municipalities have to fulfill, and the fact that state grants allo-
cated for municipal tasks declined following the economic recession (Haveri and Airaksinen, 2007), inter-
municipal cooperation developed when looking at public services provision by local governments. Joint mu-
nicipal boards and inter-municipal utility companies in water, electricity, transport, education, health, re-
gional e-government, and culture emerged across the country (Haveri and Airaksinen, 2007).  
4.3.1.2 Local Level: Helsinki 
 Current Situation
Helsinki is the capital city of Finland, and its largest city, with a population in 2015 of 628,208 inhabitants, 
accounting for 11.5 percent of the total Finnish population. The city of Helsinki is surrounded by a first ring 
of municipalities, forming what is defined as the Helsinki Metropolitan Area (HMA) and comprised of the 
cities of Helsinki, Espoo (second most populated city of Finland with over 269,802), Vantaa (fourth most 
populated city of Finland, with a population of 214,605) and Kauniainen (9346) itself surrounded by Espoo 
(Statistics Finland, 2015). Although the population of Helsinki has been growing steadily since 1995, the 
population of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area has been growing at a higher pace; see Figure 4.3.3. 
The HMA is surrounded by what is called the Outer-Helsinki Region, composed of 10 other municipalities 
and forming together what is called the Greater Helsinki, or Helsinki Region, accounting for 1,420,284 inhab-
itants in 2015; that is, 25.9 percent of the total Finnish population. The authorities expect the Helsinki Re-
gion population to be home to around 1,668,691 inhabitants by 2030 (Helsinki Region, 2015). The Greater 
Helsinki Region is also part of the Uusima Region, which is currently home to 1.6 million inhabitants and is 
composed of Greater Helsinki and 11 other municipalities (Helsinki-Uusimaa Regional Council, 2016). Helsin-
ki was ranked 30th in the 2016 Mercer Quality of Life Index and 7th on the 2009 Green City Index by Siemens.  
The municipality of Helsinki works as follows. A City Council, composed of 85 members is elected every four 
years by citizens and decides on the general strategy of the city. It is the highest decision-making body. City 
Council members then elect a City Board, composed of 15 members, for a two-year term. The City Board, 
directed by the chairman of the City Board, decides on everything that is not under the authority of any oth-
er city body or officer. It has a strong administrative function. The City Council also elects the mayor and 
deputy mayors that must be members or alternate members of the City Council. Prior to 2017, the Helsinki 
City mayor was elected for a period of seven years, but starting from the 2017 municipal council elections, 
the mayor will only be elected for one City Council term; that is, four years. This follows a governance reform 
introduced in June of 2016, which also includes the replacement of all the different city departments by four 
main units, in charge of education, environment, culture and leisure, and social services and health care. 
Under the new governance structure, the mayor also serves as the chair of the City Board, and deputy 
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mayors chair the sector committees (City of Helsinki, 2016). This structure is expected to come into force by 
June 2017, when the next municipal elections are organized. 
Figure 4.3-3: evolution of the population of the city of Helsinki and of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area (author’s elaboration from data from the 
City of Helsinki, and Statistics Finland) 
Since the 1970s, the NCP has been the dominant party in the Helsinki City council, always wining more than 
25 percent of the seats in the elections. The second-most represented party is usually the SDP with generally 
around 20 percent of the City Council seats. Since the 1990s, the third-most represented party has been the 
Green League, even beating the SDP in the 2008 and 2012 elections. Although less represented than at the 
national scale, the True Finns have increased their share of seats in the municipal council, winning eight 
seats in the 2012 elections.  
From 2005 to 2017, Jussi Pajunen (NCP) has occupied the position of City manager.22 Following the 2017 City 
Council elections, and the introduction of the governance reform, Jan Vapaavuori (NCP) was elected as new 
mayor of Helsinki. Anni Sinnemäki, from the Green Party, who was previously in charge of the Public Works 
and Environmental Affairs municipal department and was appointed as deputy mayor in charge of the envi-
ronment, for which she will also be in charge of everything related to transportation. 
 Presentation of the Actors
Below the main actors that have been involved into the development of MaaS in the Helsinki Metropolitan 
Area are presented. 
 The Ministry of Transport and Communications (LVM) is in charge of providing safe and se-
cure transport and communications connections and services throughout the country. The LVM
is responsible for legislation and law drafting in order to create the best operating environment
for transport and communication services. In terms of size, the LVM is a rather small public enti-
ty, employing no more than 100 people.
22 http://www.hel.fi/hel2/kanslia/guggenheim/pajunen_bio.pdf, accessed 5 January 5, 2017. 
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 TEKES is the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation. It acts under the Minis-
try of Employment and the Economy. It was founded in 1983 and aims to fund “industrial pro-
jects as well as projects in research organizations, and especially promotes innovative, risk-
intensive projects” (TEKES, 2012: 4). In 2010 it invested €633 million in R&D grants to companies,
R&D loans to companies, research funding, and research programs for universities (TEKES, 2012).
 VR was created more than 150 years ago as the national train operator. It is a 100 percent
state-owned enterprise and is currently the only passenger operator in Finland. Its main services
are passenger services, which are divided into long-distance services, commuter services, and
restaurant services. VR also owns a bus company that operates both local and long-distance ser-
vices. The VR group also counts the freight operator VR Transpoint, which has competed with
other smaller companies on the market since its liberalization, and VR track, which maintains the
train tracks for the government. The train infrastructure is actually owned by the Finnish Gov-
ernment. VR operates approximately 300 long-distance trains on a daily basis and has almost 12
million passengers yearly. Commuter services (regional train) account for a total of approximate-
ly 60 million journeys yearly. The company’s entire turnover is about €1.3 billion. VR also owns
part of the newest fleet through an equipment company that has two other main stakeholders,
being HSL and cities of HMA. VR gets most of its operating income in HMA from HSL, which buys
routes and train departures from VR. Ticketing of VR-operated trains in HMA is done by HSL.
 At the time this study was undertaken (that is, prior to the governance reform), the City of
Helsinki was composed of 33 different departments. The following were the two most relevant
departments linked to the development of MaaS in HMA.
 The Public Works Department of the City of Helsinki (HKR) is in charge of the devel-
opment, design, and maintenance of Helsinki’s streets and green areas (that are the
property of the city). Maintenance and construction are usually contracted out by
HKR to third-party companies or the city-owned company Stara. HKR is also responsi-
ble for organizing parking control in the city (Heikkila, 2014).
 The City Planning Department of the City of Helsinki (KSV) is responsible for urban
planning in Helsinki. It prepares plans for the City Planning Board to approve (Heikki-
la, 2014). The department encompasses the Strategic Urban Planning Division, the
Town Planning Division, and the Transportation and Traffic Planning Division.
One of the key elements to remember is that the City of Helsinki (as well as other cities of the 
HMA) funds most of the transport infrastructure development (the other part being financed by 
the LVM). It also owns public transport infrastructures, either directly or through its transport 
municipal company (HKL). 
 HKL was founded in 1944 and is 100 percent owned by the City of Helsinki. HKL’s main task
is to produce Helsinki’s tram, metro, and ferry services. HKL owns all the public transport infra-
structures in Helsinki; that is, tram and metro tracks, stations, stops, bus stops, and the largest
terminals, except for a few stations that are owned by the City of Helsinki or the Finnish State.
HKL is responsible for Helsinki’s track infrastructure and most other public transport infrastruc-
ture like stations and terminals. HKL has approximately 1100 employees, who drive trams and
metro trains, control traffic, maintain equipment, and plan and implement new projects. HKL’s
annual turnover is more than €140 million and its investment program for 2015–2024 is approx-
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imately €1.2 Billion. HKL’s most important partner is Helsinki Region Transport (HSL), from which 
it receives nearly 100 percent of its operating income. 
 HSL is the Helsinki Metropolitan Transport Authority and was formed in 2010. HSL plans and
organizes public transport in seven municipalities of the Greater Helsinki: Helsinki, Espoo, Van-
taa, Kauniainen, Kerava, Kirkkonummi, and Sipoo. The only thing HSL owns is the ticketing and in-
formation system of the transportation system. These seven municipalities own 100 percent of
HSL. Half of HSL’s income comes from ticket revenue, for which it is responsible in HMA, and the
other half from municipal subsidies of the seven owning cities. As it works under the Public
transport purchaser-provider model (HSL, 2016), HSL organizes public transport services in the
seven cities by tendering bus services and procuring rail services from HKL for trams and metro,
and VR for commuter train services (HSL, 2014a). In 2016, HSL’s operating income was €647.2
million, 49.3 percent (€319 million) of which came from ticket revenue, 48 percent (€311 million)
from municipal subsidies, 0.8 percent (€5 million) from central government subsidies, and 1.9
percent (€12.2 million) from other sources (HSL, 2016a). HSL’s operating expenses in 2016 were
€654.2 million, 75.3 percent of which (€493 million) came from operating costs, 15.2 percent
(€99 million), and 9.6 percent (€63 million) from other sources. HSL has an executive board con-
stituted of politicians from the seven member municipalities. For the last four years, the board
has been formed of seven members from the Helsinki City Council (including the chair), three
members from the Espoo City Council (including the vice chair), three members from Vantaa,
and one from Kirkkonummi. HSL’s executive board decides the fares and levels of service. Above
the executive board is what is called the general meeting of HSL, where delegates from each city
vote on the budget and make major decisions (IH10). HSL also proposes the Helsinki Region
Transport Plan (HLJ), a strategic document prepared in close coordination with the Land Use and
Building Act (HSL 2015), outlining short- and long-term transport development projects for the
Greater Helsinki Area. HSL is responsible for the marketing of public transportation in the HMA,
as well as passenger information (Ullah, 2016). According to its charter, HSL is supposed to cover
all Greater Helsinki municipalities in the region in the future (HSL, 2014e). Finally, HSL pays com-
pensation to cities (or their transport companies) for using their infrastructure. For example, in
2015, the infrastructure compensation paid by HSL to HMA municipalities amounted to €68.6
million; 85 percent of that amount went to the City of Helsinki, as the sole owner of the Metro
and tramway system, while Vantaa received about 8 percent and Espoo about 2 percent (HSL,
2014a).
 Forum Virium is a non-profit company that was founded in 2006 and is fully owned by the
City of Helsinki. It defines itself as an in-house innovation agency that aims to support the devel-
opment of new initiatives in the city, taking care of European R&D projects. As a company Forum
Virium receives its base funding from the City of Helsinki, which is slightly under €1 million, and
receives a few million on top from other sources (Cities of HMA, European funding, corporate
membership fees) (Forum Virium, 2015).
 City Car Club (CCC) was originally founded in 1999 and is presented as being one of the first
world operators in the car sharing business; it was also a finalist in the World Technology Award
in 2003. The company has also won environmental awards in Helsinki and in the HMA. In 2010,
CCC merged with a media company called O2 media. CCC receives its income from advertise-
ments it displays through its car-sharing network and from car-sharing fees. The company has
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60–70 cars in the HMA and has a turnover of about €1 million. It recently invested in the devel-
opment of its fleet by buying 20 GTE hybrid vehicles 
 Lahitaksi is a company founded in 1965 that started in Vantaa (part of HMA). Gathering
about 1250 taxi cars, it is the second–largest taxi company in Finland in terms of cars, providing
in total over five million trips yearly. Lahitaksi’s main activity is to make the taxi demand match
the offer by dispatching taxi-ordering calls. Lahitaksi main income comes from the commission
taken from customers ordering taxis by phone, as well as the membership paid by Lahitaksi taxi
members (about €150 monthly) to benefit from the dispatching call service. Lahitaksi operates in
17 municipalities of the Uusima region as well as in the city of Helsinki. The company is 100 per-
cent owned by Lahitaksi member companies (about 700 companies). The annual turnover of the
company is approximately €6 million and the revenue of all Lahitaksi drivers combined is about
€150 million (from which Lahitaksi does not take any fee). Lahitaksi is also part of Suomen
Taksiliitto, the Finnish Taxi association, which includes roughly 80 percent of all taxis in Finland;
that is, 9000 taxis. Suomen Taksiliitto (located in the same building as Lahitaksi) is in charge of
defending the interests of taxi companies and taxi drivers and is known to be a powerful lobby.
 Ramboll is a private Danish consulting company that was established immediately after the
end of the Second World War. It was originally involved in a Finnish company called Viatek. Ram-
boll is 100 percent owned by a Danish Foundation. Its core business is in infrastructure planning,
plumbing, highways, and streets. Ramboll has a long history of planning for Finnish transport
agencies and Finnish municipalities. ITS-related projects account for nearly 20 percent of Ram-
boll’s revenue in Finland.
 Eera is a Finnish business and strategy management consulting company that specializes in
building businesses ecosystems. The company split in January 2016 into an entity specialized in
management consultancy (Eera) and Eera Industrial Development (EID). The management con-
sultancy company employs about 40 people, 20 of whom are special advisors, mostly former
Finnish executives and officials. Although Eera historically had public and private contractors,
most of its contractors recently have been private. Eera’s annual turnover is €2–3 million.
 SITO is a Finnish engineering company that was created in 1976 and now employs about
550 people. Quite heavily positioned in the planning sector, the company is trying to diversify it-
self and move into new traffic solutions. ITS-related projects account for about 10 percent of the
company’s revenue.
As seen above, the city of Helsinki is surrounded by populous municipalities, forming what is called the Hel-
sinki Metropolitan Area, and the Greater Helsinki Region. It seems thus important to pay attention to how 
metropolitan governance is considered in the HMA to better understand the context in which MaaS has 
developed in recent years.  
 Metropolitan Governance in Helsinki
Following the 2003 OECD Helsinki territorial review report, the Finish Ministry of the Interior appointed a 
civil servant to redefine metropolitan governance for the Finnish capital region (Ache, 2011). Among other 
recommendations, Mr. Alanen proposed the merger of the Uusima and East Uusima regions into a single 
administrative body that would be in charge of “land use, housing, traffic and public transportation systems” 
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(Ache, 2011: 162). Although the proposal was rejected quasi-unanimously by the different involved actors 
(the municipalities and the two targeted regions), it is acknowledged that the Alanen report paved the way 
for more cooperation between municipalities within the Helsinki Region, which ultimately motivated the 
birth of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board in 2004 and the Helsinki Region Cooperation Assem-
bly in 2005. While the former has brought together the municipalities of Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa, Kauniainen, 
Kirkkonummi, Vihti, Sipoo, Hyvinkaa, Nurmijarvi, Tuusula, Kerava, Jarvenpaa, Mantsala, and Pornainen to 
focus on land use, housing, and transport, the latter has brought together the four municipalities of the HMA 
to look at strategic issues (Ache, 2011). Another attempt towards metropolitan governance was made with 
the creation of the Helsinki Club, which included the four mayors of HMA, the director of the chamber of 
commerce, university rectors, Sitra, and some other key figures of Helsinki Metropolitan area, and aimed to 
a “vision” for the HMA. In 2011, the Uusimaa and East Uusimaa regions merged as initially proposed by 
Alanen into the Helsinki-Uusima Region.  
However, until that point, no functional and holistic metropolitan governance body had been implemented 
for the HMA or the Helsinki Region, which suffers from clear institutional fragmentation (Ache, 2011). Figure 
4.3.4 is a map of the different functionning entities of the Helsinki Region.  
Figure 4.3-4: map of different jurisdictions within the Helsinki Metropolitan Area (author’s elaboration, based on HSL [2015]) 
For example, seven different policy visions that have been designed for the Helsinki region since 2003, by 
Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board, the Helsinki Region Cooperation Assembly, YTV, the counties, or 
a combination of the above-mentioned actors, but none of these visions are supported by actors having 
coercive powers, and thus have low chances of being implemented. According to Haila and Le Galès (2009), 
possibilities of seeing a metropolitan body emerge from the four municipalities of the HMA are very low, as 
the four cities seem to be in constant competition and hence resist attempts to institutionalize metropolitan 
governance. The latest attempt to consolidate metropolitan governance – the constitution of two working 
groups in 2013 to prepare new legislation and municipal division arrangements for the HMA by the Finnish 
Ministry of Finance – has been poorly received by the concerned municipalities. The metropolitan admin-
istration, which would have been responsible for making decisions for the whole area for housing, land use, 
or transport, was originally supposed to start in 2017 but never came to life (Söderström et al., 2015). Thus 
HSL, as well as HSY in charge of providing water and waste management services, seem to be the only au-
thorities operating at a metropolitan level in the HMA. In the next par, the historical development of the 
Helsinki Transport system, through its key infrastructural and institutional developments from the beginning 
of the 20th century until today, is presented. 
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4.3.2 Historical development of Helsinki transportation system 
4.3.2.1 Development 
In 1887 the Helsinki Omnibus Ltd (HRO) was founded, which provided transport services with horse-drawn 
omnibuses. In 1889, HRO received the right to build tramlines in Helsinki, which at that time had nearly 
87,000 inhabitants (Weckstrom, 2016). The Helsinki tram system was one of the first functioning tram sys-
tems worldwide. However, due to the slowness of the HRO tram electrification process, which started in the 
late 1890s, some other electrified tramlines moving around the city were developed by competitors to be 
finally transferred to HRO in exchange for HRO stocks (Herranen, 1988). The electrification of the entire tram 
network was completed by 1901. In 1913, the City of Helsinki decided to buy the majority of HRO stocks (City 
of Helsinki, 2012), and the tram network reached its most advanced state in 1930, when there were 14 lines 
in operation, all operated by HRO (Alku, 2002), providing over 61 million tram journeys during 1939. In 1944, 
the City of Helsinki bought the remaining HRO shares and turned HRO into a municipal transport company, 
under the name HKL. The development of the tram network in the 1900s enhanced the expansion of the city 
towards the north, as well as the development of an industrial belt around the inner city, and along the or-
bital tramlines (Sundman, 1982). As a result, 100,000 people were estimated to live in the Finnish capital city 
in 1907 (City of Helsinki, 2012), which was still contained within the actual city of Helsinki’s jurisdictional 
boundaries. 
As the population of the city was increasing rapidly, the need to plan the Helsinki region as an entity, and not 
only the city of Helsinki, became real. The first plan was brought up in 1912 by famous Finnish architect Eliel 
Saarinen and his team, as the Munkkiniemi–Haaga plan, which proposed the development of two suburbs 
outside the official boundaries of Helsinki, offering options for the expansion of the city (Niemi, 2016). The 
city kept growing and, in the 1920s, the population of Helsinki reached 152,000 inhabitants (City of Helsinki, 
2012). Following the Paris Peace treaties of 1947 that followed the end of the Second World War, Finland 
lost the region of Karelia to the Soviet Union. As a direct consequence, the Karelia-located city of Viborg, 
Finland’s second-largest city at that time was “annexed” by the Soviet Union, which caused massive migra-
tion. This lead Helsinki to accommodate an influx of 30,000 people, which resulted in a significant increase in 
the number of inhabitants in Helsinki (Weckstrom, 2016).  
The expansion out of the historical downtown area – that is, out of the peninsula – only happened in the 
1960s once the first radial freeways were built (Leaks and Keinanen, 1995). Since then, urban sprawl of the 
Helsinki region has been quite rapid (Sundman, 1982). The planning of the city of Helsinki was facilitated by 
the fact that the City at that time owned almost two-thirds of the land within its own borders, which was not 
the case for the surrounding municipalities. In 1925, Finnish municipalities gained the legal right to embody 
surrounding suburbs and the Town Plan Code of 1931 gave municipalities the right to plan privately owned 
land (Bengs and Loikkanen, 1991). However, Helsinki continued its old practice of buying private land to be 
zoned for urban development, also increasing its role in the land market (Laakso and Keinanen, 1995). Urban 
sprawl was also facilitated by the development of the bus network in the capital region. 
In 1973, the cities of Espoo, Helsinki, Vantaa and Kauniainen (which together form the HMA) decided to join 
forces under a joint municipal authority called YTV (standing for Helsinki Metropolitan Area Council) to han-
dle waste management, regional and environmental services, and arrange regional transport between the 
member municipalities. Decisions within YTV were carried out by a Regional Assembly constituted of repre-
sentatives from the four municipalities. Being proportional to the population of each municipality, 11 repre-
sentatives from the City of Helsinki sat in the assembly: five from Espoo and five from Vantaa, as well as one 
from Kauniainen (YTV, 1996). 
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Regarding transportation, YTV was at that time responsible for arranging public transportation services 
across municipal boundaries of the HMA, leaving municipalities responsible for organizing bus services with-
in their jurisdictions (Valkama and Anttiroiko, 2007). As local bus services were at that time contracted by 
municipalities with third-party operating companies, YTV continued to work under a contract based co-
operation scheme. YTV’s main responsibilities were to plan cross-municipalities bus routes and buy bus ser-
vices from operating companies under a specific license scheme (Valkama and Anttiroiko, 2007). However, 
as a consequence of its EU membership, Finland had to embrace the single-market framework of the Euro-
pean Economic Community, which meant opening up its transport market to competition, as formulated in 
the European Commission’s 1992 White Paper on Transport (Commission of the European Communities, 
2001).  
In March 1991 the new National Passenger Transport Act became operational in Finland, allowing municipal 
authorities (and thus YTV) to organize tenders for public transport provision. Consequently, YTV established 
a framework to guide tendering processes. In December 1992, YTV decided to put regional bus services to 
tender, planning to have the first tendered services running on January 1, 1995 (ICLEI, 2003). Although mul-
tiple tendering processes were considered, YTV chose to tender via the km cost so that it could still get all 
the ticket revenue (ICLEI, 2003). Under this mechanism, the planning of routes, time-tables, and fleet sched-
ules is left to the organizing authority, while the winner of the tender is only responsible for providing the 
buses and crews as well as running the service (ICLEI, 2003). By the beginning of the 2000s, all bus lines of 
the Helsinki Region, including those within municipalities, were organized under competitive tendering pro-
cedure. In 2003, four operating companies were providing 81 percent of bus services in the Helsinki Region. 
Two of them were municipal companies and two of them were private, being Veolia Transport and Nobina 
(Valkama and Anttiroiko, 2007). The introduction of competitive tendering for bus services in Helsinki Region 
enabled savings of €21 million for YTV from 1995 to 2000 (Valkama and Anttiroiko, 2007) and also decreased 
the average age of the bus fleet by two years and increased overall customer satisfaction (ICLEI, 2003). 
Within the City of Helsinki’s jurisdictional boundaries, a metro system was also proposed several times be-
tween 1918 and 1955 (Weckstrom, 2016). In 1963, the first plan for a metro system was finally presented to 
the City Council, but was criticized for having too many stations and too many overlaps with the existing rail 
network. The system that was finally chosen for construction in 1969 was smaller, with a total length of 38 
kilometers (Weckstrom, 2016). In 1982, the first section of the Helsinki metro, 10.7 km in length, opened 
between Roihupelto and Herttoniemi (Iltanen 2001) and later expanded towards the East and the West; that 
is, the center of Helsinki. The metro was financed by the municipalities of Helsinki and Espoo as well as by 
the state of Finland (HSL, 2014). 
On January 26, 1969, the first electric commuting trains started to operate in the HMA, initially between 
Helsinki and Kirkkonummi (Alameri, 1979). The development of commuter train services also influenced the 
radial development of the metropolitan area. Hämekoski and Sihto (1996) argued that Helsinki city center’s 
location on a peninsula has influenced land use and the development of transport networks, and made the 
city’s spatial structure look like the fingers of a hand. 
In 2006 the City of Espoo approved the construction of the western extension of the metro, construction of 
which began in 2009 and was finally inaugurated in November 2017. This eight-station extension, which cost 
€1.1 billion, was financed by the cities of Espoo (72 percent) and Helsinki (28 percent) thanks to loans from 
the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB). The new development, which is 
operated by HKL, is expected to cut transport-related emissions along this corridor by 40 percent, and will be 
used by an estimated 50,000 people each day. Another five-stop extension is planned for 2020 at the earliest 
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(Metro Report, 2017). In the meantime, the second line of the metro towards the airport and the north is 
currently being discussed and might start once the western expansion is completed. 
Following the creation of HSL in 2010, a new transport plan called HLJ was developed in 2011, and for the 
first time took into account the 14 municipalities of the greater Helsinki (HSL, 2014c). The first plans for the 
Helsinki Metropolitan Area were set out by YTV in 1994 as the Transport System Plan (PLJ). The exercise was 
continued with the PLJ 1998, PLJ 2002, and PLJ 2007. These plans insisted on the need to link transport plan-
ning between the region and the state. HJL 2011 was followed by HJL 2015, which promoted four main di-
rections. It planned the strengthening of transport system financing, the improvement of service level of 
sustainable modes of transport, an increased use of information and steering tools, as well as the improve-
ment of logistic traffic flows. Under the second direction, the document planed to include a 60 percent in-
crease in park-and-ride sites for cars and 80 percent for bikes by 2025, in order to promote intermodality 
and physical integration. To engage in the four above-mentioned directions, the plan also promoted the 
adoption of an integrated vision when it comes to public transport in the Helsinki Region, by developing an 
integrated ticketing system for the region.  
In order to break with the radial structure of the HMA (Albacete et al., 2015), a ring rail line directly linking 
Vantaa Airport to Helsinki central station also opened in 2015 after six years of construction. This new line 
allowed about 200,000 people to shift from private car to rail. The project costs were estimated at approxi-
mately €675 million, supported by the Finnish Transport Agency, the City of Vantaa Finavia (Finish Civil Avia-
tion Administration), and the EU, thanks to TENT-T funding (Finnish Transport Agency, 2013a). Trains running 
on the Ring Rail Line are operated by VR as all other commuter trains in Greater Helsinki.  
In December 2015, HKL signed a 10-year contract with CityBikeFinland, a joint venture between the bike 
sharing services provider Smoove and the public transport specialist Moventia. The first 500 bikes of the bike 
sharing system were inaugurated in May 2016, and 1000 more bikes are expected to be added to the net-
work by the summer of 2017 (CityBikeFinland, 2016). Figure 4.3.5 summarizes the key infrastructural and 
institutional developments of Helsinki’s transport system. 
Figure 4.3-5: infrastructural developemnt of Helsinki's transportation system (author’s elaboration) 
Although VR has had the exclusive right to operate domestic passenger traffic Finland, as stated in the 
agreement on exclusive rights signed between VR and the LVM (Finish Transport Agency, 2013b), domestic 
passenger transport market is supposed, as part of EU requirements, to be liberalized and open to competi-
tion in 2017, to enable other actors to enter the market and provide services that better match the demand 
(Barrow, 2015; Heikkila, 2014). In 2016, HSL started an RFB process that aimed to open the commuter train 
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markets of the HMA to other train operating companies. However, after having VR agree to a 15 percent 
decrease in prices, HSL finally decided to postpone the RFB until 2021. According to VR: 
“(HSL) is satisfied with the quality and operations (…) And I guess that the whole Infra is not ready for 
competition yet (… )therefore that’s maybe one reason that they started to negotiate with us, and they 
were saying that the only problem [now] is the price level. Quality is okay and fleet is okay and all these, 
but the price is too high. So we committed that if we decrease [our] price (…) they are ready to postpone 
the RFB process, because it is quite heavy for both sides and requires heavy organization and time to 
commit. We promised that we will start this kind of program in the company to cut our costs and that 
was the target. So we made quite huge savings, and this will take place year by year as we go.” (IH3) 
Public authorities in Finland are also considering heavy deregulation in urban rail that have not been deregu-
lated yet. It is estimated that the City of Helsinki, as well as HSL, will consider opening up urban rail by 2021, 
for a possible opening in 2024. 
“When it comes to tram and metro, [opening to competition] is possible… it may happen but it will be 
analyzed whether it is good for the society and profitable or if HKL is the best solution. That analysis will 
be done by HSL and by the City Council of Helsinki and neighboring cities. It will be a political decision. 
Our present contract in metro and tram transportation are going until the mid of next decade; that is to 
say, until the end of 2024. And the decision about the possible opening for competition will be done in 
2021 or so. HKL’s aim is to enhance our both financial efficiency and quality, so we can show that we are 
the best solution. But it is also possible that we don’t manage to do that and the competition will come.” 
(IH4) 
A new region zone model is planned to be introduced in 2018, which will not follow municipal boundaries as 
is the case nowadays, but will be concentric and centered on the Helsinki city center, making it easier to 
extend to further municipalities that will be interested in falling under HSL jurisdiction in the future. Among 
the advantages brought by this new zoning system, pricing is expected to be based more on the distance 
travelled than it is today, potentially resulting in cheaper journeys for cross-municipality travel, and longer 
distances within the same travel zones (HSL, 2012). 
4.3.2.2 Transport in Helsinki nowadays 
The post-war era in Finland coincided with economic renewal and consequently rising car ownership. If the 
bus was the preferred way of travel in Finland in the 1950s, the private car became the preferred way to 
move in the 1960s (Meinander, 2011). In the mid-1960s, the number of registered cars in Finland grew sig-
nificantly, from 258,000 to 602,000 private vehicles, which can be understood as a growing demand, but 
more precisely as a consequence of car importations deregulation by Finish authorities (Meinander, 2011). 
In the 1990s there were over 2.2 million private vehicles registered in Finland (Meinander, 2011), for a popu-
lation of nearly 5 million people. In 2015, some 3,847,045 vehicles were registered in Finland, which repre-
sented 701 vehicles per 1000 habitants (Statistics Finland, 2016). Figure 4.3.6 shows the evolution of private 
car ownership for Helsinki, its surrounding municipalities, and the Helsinki Metropolitan Area. Although it 
seems that car ownership has not been increasing remarkably for the city of Helsinki, it has continued to 
increase for the HMA in general, mainly due to significant increases in the cities of Espoo and Vantaa. Even 
when considering the plateau reached by the city of Helsinki as coinciding with the Peak Car phenomenon, 
the argument is not valid to analyze the trend over the entire metropolitan area. 
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Figure 4.3-6: evolution of car ownership in HMA (adapted from Statistics Finland [2016)] 
In 2015 there were 5158 road traffic accidents in Finland, involving 260 deaths and 6385 persons injured 
(Statistics Finland, 2016). It was estimated that transport induced 27 percent of Finland’s greenhouse gases 
in 2012 (Heikkila, 2014). In 2015, within the HMA, 41 percent of trips were made by private vehicles, 33 per-
cent by public transportation, and 26 percent by human-powered mobility (Rosello et al., 2016), as can at-
test Figure 4.3.7.  
Figure 4.3-7: modal share in the HMA in 2015 (adapted from Rosello et al. [2016]) 
In 2014, 51 percent of the trips done by public transport within HMA were realized by bus, accounting in 
total for 182 million trips (Ullah, 2016). At that time, four different bus operating companies (Nobina, Hel-
singin Bussiliikenne Oy, Veolia Transport and VR-owned Pohjolan Liikenne) provided bus services for HSL 
within the HMA. Since then, Veolia Transdev has exited the Finnish bus market. In 2014, trams operated by 
HKL provided 55 million trips, accounting for about 15.5 percent of all public-transport-related trips; com-
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muter trains, operated by VR, provided 52 million trips (15 percent of all public transport trips); and 62 mil-
lion trips (19 percent of all public transport trips) were made by metro, operated by HKL.  
From an environmental point of view, it is estimated that transport accounted in 2014 for 23.2 percent of 
the carbon emissions of the city of Helsinki and for 24.1 percent of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area (Dahal 
and Niemelä, 2016). 
4.3.3 Evolution of Climate policies at the National and Local levels 
Climate change has long been on the table for Finnish authorities, as one might already observe with the 
2001 Finnish Climate Strategy. However, in 2003, the Finnish government decided to work on a new strate-
gy, in order to follow the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) developed to monitor the implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol, which was published in November 2005. This new strategy emphasized the need to increase 
the efficiency of the Finnish transport system as well as to use less CO2-emitting technologies in order to 
reduce GHG from traffic. In 2008 Finland edited its National and Climate Strategy to implement the 3*20 EU 
package (TEM, 2013). In 2009, Finland committed, through its Long-Term Climate and Energy Policy, to re-
ducing its domestic traffic related emissions by at least 80 percent by 2050 compared to its 1990 levels (VNK, 
2009).  
In comparison with the neighboring municipalities, the climate mitigation targets set by the City of Helsinki 
are known to be more ambitious. Where Espoo and Kauniainen have not defined bold climatic targets, the 
City of Helsinki, in its 2013–2016 Strategic Plan, has planned to have its carbon emissions reduced by 30 
percent by 2020 compared to 2005 and to be carbon-neutral by 2050. The Strategic Plan also targeted im-
proving energy efficiency by 20 percent by 2020 compared to 2005, and to have at least 20 percent of their 
energy consumed coming from renewables (Dahal and Niemelä, 2016).  
In 2014, The Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy edited its Energy and climate road map, tar-
geting an 80–95 percent CO2 emission reduction by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. To do that, the report 
recommended moving towards fossil fuel-free fuel for vehicles and working on the efficiency of transporta-
tion systems, promoting public transport and other sustainable ways of transportation (TEM, 2014). In 2014, 
the Uusimaa Regional Council also fixed in its strategy document the aim of becoming carbon-neutral by 
2040 (Uusimaa Regional Council, 2014). 
In 2016, Climate Analytics released a report analyzing the Paris Agreement and explaining the consequences 
it would have on Finnish Energy and climate policies. The report stated that neither the 2030 nor 2050 tar-
gets for Finland were in line with levels consistent with the Paris Agreement, and that if Finland wanted to 
respect its engagements taken by supporting the Paris Agreement, It would have to adopt bolder climate 
and energy targets (Climate Analytics, 2016). 
At the end of November 2016, the Finnish Government approved the National Energy Strategy for 2030, 
which has since that been submitted to the normal parliamentary procedure. According to the first version 
of the strategy, Finland aimed to increase the share of final energy consumption coming from renewables to 
over 50 per cent in the 2020s in order to move towards a carbon-neutral energy system. Regarding the 
transport sector, the strategy proposed the development of new transport services and intelligent transport 
methods (TEM, 2016). While the Finnish Government views transport as an important sector in moving to-
wards a more sustainable society, climate change is also acknowledged to lie at the core of the LVM policies 
(IH11). 
Figure 4.3.8 summarizes all the different climate related policies that have been put in place these last years, 
focusing on the supranational, national, and local levels. 
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Figure 4.3-8: evolution of climate and energy policies at the local and national levels (author's elaboration)  
Having looked at the historical development of the transportation system in the HMA and the evolution of 
climate-change-related policies in Finland and in Helsinki, the next subsection will present the different stag-
es of development of MaaS in the HMA. 
4.3.4 The development of MaaS in Helsinki Metropolitan Area 
According to the father of the concept, MaaS would be, at least conceptually, over 15 years old: 
“It started somewhere turn of millennium, I saw the development that happened in telecom (…) We had 
the infra layer, the transportation layer but we were lacking the last layer as in telecoms, where it is the 
operators. Once I got to that one, I thought it was obvious we were definitively going to have mobility 
operators at some point.” (IH1) 
It is estimated that integrated ticketing has been on the table of Finnish Authorities prior to the 2000s. For 
the LVM, there are “papers from 1989 talking about nationwide ticketing and payment systems, which is 
trying to push for what is best for the users” (IH10). However it is really in the early 2000s that concrete de-
velopments happened vis-à-vis integrated ticketing systems. At that time, a project was developed by LVM 
to create physical centers where customers would be able to buy tickets from different transportation pro-
viders. 
“The LVM wanted to put together bus operators, train operators and taxis, and at that time some type 
of park-and-ride system in the same building and then give funding to build these centers. It existed for 
five or six years, and then the program ended (…) They tried to look at one place where the people could 
buy tickets for the bus and the trains together.” (IH5) 
In September 2006, on the basis of two early reports from Finnish Ministry of Finance from  (Finland – To-
wards an Information Society, A National Outline) and the Finnish National Fund for Research and Develop-
ment SITRA (Quality of Life, Knowledge and Competitiveness), the National Information Society Strategy for 
2007–2015 was published, presenting “72 proposals for measures intended to ensure Finland’s transfor-
mation from an industrial society to an internationally attractive, human-centric and competitive knowledge 
and service society” (VNK, 2006: 5). Regarding transportation, the report foresaw that ICT-based transporta-
tion systems such as smart cards, route navigation, or electronic timetable information would be part of 
Finnish citizens’ daily lives by 2015. In June 2007, the Finnish Government appointed the Information Society 
Advisory Board to oversee implementation of the National Information Society Strategy. 
In the 2007 Finnish Transport Policy Report, apart from some discussion of intelligent speed adaptation and 
intelligent road pricing, nothing was mentioned about ITS or digital transport (LVM, 2007). As a direct conse-
quence of the National Information Strategy, the government encouraged the introduction of transport 
services, which “make use of information technology” in the 2008 Transport Policy Guidelines report (LVM, 
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2008: 24). In 2009, the Finnish Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunication released the first National 
Strategy for ITS, which aimed to make Finland one of the five most advanced nations in the world when it 
comes to the use of ITS by 2020 (LVM, 2009). The strategy also targeted a 20 percent increase in non-private 
vehicles modal share and a 20 percent decrease in traffic delays caused by congestion in large urban areas.  
In the early 2000s, a web-based journey planner was released in HMA, which is believed to be one of the 
first publicly available journey planners in the world (IH6). In the same year, YTV implemented an electronic 
travel card system (Matkakortti) in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area for all transport modes – buses, commut-
er trains, trams, metro, and Suomenlinna ferry (Mezghani, 2008). In 2002, HKL proposed the first SMS ticket-
ing system, in collaboration with PlusDial MTSP. The system was quite successful, as in January and February 
2002 alone, over 100,000 SMS single tickets were purchased.  
Regarding national transport policy, 2010 saw some significant developments. The organization of the 
transport sector at the ministerial level changed from having different modal agencies to having two holistic 
and transversal agencies. At that time were created the Transport Safety Agency (Trafi) and the Finnish 
Transport Agency (FTA), which both looked at all transportation modes.  
“[From 2010] In the ministry there was no longer several transport modes department. That is one of 
the ground lane things about MaaS as well. We blurred the lines between the different modal silos.” 
(IH10) 
That was followed by the release of a report entitled Digital Finland, New Transport Policy. This report aimed 
to inform the different Finnish political parties about possible future developments in the transport sector 
thanks to digitalization (LVM, 2010). In December 2010, the Finnish Digital Agenda for 2011–2020 was sub-
mitted to the Finnish Parliament and eventually published. It promoted the change in customer paradigm 
enabled by the ICTs. In particular, the Digital Agenda set out the vision of having customers at the center of 
the mobility system, and the possibility of customers becoming actors who were potentially able to provide 
services (LVM, 2011a).  
In September 2011, the LVM released the Transport Revolution Report, which aimed to offer a new dimen-
sion and a new momentum to transport, based on the assumption that “The roles of the private and public 
sectors are changing; the role of the private sector is increasing” (LVM, 2011b: 11). Among other things, the 
report proposed the improvement of information management and traffic flow management through ‘smart 
traffic’ means to leverage transport systems more efficiently, as well as to move towards more integrated 
urban transport (LVM, 2011). It is estimated that the Transport Revolution Report paved the way for more 
MaaS-oriented policies. 
“In 2010 began the Transport Revolution policy. Once again, it did not include the term MaaS, but it was 
there. And then I joined the ministry in 2011. It [MaaS] has been at the heart of our transport policy ever 
since.” (IH10) 
Along the definition of the Transport Revolution Report, a think tank was put together in 2011, under the 
direction of Finnish Minister for Transport Merja Kyllönen, to carry out innovative ideas related to the devel-
opment of intelligent transport solutions (IH1, 4, 9, 10, 13). Headed by the LVM, the think tank put together 
local Finnish transport authorities, and cities, including HSL and the City of Helsinki, and non-profit, such as 
ITS Finland. The purpose of the think tank was to make the perception of the transportation sector evolve 
and stop organizing it around the private car. 
“Six or seven years ago [in 2010] we have been (…) looking at apps ecosystem for cars. The focus there 
was cars. At that time we discussed that some of the services you used in the car, such as parking the 
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car and hopping off on a bus, they follow you on your mobile phone anyway ... So we thought, ‘should 
we re-check the focus?’” (IH13) 
The same year, 2011, represented a shifting point for the national train operator VR, which decided, shortly 
after having started to install Wi-Fi on its trains, to renew its sales channel and establish a customer loyalty 
program. Hence, VR created a digital platform for customers to choose from among all kind of services it was 
providing, and also started to gather data about its customers. Regarding the ticketing, VR decided to have 
all its tickets equipped with bar codes, allowing it to see whether the tickets had been validated or not, and 
also to cancel tickets bought from the webstore. 
In June 2012, the LVM released its report on transport policy, which framed the future of transport towards 
2022. Although almost nothing is mentioned on ITS, the report stated the creation of a working group to 
propose a new ITS strategy by 2013 (LVM, 2012c). In the same year, the Helsinki City Planning Department 
commissioned a report on the development and exploitation of intelligent transport systems (ITS), released 
in May 2013 (KSV, 2013). The report promoted the use of ITS to reduce congestion and improve the efficien-
cy of transportation systems. With the goal of fulfilling the 2011 EU White Paper on transport and the 2010 
EU ITS directive, the second Finnish ITS strategy was released in April 2013. It aimed to improve the level of 
services for mobility, transport, and information services for the customers, enhance the development of a 
new transport policy, and exploit the potential brought by the rapid development of the ICTs (LVM, 2013). 
This new ITS strategy, developed by a working group composed of FTA, Traffi, the Finnish Meteorological 
Institute, the City of Helsinki, ITS Finland and Nokia, particularly emphasized the need to develop integrated 
public transport systems and smarter and more eco-friendly mobility, through the use of ITS. The document 
also stated that approximately €300 million would be needed to develop projects in these areas, approxi-
mately 71 percent (€215 million) of which would from the Finnish central government, 7 percent (€20 mil-
lion) from municipalities, 10 percent (€30 million) from businesses, and 12 percent (€35 million) from end 
users (LVM, 2013). The second ITS strategy in particular insisted on the need to develop information provi-
sion through multiple channels, and seamless ICT-facilitated door-to-door trip chains, in order to have a 
transportation system that achieved a level of flexibility and functionally close to that of the private car 
(LVM, 2013). According to the strategy, seamless mobility would only be possible if substantial investments 
were made in feeder traffic, park-and-ride payments, information services, and new mobility modes such as 
car sharing or pooling development.  
In 2012, Gemalto won the tender to develop a new SMS ticketing system for the inner Helsinki area (Gemal-
to, 2016), taking over the service that had previously been provided by Plus Dial. In the same year, the 
Kutsuplus service was launched in Helsinki by HSL, after five years of research and trials, jointly done with 
Aalto University. Kutsuplus was an on-demand transportation mode (VTT, 2016), similar to a DRT solution, 
that connected passengers flexibly to the nearest viable vehicle, relying on an algorithm using real-time data 
being collected by ICTs. Although the system was not integrated to HSL ticketing system, it was a real suc-
cess. Due to the fact that the service was highly subsidized and consequently required investments from the 
partner municipalities to sustain, Kutsuplus was finally abandoned in December 2015 (Ullah, 2016) but 
gained international recognition. By the time it stopped, more than 31,000 people had subscribed, and over 
100 vehicles were being used. 
In 2012, Sampo Hietanen, by many referred to be the father of the Maas concept, resigned from his job in 
the civil engineering sector to start preaching his MaaS idea. He joined ITS Finland in 2012, a non-profit or-
ganization that aims to create a network of professionals related to ITS. As the chairman of ITS Finland, he 
was invited to join the Transport Revolution think tank. 
166 
“Sampo is the one who kind of described [MaaS], and said, ‘this is what we should be doing’. In that 
think tank they really picked that up, especially our transport minister.” (IH13) 
Another integrated travel card, supported by the Finnish Transport Agency, was also to be developed for the 
22 remaining main Finnish urban centers in 2013 by the company TVV Lippuja maksujärjestelmä Oy, founded 
by the Finnish Government and other Finnish municipalities (Tieto, 2013), but never came through. In 2013, 
VR also established a mobile application to enable customers to buy long-distance tickets, connected with 
their loyalty program database. 
In 2013, discussions were ongoing in the transport revolution think tank and the transport director of the 
City of Helsinki became interested in MaaS (IH13). Given his willingness to know more about the subject, and 
better understand what would be the role of the city as well as the one of public authorities to make MaaS 
happen, he commissioned a master’s thesis to Aalto University in the summer of 2013 (IH4, 6, 9, 8, 13). The 
thesis was to be jointly supervised by himself and Hietanen. Sonja Heikkila, a master’s student from Aalto 
University, was selected from among various candidates to undertake this job, which she finally delivered in 
Spring 2014. It is acknowledged that the main building blocks of MaaS were defined in the working meetings 
between the transport department of the City of Helsinki, Hietanen, and Heikkila: 
“We designed the criteria of MaaS during those meetings when we were supervising Sonja. Everything, 
including the name MaaS, came up in one of those meetings. I still have some mails calling MaaS 
‘transport-as-a-service’.” (IH13) 
In 2013 the Helsinki City Plan Vision 2050 was released, where the transport system was described more 
efficiently and as being composed of an integrated system of various modes of transport. In its 2013–2016 
Strategy, the City of Helsinki targeted being a city with good services, transparent decision-making process-
es, and a hub for the science, art, and creativity scenes, as well as a world-class business and innovation 
center. The strategy also noted that the HMA will be developed as a uniformly operating area, respectful of 
its environment and neighboring nature. The strategy also targeted the improvement of public data open-
ness. In terms of transport, the strategic plan proposed prioritizing projects focusing on the development of 
public transport, walking and cycling, improving the current park-and-ride system, and developing a network 
of electric car charging stations (City of Helsinki, 2013b). The report did not make any reference to MaaS. 
In February 2014, a report from the LVM proposing the replacement of the in-place fixed tax system by the 
kilometer tax acknowledged that ITS should allow the development of “Traffic-as-a-Service”, defined as “ef-
fective and user-friendly coordination and integration of intelligent transport infrastructure, transport ser-
vices and transport-related information and other services” (LVM, 2014a: 8), and used interchangeably with 
MaaS. According to the report, reaching Traffic-as-a-Service would require the lowering of boundaries be-
tween transportation modes and the re-design of transport pricing. However, the kilometer-based tax was 
not implemented at that time and postponed. 
In March 2014, discussions about the future of transport were undertaken at the LVM. Merja Kyllösen, who 
was still minister of transport, highlighted the opportunity to use the ICTs to make the Finnish transport 
sector a potential sector of growth and employment (LVM, 2014b). This was followed by the organization in 
spring of 2014 of workshops focusing on Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) by TEKES (IH3, 13), where the city and 
ministry officials, public transportation authorities, transportation providers, and technological providers 
discussed solutions and ways forward (TEKES, 2016). 
In preparation for the European ITS congress of June 2014, to be held in Helsinki, the LVM commissioned the 
consulting company Eera to coordinate the development of the Traffic Lab (IH6), which aimed to gather 
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private and public actors to put together data from different traffic services, sell them, and use them to de-
velop innovative digital services. As a member of the Traffic Lab, ITS Finland took part in the discussion and 
managed to position MaaS as a subject of interest for the Traffic Lab (IH6). In her opening speech of the ITS 
congress, the Finnish Minister of Transport and Local Governments, Henna Virkkunen, announced the open-
ing of the Traffic Lab (LVM, 2014c), a trial of electronic transport services, supposed to make travel easier 
through more intelligent choices in traffic. However, the Traffic Lab experiment ended in December 2015 
(LVM, 2014d).  
MaaS was officially presented to the public at the 2014 European ITS congress (IH6, 10, 13). Subsequently, a 
lot of media articles came out in Finland and internationally about MaaS. Most of the articles stated that 
according to the City of Helsinki, the city would be car-free by 2025 thanks to the development of innovative 
mobility packages (Helsinki Time, 2014). However, there was never a real policy from the City of Helsinki 
targeting a car-free city within a 10-year timeline (IH13). At the beginning of December 2014, HSL an-
nounced the development of a National Journey Planner in collaboration with the FTA, scheduled to open in 
2016 and to replace the existing HSL and FTA (called Matka.fi) journey planners. The cost of the project was 
expected to be €600,000, which would be 55 percent paid for by HSL and 45 percent by the FTA (HSL, 
2014b). 
In December 2014, as CEO of ITS Finland, Heitanen, with help Mr. Poyry from Eera, with whom he had 
worked to develop the agenda of the Traffic Lab, organized an important event to kick off MaaS in Finland 
(IH1, 5, 6, 8). This event was organized as an open call to all organizations interested in knowing more about 
MaaS. At that time, ITS Finland also received assistance from the Helsinki Business Hub23 (HBH), which would 
manage contacts with relevant actors abroad (IH15). About two hundred organizations, from both Finland 
and abroad, attended this event. From that event, Mr. Hietanen proposed that all companies interested in 
joining the MaaS journey should pay a membership fee of a couple of thousand euros in order to hire a con-
sultant to create a business plan for MaaS. 
“[After the 2014 ITS Europe Congress] we said: we do not know how it will look like, but for those who 
want to join, let’s put some money and buy a consultant and make a business plan.” (IH1) 
Twenty-four players decided to join this first phase, and a start-up company (MaaS.fi standing for MaaS Fin-
land) was created at that time (IH1). The idea of creating a MaaS company mainly came from the partners of 
the first phase, not from Hietanen (IH1). The consulting firm contracted to realize the business plan was Eera 
(IH6), which had to deal with a lot of open questions at that time. 
“At the beginning we did not know what kind of companies MaaS.fi would eventually become and 
would it only focus on personal cars or public transport … so there were really lot of open questions. 
There were only open questions. Nobody knew what would come out of the project.” (IH6) 
In 2015, HSL promised in its HLJ 2015 plan to study in depth the concept of Mobility-as-a-Service, from the 
point of view of trip chains and for the promotion of sustainable modes of transport together with other 
actors (HSL, 2015). In February 2015, the Finnish Fund for Innovation TEKES opened two calls for organiza-
tions that would be keen on developing MaaS projects or would be interested in developing MaaS-
compatible transport projects. 
23 Helsinki Business Hub is a non-profit company owned by the HMA municipalities, which aims to attract foreign direct investment in the 
Helsinki Metropolitan Area, and also has smart mobility as one of its core focus. 
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At the end of spring 2015, the business plan prepared for MaaS.fi by Eera was ready, and was submitted to 
Hietanen and the other member companies (IH6). The business plan focused on the development of the 
company that would be the first MaaS operator and highlighted the benefits for other investors to invest in 
it. The logical next step was to start looking for investors. 
In 2015, the Mayor of Helsinki commissioned a report to the transport planning department of the city to 
understand how to make MaaS happen (IH13). A report was released during spring 2015. Following this 
report, the City of Helsinki decided to hire someone who would specifically focus on the development of 
MaaS for the city. In the same year, 2015, VR started working on its own MaaS solution. After releasing a 
new mobile application focusing on commuter traffic, which provided it with information and the possibility 
to buy commuting trains tickets, VR worked on an internal MaaS strategy to identify what role it should play 
within the Finnish MaaS ecosystem (IH3). A more thorough strategy was eventually conducted in 2016 and 
VR’s “MaaS hackathon” was organized in the same year (IH3). 
In October 2015 was held the World ITS Congress in Bordeaux, France. During the congress, the MaaS Alli-
ance was officially established as an independent organization that aimed to gather stakeholders that had an 
interest in MaaS. The founding members were Ericsson, ERTICO – ITS Europe, FIA Region I, Transport for 
London, and Xerox (ITS International, 2015). During its launch, the MaaS alliance also received political sup-
port from the freshly appointed Finnish Transport Minister Anne Berner, who stated at that time that “It 
(was) time to make the transport sector the most advanced sector in digitalism” (ITS International, 2015). By 
November 2015, 20 organizations had joined the MaaS Alliance.  
In mid-October 2015 a seminar was organized in Brussels by Merja Kyllönen, member of European parlia-
ment and former Finnish transport minister from 2011 to 2014 in charge of the transportation revolution 
work. In this seminar, Kyllönen explained that the EU environmental targets had created a certain context 
that needed to be understood as an opportunity for Europe to develop innovative transport solutions. Be-
cause Europe had one of the most developed transportation systems in the world, and was host to world-
class transportation firms, the EU, through its member states and companies, was presented as having eve-
rything it needed to become the leader in sustainable transport. Within these innovative solutions, she men-
tionned the MaaS idea as one of the most promising ones, which was then presented in more details by Mr. 
Hietanen himself. 
In late December 2015, Hietanen resigned as the CEO of ITS Finland to become the CEO of MaaS.fi (IH1, 13), 
which aimed to become the first MaaS operator in the world. This was followed by a first round of seed in-
vestment in February 2016, in which the company raised €2.2 million. Transdev accounted for 20 percent of 
the initial investment, the same amount as Karsan Otomotiv Sanayii and Ticaret AS (20 percent), a leading 
car-industry family from Turkey. Hietanen himself decided to invest, as a particular, in the company. Other 
investors included InMob Holdings, Neocard, Korsisaari, GoSwift, MaaS Australia, Goodsign, IQ Payments, 
and Delta Capital Force (MaaS Global, 2016a). Transdev, which is a traditional transport operator, comment-
ed on its investment: 
“Transdev’s focus has always been on MaaS but has never had the focus on the technology to support 
MaaS. You can’t do every portion of the MaaS Business. So it’s extremely important to us for our future 
that we are part of a MaaS initiative, that we either participate, create, or invest in like we have. Be-
cause we think that is really where the market is going. We are going to platform, and the day-to-day 
operations have already been commoditized, marginalized, and we have been desintermediated by 
some of the platforms businesses that are out there.” (IH2) 
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MaaS.fi has a board of five investors, elected by the general shareholders. Transdev holds the chair and the 
second–largest investor holds the co-chair, and both are responsible for overseeing the fundraising of the 
entity, while day-to-day operations are left to Hietanen and his team. In March 2016, the Finnish car rental 
company Veho/Sixt also invested in MaaS Finland (MaaS Global, 2016b) and thus entered the board.   
“[On the board] we have payment provider, automotive manufacturer, and transportation operators. It 
is a very interesting board. I have invested in other companies before and usually the board is made up 
of people that will further invest for the company. So venture capitalists, for example, usually sit on the 
board. For us, really the board is strategy and operational and administrative support. We are very 
much an extension of staff in some cases.” (IH2) 
In the beginning of 2016, HSL launched an important ticketing and information system reform, starting with 
the progressive implementation of new card readers in all public transport vehicles (HSL, 2016c), and fol-
lowed by the replacement of in-use travel cards, which were used for 92 percent of HSL public transport 
journeys in 2014 (HSL, 2014d), with HSL travel cards conforming to the ISO standard. The change of card is 
supposed to be free of charge for a certain period of time and should happen when customers top up their 
cards at traditional sales points.  
Also in early 2016, HSL released a mobile ticketing application for smart phones, again operated by Gemalto. 
The app, called HSL Mobiililippu, allowed customers to buy single tickets for specific travel zones (Internal to 
HSL municipalities or Regional tickets), and have the cost of the ticket added to their mobile phone bill at the 
end of the month. Customers using the app were expected to show their smart phone ticket upon request of 
controllers and when entering buses. However, when released, the HSL ticketing app was not integrated 
with any journey planner and did not allow users to book seasonal tickets. 
“Last year we also launched the mobile app ticket but so far it is only for single tickets. We will work on 
that next year to include seasonal tickets. Our basis has been this travel card. We have made a huge sys-
tem based on the new travel card. But now we have the app coming along.” (IH9) 
In June 2016, MaaS Finland changed its name into MaaS Global, as the company started to also look for po-
tential markets of application abroad. According to the CEO of the newly created MaaS Global: 
”Our new name better supports our global approach as we will be expanding the service to other coun-
tries already this year. We are still proud of our Finnish heritage but it is time for a global transport 
revolution.” (MaaS Global, 2016c) 
In the summer of 2016, MaaS Global released its app prototype called Whim for 100 customers that it had 
reached out to thanks to social media. Although the sample of the population was not clearly representative 
of all types of citizens living in HMA, this first trial was considered important in order to have a first form of 
feedback from customers (IH2). In August 2016, MaaS global concluded a deal with Lahitaksi that added taxi 
services to the proposed mobility packages (MaaS Global, 2016d). In September 2016, MaaS Global received 
the Smart City Award from the City of Helsinki (MaaS Global, 2016e). 
In the fall of 2016, HSL edited guidelines for MaaS providers, explaining their ability to provide MaaS provid-
ers with APIs of their different single tickets (local and regional scale). At the same time, MaaS Global con-
cluded a deal with HSL to offer public transportation tickets as part of its mobility packages (MaaS Global, 
2016f). At that time, HSL agreed to open their single local tickets, meaning a single ticket that would allow 
users to travel within one single municipality. Users wishing to travel from Espoo to Helsinki were not able to 
do so at that time with the Whim app. 
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In the same period, following a series of workshops and discussions that were initiated in the summer of 
2015, the Finnish Government submitted a legislative proposal for the first phase of the Finnish Transport 
Code (Liikennekaari) to the Finnish Parliament. This new legislation, which is one of the core policies of the 
current administration, was pushed by the current transportation minister, Anne Berner (IH10). 
The new legislation looked at market access legislation and aimed to create the type of environment that 
would enable the development of innovative mobility services, especially those relying on digital processes. 
The Finnish Transport Code has been organized into three phases, with a first phase focusing on road 
transport, specifically the taxi, passenger, and goods transport markets, and second and third phases that 
focused on all other types of transports (rail, maritime, air, etc.). Due to the small number of taxi licenses in 
Finland, and the willingness to increase the number of taxis, as waiting times can be quite long, the law pro-
posed removing the limited number on taxi licenses and pushed anyone to apply for a taxi license. The text 
also proposed that drivers earning less than €10,000 a year would no longer need to hold a taxi license (this 
became known as the “€10,000 rule”), opening the door to peer-to-peer mobility solutions such as Uber. 
The taxi sector immediately reacted, claiming that this would be unfair competition for their sector, and that 
Finland should also look at past taxi deregulations in order for Nordic countries to see that total opening up 
of the market without any rules should not be the way to go. Finnish taxi companies such as Lahitaksi voiced 
their concerns, which were then amplified by The Finnish Taxi Association (Suomen Taksiliitto), which lob-
bied against the text.  
“We did not like it at all. In the same business you would have two different rules. If you see that you are 
competing against some other companies, which is what we are already doing in small portions today … 
the only way is to have the same rules for everybody that is functioning as a taxi. If you thing about the 
new taxi legislation that is coming out, that is actually the most not wanted thing that you want to have 
(…) If you have different versions of how you work in the field, then it is not nice.” (IH7) 
Their concerns were taken seriously by MPs and government members, and particularly by the True Finns 
party. Finland’s nationalist party (Reuters, 2016), in the form of Timo Soini, the vice prime minister of Finland 
since the 2015 parliamentary elections, stood up particularly against this resolution, following the position 
taken in 2015 by Minister of Transport Ms. Risikko (NCP) to allow Uber in Finland only if Uber drivers held a 
Finnish taxi license (LVM, 2015). It was unclear for a long time whether the so-called €10,000 resolution 
would be left out of the law or not, and taxi companies were quite worried about this: 
“If you allow the €10,000 rule to be there it will be a game changer. There will be a lot of people using 
Uber and doing black market business. The black market will explode, as it is an area where people will 
easily do it as there won’t be any control.” (IH6) 
In the final version of the text, which was voted in spring 2017, the €10,000 rule was omitted. However, the 
text introduced two major changes. First, it introduced the removal of the limitation on the number of taxi 
licenses, thus making it easier to gain access to the taxi market (which was closed prior to the Finnish 
Transport Code). Second, it introduced the removal of price regulation on taxi fares and the obligation for 
taxi services providers to inform customers about their prices and basis for fare calculation in advance. The 
law also meant that taxi licenses were no longer zone-specific and changes from being vehicle-specific to 
operator-specific (LVM, 2017b). 
It is also acknowledged that some innovative mobility companies joined forces in order to lobby in favor of 
the Finnish Transport Code. A lobbying group was led by the company Piggybaggy, proposing a peer-to-peer 
goods delivery platform and aimed at proposing much larger changes than those proposed in the initial ver-
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sion of the law. However, as the group was quite small and not “loud” enough, not so many of their claims 
were taken into account in the public consultation phase (IH11, 2016). The Finnish Transport Code also in-
troduced the whole concept of technology neutrality, proposing, for example, that all essential data from all 
transport services be made open, in a computer-readable format, including routes, timetables, stops, prices, 
availability, and accessibility information, in order to enhance new business concepts, and make seamless 
and mobile travel chains possible. The proposed Transport Code also laid out provisions for the interopera-
bility of ticket and payment systems (LVM, 2016), and interoperability of MaaS systems, requiring all provid-
ers of road and rail passenger transport services to open, at a minimum, their single-ticket APIs (LVM, 
2017c). 
At the same time, The LVM started to develop a proposal to explore new ways of financing transportation 
infrastructure development, that would be managed by a single state-owned company, potentially financed 
by the development of a kilometer road tax (road charging), which would complement the revenues coming 
from the gas tax that have constantly fallen due to declining gas prices (LVM, 2016). The LVM defended the 
above-mentioned proposition as follows: 
“[With that new organization], the money put into transport, and especially infrastructure, will not be 
used depending on who is in the parliament. The big debate is about the ownership model vs. how we 
organize maintenance and building of the infra. What that brings is basically a national road tax (…) 
What you need is to go towards user-based model and have a kilometer-based tax, and fine tune it (…) 
That links to MaaS of course. If there is this kind of fundamental change in the background, and then 
you have this idea that you plan and organize all your transportation network via one operator, and 
then you have this whole taxation model change, that is going to affect the MaaS operator business and 
the kind of logic in there as well.” (IH13) 
Opposition parties reacted against this proposal. The SDP Party chair stated at that time that the “plans to 
consolidate the country’s transport routes into one company would lead Finland down the path towards a 
market-driven society” (YLE, 2016), whereas Green League Party Chair said that the consolidation of all the 
transportation network in a single company would affect and diminish democracy as well as increase costs 
(YLE, 2016). The first phase of the Finnish Transport Code was finally voted for in the spring of 2017. The 
clause related to opening of data and single tickets APIs entered into force on January 1, 2018, while the one 
regarding taxi market new regulations entered into force on July 1, 2018 (LVM, 2017c). The summer of 2017 
was marked by a new funding round of over €10 million for MaaS Global, mostly supported by the invest-
ment from a subsidiary of the Toyota group into MaaS Global (MaaS Global, 2017g). 
In the fall of 2017, the LVM submitted to parliament the second stage of the Finnish Transport Code, specifi-
cally targeting the other transport modes and further regulating the opening of data, which was ultimately 
voted for on March 21, 2018. The second stage of the Transport Code introduces the possibility for third 
parties to have access to public transport seasonal ticket APIs if this is what their customers want. This sec-
ond stage of the code builds on the My Data approach of the Finnish Government, aimed at refocusing data 
management around users, and not organizations. The second phase of the transport code is supposed to 
enter into force on January 1, 2019. 
In March 2018, HSL finally hired someone in charge of coordinating the transport authorities’ activities relat-
ed to MaaS (HSL, 2018). On April 2, 2018, HSL launched an open retail interfaces for single tickets, accessible 
by anyone interested in putting a MaaS-like solution together. Finally, HSL announced that seasonal tickets 
would be added to this OpenMaaS interface by November 30, 2018. Figure 4.3.9 summarizes the main de-
velopments that have led to the development of MaaS in the HMA. 
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Zoom on the Whim solution 
Technology: From a technology standpoint, the Whim app (front-end) builds on a back-end, 
which itself builds on the integration of different APIs (routing, mobility partners, payment, geo-
information, etc.). It is highly similar to the technology supporting the SMILE product (see Case 
2). 
Functionalities: The Whim app has three main functionalities. Firstly, it enables users to plan 
their trips (trip-planning function) by proposing them all the possible transport options to go 
from one point to another. Secondly, it enables users to book mobility services in advance 
(booking function). Finally, it offers users electronic tickets (ticketing function).  
Transport modes integrated: As of May 2018, the Whim app has integrated public transport 
(bus, trams, metro), commuting trains, taxis, and car rental services.  
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Figure 4.3-9: development of MaaS in the HMA (author’s elaboration)  
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Figure 4.3-10: development of MaaS in the HMA (author’s elaboration) 
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4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, one could observe that the three studied ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes have 
taken different paths of development, with smart cards being driven by public authorities in London, IMP 
being developed as a research project in Vienna, and MaaS having unfold as pushed by the private sector as 
well as the Finnish government. Before going into more detail in terms of the analysis of public actor’s be-
haviors in the development of these three ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, it seemed important 
to briefly summarize the technicalities of the three solutions in order to have those in mind. Table 4.4.1 
summarizes the functionalities of the three solutions, as well as the actors who developed them, and the 
underlying business model for the companies operating them. 
Table 4.4-1: technical comparison of the three ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes studied 
As the table shows, there are differences between the three solutions. Firstly, the geographical coverage 
differs. While smart cards and the Whim offer cover a metropolitan area (Greater London and Helsinki Met-
ropolitan Area), the SMILE solution had wider coverage, adding other Austrian cities to the city of Vienna. 
The main difference between Case 1 and Cases 2 and 3 pertains to the functionalities proposed by the solu-
Case n°1 Case n°2 Case n°3 
ICT-supported 
integrated mobil-
ity solution 
Oyster CPCs SMILE Whim 
Geographical 
coverage 
Greater London Vienna + other Austrian 
cities 
Helsinki Metropoli-
tan Area 
Period of opera-
tion 
2004–present 2012–
present 
2014–2015 2017–present 
Operator CUBIC Transportation Systems Consortium led by ÖBB and 
WS 
MaaS Global 
Business Model Concession between private 
operator and transport author-
ity 
(No business model = re-
search project) 
Commission taken 
on services sold 
Functionalities included 
Trip-planning x x 
Booking x x 
Payment x x x x 
Ticketing x x x x 
Transport modes integrated 
Metro x x x x 
Bus x x x x 
Commuter train x x x x 
Light-rail x x x x 
Car sharing (x) x 
Car rental (x) x 
Taxis x (under 
spending 
limit) 
x x 
Bike sharing (x) x 
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tions. While the Oyster and CPC only propose a payment and ticketing functionality, the SMILE and Whim 
solutions propose two additional functionalities, being a trip-planning option as well as a booking service. In 
that sense, the SMILE and Whim solutions propose more functionalities than the Oyster and CPC. In terms of 
the integration of transportation modes, all solutions integrated all public transport modes. Only two of the 
solutions (SMILE and CPC24) integrated shared mobility services, such as bike and car-sharing. All solutions 
integrated taxi services, except the Oyster card in London. From the three case of studies, it seems that the 
SMILE offer integrated the most transport options, followed by the Whim solution and finally by smart cards 
in London.  
From an operating point of view, two out of three solutions (Smart cards in London and Whim in Helsinki) 
were operated by private actors, being CUBIC in London and MaaS Global in Helsinki. While the former had 
been chosen by the public authorities to operate smart cards and IMPs, the latter was operating on its own 
without any mandate from public authorities in Helsinki. On the other hand, the SMILE solution was operat-
ed by a consortium constituted of multiple actors, led by two public actors. While the business model of 
smart cards in London was clear for CUBIC (multiple-year contract with annuity), it is not that transparent for 
the two other cases. The SMILE offer did not have a business model, as it was a research project that did not 
worry about covering costs (IV2). The business model of the MaaS solution (for MaaS global) was based on 
commissions taken from the sale of its mobility packages (B2C). However, to be sustainable, such a business 
model must ultimately rely on an important number of users. In other words, the more people using MaaS, 
the more profitable it will be for its operator, which ultimately questions the relevance of such business 
model for solutions rolled out in medium-size cities such as Helsinki (IH7) and vis-à-vis sustainable transport 
policy goals, as it will be discussed in the conclusion chapter. 
In the next chapter the three case studies will be analyzed to ultimately determine the role that public au-
thorities (and public actors) have played in the development of smart cards in London, IMP in Vienna, and 
MaaS in Helsinki, and ultimately answer the research question this thesis seeks to address. 
24 CPCs can be used to as payment means for shared mobility services through dedicated platforms. Indeed, most of those platform require 
users to enter their credit card details in order to pay for the services they consume. However CPC is only an integrated payment system ; it 
does not allow users to book or acquire information upfront, which is why I have put the symbol (x) and not « x ». 
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Analysis 
I start this chapter by presenting how the analysis will be conducted. I follow this by analyzing each 
of the case studies separately using an analytical framework building on the governance literature, and then 
conduct a cross-case analysis called the governance analysis. Thirdly, I conduct a cross-case analysis using a 
second analytical framework building on the socio-technical transition literature, and called the transition 
analysis. Finally, I draw conclusions and make the synthesis of both the governance and the transition analy-
sis.25 
5.1 Introduction 
Having presented the three descriptive case studies in Chapter 4, it is now time to analyze the empirical 
material, which is the main focus of this chapter. As presented in the introduction, ICT-supported integrated 
mobility schemes have triggered the interest of stakeholders from the public and private sectors, although 
not always for the same reasons and not always towards the same goals. Therefore, the development of 
smart cards, IMPs, and MaaS calls for the development of new governance structures in order for the full 
potential of those schemes, from a public policy perspective, to be harvested. As the organization of 
transport usually falls under the responsibility of the public sector, and as the public sector is also known for 
lacking the ability to drive digital transformations, this thesis has aimed at answering the following research 
question: “How are public authorities governing the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility sys-
tems?” (RQ) 
To answer this research question, a so-called “governance analysis” is first conducted, where a conceptual 
framework building on the urban and innovation governance literatures is used to analyze the role played by 
each public actor involved in the development of smart cards in London, IMPs in Vienna, and MaaS in Hel-
sinki. However, the aim of the thesis was not just to depict the behavior of public authorities, but also to 
make recommendations for other public actors interested in engaging in the development of ICT-supported 
integrated mobility schemes. Thus, due to the limitations of the governance literature in terms of looking at 
dynamic bottom-up innovation development, the emergence of smart cards, IMP, and MaaS is also looked 
at from the socio-technical transition literature, through a so-called the “transition analysis”. The transition 
literature26 appeared indeed to be quite complementary to the urban and innovation governance literatures 
in terms of ultimately obtaining a comprehensive understanding of what public authorities had done in the 
development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, and of what they should ultimately be doing to 
ensure those schemes develop successfully. 
25 This chapter has lead to a specific publication, see Audouin and Finger (2018c), which was presented at the 2018 mobil.TUM conference in 
Munich, and has been published in Transport Research Procedia.  
26 The complementarity of the governance and socio-technical transition literatures is described in greater details in the methodology chapter 
(Chapter 3), subchapter 3.3.6. 
Chapter 5
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Both the governance and the transition analysis were conducted along dedicated conceptual frameworks,27 
which are presented at the beginning of each analysis. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. 
Firstly, the so-called “governance analysis” is conducted on each of the cases separately and then compara-
tively across the three cases of studies. This sub-chapter concludes by discussing the extent to which what 
happened in some cases might have happened in others (transferability). Secondly, the so-called transition 
analysis is conducted comparatively across the three cases of studies using a conceptual framework building 
on the socio-technical transition literature. The chapter concludes by briefly combining both analysis and 
answering the research question. 
For the rest of the chapter the following denomination is used, which builds on the order in which the cases 
were presented in the empirical chapter (Chapter 4). Case 1 refers to the development of smart cards in 
London (Oyster and CPC), Case 2 deals with the development of IMP in Vienna (SMILE and follow-up pro-
jects), and Case 3 relates to the development of MaaS in Helsinki.  
5.2 Governance analysis 
This sub-chapter begins by presenting the analytical framework that builds on the governance literature and 
more particularly on different governing approaches proposed by urban and innovation governance schol-
ars. A cross-case analysis is then conducted before the findings are summarized in Table 5.2.2. 
5.2.1 Analytical framework 
Although it has not been used extensively amongst transport researchers so far, the governance lens has 
been increasingly used to look at the development of innovations in transportation. Recent examples in-
clude for example looking at the development of carsharing schemes (Akyelken et al., 2018). However, the 
governance literature has not yet been extensively used to look at the development of ICT-supported inte-
grated mobility schemes, which is intended here.28 
The theoretical propositions used to structure the governance analysis build on Bulkeley and Kern (2006), as 
well as Etzkowitz (2008). Bulkeley and Kern proposed centering the focus of a governance analysis on public 
authorities’ “governing approaches”. According to them, public authorities might actually adopt four distinct 
governing approaches. First, public authorities might choose to adopt a governing by authority approach, 
where they usually employ traditional top-down mechanisms to govern. Example of such approach can be 
found in the definition by public authorities of coercive regulations towards a specific goal. Second, they 
might decide to govern by enabling, by facilitating and encouraging actions with non-public actors through 
partnerships and incentives development. Third, public authorities can opt to govern by doing, where they 
basically take care of all service production and delivery and avoid collaborating with private actors. Finally, 
public bodies might also choose a self-governing approach, where they would govern by “showing the way” 
themselves. For example, a municipality replacing all its municipal ICE vehicles by electric cars to sensitize its 
population to transport decarbonisation would be categorized as adopting a self-governing approach. To 
those four governing perspectives, one might add the governing by laissez-faire approach, where public 
authorities essentially allow the network of actors to reach a stable state, without getting involved at all 
(Etzkowitz, 2008), as this governing approach is not captured by the typology proposed by Bulkeley and 
27 The use of the term “conceptual framework” here refers to what Yin (2003) called “key theoretical propositions”. For more information 
about the case analysis process, refer to the methodology chapter (Chapter 3).
28 For a review of the literature on transport governance and the existing research gap, see Section 2.3.2. 
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Kern. Table 5.2.1 summarizes what one might expect from public authorities in the development of ICT-
supported integrated mobility schemes depending on the governing approach selected. 
Table 5.2-1: expected actions from public authorities in the development of MaaS depending on different governing approaches
Governing approaches Corresponding actions expected in the development of MaaS schemes 
Governing by authority 
 Develop specific legislation/regulation that enforces in a top-down fashion 
the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes
 Procure smart cards, IMPs or MaaS to a third-party through traditional 
tender mechanisms
Governing by enabling 
 Initiate public–private interactions
 Define vision with strong quantitative objectives
 Provide funding
 Influence negotiations in favor of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes
and leverage opponents using horizontal network governance 
Governing by doing 
 Develop an ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes in-house in a closed 
way
 Minimize collaboration with third parties
Self-governing 
 Provide all government employees with smart cards, IMPs, or MaaS to show 
the example to be followed by citizens
Governing by laissez-faire  Adopt a wait-and-see approach/avoid getting involved
5.2.2 Case analysis 
As it is usually agreed that governance needs to be multi-level in order to be effective (Benz and Eberlein, 
1999), it seemed important to consider different territorial levels when looking at the behavior of public 
authorities into the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. Therefore, this section is 
structured as follows. It starts by looking within different territorial scales at the role that public actors have 
played using the five governing categories presented above. The following actors (which lie at different terri-
torial scales) are analyzed: governments (national level), funding agencies (national level), state-owned rail-
way companies (national), city governments (local level), and public transport authorities (local level). In a 
second time, a cross-case analysis is conducted in order to compare the behavior of public authorities across 
cases in order to draw cross-case conclusions. In the cross-case analysis, the transferability of public authori-
ties’ behavior from one case to another is discussed. Finally, building on the cross-“governance” analysis, 
public authorities’ best and worst practices for the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes are summarized in Table 5.2.3. 
5.2.2.1 Case 1 
 National government
There are basically three kinds of actions from the UK government that deserve to be analyzed in order to 
understand the governing position they have adopted in the development of smart cards in London. The first 
kind pertains to the development of long-term visions of how transport should look like in a more or less 
distant future. For example, this was done with the 2000 Transport Ten-Year Plan, which set a target of a 
12.5 percent reduction in transport-related GHG emissions by 2010 compared to 1990 levels. Similarly, the 
2000 Transport Act presented transport integration and integrated transport as the direction for local au-
thorities to follow. By setting those visions, the UK government basically set the course for the evolution of 
transport in the UK, ultimately creating the need to embrace solutions that have the potential to reach those 
visions. As it was acknowledged that smart cards had this potential, the definition of visions can be under-
stood as having pushed for their development, ultimately acting as an enabler for smart cards to come to 
life. The second kind of action from the UK government that deserves to be analyzed here pertains to the 
promotion of smart cards as a means of reaching transport policy objectives. Given that the Oyster card was 
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actually launched in 2002, one must consider policy documents that were published prior to that. The first 
such document is the 1998 White Paper on Transport entitled “A new deal for transport: better for every-
one”, which called for the development of “through-ticketing” as a means of moving towards a more sus-
tainable transport system. Similarly, the 2000 Transport Ten-Year Plan suggested the implementation of 
integrated information and ticketing systems as a means of reaching the vision presented in the document. 
By formally proposing ways to implement their transport vision, the UK government gave smart cards the 
status of a means to reach policy goals, ultimately pushing for their implementation. The promotion (and 
support) of smart cards as a means to achieving a goal can also be considered as having contributed to their 
takeoff, and can therefore be understood as an enabling action. The support of the DfT for smart cards solu-
tion actually continued with the 2004 Future of Transport Strategy and the 2009 Smart and Integrated Tick-
eting Strategy, where both of which presented the Oyster card as a success story. The third and final kind of 
action from the UK government that must be analyzed here pertains to actions having influenced the collab-
oration of TfL with a private actor (CUBIC). Although it does not seem that the decision of TfL to contract a 
private company for the operation of its smart ticketing scheme was directly influenced by the UK govern-
ment, it may have been influenced by the public sector’s habit of collaborating with private actors in the 
transport sector, which is a direct consequence of UK’s government NPM-led policy of the 1980s. Indeed, 
with the 1984 London Regional Transport Act, as well as the 1985 Transport Act and the 1993 Railway Act, 
the UK Government basically institutionalized public–private collaboration in the transport sector, which 
might have influenced TfL’s choice of collaborating with a private company instead of developing the 
scheme by itself. Although those policies largely predate the development of smart cards in London, they 
can be understood as having had an impact on the way the Oyster and CPCs developed; that is, in collabora-
tion with the private sector. Somehow they can be understood as having loosely enabled private companies 
to propose smart card solutions. 
So, having set visions, promoted smart cards as way of achieving those visions, and enhanced public–private 
collaboration, The UK government can be understood as having adopted an enabling position for the devel-
opment of smart cards. One could also observe this enabling approach in the definition of a dedicated or-
ganization for the development of smart card standards (ITSO). However, ITSO was founded after the PFI 
between Transys and TfL was signed, which means it cannot be considered as having enabled the London 
smart ticketing scheme to come to life.  
 City government
There are basically three kinds of actions from local public authorities (Mayor of London and Greater London 
Authority) that deserve to be analyzed in the development of smart cards in London. The first pertains to the 
development of a strong vision for the future of transport in London. With the 2001 Mayor Transport Strat-
egy (MTS), the mayor of London targeted, by 2010, a 15 percent traffic reduction in central London, zero 
growth of traffic in inner London, and a reduction of traffic growth by one third in outer London. The devel-
opment of this vision can, as with visions developed at the national scale, be understood as an enabling ac-
tion for smart cards to have developed, as it created the need for those to be embraced. The second action 
pertains to the decision of the mayor of London to implement smart cards to reach this vision. Unlike the 
national government’s suggestion of using smart cards to reach vision objectives, the mayor of London basi-
cally decided to use smart cards to reach his vision’s objectives, thus acting in a top-down fashion that fits 
the governing by authority characteristics. The third action of the local government pertains to the devel-
opment of a massive communication campaign about the Oyster, giving out 100,000 free smart cards to the 
most vulnerable users (TfL, 2007) in order to have the London smart ticketing scheme gain in visibility and be 
embraced by many. This can be understood as an action that did not enable the development of smart 
cards, but enabled their uptake (at least of the Oyster) by the population, and thus as governing by enabling. 
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The development of positive incentives, such as the non-augmentation of fares for Oyster users compared 
to paper ticket users in 2004 (TfL, 2004a), must also be quoted here as a governing-by-enabling measure. To 
sum up, the local government in London can be understood as having adopted both governing-by-enabling 
and governing-by-authority measures in the development of smart cards and CPC in London. 
 PTA
Here is analyzed the behavior that TfL has adopted vis-à-vis the development of smart ticketing in London. 
As explained below, TfL has been using a governing by authority as well as self-governing approach. The 
“authority” measures from TfL actually started in its 2003–2004 business plan, which included a ticketing 
and boarding strategy, with the aim of having the entire transport network able to receive cashless pay-
ments by 2008. It was also TfL that decided, in 2008, to terminate the Transys contract, and (still on its own) 
launched the Future of Ticketing Project (FTP), which paved the way for the development of CPCs. TfL also 
launched a bid for the Future Ticketing Agreement (FTA). Finally, TfL awarded the Electra contract in 2014 
that established which company would operate London’s smart ticketing system. All those actions from TfL 
can be understood as top-down, meaning that TfL took the initiative and reached out to relevant third par-
ties to implement them, without considering that a better solution might emerge in a bottom-up fashion. It 
is because TfL really drove the development of smart ticketing in London that its approach has been catego-
rized as governing by authority. The authority governing approach that TfL adopted can also be understood 
as a direct consequence of the governing-by-authority measure of the mayor of London vis-à-vis the devel-
opment of smart cards. By adopting such an approach, the mayor of London did not leave much choice to 
TfL on what to do, as TfL is considered to be the mayor’s “armed wing” for transport. Last but not least, the 
self-governing measure relates to the decision of TfL to use its employees to test the Oyster system in 2002, 
and to provide all TfL’s employees with Oyster cards once implemented. 
 Funding agency and state-owned railway company
It appeared there was no national funding agency involved in the funding of the Oyster experiment (in the 
pilot phase in 2002), or in the development of the CPCs. Therefore, it is irrelevant to categorize the behavior 
of UK funding agencies involved in the development of smart cards in London, as they were none. Similarly, 
the role of a dominant state-owned railway company in the development of Oyster and CPCs cannot be 
conducted, as they were none. As seen in chapter 4, the privatization of the rail sector in the late 1980s re-
sulted in a very fragmented rail market in the UK, and the absence of a dominant railway undertaking.  
5.2.2.2 Case 2 
 National government
Given that IMPs in Vienna actually started in 2012 with the SMILE project, one must here consider the ac-
tions from the Austrian government that happened before that year. There are four actions from the Austri-
an government that can be understood as having influenced the development of the IMPs in Austria and, 
more specifically, of the SMILE project. First, the BMVIT created a vision for transport with the 1991 
Transport Master Plan, which targeted a 20 percent reduction of CO2 emissions related to transport by 2005 
compared to 1998 levels. As seen in Case 1, the development of a vision can be understood as a governing 
by enabling action, by creating the need for new solutions, such as IMPs, to be embraced. The second action 
of the BMVIT to be analyzed concerns the promotion of IMPs, either through the definition of strategic areas 
for research or through the development of a dedicated strategy. By defining research areas, the BMVIT 
highlighted the importance of some key topics related to transport, including intermodal transport/transport 
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integration. For example, the 2006 IMPULSE Programme I2V aimed at funding research that would support 
the development of solutions that “enable efficient transfer between the modes of transport (…) and ensure 
connections and flexible schedule management” (BMVIT, 2006). By proposing this program, the BMVIT ena-
bled research to be conducted on the intermodality and interoperability of transport systems, which consti-
tuted a knowledge base for the development of IMPs; this is why this kind of actions can also be considered 
as governing by enabling. On the other hand, the development by the BMVIT of its ITS Action plan in 2011 
can also be understood as a promotion of IMPs. Among other things, the action plan highlighted the im-
portance of developing systems that provide transport “information to the individual travellers” as well as 
“booking and invoice services” (BMVIT, 2011: 12), again helping promote and raise awareness about IMPs 
and enabling it to come to life. However, while the Austrian government was adopting an enabling position 
upfront of the development of the development of IMPs, it appears it never stood up in the development of 
the SMILE project, and only let it happen (IV4).  
“My suspicion is that [the BMVIT] said: ‘two strong partners, let’s see what comes out. If they are 
successful, we will get some glory, but if not we will say that we were not involved, and thus not re-
sponsible’.” (IV5) 
 Funding agency
Having financed the development of projects related to SMILE, and of the SMILE project itself, Austrian fund-
ing actors (Climate and Energy Fund as well as FFG) can be understood as having enabled the growth of 
IMPs. The first important enabling action from the Climate and Energy Fund that should be acknowledged as 
having played a role in the development of the SMILE project is the funding of the GIP and the VAÖ. From 
2006 to 2011, the Climate and Energy Fund funded the development of both systems, which actually served 
as the technical backbone of the SMILE solution. Without the funding from the Climate and Energy Fund, the 
digital infrastructure supporting the SMILE project would have probably never come to life, which would 
have certainly been a bottleneck for the development of the SMILE project. The Climate and Energy fund 
later continued its enabling actions by awarding funding to the SMILE project, as part of the third Austrian 
Electric Mobility Flagship program, aimed at supporting projects that would enhance the “development of 
interoperable mobility information, electric mobility offers and electric mobility billing by public transport 
service providers and operators and their integration in a functioning system environment by using linked ICT 
systems” (Klima und Energiefonds, 2011: 11). By providing the necessary financial resources (€2.9 million) 
for the SMILE project to develop, the Climate and Energy Fund can be considered to have acted as a true 
enabler. Similarly, the funding from the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG) awarded to the SMILE 
consortium can be seen as having enabled the success of the SMILE project. As seen in Chapter 4, the SMILE 
consortium was not making any money out of the operation of the integrated mobility platform (it had no 
business model, as this was not the purpose of the project) and thus could not have survived without any 
external funding available to cover the costs of all the stakeholders involved in the project.  
 State-owned Railway company
The main governing approach adopted by the ÖBB in the development of the SMILE project has been a gov-
erning-by-doing approach. Having been the co-leader of the SMILE project (with the Wiener Stadtwerke), 
the ÖBB clearly demonstrated its willingness to be in the driving seat for the development of integrated 
mobility platforms. This governing approach can also be observed in the strategy that the ÖBB adopted at 
the end of the SMILE project. By deciding to pursue the development of an IMP of its own with iMobility and 
WegFinder, and to stop the collaboration with the Wiener Stadtwerke, it is clear that the ÖBB decided to 
adopt a governing-by-doing approach at the end of the SMILE project (IV7; 13; 14).  
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“They [ÖBB] want to integrate everything to death. They are taking it all (…) they are not acting in a 
partnership mode. They are like in Star Trek.” (IV4)  
With IMPs, ÖBB actually saw the opportunity to become mobility provider for the entire travel chain and not 
only long-distance capacity providers (IV9). In particular, it saw in IMPs an opportunity to also generate prof-
its (IV9; 10). The willingness of the ÖBB to do things by itself was not new. In 2010 the ÖBB had been the 
leader of the eMORAIL project, which aimed to develop a digital platform integrating mass transit with elec-
tric mobility. Prior to that, the ÖBB also decided to create, on its own, a multimodal information app (Scot-
ty), as well as a digital ticketing solution, again clearly illustrating its position vis-à-vis the development of 
IMPs.  
 City government
Although the sole owner of the Wiener Stadtwerke (and thus of WL), the City of Vienna is acknowledged for 
not having been directly involved in the development of IMPs (IV1; 2; 4; 5; 7; 8). While the City of Vienna did 
develop a vision for transport (with the 1999 KLIP I and the 2003 Transport Master Plan for Vienna), it has 
not developed transport visions coinciding with the beginning of the SMILE project, and therefore cannot be 
categorized as having enabled it. Hence, the governing approach of the City of Vienna vis-à-vis the develop-
ment of SMILE can be understood as a governing-by-laissez-faire approach. One could see the Smart City 
Framework Strategy as a strategy that has paved the way for the development of IMPs, with the quantitative 
objectives it includes. However, the strategy is considered to be “weak” on mobility (IV4), as it does not have 
clear CO2 emission reduction targets for transport and does not propose any means (such as IMPs) to reach 
those objectives. Furthermore, the Smart City Framework came in 2014 – that is, after the SMILE project – 
and therefore cannot be understood as having influenced it.  
 PTA
In the development of the SMILE project, the behavior of Wiener Stadtwerke (and of course Wiener Linien) 
can be understood as quite similar to that adopted by the ÖBB. 
“The ÖBB think they are the key player to integrate everything, and so does the WS.” (IV7) 
Hence WS’s approach has also been categorized as governing by doing. Indeed, having initiated and led the 
SMILE project (IV9), the WS clearly demonstrated its willingness to be involved in the development of IMPs. 
Such behavior can also be observed as previous developments by the ÖBB in terms of digital transport ser-
vices. The WL’s development of a multimodal journey planner in 2009 (Qando), as well as a ticketing app in 
2011 (Wiener Linien app) for public transport, should also be understood as a governing-by-doing approach.  
However, it seems the governing by doing approach from the Wiener Stadtwerke has somehow evolved 
since the end of the SMILE project. Although the Wiener Stadtwerke wanted to continue being in the driving 
seat by creating Upstream, which was 51 percent owned by the Wiener Linien and 49 percent by the Wiener 
Stadtwerke, it somehow shifted towards a more governing-by-enabling approach. By deciding with Up-
stream to create an open backend service, and allow third parties to use its digital platform (IV1) to create 
their own front-ends, Upstream finally adopted an “open” approach to IMPs, seeing itself more as a digital 
infrastructure provider than an IMP operator. 
 “We think it [the digital infrastructure] is a public good. As a public company (…) we have to provide 
the digital infrastructure (…) it is an open platform so we treat everybody the same way!” (IV3) 
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5.2.2.3 Case 3 
 PTA
As explained below, HSL has basically been using three governing approaches in the development of MaaS in 
the HMA: governing by doing, governing by laissez-faire, and ultimately governing by enabling.  
Having developed services that can be considered as MaaS building blocks, such as their own multimodal 
journey planner in the 2000s, SMS ticketing system in 2012 (Gemalto, 2016), or a dedicated ticketing app in 
2016 (HSL, 2016c), HSL can be seen as having sought to be in the driving seat for all developments related to 
ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, and thus as having adopted a governing-by-doing approach, 
even though the Helsinki Metropolitan Transport Authority never concretely announced it was interested in 
developing its own MaaS app.  
At the same time, HSL should be understood as having used a governing-by-laissez-faire approach for a long 
period. Developing a MaaS solution (from the MaaS operator point of view) depends on the willingness of 
transport authorities, and other transport providers, to open their information and ticketing APIs, to consti-
tute the back end on which a front end can be developed. While HSL finally agreed to open its single ticket 
API in December 2016, it took about one and a half further year to agree on opening its seasonal ticket API, 
which actually acted as a major bottleneck for MaaS Global to develop a sustainable solution (IH10, 13). 
While MaaS Global customers were given the possibility to use public transport as much as they wanted (as 
part of their subscription), they actually had to book single tickets each time they used it, which HSL kept 
track of and billed MaaS Global at the end of each month. There is nothing wrong with that, apart from the 
fact that single tickets are not subsidized, whereas monthly and seasonal tickets are (IH9), which ended up 
being much more expensive for MaaS Global than if seasonal tickets were available to them from the begin-
ing. Consequently, the Helsinki Metropolitan Transport Authority has been depicted as not having “done so 
much” (IH3) to push MaaS forward, as not having been “easy” (IH15), not as “enthralled as we would have 
probably expected them to be” (IH6), and as having tried to “slow the progress” (IH13). HSL’s governing-by-
laissez-faire approach ultimately joins Bond’s understanding of PTAs behavior vis-à-vis innovation for whom 
PTAs often fail to “understand the environment of change and the need for innovations” (1984: 39).  
Ultimately, HSL finally changed its position vis-à-vis MaaS. After having developed an HSL strategy and orga-
nized a MaaS stakeholder meeting in Spring 2017, HSL finally hired, in March 2018, someone in charge of 
coordinating the transport authorities’ activities related to MaaS (HSL, 2018). On April 2nd 2018, HSL 
launched an open retail interface for single tickets, accessible by anyone interested in putting together a 
MaaS-like solution. Finally, HSL announced that seasonal tickets would be added to this OpenMaaS interface 
by November 30th 2018, finally putting a theoretical end to the single-ticket API issue, and thus ultimately 
adopting a governing-by-enabling approach.  
 City government
The City of Helsinki undertook three main actions that can be analyzed as having had an impact in the devel-
opment of MaaS. The first was the promotion of the MaaS concept in its 2013 Helsinki City Plan vision 2050, 
in which the transport system of the Finnish capital is presented in 2050 as being “an uncomplicated public 
transport network, cycling, private cars, Demand Responsive Transportation, shared vehicles, city bikes and 
walking into a seamless whole, in which travel chains have been optimized via efficient transfers. City resi-
dents can purchase the ‘transport package’ of their choice, similar to current mobile call/data packages” 
(City of Helsinki, 2013a: 41). While the term MaaS was not mentioned specifically, all its building blocks were 
there. The promotion of MaaS by the City of Helsinki also happened through its acceptance as the host city 
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of the 10th European ITS Congress (16–19 June 2014), the motto of which was “ITS in your pocket – proven 
solutions driving user services”. By clearly standing up as a partner of the ITS Congress, the City of Helsinki 
directly supported the key themes of the congress, and in particular three themes directly related to MaaS: 
new mobility apps for consumers and businesses, smart transactions, and multimodal transport. In the pro-
gram of the ITS Congress, the City of Helsinki described itself as an “enabler rather than a service provider” 
and stated its motivation to “become the world-leader in Mobility-as-a-Service” (ITS in Europe, 2014: 2). As 
seen in the two other cases, promotion of a solution by public authorities can be categorized as governing by 
enabling.  
The second set of actions pertains to the City of Helsinki’s lobbying to push the MaaS subject forward, for 
example through negotiations undertaken by the some city council members with HSL so they would open 
their ticketing APIs (IH13, 4), and the work done by Forum Virium and Helsinki Business Hub to make HSL 
change its position (IH15, 16). Negotiations were to be directly linked with governing by enabling, as it aims 
to find common ground to avoid bottlenecks, without using binding mechanisms. The third and last set of 
actions pertains to the City of Helsinki collaboration with non-public actors interested to push MaaS forward. 
The best example of such actions is the acceptance of the City of Helsinki to co-supervise, in partnership 
with Sampo Hietanen (at that time director of ITS Finland) and Aalto University, a master’s thesis that would 
explore the role that public authorities should play in the development of MaaS. The main building blocks of 
MaaS were basically developed during supervision meetings between the student, the head of the transport 
department of the City of Helsinki, and the head of ITS Finland (IH13). Those collaborations with non-state 
actors should also be considered as governing by enabling, as they enabled the subject to gain in visibility 
among local politicians, and other stakeholders of the Helsinki transport ecosystem. 
 
 National government 
 
The national government must be understood as the shadow architect of the development of MaaS in Hel-
sinki (and more generally, in Finland), where it adopted governing by enabling and, ultimately, a governing-
by-authority approach. More specifically, there appears to be three broad sets of actions falling into the 
former category, and one falling into the later. While the definition of visions, promotion of the MaaS con-
cept, and development of networks of actors having facilitated public-private interactions, fall into the gov-
erning-by-enabling category, the development of a legislation specifically targeting the development of 
MaaS must be categorized as governing by authority. 
The first kind of governing-by-enabling actions pertains to the definition of strong visions by the LVM having 
put pressure on all (public and private) actors of the MaaS ecosystem, and pushing them to collaborate with 
one another. For example, the first and second National ITS strategies (in 2009 and 2013, respectively) spe-
cifically targeted making Finland one of the five most advanced countries in the world in terms of ITS by 
2020; this undoubtedly put pressure on the private sector, as well as on public transport authorities to de-
velop MaaS.  
The second kind of action that falls into the enabling category basically deals with the development of policy 
documents, where MaaS (or at least its building blocks) was presented as a way to reach the objectives tar-
geted by the policy. For example, as early as 2006, the Finnish National Knowledge Society Strategy (VNK, 
2006) promoted smart cards, route navigation, and electronic timetable information systems as solutions 
facilitating the transportation of people. Similarly, the support of the government for transport solutions 
relying on “information technology” was re-emphasized in the 2008 Transport Policy Guidelines (VNK, 2008: 
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40) and in the 2011 Transport Revolution Report (LVM, 2011). Other similar examples include the video29
presented by the LVM in the ITS Europe Congress in June 2014, entitled “Could mobility be viewed as a ser-
vice?”, as well as repeated joint appearances of the LVM with MaaS Global at conferences (such as MaaS
Market conference in London in 2016)30 or the report Transport and Communications Architecture 2030 and
2050, that presents MaaS as a way to reduce emissions in the transport sector. Although none of the above-
mentioned documents proposed strategies to specifically develop MaaS (instead leaving that to third parties
[IH10]), they did mention the utility of MaaS to reach policy goals, thus acting more as promotional docu-
ments. In other words, by mentioning integrated ticketing and integrated travel information system in
transport and climate policy documents, the Finnish public authorities at the national level helped raise
awareness among transport actors (including local transport authorities and local governments) regarding
the availability of those solutions and the potential benefits that could be harvested from their use.
The third kind of action that can be categorized as governing-by-enabling approaches for the development 
of MaaS in Helsinki pertains to the development of “places of exchange”, or dedicated networks, where non-
state actors could actually influence state-actors vis-à-vis the development of ICT-supported integrated mo-
bility schemes. Those networks acted as places where the private sector could also influence the develop-
ment of transport policy so it would serve their interests and so on. Four examples of such “places of ex-
change” are provided here. The first is the think tank that was developed along the 2011 Transport Revolu-
tion report, which aimed to gather public and private stakeholders to think about the future of transport. 
This think tank basically gathered several bodies such as the ministry of transportation and communication, 
local Finnish transport authorities, local governments, and non-profit organizations, such as ITS Finland,31 
which could use the network to represent the private sector interests in the development of MaaS. A second 
example of public–private collaboration facilitated by the LVM is the working group that prepared the sec-
ond ITS strategy, which was composed of representatives of the FTA, TraFi, the Finnish Meteorological Insti-
tute, the City of Helsinki, ITS Finland, and Nokia. This working group was an opportunity for non-state actors 
(ITS Finland and Nokia) to influence the definition of the strategy and push MaaS forward on the political 
agenda. The third example is the so-called Traffic Lab, developed to gather private and public actors to put 
together data from different traffic services and develop innovative digital services. As a member of the 
Traffic Lab, ITS Finland took part in the discussions and this was a way for the non-profit organization to 
position MaaS as a subjet of interest (IH6). It is estimated that the first phase of the Traffic Lab program 
provided “a good framework for developing the MaaS operator model on a conceptual level” (VTT, 2016: 46). 
The final example of such networks of exchange is related to the development of the Finnish Transport 
Code. The development of this piece of legislation was highly consultative and non-state actors were closely 
consulted (IH10), which can be seen as having influenced the final version of the law. One might wonder 
what would have happened if the code was not consultative, or more specifically how supportive of the 
MaaS concept the Transport Code would have been if its definition had not been based on a consultation 
exercise.  
However, the strongest (and final) set of actions from the ministry for the development of MaaS undoubted-
ly pertains to the development of a dedicated legislation (the Finnish transport code) aimed at making MaaS 
a reality, which should be understood as the governing-by-authority mechanism. By making “providers of 
road and rail passenger transport services, providers of brokering and dispatch services, or actors managing 
a ticket or payment system on behalf of these” forced to “give mobility service providers and providers of 
integrated mobility services access to the sales interface of their ticket and payment systems, through which 
29 Accessed on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZQieTU7_5xo on April 18th 2018. 
30 http://ertico.com/event/maas-market-concept-to-delivery-2/ accessed June 4th 2018 
31 Headed at that time by Sampo Hietanen, the CEO of MaaS Global and considered by many to be the father of the MaaS idea.
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it is possible to purchase a ticket product at a basic price that, at minimum, entitles the passenger to a single 
trip”, the first phase of the Transport code (LVM, 2017c: 13) basically forced PTAs to open their single-ticket 
APIs, ultimately making the future of MaaS dependent on the willingness of PTAs to open (or not) the rest of 
their tickets; that is, acting as a demonization strategy. 
Despite having announced that it would be “ridiculous to go that far” (IH10), the LVM finally included in the 
second phase of the Transport Code (which was voted for on March 2018) a clause forcing all PTAs to open 
all their ticket APIs (including subsidized seasonal tickets). By making it possible for MaaS operators “to in-
corporate tickets for all modes of transport, car hire service, various serial and seasonal products as well as 
discounts into a combined mobility service by acting on the customer’s wishes or on the customer’s behalf” 
(LVM, 2017d), the LVM untimely found a solution to HSL’s long-standing refusal to open its seasonal-ticket 
API. Given that the legislation does not leave any room for PTAs to maneuver, the second phase of the 
transport code can be understood as governing by authority and not as governing by enabling. Indeed, it 
seems that HSL would not have opened its OpenMaaS interface and announced the opening of seasonal 
ticket APIs if the second phase of the transport code had not included a binding clause:  
“The main reason in the change of position is the new legislation (…) honestly I don’t know that if 
there was not the Finnish Transport Code how the situation would be.” (IH16) 
 Funding agency
Finnish public authorities also provided public funding that basically enabled MaaS Global to grow. Indeed, 
by offering a €50,000 grant to eight of the 13 companies that had responded to the call (Eltis, 2016), TEKES 
enabled MaaS experiments to come to life in Finland. In February 2016, TEKES also directly invested into 
MaaS Global in the first investment round of the Finnish start-up (MaaS Global, 2016a), which also played a 
role in the development of Whim. In the spring of 2014, the Finnish innovation agency undertook another 
enabling approach by organizing three workshops focusing on MaaS. Those workshops, to which all relevant 
stakeholders were invited, basically acted as public–private networks enhancing public–private interactions 
to happen and private actors to “preach” their MaaS ideas to the public sector, which was also one of the 
strategies adopted by the LVM, as seen above. 
 National Railway company
Although not highly involved in the development of MaaS Global’s solution, as it did not see “any clear busi-
ness proposal or product proposal” (IH3), the Finnish Railway company (VR) has been involved in the devel-
opment of MaaS in Helsinki by working on its own MaaS product. The development of an internal strategy 
vis-à-vis MaaS and its stated willingness in a more or less distant future to develop its own MaaS schemes 
(IH3), are examples of the position adopted by VR, which can be understood as a governing-by-doing ap-
proach.  
5.2.2.4 Supra-national level (EU) 
In order to be able to analyze in depth the role that public authorities played at the supra national level in 
the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, it was important to select cases of studies 
that had developed under the same macro institutional context. As explained in the methodology chapter 
(Chapter 3), this requirement could only be satisfied by looking at cases in Europe and, more specifically, in 
countries that were members of the European Union, and thus subject to the same European directives as 
was the case for the UK, Austria, and Finland. Therefore, the role that EU authorities have played in the de-
velopment of the three ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes studied has been analyzed, using the five 
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governing approaches framework presented above. It appears that EU authorities have mainly used two 
governing approaches in the development of the studied ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes: gov-
erning by enabling and governing by authority. 
First are presented actions pertaining to the former. The Commission adopted an enabling approach by de-
fining a vision and clearly formulating the means to reach it. In so doing, it promoted some solutions to 
reach policy objectives and ultimately helped those solutions increase in visibility, which is why such actions 
have been categorized as enabling actions. Considering the timescale of the case studies, with the London 
case starting in the early 2000s, the first policy document that should be considered (at the EU level) is the 
2001 white paper from the European Commission, entitled “European transport policy for 2010: time to 
decide” (Commission of the European Communities, 2001). The document, presented as the second white 
paper for the future development of a common transport policy, primarily aimed at shifting the balance 
between modes of transport; that is, to enhance by 2010 a modal shift from private motorized transport to 
other transportation modes as those were in 1998. Regarding passenger transport, and in order to contrib-
ute to the general target of the white paper, the document emphasized the need to develop high-quality 
urban transport (p.17) and to develop intermodality for people (p.80). In particular, emphasis was given to 
the benefits of integrated ticketing systems, as well as the use of intelligent traffic systems to inform pas-
sengers about transport conditions in order to help them reduce the time needed to transfer between 
modes. The second document that falls into this category is the 2006 report entitled “Keep Europe moving – 
Sustainable mobility for our continent”, which re-emphasized the need to produce a shift from private mo-
torized transport towards environmentally friendly modes, especially in urban areas, and proposed increas-
ingly coordinating investment in the development of intelligent transport systems in order to enable “co-
modal transport solutions” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006). The third document to be 
cited here is the 2007 green report entitled “Towards a new culture for urban mobility”, which specifically 
presented traveller information systems and smart ticketing system as a means of moving towards the 2001 
white paper’s vision (Commission of the European Communities, 2007). The fourth document is the commu-
nication from the Commission entitled “A sustainable future for transport: towards an integrated, technolo-
gy-led and user friendly system”, which again emphasized the impact that ITS-related solutions could have 
on the efficiency of the European transport system (Commission of the European Communities, 2009a). The 
communication was followed by the Action plan on urban mobility, which aimed to set out a coherent 
framework for EU initiatives in the area of urban mobility (Commission of the European Communities, 
2009b). The plan re-affirmed the willingness of the commission to work with public transport organizations 
on facilitating the provision of travel information to transport users, and the support of the commission vis-
à-vis the development of multimodal journey planners (p.6) and integrated ticketing schemes (p.10). The last 
policy document that should be mentioned here is the 2011 white paper entitled “Roadmap to a single Eu-
ropean Transport Area – towards a competitive and resource-efficient transport system”. That paper set out 
a new vision for transport in Europe (60 percent reduction in transport-related GHG emissions by 2050 com-
pared to 1990 levels) and re-affirmed the availability of specific solutions to reach it, which included multi-
modal transport information, management, ticketing and payment systems (EC, 2011). Also, by having sup-
ported the development of the EU urban expert group in 2010, the Commission acted as an enabler, or more 
as a facilitator, for the deployment of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. By setting up an expert 
group aimed at showcasing best practices of urban ITS use, the commission basically enabled member 
states, as well as European public transport authorities to learn from each other. By making recommenda-
tions on how to develop smart ticketing, travel information, and traffic management systems, this expert 
group also acted as an advisor for local public transport authorities, which can also be understood as falling 
under a governing-by-enabling action from the EU authorities.  
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As mentioned previously, the Commission also used governing-by-authority approaches. The first document 
that should be quoted in this category is the “Action Plan for the Deployment of Intelligent Transport Sys-
tems in Europe”, which proposed the development of a framework for the unfolding of ITS in Europe. In 
particular, it proposed the definition of processes for the provision by private and public actors of EU-wide 
real-time traffic and travel information (RTTI) services (Commission of the European Communities, 2008a). 
The second piece that should be mentioned here (and is perhaps the most evolved authority action from the 
Commission) is the EU ITS Directive, which aimed at setting the legal framework for the deployment of ITS in 
Europe (EU, 2011). The directive basically aimed to develop legally binding specifications and standards for 
interoperability of ITS systems across member states. However, both documents should be considered as 
weak approaches given their lack of coercive measures and low repercussions for member states. Indeed, 
the ITS directive only aimed to create a framework for the development of ITS in Europe, and the interoper-
ability of systems between member states, leaving the responsibility and strategy of developing ITS to each 
member state. The only binding measure that was included in the ITS directive basically required each 
member state (Article 17) to send the Commission a report on the current state in 2011 of its ITS infrastruc-
ture, as well as its future plans for developing ITS. By “forcing” member states to come up with such reports, 
one can actually understand the Commission as having pushed EU member states to think about what to do 
with ITS, but without really giving instructions on how ITS should be deployed on their territories. While the 
requirement for each member state to send the commission a report on its current strategies vis-à-vis ITS 
might have influenced Finland and Austria in the process that led to the development of MaaS in Helsinki 
and IMP in Vienna, it would be wrong to think the same for the development of smart ticketing in London. 
Because the Oyster card predates the ITS Directive, it would be incorrect to think that it played a role in the 
development of smart ticketing in London.  
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Supra-National 
level 
European Commis-
sion 
•Definition of a vision and promotion of ICT-supported integrated mobility solutions (2007 Green Paper; 2011 White Paper)
•Definition of specific strategy and legislation (2008 ITS Action plan; 2010 ITS Directive)
•Knowledge sharing (EU Urban ITS Expert Group)
Enabling / Authority 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
National level Governments •Set the vision (1998 White Paper; 2000 Ten
year plan)
•Promotion of smart cards (1998 White
Paper; 2000 Ten year plan)
•Initiation of public–private collaboration
(1985 Transport Act)
Enabling 
•Set the vision (1991 Transport Master Plan)
•Promotion of IMPs (IMPULSE Programme I2V; 2011
Austrian ITS Action Plan)
Enabling 
•Set the vision (ITS strategy)
•Promotion of MaaS (2011
Transport Revolution Report)
•Initiation of public–private
collaboration (Transport
Revolution Think-tank; Traffic
Lab…)
Enabling 
•Legislate/regulate (1st and
2nd phases of the Finnish
Transport Code)
Authority 
Funding Agencies 
- 
•Funding of VAÖ and SMILE
Enabling 
•Funding of Whim 
Enabling 
State-owned Rail-
way company 
- 
•Release of the Qando app in 2009 and ÖBB ticketing
app in 2013
•Leader in the SMILE project
•Launch WegFinder (2017)
Doing 
•Development of VR’s MaaS strategy (2016)
•Developing their own MaaS app
Doing 
Local level Public Transport 
Authority 
•Contacting (FTP 
2006; FTA 2010; 
Electra 2014) 
Authority 
•Oyster cards for
TfL’s employees
Self-governing 
•Release of Scotty 
(2007) & WL ticketing 
app (2011) 
•Leader in the SMILE
project
Doing 
• Launch of Upstream
(2016) 
Enabling 
•Release of the
HSL single-ticket
app in 2016
Doing 
•Refusal to open
seasonal-ticket
APIs
Laissez-faire 
•OpenMaaS
interface (2018) 
•Opening of 
seasonal-ticket
APIs (2018)
Enabling 
City Government •Decision to go for
Oyster (2001 Mayor
Transport Strategy)
Authority 
•Set the vision 
(2001 Mayor 
Transport Strategy) 
•Promotion of the
smart card solution
Enabling 
•Set the vision (1999 Klip I, 2003 Transport Master
Plan for Vienna; 2003 Urban mobility plan)
Laissez faire 
•Promotion of the concept (Helsinki city plan vision 2050; Joint 
supervision of a master’s thesis with ITS Finland 2013)
•Support of the concept (Host of the ITS Europe Congress in
2014…)
•Lobbying in favor of MaaS (City Council members with HSL,
Forum Virium, HBH)
•Collaboration with non-state actors (master’s thesis supervi-
sion with ITS Finland)
Enabling 
5.2.3 Cross-case analysis and discussion 
Here, the role of the different public actors (national government, state-owned railway company, local gov-
ernment, public transport authority and funding agencies) in the development of the three studied ICT-
supported integrated mobility schemes is compared. Given that actors might have adopted the same ap-
proach from one case to another but with different intensities, three levels of strengths in the different gov-
erning approaches (weak, medium, and strong) have been introduced. The role of EU authorities is also dis-
cussed. Ultimately, the possibility of potentially adopting different governing approaches in the three case 
studies is discussed. 
 PTAs’ roles
While PTAs have all adopted different approaches in the three case studies, there seem to be conclusions 
draw from their behavior vis-à-vis the development of smart cards, IMPs, and MaaS. First of all, it seems that 
the laissez-faire approach actually acts as a bottleneck, as it could be observed with the behavior that HSL 
adopted at the beginning of the MaaS era in Helsinki. By refusing to get involved and embracing a “wait and 
see” approach, the Helsinki Metropolitan transport authority put the development of MaaS in jeopardy. 
Indeed, by usually being responsible for ticketing, PTAs naturally play a very important role when it comes to 
the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, and it is only by getting them fully on-board 
that private third parties will be able to develop commercially sustainable MaaS solutions. The approach 
adopted by the PTA in Vienna has somehow been much more offensive. By first adopting a governing-by-
doing approach, the WL acted to position itself as a leader in the IMP field, and saw in IMPs an opportunity 
to be an actor in the digital transport sphere. However, governing by doing might not be the best governing 
position for PTAs to adopt. Developing an ICT-supported integrated mobility scheme requires (digital) skills 
and know-how that were never the focus of PTAs. By doing things by themselves, PTAs might actually be-
come trapped in technical difficulties, as HSL was in the in-house development of its single- and seasonal-
ticketing app (IH13). Considering how successful the development of smart cards has been in London, one 
might be tempted to consider TfL’s approach – that is, governing by authority – as the relevant one. By put-
ting the operation of Oyster and CPCs to tender, TfL emerged relatively unscathed from the development of 
smart ticketing in London, avoiding becoming trapped in technical issues, and ultimately reinforcing its im-
age of innovative PTA (Stone and Aravopoulou, 2018). 
However, such an approach might not be optimal in all cases, as it locks things into a particular ICT-
supported integrated mobility scheme, from which it might be hard to revert. In London, for example, where 
TfL has used an authority governing approach, the ticketing system is built around Oyster and CPCs. This 
prevents another more advanced ticketing system (such as IMPs or MaaS) from being implemented, as the 
card readers installed for Oysters and CPCs would not be able to read any other ticketing means (such as bar 
codes on smart phones). It is commonly agreed that being an authority that is entirely dependent on a third 
party to run a digital service (smart ticketing) increases path dependency and lock-in effects (Kitchin, 2014). 
Therefore, the approach undertaken by TfL with CUBIC could result in a lock-in in Oysters and CPCs. Thus, it 
seems the governing-by-authority stance might not be the optimal long-term approach to endorse for PTAs. 
Ultimately, it seems that the approaches undertaken by the Wiener Linien after the SMILE project, and re-
cently by HSL, are more appropriate. By setting up Upstream Gmbh as a kind of independent public start-up 
in charge of developing the digital infrastructure for other IMPs to develop, the PTA in Vienna has moved 
from a governing-by-doing approach to a governing-by-enabling one, thereby avoiding locking itself into a 
given technological state, and with a given technological partner. This is also the approach that HSL eventu-
ally started to adopt (albeit having been forced to because of national legislation), by announcing in March 
2018 the development of an online platform where both single-ticket and seasonal-ticket APIs would be 
made available (HSL, 2018). Although it does not seem to be the governing approach first adopted by PTAs 
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when confronted to the subject of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, both PTAs seem to have ul-
timately shifted towards enabling. Based on a limited number of cases, it seems that PTAs are going through 
the same stages when considering ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. 
“First they say it is not gonna happen. And then they say, ‘it is going to be a threat’; then they will 
say, ‘we want to be THE operator’ (…) only after that they will get to the strategy where they say, 
‘we will enable and let our public transport be a (…) part of the MaaS offering’.” (IH1) 
If this pattern proves true, one might expect TfL to adopt an enabling approach in the coming years, to push 
for the implementation of the more evolved steps of the transport integration ladder; that is, for IMPs or 
MaaS eventually. TfL has actually already started doing this by opening most of its data to third party devel-
opers since 2011 (Hogge, 2015) and is depicted as being the “ideal organization” to implement MaaS in Lon-
don (Kamargianni et al., 2015: 62). 
 Local governments’ roles
From the three case studies, there is no doubt that London’s local government has been the most directly 
involved. Indeed formally proposing the implementation of smart cards as a way of achieving his 2001 MTS 
vision, the mayor of London directly pushed for the development of the Oyster and later of CPCs, which is 
consistent with what Li (2018) recommended for the uptake of MaaS schemes. By continuously promoting 
and supporting smart cards as a step towards achieving policy objectives (e.g., Mayor of London, 2017),32 
the mayor of London demonstrated his political support for smart cards, safeguarding them from any possi-
ble disruptions. This governing-by-authority approach can be seen as quite effective for pushing an ICT-
supported integrated mobility scheme forward.  
However, one can understand why local governments in Helsinki and Vienna adopted different approaches 
for the development of MaaS and IMPs (enabling and laissez-faire, respectively). While there was existing 
knowledge about the benefits of smart cards33 when the mayor of London chose that solution, knowledge 
about the impact of IMP and MaaS is still very limited, which might explain the lack of clear and official polit-
ical commitment and steering from local governments for those solutions (Voß et al., 2007). In particular, 
the lack of knowledge has created a fear that MaaS and IMP might take away regular public transport users, 
which would have an impact on the sustainability of the investments made by local governments in public 
transport infrastructure (and their payback). 
“If we go in a direction [through MaaS] where the transport system is more based on shared mobility 
with smaller buses or smaller cars, there won’t be enough users for these new developments. And 
the cities have to pay for [public transport infrastructure] anyway, so that is another point of view. 
As a region, cities and state together, we have decided to invest in transport infrastructures, so of 
course we have to build our city and system so that we use them!” (IH16) 
Although it would have helped to have a clear political commitment from the Mayors (IV5), it would have 
been quite risky for the mayors of Helsinki and Vienna to publicly push and steer MaaS and IMP without 
being sure of their benefits. Once there is research available clearly demonstrating the positive impacts of 
32 For example, in the last Mayor’s Transport Strategy, Oyster and CPCs were cited as ways of reaching Policy No. 11, which aims to make the 
transport system more pleasant to use, enabling customers to enjoy comfortable, confident, safe and secure, informed, and stress-free travel 
(Mayor of London, 2017: 122). 
33 The Octopus card was launched in Hong Kong in 1997 and quickly declared a success. 
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MaaS on existing transport systems, local governments might well take an authority approach; before that, 
however, the adoption of other governing approaches seems to be more logical. 
At the end of the day, the approach adopted by the City of Helsinki seems to have been the most relevant 
vis-à-vis the development of MaaS and IMPs. By avoiding pushing too hard for MaaS (and especially pushing 
too hard HSL), the City of Helsinki adopted an enabling approach that seems to have paid off. By using tools 
such as lobbying, promotion, support, and collaboration with the private sector, the City of Helsinki, espe-
cially through Forum Virium (IH13), managed to contribute to the change of mindset of HSL, which may not 
have been the case if it had used “stronger” instruments such as the development of a vision that would 
have specifically planned the implementation of MaaS. Such approach adopted by the City of Helsinki is to 
be linked with the use of network governance and negotiations in networks in order to steer system devel-
opment (Voß et al., 2007). While some might criticize the City of Helsinki for not having done enough (IH10), 
especially vis-à-vis the single-ticket API issue, there is not much more that could have been done. It is true 
that the City of Helsinki partially owns HSL, and that HSL receives about half of its operating budget from the 
City of Helsinki. However, there is no way the City of Helsinki could have used that to leverage HSL to change 
its position. Indeed, HSL is also owned by six other cities of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area, with whom the 
City of Helsinki is known to have conflictual relations, because of its economic domination and differences in 
political views (Heinelt and Kübler, 2005); this would have presented another issue in terms of reaching a 
consensus. Therefore, except from informal negotiations between politicians and members of the HSL 
board, the use of hybrid mechanisms, for example through its innovation agency Forum Virium, through 
Helsinki Business Hub, were the only available instruments for the City of Helsinki to push MaaS forward. 
It is also not clear whether having had the city of Vienna adopt an enabling approach, while it adopted a 
laissez-faire approach, would have changed anything. It seems that, in the Austrian context, the less involved 
local governments are (in the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes), the better. From 
that perspective, having political actors not opposing the development of IMP was already perceived as a 
kind of support. 
“Knowing the Viennese politics … [laughs] you must say that it was a success having them not oppos-
ing the project (…) at the end we are in a situation where the city, because they own the utility com-
pany, can still go against them (…) not intervening in the negative sense is always kind of support.” 
(IV5) 
Ultimately, the embracement of the solution by city actors themselves is also expected to boost the uptake 
of ICT-supported integrated mobility scheme. Therefore, it seems cities would also have to adopt self-
governing approaches if they were to really push those solutions forward, leading by example (as was the 
case when every TfL employee was given an Oyster Card when it was launched in 2002). 
 
 State-owned railway companies’ roles 
 
From the three case studies, it is clear in the Vienna case that the state-owned railway company has had the 
most pro-active behavior. By clearly demonstrating its willingness to be in the driving seat for the develop-
ment of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, the ÖBB has adopted a governing-by-doing approach, 
having put the development of IMPs in jeopardy in Austria. By having a monopoly on long-distance rail tick-
eting and refusing to open those to third parties, the ÖBB has acted as the sole governing actor for the de-
velopment of IMPs at the national level. 
“We would be interested in providing ticketing, but our shareholders don’t let us provide that. In par-
ticular, the ÖBB says: ‘we provide tickets and you provide information, basta!’” (IV14) 
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Although not as strong, VR has also stated its willingness to do its own MaaS, and refused to collaborate 
with MaaS Global, slowing down the process of MaaS development in the HMA. There are two reasons why 
VR did not act as boldly as the ÖBB. Firstly, it is acknowledged that VR has not focused closely on MaaS since 
it has been using most of its resources to prepare for the rail market opening, which is supposed to happen 
in the HMA by 2024.  
“We committed that if we decrease our prices by 15 percent, HSL would be ready to postpone the 
RFB process (…) when you are decreasing prices you also have to go for cost savings (…) I guess this 
postponed our role in MaaS for a little bit, and made us not so active in the area.” (IH3) 
Compared to VR, the ÖBB seems to be under less pressure regarding rail market opening, which has allowed 
it to focus on new strategic areas, such as IMPs. The second explanation for the bolder move of ÖBB com-
pared to VR pertains to the leadership and management of the two railway undertakings. While it seems 
that the MaaS subject has not been pushed strongly by VR’s top management (as mainly focused on coping 
with rail liberalization), the position of the Austrian RU vis-à-vis IMPs was promoted heavily by ÖBB’s CEO at 
that time, who later became president of the republic of Austria. 
“Of course Mr. Kern was really one of the drivers of this initiative [iMobility]. He had good contacts 
into the start up scene so he brought a lot of people together. And this was very helpful. One of the 
main success factors of what iMobility is, what it is today, is that Mr. Kern was really supportive.” 
(IV9) 
As for local governments and public transport authorities, there is little evidence that state-owned railway 
undertakings are the best option for developing ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes by themselves, 
as it is not obvious that they have the necessary (digital) competences to do so.  
The only case where the ICT-supported integrated mobility scheme has really taken off was where no state-
owned railway company was involved (Case 1). Due to heavy liberalization and privatization in the 1980s, 
the UK rail sector is not dominated by any state-owned railway company, but is shared by a consequent 
number of private railway operators. For example in London, there are 14 train operating companies (TOCs) 
providing commuting rail services (Nisar and Prabhakar, 2018), all of which have less power than would have 
a single RU dominating the market, as it is the case in Austria and Finland. Hence, the development of smart 
cards in London was not put in jeopardy by a dominant state-owned railway undertaking. Because they had 
limited power, the TOCs adopted an approach close to governing by enabling in London, by agreeing, with 
TfL (after a long period of negotiations from 2006 to 2009) for Oyster PAYG readers to be installed at all 
National Rail stations in London (TfL, 2011). In sum, it seems that having one monopolistic RU might not be 
optimal for the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, as the RU might want to do the 
development by itself. A case (like Case 1) where there are more actors with less power might be easier.  
However, it is not certain that rail fragmentation would act in favor of ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes. Fragmentation is often associated with conflict (Vass, 2003), so it should not be assumed to be the 
answer to the monopolistic behavior of RUs when it comes to the implementation of smart cards, IMP, and 
MaaS. Furthermore, rail liberalization and privatization in the UK has led to increased transaction costs, loss-
es of economies of scale, and negative impacts on costs and safety (Wellings, 2014), which is why it might 
not be the optimal solution for pushing ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. 
 National governments’ roles
In all of the three cases of studies, national governments have been quite heavily involved in the develop-
ment of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, and all have adopted an enabling position. However, 
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they have done so in different ways, and with different intensities. From their observed behaviors, there are 
seven kinds of actions that can be understood as having had an influence in the development of smart cards, 
IMP, and MaaS. Those are the development of a vision, the promotion of the solution after its implementa-
tion, the provision of funding, the initiation of public-private collaborations, the development of specific 
legislation targeting the development of the solution, as well as some actions related to rail liberalization 
and with the creation of metropolitan entities. The positions of national governments in all those seven cat-
egories across the three case studies are compared below. 
All three national governments have proposed visions for the future of their transport systems, which is an 
integral part of steering activities (Voß et al., 2007). However, only the UK and the Finnish governments 
mentioned ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes as means of reaching their proposed visions. While 
the Austrian Ministry of Transport proposed a vision for the Austrian transport network (with the 1991 
Transport Master Plan), it failed to mention ICT-supported integrated mobility solutions as a way of reaching 
it. By defining a vision and highlighting the possibility of certain innovations to reach the vision objectives, 
the UK and Finnish national governments set the course for the development of those solutions, although 
this unfortunately did not happen in Case 2. Secondly, national governments can also set visions specifically 
for the development of ITS (which include ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes). While this happened 
in Finland and Austria with specific ITS strategies that predated the development of MaaS and IMP, the UK 
government’s ITS strategy did not precede the development of smart cards in London and thus cannot be 
seen to have had an impact on the development of Oysters and CPCs in London. The definition of an ITS 
vision, in parallel to a transport vision mentioning ITS-based solutions as a means of reaching the vision’s 
objective, appears to be an important component of the role that national governments can play in the de-
velopment of ICT-supported integrated mobility solutions. 
“Authorities should also make a decision about their own roles. What they want to do by themselves, 
and what do they want the companies to do, and communicate it with the companies! Because noth-
ing will happen if nobody knows what are their roles. When a company knows what its roles are, it is 
easier to create new services. Of course we can create new services, but if we are not sure any mon-
ey will come in, maybe we won’t create new services, because companies want to be profitable.” 
(IH8) 
Secondly, while the Finnish and the UK government openly promoted MaaS and smart cards and publically 
supported both solutions, the Austrian government has failed to do so with IMPs. This might be explained by 
the presence in Austria of an actor that does not exist in Finland and the UK, or at least is not so powerful. 
According to one of the interviewees, the Austrian federation of car drivers is immensely powerful, and the 
federal government is careful not to do anything that would go against the federation’s principles. In other 
words, the BMVIT’s lack of official support for IMPs might be explained by its unwillingness to openly sup-
port a solution that is targeting private car ownership, which is at the core of the Austrian federation of car 
drivers.  
“We have this federation of car users in Austria, which is the biggest one in the world related to the 
size of the population, and the car in Austria is something like the Holly cow. People are really sensi-
tive about their car, and owning it, and having the right to go everywhere and so on. So it is a very 
unpopular policy field if you want to restrict it in a way. Politicians are very careful with that (…) they 
just can’t make it happen because on a political level, it will be like suicide (…) If politicians do some-
thing too strongly about cars, in any case they will lose the next vote.” (IV11) 
Thirdly, only two of the three national governments provided funding for the solutions to take off. While the 
Austrian and Finnish Governments decided to provide funding for IMP and MaaS to develop, the UK Gov-
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ernment did no such thing to enable smart cards to come to life. Again, this can mainly be explained by the 
fact that the smart card technology was more mature when launched in London than when IMP and MaaS 
were developed in Vienna and Helsinki, respectively. Knowledge about the Hong Kong Octopus card was 
available for London, which was not the case for IMP and MaaS, as knowledge about the impact of such 
schemes on existing transport systems was (and still is) very limited. So, it appears that national govern-
ments funded projects where knowledge was limited in order to potentially gain more knowledge. There-
fore, investments by the Austrian and Finnish governments in IMP and MaaS can be understood as invest-
ments in so-called pilot and demonstration plants (PDP), which basically aim to generate knowledge, but 
also to establish a bridge between basic knowledge generation and industrial application (Frishammar et al., 
2015). 
One action that was undertaken by the LVM and not by the two other ministries is the development of plac-
es of exchange between the public and the private sector. The LVM did such things with, for example, the 
creation of the Transport Revolution think-thank, the definition of the ITS strategy, the Traffic-lab, etc. The 
DfT did not appear to be involved in any similar activities where it would have invited, for example, public 
transport authorities and private smart card providers. It had enhanced public–private collaboration in the 
transport sector (through NPM-led policies), but had not created places of exchange between the public and 
private sector for the development of smart cards. Similarly, the BMVIT is not acknowledged for having di-
rectly enhanced such meetings that would have brought together the different stakeholders of the IMP sce-
ne.  
Where the LVM has really made a difference with the DfT and the BMVIT is in the development of legislation 
specifically targeting the development of MaaS (first and second phase of the Finnish Transport Code), re-
quiring all transport providers to open all their data and (all) ticketing APIs to MaaS operators. The legisla-
tion is so powerful that it was categorized as governing by authority, which is something the DfT and BMVIT 
have not done at all, and is very unlikely to happen, especially for the BMVIT in Austria. One of the explana-
tions for this is that Austria is a federal country, unlike Finland and the UK, which can be classified as central-
ized states. Consequently, the Austrian central government has less “power” than the UK or Finnish govern-
ments.  
“The difference between many member states and Austria is that Austria is a federal country. The 
federal ministries are responsible for certain federal issues. And then there is a regional level. Re-
gions are quite autonomous. They have their own governments and responsibilities, and cities also 
have their own governments (…) the role of the BMVIT is to ensure that other governmental actors, 
such as the road authority, or the ÖBB, cooperate to a certain extent. They are funding programs 
that deal with integration, but the BMVIT cannot write a legal act that forces everybody to integrate. 
They can’t do it, and they don’t.” (IV12) 
As observed previously, state-owned railway undertakings are usually resistant to the development of MaaS 
and IMP, or want to do it by themselves. For the cases of Finland and Austria, national governments actually 
have a role to play in helping to avoid this bottleneck, as they basically own the national railway company. 
More importantly, national governments might use EU requirements for member states to open their inter-
nal rail market to competition in order to ultimately make national railway company understand that they 
can no longer think in terms of monopolistic behavior, as they used to do when they had a monopoly over 
rail passenger market. Without saying that national governments should entirely liberalize their rail system, 
as it might have some serious drawbacks in terms of cost and safety, it seems that central governments have 
to adopt a clearer position vis-à-vis national railway companies (IH3, 2016). It is up to national governments 
to decide whether they wish to keep protecting their railway companies from competition, and at the same 
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time reinforce their “winner takes it all” situation, or if they want to introduce competition in order to im-
prove performance of railways, which might make them understand that they must compete to gain market 
shares (even in the digital world). In Finland, for example, the opening of the rail market has been post-
poned several times and will only start to open in the early 2020s. The central Finnish government is some-
how contradicting itself by being very supportive of MaaS, and at the same time avoiding pushing rail market 
opening. Similarly, although it has already started in Austria, rail market opening is very slow, which con-
trasts with the willingness to develop IMP stated in the 2011 Austrian ITS action plan.  
“[The BMVIT] always protect [the ÖBB]. So stop protecting them, and just treat them like everybody 
else in the system. This could be a cure! (…) How they are protecting them is just wrong, especially in 
the context of MaaS, where you have to attract new customers through new partnerships.” (IV4) 
The fact that smart cards took off so well in London is largely because of the governing-by-authority ap-
proach adopted by the mayor of London and TfL. However, it is also linked with the jurisdictional level at 
which the actors having ordered their development acted; that is, the metropolitan level (Katz et al., 2003). 
Having those solutions develop at a metropolitan level was indirectly enabled by the UK central government 
that created TfL as the armed wing of the Greater London Authority, with the 1999 Greater London Act. The 
way transport in Helsinki is organized is more complex, as HSL is basically the only metropolitan authority, 
that “sits” on top of HMA cities. Consequently, HSL can be perceived as being stronger than its seven owning 
cities when it comes to transport, as the seven cities will have to agree on something to leverage the Metro-
politan Transport Authority. Therefore, it seems that the Finnish government might also have a role to play 
in strengthening metropolitan organization, perhaps not by applying a top-down legislation that would cre-
ate metropolitan governments, but by pushing for more bottom-up cooperation between cities. As Finland is 
known to be a unitary state with strong local governments, it is very unlikely that central government will 
impose the creation of metropolitan bodies (Söderström et al., 2015). The way transport is organized for the 
Viennese metropolitan region would also necessitate more involvement from the Austrian Government. 
While most of the traffic issues in Vienna are known to be linked with the amount of cars commuting from 
towns in surrounding regions (Lower Austria and Burgenland), the WL only has jurisdiction over the city of 
Vienna, and thus has no power to develop a metropolitan solution. Consequently, the WienMobil app, de-
veloped by Upstream for the Wiener Linien after SMILE, only works for the city of Vienna and does not inte-
grate transport solution that would benefit people commuting from outside Vienna. For example, it does not 
integrate public transport options of neighboring towns or the option to book commuting trains. Although 
an organization in charge of organizing transport at the metropolitan scale does exist (the VÖR), it has not 
been involved in the development of SMILE and follow-up projects, as it developed its own routing infor-
mation system, named ANachB. Therefore, it is relevant to question whether it would not make more sense 
to have the VÖR take over the digital infrastructure currently being developed by Upstream, instead of hav-
ing several platforms being developed in parallel. 
“You have to upscale IMPs from the city level to the regional level. It is important! (…) We need more 
integration at a metropolitan level, so you will see in your routing, as a customer, that a mobility so-
lution is waiting for you outside the city as well. We will need this in the future.” (IV8) 
Again, however, it is very unlikely that the Austrian Government will get more involved in metropolitan gov-
ernance as Austria is a federal state and the central government has no power in local politics. Creating an 
intermediary metropolitan government in Vienna might also be perceived as the fragmentation of power 
across multiple political institutions, which would create new barriers to tackling ‘wicked issues’ and more 
coordination needed across different sectors and levels of government (Katikireddi et al., 2016). 
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 EU authorities’ roles
By setting the vision, promoting means to reach the vision objectives, and developing directives and action 
plan to frame the development of those means, the EU has mainly acted as an enabler. From a more indirect 
perspective, although it came quite late (2016), the fourth railway package, which required member states 
to open their rail markets to competition, can be seen as potentially contributing to solve the “state-owned 
railway undertaking lock-in”. 
However, one might understand the actions of the EU directly targeting the development of ICT-supported 
integrated schemes as not being strong enough. There has been a difference of support among EU authori-
ties for the development of smart ticketing compared to the development of multimodal information sys-
tems, which together constitute the building blocks of MaaS (Li, 2018; Kamargianni et al., 2016). While the 
Commission has been quite supportive of the unfolding of multimodal information systems, most recently 
with the 2017 delegated regulation regarding the provision of EU-wide multimodal travel information ser-
vices (EC, 2017: 14), EU authorities have not yet proposed framework conditions to promote the develop-
ment and use of smart ticketing, although this was initially proposed in the 2011 White Paper (EC, 2011: 23). 
There are several actions that could be undertaken at the EU level for the development of ICT-supported 
integrated mobility schemes, such as the development of a delegated regulation requiring all transport op-
erators to open their ticketing APIs (as done in the Finnish Transport Code, for example), or the develop-
ment of standards for the interoperability of smart ticketing schemes across Europe.  
Worst practices Best practices 
Local Governments 
Laissez-faire (lack of strong and recent 
vision [City of Vienna]) 
Enabling (strong vision with clear objectives and 
proposed means to reach those [Mayor of London]; 
use of network governance [City of Helsinki]; initia-
tion of public–private interactions [City of Helsinki]) 
PTAs 
Doing (might prevent having the best 
solution [WS]) 
Authority (might prevent selection of 
the best solution [TfL]) 
Laissez-faire (put the development of 
the solution in jeopardy [HSL]) 
Enabling (let the best option emerge [Upstream and 
HSL 2.0]) 
Self-governing (have PTA staff embrace the solution 
[TfL]) 
National Governments Laissez-faire (lack of vision [BMVIT]) 
Enabling (set the vision [DfT and LVM]; provide fund-
ing [TEKES and Climate and Energy Fund]; promote 
and support the solution ex-post [DfT and LVM]) 
Authority (develop enabling framework [LVM]; ex-
ante rail sector liberalization [DfT]; top-down crea-
tion of metropolitan entities [UK Gov]) 
(State-owned) Railway-
Undertaking 
Doing (does not have the competences 
[VR and ÖBB]) 
Enabling (accept the proposed solution [TOC in Lon-
don]) 
EU authorities 
Weak enabling (lack of framework for 
integrated ticketing [EU Commission]) 
Enabling (set vision; push for rail liberalization) 
Authority (develop directives) 
Table 5.2-3: Summary of good and bad practices of public authorities for the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes 
The comparative governance analysis has shed light on the different governing approaches adopted by pu-
blic authorities in the development of smart cards, IMPs, and MaaS. However, there are still some questions 
related to the processes of development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes that remain 
unanswered. While the questions related to the reasons underlying the choice of governing approaches of 
certain actors will partially be answered via the so-called Transition analysis, it is important to underline the 
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fact that the way some public actors have acted was actually grounded in the constitutional context of each 
of the cases. Said differently, although we have been criticizing the behaviour of some actors, it is almost 
impossible they could have acted differenty, because their actions were directly shaped by the contitution of 
their own countries, that can be understood as falling under what Healey (2004) calls “external influences”. 
The behaviour of certain public actors can thus be understood as almost “natural” or “inevitable” given the 
importance of the constitutional context. For example, although this is what we would recommend, it is 
almost impossible that the central Austrian government adopts a stronger governing approach in the deve-
lopment of IMPs because Austria is a Federal country where central government has very limited power on 
states and cities. Similarly, it is quite normal that the central government in Finland proposed its highly in-
terventionist and authoritarian transport code given that Finland is one of the most centralized country in 
the world. In the same fashion, if public authorities at the local level (TfL and Mayor of London) for the case 
of smart card development in London adopted such an authority approach, it is mainly because of the auto-
nomy/rivalry of London vs. central government in the UK. 
Last but not least, the behaviour adopted by EU actors can also be understood as quite natural. It is actually 
not in the intrinsic principles of the EU to adopt a governing-by-authority approach, or even a strong govern-
ing-by-enabling approach. Indeed, EU intervention is shaped by the principles of proportionality and subsidi-
arity. Proportionality relates to the idea that EU action can only be justified if suitable and necessary to real-
ize EU goals, and if the realization of those actions does not affect other interests. Subsidiarity refers to the 
fact that EU authorities should not intervene when the power to act actually remains in the hands of mem-
ber states. Because those principles dictate EU intervention (and cannot be overcome), there might be a 
long wait to see a directive forcing member states to force transport operators to open their data, or forcing 
coercively all public transport authorities within Europe to collaborate in the development of ICT-supported 
integrated mobility schemes. The EU simply does not have the power or the ability to develop such govern-
ing mechanisms, and even if it did, “has no intention of prescribing one- size-fits-all or top-down solutions” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2009b: 3). The governing approach of EU authorities is closer to 
an approach where “member States would be free to determine where to concentrate their efforts, and what 
measures to bring into play to leverage change” (CEC, 2008b: 7) than a top-down and authoritarian ap-
proach. Hence, even though a stronger role of EU authorities might be needed, it seems unlikely to happen 
any time soon.  
5.3 Transition Analysis 
Having looked at how public authorities behaved in the development of the three ICT-supported integrated 
mobility schemes studied, one might now wonder why things developed the way they did, in order to ulti-
mately be able to make recommendations for policy makers for things to develop differently. In this section, 
the literature focusing on socio-technical transitions is used to better understand why things developed the 
way they did in the three case studies. This subchapter begins by presenting the analytical framework and 
then conducts the cross-case analysis by applying it across the three case studies. The findings of this transi-
tion analysis are summarized in Table 5.3.1. 
5.3.1 Analytical framework 
The theoretical propositions used to structure the analysis have been withdrawn from the transition litera-
ture, which is useful for analyzing the development and diffusion of potential system innovations, such as 
ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. So far, transition frameworks have been widely used to look at 
the development of new transport technologies (electric vehicles, human powered mobility solutions, auto-
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mated vehicles), but have not yet been really used to look at the development of ICT-supported integrated 
mobility schemes.34 Below are detailed the eight propositions drawn from the transition literature that con-
stitute the conceptual framework along which this transition analysis has been structured. 
As socio-technical transitions are known to be long processes (Geels, 2012), they have been divided into 
different phases (Rotmans et al., 2001). Transitions usually start with a pre-development phase, where the 
status quo is known to stay relatively constant, and where innovations develop in niches. This is followed by 
a takeoff phase, during which the state of the system begins to shift, thanks to the diffusion of niche innova-
tions into the regime layer. The takeoff phase is usually followed by the breakthrough phase, in which the 
main shifts in the regime layer occur. Finally, the pace of changes within the regime layer tends to decrease 
in what is known as the stabilization phase. Due to the novelty of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes 
(10–15 years old), it would be presumptuous to believe the studied innovations have gone through all the 
above-mentioned phases. Thus, it is pertinent to ask to which phases of the transition the three case studies 
correspond to. Therefore, the first question structuring the transition analysis will be the following:  
(1) To which phase of socio-technical transitions do the three case studies correspond to?
As mentioned in Chapter 2, and according to transition frameworks, socio-technical transitions occur as the 
interplay and interaction between three key “layers”, being the niche, the regime, and the landscape layers. 
A graphical representation of socio-technical transitions is given in Figure 5.3.1. In more detail, as summed 
up by Kemp et al. (2001: 277) “it is the alignment of developments (successful processes within the niche 
reinforced by changes at regime level and at the level of the sociotechnical landscape) which determines if a 
regime shift will occur”. The first of these three layers, which lies at the bottom of the MLP, is known as the 
niche layer, in which system innovations start their innovation journeys. Niches can be understood as incu-
bation rooms, protected from traditional market selection process (Geels, 2002). According to Schot et al. 
(1994), niches might fail if they are created as the only result of government activity, and not as a multi-actor 
process. Indeed, the only actions public authorities might decide to undertake to make a niche successful are 
the steering of their development and subsidizing (Schot and Geels, 2008), but nothing more. In particular, it 
is generally agreed that public authorities should avoid “picking winners” and should encourage participa-
tion from all stakeholders (Foxon et al., 2009) for niche innovations to penetrate the regime layer. There-
fore, it is relevant to question what role public authorities played in the process of niche creation in the dif-
ferent cases of studies. The second “framing question” structuring the analysis is the following: 
(2) Have public authorities provided both steering and funding in the process of niche devel-
opment?
Niches are known to be successful when they respect three criteria (Schot and Geels, 2008; Caniëls and Ro-
mijn, 2008). First, niches should enable learning among niche actors, via learning by doing, learning by using, 
and learning by interacting (Geels, 2002). In particular, the development of both first-order (facts, data) and 
second-order learning (that should enable the change in cognitive frames) are important for niches to be 
successful. Secondly, to be successful, niches must rely on the building of deep social networks, involving a 
wide array of stakeholders, including outsiders, and providing necessary resources (money, people, and 
expertise). Last but not least, expectations between stakeholders must be articulated in order for niches to 
succeed. It is generally agreed that niches might not be successful without the development of a common 
vision among the different involved actors. In particular, it is acknowledged that the shared expectations 
must be robust, specific, and of high quality to enable the niche to be successful. According to Schot and 
34 For a deeper description of transition frameworks, see Subchapter 2.4 
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Geels (2008), failed niche developments can often be linked to insufficient involvement of outsiders and the 
lack of second-order learning, as well as the lack of involvement of regime actors in the niche network, re-
sulting in insufficient availability of resources and institutional embedding. Those three criteria provide the 
three following framing questions: 
(3) Have social networks developed in the niches?
(4) Has the niche enabled learning processes among actors?
(5) Did a common vision exist among members involved?
The second layer of the MLP is known as the (socio-technical) regime layer, which basically bundles the rules 
(embodied in standards, skills, designs, and government regulations) for how to manufacture, utilize, and 
regulate a specific technology (Schot and Geels, 2008). More specifically, socio-technical regimes (that, bun-
dled together, form what is referred to as a “patchwork of regimes”) are known to be structured among 
seven dimensions (Geels, 2002), being the technology itself, its symbolic meaning, its supporting infrastruc-
ture, its related industry structure, its associated set of policies, the user practices associated to it, and the 
techno-scientific knowledge linked to it. Personal transportation, for example, is mostly organized around 
the automobility regime, which is structured around a specific technology (internal combustion engine), 
associated with symbolic meanings (masculinity, freedom, social success), user practices (how and why peo-
ple decide to use their cars), and supported by a dedicated infrastructure (road network, signals, parking, 
fuel infrastructure). Automobiles are also supported by a dedicated industry (OEMs) that builds on specific 
techno-scientific knowledge (for example, engine optimization) and are regulated by dedicated policies 
(road safety, environmental regulations). A second regime also structures personal transportation, known as 
the public transport regime, although this is much smaller and weaker that the dominant automobility re-
gime (Parkurst et al., 2012). Elements of established socio-technical regimes (such as automobility) are 
known to be stable because they are linked with one another, and hence contribute to reproducing the re-
gime over and over, with little hope to see changes emerge (Geels, 2002). This is because Incumbent re-
gimes are known to be subject to technological and/or institutional lock-ins (Foxon, 2002), defined as 
“mechanisms, which reinforce a certain pathway of economic, technological, industrial and institutional de-
velopment” and potentially “leading to path-dependency” (Klitkou et al., 2015: 23), thus preventing radical 
innovations from emerging. Within the regime layer, innovation is known to be incremental and to happen 
‘down the design hierarchy’ (Geels, 2002: 1272). The regime can be seen as a double-edged sword vis-à-vis 
niche innovations. On one hand, it can act as inhibitor. In general, regime actors (that is, actors that are part 
of the incumbent socio-technical regime) are reluctant to change because of sunk investments, vested inter-
ests, habits, and bureaucracy (Whitmarsh, 2012). On the other hand, the regime can act as an enabler be-
cause of its important organizational power (Rotmans et al., 2001). Therefore, it is pertinent to focus on the 
level of involvement of the regime actors in each of the three case studies, as it appears such actors should 
be involved, but not too much, for system innovations to take-off. Thus, the sixth question used to structure 
the transition analysis is the following: 
(6) How involved have regime actors been in the development of each of the ICT-supported in-
tegrated mobility schemes studied?
In order to penetrate the regime layer, system innovations need to develop through dedicated ‘windows of 
opportunity’, which can be understood as ‘cracks’ in the incumbent regime allowing regime actors to 
acknowledge the added value of niche innovations. The availability of windows of opportunity can be under-
stood as the output of external pressures originating from the third layer of the MLP, known as the land-
scape layer (Geels, 2002). This ultimate layer of the MLP, which one might also understand as the context, 
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bundles all kind of macro-trends in which socio-technical transitions are set to happen. Economic growth, 
digitalization, climate change, cultural and normative values are examples of factors that are located at the 
landscape layer and have the ability to create windows of opportunity in the regime. This leads to the sev-
enth framing question: 
(7) Did windows of opportunity exist and, if so, were they large enough to enhance the devel-
opment of the studied innovations?
Figure 5.3-1: MLP Framework (Author’s elaboration, based on Geels [2002; 2012])
Last but not least, it is acknowledged that a third kind of actor needs to be included in the governance of 
socio-technical transitions. According to Loorbach (2007), it is only by involving societal actors, along with 
governments and the private sector, that socio-technical transitions will be effective. Therefore, it is relevant 
to ask whether, in the three cases of studies, societal actors have been involved in the decision making pro-
cess, as this might explain why some potential system innovations failed to grow from the niche into the 
regime layer. The eighth and final question is: 
(8) Has civil society been involved into the development of the ICT-supported integrated mo-
bility schemes and, if so, how?
5.3.2 Cross-case analysis 
In this subchapter, the three cases studies are analyzed through the eight questions (analytical frame-
work) that have emerged from the literature on socio-technical transitions. For each of the questions, 
examples are provided as well as, where possible, illustrative quotes from interviewees.  
(1) To which phase of the transition do the three case study periods correspond?
MaaS and IMPs are relatively young solutions, for which Vienna and Helsinki were among the first cases of 
application worldwide; this was not the case of London, as other smart card solutions had already been im-
plemented elsewhere. The technological know-how of putting a MaaS or IMP solution together did not exist 
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before these two cases (Helsinki, 2011–2018; Vienna, 2012–2018), which is why it is relevant to look at both 
cases from the pre-development phase perspective, which is characterized by technological experimenta-
tions and learning in so-called niches (Schot and Geels, 2008; Loorbach and Rotmans, 2006). The case of 
London (1998–2018) is somehow to be understood differently, as the technology that supported the Oyster 
was not actually developed for the case of London specifically. The smart card technology and associated 
technological knowledge had existed for some time before the Oyster. Smart card technology was created in 
the 1970s,35 and employed in the transport sector since the late 1990s (Blythe, 2000). For example, the 
Hong-Kong-based Octopus card system, which was the first smart transport card system ever, dates back to 
1994 (Poon and Chau, 2001); that is, four years before TfL awarded the PFI to Transys to develop a smart 
ticketing scheme. Although the implementation of the Oyster in London also contributed to generating 
knowledge, it is not associated with technological knowledge development, which was carried out by specif-
ic technological suppliers outside the transportation industry, such as Sony, Mitsubishi, and Phillips (Poon 
and Chau, 2001). For the case of CPC, London is the first city worldwide to have developed such a scheme. 
Again, however, CPCs as such already existed and the implementation of CPCs in London does not go hand in 
hand with the technological development of CPCs, which have been in use for commercial transactions since 
the early 2000s (Polasik et al., 2013). The real technological innovation in the London case was enabling 
Oyster card readers to also read CPCs. This should be understood as technological integration, as technologi-
cal know-how on Oyster and CPCs both existed upfront.  
Another reason for looking at the London case from a different perspective than the Helsinki and Vienna 
cases pertains to the number of people using the solution. Oyster and CPCs are now part of Londoners’ eve-
ryday travel behavior, as they are by far the most used ticketing and payment solution for most public 
transport options in the city. In 2017, for example, Oyster and CPCs were estimated to have been used for 
about 88 percent of all travel on the London Underground (TfL, 2017b). By contrast, a relatively limited 
number of people are MaaS and IMP users in Helsinki and Vienna, respectively. The fact that the number of 
users is also a characteristic of the phase of the transition is another reason for looking at the Vienna and 
Helsinki cases from a pre-development phase perspective and looking at the London case from the takeoff 
perspective, defined as a phase where “structural change picks up momentum” (Avelino and Rotmans, 2009: 
545). Looking at the processes that led to the birth of smart cards technology – that is, looking at it from a 
pre-development phase perspective – would be interesting, especially given that there is a lack of research 
on the subject. However, it would be far beyond the scope of this study.  
For the Helsinki and Vienna cases, it is now pertinent to determine the type of niches in which MaaS and 
IMPs have evolved. According to Geels (2005b), there are two types of niches. The first are technological 
niches, in which protection is provided in the form of subsidies or strategic investments from firms, and 
where rules are unstable and the social network is precarious. The other type are market niches, which are 
more stabilized than technological niches and where it is clearer what the users really want. As MaaS and 
IMP both received public subsidies and investments from private companies in the period being looked at, it 
appears more relevant to look at the development of both ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes from 
the technological niche perspective. Both solutions are still in their infancy and quite fragile, and are subject 
to high uncertainty regarding their future. 
As the London case (take-off) does not correspond to the same phase of the transition as the Vienna and 
Helsinki cases (pre-development), some of the following questions (2, 3, 4, 5) that really look at the nuts and 
bolts of niche development processes are not relevant for the London case. Therefore, greater care has been 
given to the Vienna and Helsinki cases for those questions. 
                                                                    
35 For an early history of smart cards, see Rankl and Effing (2004). 
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(2) Have public authorities provided both steering and funding in the process of niche devel-
opment?
As seen in the governance analysis, public authorities have been closely involved in the development of IMPs 
and MaaS. However, as also mentioned earlier in this chapter, Finnish and Austrian public authorities have 
adopted quite different approaches in supporting the development of both solutions. In the Vienna case, it 
appears that public authorities mainly became involved through the provision of dedicated funding to create 
the “Viennese IMP niche”. By investing heavily in the development of the SMILE project, the BMVIT provided 
the necessary resources for SMILE to develop. The IMP scene would not be as developed if such funding had 
not occurred, as the following quotation shows.  
“Since it was a research project, the risk to make this project was not that big, and the probable ben-
efit overweighed the risk. So I guess that was one key factor (…) one enabler was also that the pro-
ject was subsidized. If we had to carry all the costs ourselves, the decision would probably have been 
another one.” (IV1) 
However, while public authorities are, in theory, expected to also steer the development of niches to max-
imize the ability of system innovations to make it to the regime layer, it seems that this did not happen for 
the case of Vienna. Steering from public authorities has been described as “weak” (IV4). It appears there 
were no policy documents establishing strong visions that would have steered the development of IMPs 
forward, which was in turn, left to the decision of the actors developing those solutions: that is, in the case 
of Vienna, the ÖBB and the Wiener Linien/Stadtwerke. 
In the Helsinki case, it seems that Finnish public authorities did more what they were expected to do than 
for the case of Austria. The LVM provided a lot of steering through multiple policy documents, such as the 
2009 and 2013 ITS strategies, the 2011 Transport Revolution report or the 2013 National Energy and Climate 
Strategy (and more recently the Finnish Transport Code). The steering from LVM is also to be directly linked 
with political leadership of the transport minister, whom is known to have somehow championed MaaS. 
“We have a fearless minister who really stands behind the whole idea of MaaS and is really, you 
know, pushing the agenda forward. She wants to see things happening (…) hell yes, she is the 
boldest transport minister ever!” (IH10) 
At the local level, the City of Helsinki also provided steering with its 2013 Helsinki City Plan Vision 2050, 
where it depicted the future of its transportation system as being quite close to the MaaS promise. In this 
document, MaaS was presented as being “part of everyday life” (City of Helsinki, 2013a: 41). However, the 
steering from the City of Helsinki has also been criticized for being weak and overly top-down and for not 
taking the user perspective into consideration enough (IH13). 
As seen above, the LVM also provided funding through its dedicated funding agency TEKES, which funded 
several MaaS-related projects and then directly invested in the first funding round of the start-up MaaS.fi. 
However, one might criticize the LVM for having done more than just steering the development of MaaS. 
Indeed, although the second phase of the Finnish Transport code served as a response to the behavior of 
public transport authorities (in particular HSL, which refused to open the seasonal-ticket API), it should still 
be categorized as a top-down policy from the national government on local transport authorities. Govern-
ments are not supposed to act as great commanders or enforce change to make socio-technical transitions 
happen (Rotmans et al., 2001); this is why the interventionist transport code can be criticized. One might 
wonder the rationale behind such top-down action from the national government. While it appears that the 
LVM believes MaaS might be used as a means of achieving transport and climate policy goals (IH10), one 
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might also understand the strong support of the national government for MaaS as a way of supporting busi-
ness creation and pushing their innovation agenda. Indeed, the Finnish Transport Code can also be under-
stood as a text that enables new businesses to come to life, which might produce positive economic benefits 
and contribute to growth, and not only enable solutions that might help reaching policy targets.  
“[MaaS] is a future perspective for business, and a sustainability perspective for mobility (…) if 
(MaaS) is not there to solve the transport problem, it is there maybe to create some business 
op-tions. Might be smarter in the end.” (IV4) 
“And then the other side of it … what comes from our current government program, that is really im-
portant for our minister, is to be driving the right type of business environments for new digital busi-
nesses.” (IH10) 
Enabling new businesses to come to life in the transport sector might be a good thing from a short-term 
economic growth point of view, but there is a risk that such new business-pushed transport solutions actual-
ly have negative consequences on transport systems (Hensher, 2017). Thus, in the steering of MaaS, the 
LVM should ensure that although Finland is a small country with relatively few traffic problems, it does not 
favor the innovation and business creation agenda over the transport and sustainability agenda, which could 
be synonymous with negative impacts on the Finnish transport system 
Government funding can sometimes result in the “funding to death” phenomenon that happens when niche 
actors have to allocate a significant part of their own funds and scarce human resources to meet govern-
ment grants (Weber et al., 1999). While this did not occur in the case of Helsinki, as TEKES only provided 
limited funding that did not heavily influenced the behavior of MaaS operators (in particular of MaaS Glob-
al), such a phenomenon may have occurred in the Vienna case. Although the ÖBB and WS were not impact-
ed by this heavy funding, as they were large organizations and regime actors, some smaller Austrian tech-
nology companies, such as Fluidtime or NTT data, that were in charge of the IT part in the SMILE project, 
may have felt “trapped” in the SMILE and faced pressure to meet the grant provided by the Climate and 
Energy Fund as well as the FFG. By heavily funding the SMILE project, Austrian public authorities may have 
actually restrained other MaaS schemes from smaller companies to come to life at the same time, which 
would have created the competition needed between MaaS providers for MaaS to ultimately penetrate in 
the regime layer (Foxon et al., 2009).  
“The project was subsidized for the main players but not for us. So we had to invest and finance our 
parts (…) we had to finance quite some things, but we would not get that much in return.” (IV10) 
While the lack of steering might be used as an argument to explain the failure of the Austrian IMP niche, and 
therefore the decisions of both project leaders to split apart after SMILE, it also appears that providing the 
right amount of funding is a difficult exercise. With too little funding, niche actors might not have sufficient 
resources to experiment, while with too much funding, the experiment might become too demanding and 
actually have negative impact for niche actors. The LVM in the Helsinki case seems to have attended to both 
its steering and funding missions. However, one must again underline the ambiguity of the strong push of 
the government for MaaS, as something potentially favoring the innovation agenda more than the sustaina-
ble transport agenda. When it comes to the London case, the local government seems to have provided 
steering, especially with the 2001 MTS, which has helped smart cards to really enter the takeoff phase. 
However, this steering did not directly target the unfolding of a smart card niche, as smart cards were al-
ready a mature technology before their implementation in London. 
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(3) Have social networks developed in the niches?
A social network can be understood as a system of interrelated actors “that are willing to invest time and 
resources in a fledgling technology, because they believe in its potential” (Verbong et al., 2008: 556). It 
seems that social networks were constituted in both technological niches in Austria and Finland. 
In Finland, the “MaaS social network” actually developed through two distinct paths. On the one hand, it 
developed thanks to actions from the national government. By initiating interactions of private actors with 
public bodies, the LVM pushed for the development of a dedicated MaaS network bringing together state 
and non-state actors. For example, by launching the Transport Revolution think tank, the LVM brought to-
gether public (HSL, municipalities) and non-state actors (ITS Finland). Similarly, by delegating the ITS strate-
gies to a steering group constituted of public (HSL) and private actors (ITS Finland), the LVM pushed for in-
teractions between public and private sectors, and thus for the development of a public–private MaaS social 
network. The development of this social network was also facilitated by the organization of some events 
bringing together public and private actors, such as the three workshops organized by TEKES focusing on 
MaaS in 2014, or the ITS Europe Congress organized in Helsinki during the summer of 2014. On the other 
hand, the development of the MaaS social network was also pushed by private actors themselves. By organ-
izing an open MaaS business meeting in December 2014, and by inviting 200 actors from the public as well 
as the private sector, MaaS Global initiated the development of the MaaS social network. This network was 
later consolidated by the creation of a company (MaaS.fi) in January 2015 with 24 of the 200 companies that 
attended in December 2014. The MaaS network appeared quite precarious at that time, as not all the actors 
were originally interested stayed in it and it was not clear what the goal of the network was, which is typical 
of social networks in technological niches (Geels and Schot, 2007). 
“You needed to create the ecosystem36 (…) creating the ecosystem takes a lot of time (…) we did not 
have any business plans (…) if you don’t have the player involved and open for this, you have nothing 
(…) Then we thought: let’s make an open call, and we formulate the world first mobility operator. 
Two hundred companies came from everywhere.” (IH1) 
One of the reasons why HSL adopted a laissez-faire approach, by refusing to open its seasonal ticket API, 
could be its lack of participation in the Finnish MaaS social network. MaaS Global could have been more 
insistent about them joining the network. Other actors, such as the City of Helsinki, could have also acted to 
make HSL join the network. If HSL had been more integrated in the Finnish MaaS network, it might have 
resulted in better collaboration with MaaS operators, and potentially avoided the single-ticket API issue. This 
is ultimately what happened with Helsinki Business Hub, which made HSL a member of their MaaS steering 
committee in 2017, in order to discuss MaaS (IH15) and potentially made mindsets evolve.  
“What I would necessarily change is how [public transport authorities] are involved. I would bring 
them in from the beginning and help them co-create, so that they don’t feel threatened.” (IH2) 
In Austria, the IMP social network seems to have mainly developed through the SMILE project. Although it 
was not opened to every stakeholder (IV2), it is thanks to the two project leaders that the SMILE consortium 
(which was comprised of about 18 different organizations) came to life. However, due to the end of the pro-
ject, the Austrian IMP network also seems to have shrunk somewhat. Some of the actors that used to inter-
act and collaborate with one another are no longer doing so. While both the ÖBB and the WS are working on 
their own IMPs, interaction between the two has been limited since the end of the SMILE project in 2015 
36 Ecosystem can be understood here as a social network employed to designate a system of actors interelated to each other and acting under 
the influence of rules. 
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(IV9). Unlike the case of Finland, the BMVIT in Austria did not play this role of “matchmaker” and of social 
network development facilitator, which can be criticized. The BMVIT helped in the creation of the network 
by funding its development, but could have also been more involved by acting as an “arranger”. 
“If the ministry had stepped inside already in the last year of the project, saying clearly that they 
wanted this collaboration to move forward, it could have helped. At least the ministry could have 
played a much stronger role.” (IV5) 
While local networks seem to have developed in Austria and Finland, it seems that both country niches con-
tributed to the emergence of a global network of actors (see Raven and Geels, 2010) interested in ICT-
supported integrated mobility schemes. For example, it is quite common to see Austrian and Finnish actors 
share the stage at certain events related to the subject (such as joint sessions with members from MaaS 
Global and Fluidtime at the 2017 World ITS Congress37). Another example is the collaboration of Finnish and 
Austrian actors. For example, in 2017, the consultancy company SITOWISE launched a MaaS-like pilot project 
in the HMA, directly collaborating with Fluidtime (IH14), which was in charge of the technical integration in 
the SMILE project. A third example is the founding of the MaaS Alliance, which aimed to bring all public and 
private actors around the world interested in playing a role into the unfolding of MaaS. 
As the London case is not analyzed through the pre-development phase, it is not relevant to look at social 
networks that developed around the smart card technology. As explained earlier, the smart card technology 
indeed developed way upfront the Oyster and CPC implementation and is therefore not “linked” with the 
London case. Although it might be interesting to look at social networks that developed in the smart card 
technological niche, this would be beyond the scope of the present research. 
(4) Has the niche enabled learning among actors?
As mentioned above, the generation of learning among niche actors is crucial for system innovations to 
evolve from the niche to the regime layer. It appears that, both for the Helsinki and Vienna cases, learning 
did develop among actors of the social network. 
For the Helsinki case, learning occurred between actors of the social network as several other similar solu-
tions have developed from actors of the MaaS social network since the “official” presentation of the MaaS 
concept at the European ITS Congress in Helsinki during the summer of 2014. In late 204, for example, the 
Finnish consulting company SITO, which was one of the 200 companies that participated in the very first 
meeting organized by ITS Finland about MaaS in December 2014, decided to start its own MaaS-related pro-
ject jointly with the City of Salo in Southwest Finland. Finally, it was with the City of Seijanoki (Southern Os-
trobothnia), that SITO developed a MaaS pilot, for which it was awarded funding from TEKES (IH8). By April 
2015, SITO had launched its KERAVA app, proposing to its users different mobility packages, very similar to 
what Whim proposed in 2017. Similarly, in 2015, the MaaS operator Tuup was founded, which also received 
financial support from TEKES and had its first ticketing product ready by the fall of 2015 for the city of Turku, 
which then won the best Finnish mobile application award at Flush 2015. The solution developed by Tuup 
can be taken as an example of knowledge spillover generated from the MaaS social network, as one of the 
advisors of Tuup in 2016 was actually the advisor of the Aalto University master’s student whose thesis fo-
cused on the development of MaaS in Helsinki, and was supervised by the City of Helsinki and the head of 
ITS Finland, Sampo Hietanen. Another example of learning that occurred through the MaaS social network is 
the decision of the Finnish Railway company to also develop its own MaaS solution, which also participated 
37 Program accessed on http://itsworldcongress2017.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ITSWC17_EventProgram_092917web.pdf, 19 June 
2018. 
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in the open MaaS meeting gathering 200 partners in December 2014 (IH3). After two successive MaaS strat-
egies, VR finally announced it was interested in developing its own MaaS product, for which it had already 
approached some potential partners, such as HSL (IH3). City Car Club, the main car sharing company in Hel-
sinki Metropolitan Area, which was also approached to participate to the Open MaaS meeting of December 
2014, also stated its wish to develop its own MaaS solution (IH11), which can also be understood as a 
knowledged spill-over from the Finnish MaaS niche. In general, learning has been cited as one of the main 
reasons for different actors to be part of the MaaS social network. 
“One of the points here is also to learn: to see how it functions, how we function, to see how we can 
be or cant be a part of it (…) we have to see if this is a good thing for us or not, and that is actually 
what we are doing here too.” (IH7) 
However, different types of learning do exist. According to Geels (2011), there are six learning dimensions, 
related to technical design, market demand and user preferences, infrastructure requirements, organiza-
tional issues and business models, policy instruments, and symbolic meanings. While the development of 
MaaS solutions by other actors of the social network correspond with learning in terms of technical design,38 
business models, and infrastructure requirements, not a lot of learning has been generated regarding sym-
bolic meanings, policy instruments, and user preferences. MaaS solutions have not been available for long 
enough to be able to generate knowledge on such dimensions. However, given the openness of the MaaS 
social network in Finland, one could expect learning to happen in those dimensions later. Especially, learning 
on policy might be generated once the Finnish Transport Code comes into force in the summer of 2018. 
In the case of Vienna, learning also developed among actors of the IMP social network, as both project lead-
ers decided to finally pursue their own directions, built on knowledge accumulated during the SMILE project. 
In particular, the SMILE project can be seen as having generated knowledge on four out of the six learning 
dimensions. First, the SMILE project is known to have enabled technical learning. Consortium members of 
the SMILE project learned about the nuts and bolts of API integration by doing it (IV1, 4), as it was something 
that had not been done before. Secondly, the SMILE project is known to have generated learning about 
business models, by demonstrating that the business model adopted by the SMILE consortium was not func-
tioning (IV3, 4), as well as about organizational issues, such as ways to build an IMP. 
“What my learning has been over the past few months: if you try to decide or build an integrated 
platform initiative top-down, it does not work. From my point of view, the most effective way is to 
build it bottom up, which means the companies which are working on that should connect and 
should build something, and once this is ready they can show it to the authorities and say ‘we have 
it already’.” (IV1) 
Third, the SMILE project can also be understood as having enabled learning about infrastructure require-
ments, specifically considering that the only infrastructure needed to enable IMP is the openness and readi-
ness of different APIs from project partners. Last but not least, learning about user preferences has been 
generated by looking at users behaviors in using the service. Indeed, 17 percent of the test users actually 
agreed to answer a survey, with 75 percent stating they were satisfied with the app. While 48 percent of the 
respondents answered that they had increased their usage of public transportation thanks to SMILE (urban 
PT 26 percent, regional PT 22 percent), 10 percent acknowledged having increased their use of bike-sharing  
38 In particular we will note the development by MaaS Global of the MaaS API platform, which is an open repository containing open docu-
ments for the development of MaaS compatible APIs by third parties. Accessible on http://maas-api.org  
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4 percent increased the usage of e-carsharing and 4 percent increased the usage of e-bikes. Twenty-one 
percent of respondents reduced their usage of private cars and 26 percent reported increased use of public 
transport in combination with their private cars. Knowledge was also generated about user preferences vis-
à-vis billing. 
“One learning from SMILE was that, for the customer itself, it is not that important to get one single 
invoice with all the listed mobility services from different mobility providers. It is more important to 
have the information in the front-end, to be able to compare services, or just to have the info about 
where is which transportation mode. That is more important.” (IV1) 
However, no knowledge was generated on policy instruments as no policy was used in the SMILE project, 
and no knowledge was gained about the symbolic meaning of IMPs as none of the survey questions covered 
this aspect. However, one might question the validity of the learning generated on user preferences. It ap-
pears that the number of test users who answered the final survey was not representative enough to gener-
ate robust learning. The results of the evaluation phase are claimed by some to be biased: 
“What we did with SMILE is discuss with the frequent users of your service afterwards to see how 
they have liked it. Because the one who disliked it, they are not even answering your questionnaire! 
So I think it is a totally biased view on those kind of services. It is good because it helps us to bring it 
to a higher level, but we don’t know if this is really working.” (IV4) 
(5) Did a common vision/shared expectation exist among the members involved?
As mentioned above, the development of social networks, the generation of learning, and the articulation of 
expectations and visions among niche actors are the three key dimensions of successful niches. In particular, 
shared expectations are known to “indicate directions for innovative activities and local projects, as they are 
translated into search heuristics” (Raven and Geels, 2010: 89). However, although the first two mechanisms 
seem to have been partially respected in the cases of IMPs development in Vienna and MaaS unfolding in 
Helsinki, it is far from being the case for the third one, which might explain the laborious development of 
ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes in both cities.  
For the Vienna case, the decision of the ÖBB and the Wiener Stadtwerke to split and pursue their own direc-
tions at the end of the SMILE project can be explained by the lack of shared expectations and vision among 
the two actors at the beginning of the project. Neither the Austrian Federal railway company nor the 
Viennese utility company agreed on what should have been the outcome of the project at the beginning, 
which ultimately led to its termination in 2015. If both (strong) players had agreed on a common vision at 
the beginning, they may have remained together after the funding of the Climate and Energy Fund and FFG 
was over: 
“There was a different understanding how it should go further (…) [the collaboration] broke up as the 
two main project leaders decided to have different strategies (…) It would have been better to have it 
sustain, having a joint project from OBB and the WS. It was ready for a full success story. It 
could have been much more successful, if the partnership was extended.” (IV2) 
As mentioned, the WS saw in IMPs the possibility to develop a semi-open digital platform that would act as 
the digital infrastructure of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes (IV3), whereas the ÖBB saw in IMP 
the opportunity to generate new revenues and increase its market share (IV9). It is likely that neither public 
company had such expectations at the beginning of the SMILE project; however, expectations evolve. Alt-
hough expectations usually change following a negative project outcome (Raven and Geels, 2010), it seems 
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that in the case of IMP in Vienna, expectations changed for the two project leaders (ÖBB and WS) despite 
the successful nature of the project. 
The development of shared expectations between public actors is ultimately linked with the steering actions 
from public authorities. Two public bodies, such as the ÖBB and WS, might have had similar expectations if a 
clear vision from public authorities had existed that would have pointed towards a common direction. As 
mentioned, public authorities in Austria have been quite weak in establishing visions for the future of 
transport and of ITS. The BMVIT has not been able to do this for the federal scale and the City of Vienna has 
not been able to do so for the local scale. Thus, if the City of Vienna and the BMVIT had established stronger 
visions, and more importantly had coordinated both visions between them, the ÖBB and the WS may have 
decided to stick together, as it would have served both the City and the federal government’s visions. Hence, 
it is worth highlighting the importance, in order to guide public companies, of governments at the local and 
national levels setting strong and precise visions (particularly for transport), and ultimately coordinating 
visions with each other. 
For the case of Helsinki, the lack of shared expectations between MaaS Global (which should be understood 
as the central node of the Finnish MaaS social network) and HSL can be used to explain the single-ticket API 
issue, which put the development of MaaS in jeopardy for a period of almost two years. On one hand, the 
main motivation of MaaS Global (being a private start-up) to develop a MaaS solution was to generate in-
come and become the leading MaaS operator worldwide. On the other hand, the main motivation of HSL 
was to make transport in Helsinki more sustainable by making people shift from private motorized travel to 
sustainable mobility modes such as public transport and cycling. Although the innovation provided by MaaS 
Global could enable sustainable transport, the only way MaaS Global is able to generate income for a medi-
um-sized city like Helsinki was to have as many users as possible in order to generate important network 
effects (Montero, 2018), which might actually create more unsustainable traffic, especially if users are incen-
tivized to use low-occupancy mobility solutions, and go against HSL’s ambition and vision (IH9). For the case 
of Helsinki, the lack of shared expectations did not emerge as a consequence of the development of MaaS, 
but was actually there from the beginning. From the very early days of MaaS, HSL and MaaS Global have had 
conflicting expectations, which is why the project could not move forward. 
“There were concerns. It was quite a new thing and we did not know how it would affect everything 
(…) we have been concerned if [MaaS] will change travel habits for people who already move in a 
sustainable way, or already use sustainable transport modes. What will it do for people that already 
use bikes and public transport? What if those people start using more car services? It has been the 
main concern the whole time.” (IH16) 
One might now wonder to which actor it would have pertained to articulate expectations between HSL (and 
public transport authorities) as well as MaaS Global (and private MaaS operators companies). It appears the 
national government has already done a lot. By developing a vision and initiating public-private interactions, 
the LVM did everything it could to steer the development of MaaS. However, one can wonder whether the 
Ministry of Transport and Communication did not do too much; that is, if it over-favored MaaS operators 
compared to public transport authorities. The LVM appeared to have very strong ties with MaaS Global, and 
one could wonder if this affected the ministry’s judgment.  
“MaaS Global has had quite tight relationships to the Finnish National Transport Agencies. 
They have had close connections and discussed deeply how things should be opened and all.” (IH16)
Other signs of close proximity between the LVM and MaaS Global could be found in recurrent joint appear-
ances of both actors at international transport events, such as at the 2017 European ITS Congress in Stras-
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bourg.39 Perhaps the most obvious sign of closeness between the ministry and MaaS operator was the deci-
sion of the person in charge of MaaS since 2014 at the LVM to quit her job and finally be hired by MaaS 
Global as an “ecosystem manager” in the spring of 2018. Again, it appears worth wondering about the true 
rationale for the LVM to have been so pushy for MaaS. On the other hand, it seems the local government 
(City of Helsinki) could have done more in terms of articulating expectations, especially being the main own-
er of HSL. If the local government had established a stronger vision for the future of its transport system 
(with strong quantitative targets related to transport), it could perhaps have influenced HSL to adopt a dif-
ferent position, as HSL would have had to act in order to reach this vision. Ultimately, visions from the na-
tional government would have had to be articulated with visions of the local government to ensure all actors 
would move in the same direction. 
(6) How involved have been regime actors into the development of each of the ICT-supported
integrated mobility scheme studied?
As mentioned, the degree of involvement of regime actors is an important element in the ability of system 
innovations to evolve from the niche to the regime layer, and ultimately provoke a regime shift. If regime 
actors are not involved, it is likely that the system innovation will not manage to penetrate the regime layer 
and will die in the niche layer. On the contrary, if regime actors are overly involved, they might encapsulate 
the potential system innovation into the incumbent regime they are part of, which might reduce its ability to 
produce a regime shift (Schot and Geels, 2008). Therefore, it is relevant to ask, for the three cases, the ex-
tent to which regime actors were involved in the diffusion of each ICT-supported integrated mobility 
scheme. 
For the case of MaaS in Helsinki, it seems that regime actors have not been involved enough, which is why 
the potential system innovation has struggled to really take off and is still in its pre-development phase. By 
not getting involved in the Helsinki MaaS niche, HSL, which must be understood as an actor of the incum-
bent public transport regime, actually acted as an inhibitor to the MaaS idea, especially by refusing to open 
its seasonal-ticket API. It is generally agreed that regime actors are usually reluctant to system innovations 
because of sunk investments and vested interests, despite the promise of niche-based product champions 
that niche innovations will solve problems in the existing regime (Geels, 2007). This is what happened to HSL 
in the development of MaaS. Despite the promise of MaaS Global that its solution would help tackle the 
automobility regime, HSL refused to collaborate because it had invested in a digital ticketing system (sunk 
investments) and was afraid to lose a direct link with its customers (vested interests) (IH9). Therefore, it 
again appears important to include regime actors quite early in order to overcome those sunk investments 
and vested interests as much as possible. 
 “Who is against this whole transformation of the transport world? Well, I think all transport authori-
ties are against it (…) what exactly will the transport authority be doing in the future? They have to 
re-invent themselves. And of course they are not so enthusiastic. They have something to lose. Of 
course they might have something to win, which might even be bigger, but to achieve that they will 
have to be very agile.” (IH4) 
For the Vienna case, it actually seems that regime actors were overly involved in the development of IMPs. 
IMPs in Vienna have been developed, and led by two important actors of the incumbent public transport 
regime, being the ÖBB and the WS. It is usually agreed that when regime actors are in the driving seat, the 
developed innovation is more incremental than radical (Geels and Schot, 2007). Thus, while IMPs are devel-
39 https://strasbourg2017.itsineurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/04067-Strasbourg-2017-preliminary-programme-20.04.17.pdf 
accessed June 4th 2018 
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oping in Vienna (with iMobility and Upstream), one can wonder about their real ability to produce a pro-
found regime shift and pave the way towards a post-car regime, as they have been driven by regime actors. 
However, according to Moradi and Vagnoni (2018), there are actually two ways to destabilize the automobil-
ity regime. While the most common way would be to have system innovations developed by newcomers 
emerge and destabilize the pillars of the automobility regime (Geels, 2012), having incremental innovations 
develop and stabilize the existing sub-regimes (such as public transport regime or non-motorized transport 
regime) might also be a way to disrupt the dominant car-based mobility regime. In the case of Vienna, IMPs 
seem to be better categorized as falling under the second pathway than the first one, and thus primarily 
target increases in PT ridership rather than decrease in car ownership (as MaaS would target).  
The case of smart cards in London is actually pretty similar to the one of Vienna. Regime actors (TfL) were 
heavily involved in the development of Oyster and CPCs. Again, smart cards for the case of London might be 
understood as incremental innovations, having been developed by regime actors, and targeting more a 
strengthening and stabilization of the public transport regime than a destabilization of the automobility 
regime. This pathway is to be directly linked with the transformation pathway of socio-technical transitions, 
in which niche-innovations have not yet been sufficiently developed, and where regime actors are actually 
leading the transition (Geels and Schot, 2007). One can now wonder if merely reinforcing the public 
transport regime will be enough to break away with the automobility regime. Three other transition path-
ways – such as the de-alignment and re-alignment path, the technological substitution path or the reconfig-
uration pathway – might be more effective.40 However, the realization of those transition pathways depends 
on the type of pressure that the landscape applies on the regime, and the resulting existence (or not) of 
windows of opportunity. I now look at the presence of windows of opportunities in the three cases of stud-
ies to better understand why things developed the way they had. 
(7) Did windows of opportunity exist and, if so, were they large enough to enhance the devel-
opment of the studied innovations? 
In order to elevate from niches and create a disruption in the regime layer, system innovations need to de-
velop through windows of opportunity, which are created due to sufficient pressure from the landscape in 
the regime layer (Geels, 2011). While some such windows existed for the London case, it appears this was 
not the case in Helsinki and Vienna, which is coherent with the fact that London is currently in the takeoff 
phase and Vienna and Helsinki are still in the predevelopment phase. In particular, it seems that while win-
dows of opportunity did not exist for the case of IMP in Vienna, there are elements pointing to their ongoing 
development for the case of MaaS in Helsinki. 
First, the regimes for the London, Vienna, and Helsinki cases did not all suffer from the same issues. For win-
dows of opportunity to develop, there must be issues in the regime that might create the space for system 
innovations to come up. In particular, not all the regimes suffered the same levels of traffic congestion, 
which is acknowledged to be a regime problem (Geels, 2005c). London, which is a far larger city than Helsin-
ki and Vienna, has much higher levels of congestion and traffic problems than the Austrian and Finnish capi-
tals (IH5), which might have influenced the greater embracement of smart cards than IMPs and MaaS were 
in both cities. Secondly, the embracement of smart cards in London might have also been influenced by a 
‘crack’ (Geels, 2012) in the London urban transportation regime, which could not be observed in Helsinki or 
                                                                    
40 According to Geels and Scot (2007), reconfiguration pathway happens when symbiotic innovations, which developed in niches, are initially 
adopted in the regime to solve local problems that later trigger further adjustments in the basic architecture of the regime. Technological 
substitution pathway occurs when there is a lot of landscape pressure and when niche innovations are mature enough. De-alignment and re-
alignment paths occur when increasing regime problems, combined with important pressure from the landscape, push regime actors to lose 
faith, leading to de-alignment and erosion of the incumbent regime. At the same time, one niche innovation emerges from the competition 
with other niche innovations, resulting in the re-alignment of a new regime. 
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Vienna. The development of a congestion charge in London in 2003 also created the need for the Oyster to 
be embraced. Indeed, by incentivizing car users to shift to more sustainable transport means, the congestion 
charge made Oyster (and later CPCs) appear as the solution that would improve travel experience. In other 
words, while the congestion charge acted as the stick, the Oyster acted as the carrot to induce modal shift 
away from private motorized travel. This goes hand in hand with Upham et al. (2013) and Abrate et al.’s 
(2009) suggestion that in order to move towards more sustainable transport systems, travel demand man-
agement policies also have to be developed more systematically, which Helsinki and Vienna should perhaps 
be considering. A third regime-based element that should be mentioned for the London case and did not 
happen in Vienna and Helsinki is the decision of the DfT to stop subsidizing TfL (FT, 2015). Fare collection 
being an important cost for transit agencies, TfL was comforted in its decision to have opted for a smart card 
system including CPCs, which are even less costly than Oyster in terms of revenue collection. However, while 
it seems (based on the London case) that having national governments stop subsidizing public transport 
authorities might have a positive impact for the embracement of ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes, this is not something that all national governments should do, as this might also have drastic con-
sequences in terms of service level and system performance. 
It appears that windows of opportunity existed in the London case because of the vision created by the 
mayor (combined with the above-mentioned cracks in the regime), which unfortunately did not exist to the 
same extent for Vienna and Helsinki. In particular, this vision was supported by clear quantitative targets 
that are acknowledged to be “a crucial element to steering because it facilitates implementation of monitor-
ing” (Voß et al., 2007: 202). The mayor of London was the only one to set strong quantitative targets to es-
tablish its vision with the 2001 MTS (15 percent traffic reduction in central London, zero growth of traffic in 
inner London, and a reduction of traffic growth by a third in outer London). The only quantitative targets 
(related to transport and close to the SMILE project) that one can find from the City of Vienna come from 
the 1990 KLIP I policy, the 2003 Transport Master Plan, or the 2003 Urban Mobility Plan, which were set at a 
time when technology for ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes was not ready, which is why they 
could not have motivated its implementation. If similar targets had been set by the City of Vienna in the 
2010s, it could have created the necessary windows of opportunity for IMPs to come forward. Similarly, 
although the City of Helsinki targeted in 2013 to be carbon-neutral by 2050 (City of Helsinki, 2013b), it did 
not create any quantitative objectives specifically targeting emission reduction in the transport sector in any 
policy documents. Thus, it seems that having local governments set quantitative targets for transport, in 
terms of CO2 reduction, or other KPI such as traffic reduction, might help creating windows of opportunity 
needed for ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes to take off.  
The definition of strong quantitative targets for the transport sector by national governments might also 
help create windows of opportunity for smart cards, IMP, and MaaS to take off. Unfortunately, such targets, 
which could have had an impact on the development of the Oyster, were not set by the DfT for the London 
case. For the case of Helsinki, the government did set targets in 2009 to have transport emissions in Finland 
reduced by 15 percent in 2020 compared to the 2005 levels (TEM, 2013). For the case of Vienna, the only 
quantitative objectives set for transport by the BMVIT date back to the 1991 Transport Master Plan, which 
targeted a 20 percent reduction of CO2 emissions for the transport sector by 2005 compared to 1998 levels. 
Again, however, no more recent targets were set by the BMVIT in the 2010s that could have pushed IMP to 
come through. 
In this field, EU actors could have also played a stronger role. Although EU authorities have been quite active 
in setting (general) carbon reduction targets, they have been quite slow to do it for the transport sector. 
Where the EU has been quite active in the reduction of GHG emission in ETS sectors (with the development 
of the EU ETS, and the 2020 climate and energy package), it took longer to establish clear targets for non-ETS 
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sectors (such as transport). It was only in 2009 that the Effort Sharing Decision came in, requiring countries 
to limit their GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors. With this decision, the UK, Finland, and Austria were all 
required to reduce their GHG emission by 16 percent by 2020 compared to 2005 levels. This decision was 
followed by the Effort Sharing Regulation in 2016, which required the UK, Austria, and Finland to reduce 
their emissions in non-ETS sectors by 37 percent, 36 percent, and 39 percent, respectively (EC, 2016). How-
ever, neither the Effort Sharing Decision nor the Effort Sharing Regulation (nor the 2011 White Paper) in-
cluded binding carbon reduction targets for the transport sector specifically. This is mainly due to the fact 
that EU climate transport policy is constrained by so-called “transport taboos”, which makes it not as bold as 
it should be. According to Gössling and Cohen (2014), it might only be through the re-thinking of neoliberal 
governance and societal structures that those taboos will be overcome, which will ultimately be needed for 
the right windows of opportunity to be created. Apart from KPIs targeting the reduction of transport-related 
CO2 emissions, the definition of other quantitative targets by national governments, such as reduction of 
average car ownership, modal share, and air quality improvement, are needed for ICT-supported integrated 
mobility schemes to penetrate the regime layer. Emission reduction in transport might be reached by the 
use of more efficient engines or non-fossil-based vehicles, which is other quantiative targets must be devel-
oped along. 
Another regime-based element that has the ability to create windows of opportunity, and pressure the re-
gime, pertains to urban design, usually carried out by local governments. As mentioned, transport integra-
tion can actually be understood as a ladder, with ICT-supported integration steps being placed “after” tradi-
tional transport integration mechanisms. A crucial step in the latter category is physical integration, which 
basically enables users to physically transfer from one mode to another. The use of urban planning to make 
this physical integration step happen is key in the process of ICT-supported integrated mobility scheme de-
velopment. What would be the point of having a smart card if people were not able to physically transfer 
from light rail to a bike-sharing scheme? Similarly, what would be the added value of a MaaS scheme if 
smart mobility providers were not able to integrate their system to the existing infrastructure? Such an ap-
proach was, for example, undertaken for quite some time by TfL in its method of planning the surrounding 
of public transport stations and stops (TfL, 2015c). It has also been adopted recently by the city of Vienna 
with its “mobility points” (City of Vienna, 2015b), albeit after the beginning of the SMILE project, which 
might be a reason why IMPs did not (yet) penetrate the regime layer. 
“Think about the urban design. Now everything goes from the idea of everybody getting from A to B 
with their own car. And that’s a really hard thing to break in urban planning (…) If a city wants to be 
good at [ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes], it needs to be pluggable to all kinds of innova-
tions. So cities need to think: ‘How do I get all possible innovations within this specific area?’” (IH1) 
The presence of windows of opportunity for ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes therefore seems to 
be dependent of the complexity of the transport system in a given city. The more ICT-supported mobility 
services that are available (carsharing, e-hailing, bike-sharing), the more complex the transport system is 
and, ultimately, the more important the need (pressure on the regime) to integrate them all together, in 
order to smoothen the travel experience and avoid redundancies. Thus, it is perhaps due to the high number 
of ICT-supported mobility services in London (compared to Vienna and Helsinki41) that TfL decided to opt for 
CPCs, which are the only payment means accepted to pay for such services. Similarly, if there were more ICT-
supported mobility services functioning in Vienna, the development of IMPs may have been quicker. The 
influence of the complexity on the emergence of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes can also be 
                                                                    
41 For example, Uber was not allowed to operate in Helsinki in recent years. However, the TNC has recently announced that it will soon be 
launching its e-hailing services in Helsinki thanks to the changes brought up by the Finnish transport code. 
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observed for the London case. Indeed, the UK rail industry is so fragmented that CPCs naturally appeared as 
a solution to bundle all TOC services together in London (all of which had their own ticketing means previ-
ously). Perhaps the reason for not having MaaS and IMP emerge (yet) can also be linked to the lack of com-
plexity or lack of institutional fragmentation of the different transport solutions within the public transport 
sub-regime. 
“We are definitively lacking lots of pieces. This would be an easier practice if there was a huge 
amount of car sharing easily accessible and easily servitized and so on (…) we are not the once that 
will do it, we need lots of new players into the field including Uber and car2go, we need variation. It 
is not enough to have public transport and Taxis.” (IH1) 
Last but not least, in the case of MaaS in Helsinki one might understand the change of mindset of HSL (re-
garding the opening of seasonal-ticket APIs) as linked with the so-called “transport digitalization momen-
tum”, which put increasing pressure on regime actors to reconsider their positions. For example, the DRT 
service provided by SITOWISE from spring 2018, that involved HSL, might be seen as a project that enhanced 
the transport digitalization momentum, having ultimately led HSL to change its position. The other MaaS-like 
projects being developed by VR, CCC, and Tuup can also be described as having pressured the incumbent 
regime actor that HSL is to adopt a new attitude. 
“The change [in PTA’s behavior] has not been a result of change in people. I used to work there, so I 
know the people there, and they have not changed. But digitalization has become a bigger and big-
ger issue every year, and there have been a lot of developments (…) so these processes have been 
important in the change of mindsets, and get [regime actors] so excited about the idea of MaaS. Dig-
italization’s enthusiasm was needed to see MaaS move forward, which eventually happened.” (IH14) 
Again, it is not one of the above-mentioned regime-based developments that will create enough pressure 
for windows of opportunity for MaaS, IMP, and smart cards to develop. But the combination of all (definition 
of a vision at the EU, national, and local levels; development of demand management policies; cracks in the 
regime with congestion; complexity and fragmentation of transport system; transport digitalization momen-
tum) might well do so. 
(8) Has civil society been involved into the development of the ICT-supported integrated mo-
bility schemes?
The involvement of societal actors is often quoted as an important criterion to make socio-technical transi-
tions successful. One way for transitions to occur is to destabilize the links between the seven pillars of the 
incumbent automobility regime. While the misalignment of some regime elements (such as technology, 
industry structure, infrastructure, policies, techno-scientific knowledge) might be less subject to citizens 
actions, changes in user practices and symbolic meanings are closely related to citizens acceptance of the 
new technology. The more involved citizens are in a system innovation development, the higher their ac-
ceptance might be and the less likely it is for unanticipated consequences to emerge (Mladenović, 2018). 
Unfortunately, it seems that in none of the three cases of studies were societal actors involved sufficiently in 
the development and diffusion of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. In Finland, it is acknowledged 
that no citizen group or network – that is, societal actors – was involved in the development of MaaS Glob-
al’s solution. Similarly, no societal actors were involved in the development of IMPs in Vienna, apart from 
SMILE app test users. 
“That would have been a good idea to also have citizen networks involved in the project develop-
ment. I kind of always wanted to do that but never had enough resources and time to do it (…) we 
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never really had a citizen network directly involved, and that would have been good to have. I just 
have not been good enough to make it happen.” (IH1) 
In London, no citizens were involved in the development of the Oyster card, which happened in a top-down 
fashion. In the development of CPCs, society seemed to have been slightly more involved. In 2011, the 
transport committee of the Greater London Assembly launched an investigation into the future of ticketing. 
It reached out to key stakeholders including TfL, ITSO, card schemes, and some London Boroughs, as well as 
the customer association Which?, and all submitted written submissions expressing their views on the future 
of ticketing in London. In particular, the consumer association raised its concerns in terms of data privacy as 
well as social exclusion that CPC could provoke (GLA, 2011). The consultation of Which? in the process of 
development of CPCs is the only citizen consultation that was performed in the three case studies. Given 
that the inclusion of citizens is crucial to harvest the full potential of system innovations, one could be skep-
tical about the ability of smart cards, IMPs, and MaaS to succeed in enhancing a regime shift.  
“Many are developing their offers in the wrong way … they first try to make the technology and then 
after that, they think about the users. But it should be the other way around. First users, what do 
they want, what do they need? Then the technology. This should be the right way.” (IH8) 
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Case 1 (London – smart cards) Case 2 (Vienna – IMP) Case 3 (Helsinki – MaaS)  
Phase of the transition? (Rotmans et al., 
2001; Avelino and Rotmans, 2009) 
Take-off phase Predevelopment phase Predevelopment phase 
Provision of steering and funding from 
Public Authorities? (Schot and Geels, 
2008; Weber et al., 1999) 
•Steering from the Mayor of London (2001 MTS)
•No funding, as smart card technology was
already a mature one when implemented in
London
•Lack of steering from national government (only the 2011 ITS
Strategy) and from local government (targets too old)
•Important funding from the Climate and Energy Fund as well
as FFG, risk of “funding to death”
•Important steering from national government (ITS strategies,
Transport Revolution report) and from local government (Helsinki
City Plan vision 2050)
•Funding from TEKES of future MaaS operators and investment of
TEKES in MaaS Global
Has social network developed in nich-
es? (Schot and Geels, 2008; Raven and 
Geels (2010) 
•Development of an IMP ecosystem through the SMILE project.
•Shrinking of the IMP social network after termination of the
SMILE project
•Development of the MaaS ecosystem by public actors (initiation of
public-private interactions by the ministry) and private actors (first 
MaaS business meeting in December 2014)
•Development of a global MaaS-IMP international social network (coordination of Fluidtime and SITOWISE in a MaaS pilot in the HMA
in 2018 facilitated by HBH; launch of international MaaS Alliance in 2015)
Has niche enabled learning? (Schot and 
Geels, 2008; Geels, 2011) 
•Development of several IMPs by players of the Finnish MaaS
ecosystem
•Learning of niche actors in terms of technical design (API
integration), infrastructure requirements (need to have public
transport seasonal ticket API open), business models (B2C or
B2B?), user preferences and behavior (SMILE survey)
•Lack of learning in terms of policy instruments (none to evalu-
ate) and symbolic meanings (in development)
•Development of several MaaS solutions by players of the Austrian
IMP ecosystem
•Learning of niche actors in terms of technical design (API integra-
tion, open MaaS API platform from MaaS Global), infrastructure
requirements (need to have public transport seasonal ticket API
open), business models (B2C or B2B?)
 •Lack of learning in terms of user preferences (in development),
policy instruments (after transport code comes into force) and
symbolic meanings (in development)
Existence of shared visions? (Schot and 
Geels, 2008; Raven and Geels, 2010; 
Voß et al., 2007) 
•Lack of shared vision between OBB and WS  
•No actor to coordinate expectations of the different stake-
holders (lack of involvement of the BMVIT in a matchmaker
role)
•Lack of shared vision between HSL and MaaS Global
•No actor to objectively coordinate expectations of the stakeholders 
(LVM seems to have favored more MaaS operators than PTAs)
Involvement of regime actors? (Geels, 
2007; Geels and Schot, 2007) 
•Smart card implementation being driven by
regime actors (TfL): low probability of IMPs
being proposed to drive a radical regime shift
• Smart cards in London: incremental innova-
tion/add-on
•Possible transition pathway: transformation
(due to the important involvement of regime
actors and insufficient pressure from landscape)
•IMP being driven by regime actors (OBB and WS): low proba-
bility of IMPs being proposed to drive a radical regime shift
•IMP in Vienna: incremental innovation/add-on 
•Possible Transition pathway: transformation (due to the
important involvement of regime actors and insufficient pres-
sure from landscape)
•MaaS being driven by niche actors (MaaS Global), but lack of
support from regime actors (HSL) because of sunk costs (develop-
ment of a new ticketing system) and vested interests (established
link with customers)
•Possible transition pathway: transformation (due to the insufficient
pressure from landscape)
Existence of windows of opportunity? 
(Geels, 2002; Geels, 2005c; Geels, 2012; 
Voß et al., 2007) 
•Existence of problems in the regime (high
traffic congestion in London)
•Existence of cracks in the regime: travel de-
•Lack of issues in the regime (congestion not high enough in
Vienna)
•Lack of quantitative targets-based vision from the City of
•Lack of issues in the regime (congestion not high enough in Helsin-
ki)
•Lack of quantitative targets-based vision from the City of Helsinki
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mand policies in place (congestion charging 
scheme; end of subsidies from DfT to TfL) 
•Strong quantitative targets-based vision from
the Mayor
•Use of urban planning to pave the way towards
an integrated transport system
•Important complexity and transport digitaliza-
tion momentum
Vienna and the BMVIT 
•Lack of complexity and lack of digital transport momentum
•Increasing complexity and increasing digital transport momentum
(SITOWISE-Fluidtime DRT project, other MaaS-like projects from VR
and CCC)
•Lack of pressure from EU level: No binding quantitative targets from EU institutions for the transport sector (in terms of carbon emission or traffic reduction, for example)
Involvement of societal actors? (Loor-
bach, 2007) 
•Limited (Which? Survey for the implemtation of
CPCs)
•Nonexistent •Nonexistent
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, three case studies have been analyzed through two distinct theoretical frameworks to an-
swer this thesis’ research question. As it appeared in the governance and the transition analyses, there is no 
single answer to this thesis’ problem statement, as different public authorities adopt different governing 
approaches when it comes to the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. However, 
there are still some general findings to be derived from the analysis of the three cases of studies. In all three 
cases, it appears that public transport authorities were quite reluctant to change or wanted to be in control 
when change happened, which resulted in their adoption of governing-by-doing, laissez-faire, or authority 
approaches. This can be explained by the fact that PTAs are incumbent regime actors and thus quite cau-
tious vis-à-vis the unfolding of disruptive innovations such as smart cards, IMP, and MaaS. 
At the national level, public authorities (central government) have all adopted a governing-by-enabling ap-
proach, with different intensities. This approach encompassed, at least partially, the development of visions 
including strong quantitative targets, the promotion of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes as means 
to reach those visions, the initiation of public-private collaborations by acting as matchmakers, the provision 
of funding and steering, and the use of network governance to make regime actors change behaviors. In one 
of the cases, central government also used governing-by-authority measures to make public transport au-
thorities shift from a governing by laissez-faire to a governing-by-enabling approach, but this is to be consid-
ered very carefully, as system innovations, to produce a regime shift, must unfold naturally and should nei-
ther be enforced, nor driven by state actors. 
In cases where such observation could be made, state-owned railway undertakings appeared to be govern-
ing by doing; that is, developing their own ICT-supported integrated mobility scheme and limiting collabora-
tions with (private) third parties. Such behavior can be explained by the fact that state-owned railway under-
takings are also actors of the incumbent regime, which have vested interests and sunk investments, afraid of 
seeing newcomers disrupt (and steal) their business. To avoid such situations, governments might learn from 
the only case where no state-owned railway undertaking was present. It seems that rail liberalization might 
be a way to avoid getting into a situation where rail companies are too powerful, and consequently avoid 
putting the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes into jeopardy. 
Surprisingly, it is local governments that had the most different governing approaches in the three case stud-
ies. While one adopted an authority approach, the second decided to let things happen, and the third to get 
involved “in the shadow”. While, again, a lack of involvement is not to be recommended, as it results in a 
lack of steering, overly strong involvement from local governments through authority measures might prove 
to be unsustainable. In order to enable ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes (and their supporting 
niches) to come to life, governing by enabling, by contributing to the creation of windows of opportunity, 
might well be the way to follow. 
Although those should not be understood as magic bullets, a list of recommendations, based on the two 
analysis presented above, and geared at policy makers interested to see ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes emerge, is presented in the next chapter. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I present recommendations, derived from the main findings of this study, for public 
authorities interested in developing ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. I also discuss the generaliza-
bility of my findings and outline the contribution of the present thesis to research. Finally, I discuss the limita-
tions of this research and propose avenues for future research. 
6.1 Findings and recommendations for policy makers 
Below is a list of 14 recommendations for public authorities interested in taking part in the emergence of 
ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes. The recommendations build on a combination of the two anal-
yses conducted with the governance and transition literatures. The recommendations target public authori-
ties that are willing to see smart cards, IMPs, and MaaS develop in order for those solutions to also succeed 
in delivering public value and to help enhance a regime shift towards a post-car system. For the rest of this 
sub-chapter, (N) refers to recommendations geared at national policy makers, (L) refers to recommenda-
tions targeting local policy makers, and (N & L) refers to recommendations that target both local and nation-
al policy makers. Those recommendations should be understood as the main contribution to this piece of 
research to practice. 
The first, and potentially most important, recommendations pertain to policy makers’ establishment of vi-
sions that include strong quantitative targets for the transport sector. As seen earlier in this thesis, it is by 
establishing those targets that public authorities will help create windows of opportunity for ICT-supported 
integrated mobility schemes to penetrate the regime layer. It is also by creating such visions that public au-
thorities will steer the development of the technological niches necessary to unfold smart cards, IMP, and 
MaaS. Ultimately, such target-based visions must be established by public authorities at the supranational, 
national/federal, and local scales. In particular, the development of quantitative traffic reduction objectives 
(as in the 2001 MTS) might be effective for framing the development of smart cards, IMPs, and MaaS. Simi-
larly, the development of transport-related emission reduction targets might help push ICT-supported inte-
grated mobility schemes forward, by creating the need for their development. For example, the recent ob-
jective of having London’s transportation system carbon-free by 2050, as proposed in the 2017 MTS, is a 
good example for other local governments to follow. Similarly, the objective of halving transport-related 
carbon emissions by 2030 compared to 2005, as fixed in the 2017 Finnish National Energy Strategy, is a good 
practice to learn from.  
1) (L & N) Establish a vision that includes strong quantitative targets for the transportation
sector both in terms of reduction of traffic and carbon emissions. Develop in parallalel objec-
tives in terms of modal share or car-ownership levels changes.
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It is also important to underline the need to articulate those visions between different public authorities 
located at different territorial scales. While central governments certainly play a role in setting general direc-
tions, it is often up to local public authorities to develop their own visions for urban transport. Thus, the 
coordination of visions between public authorities lying at different jurisdictional scales is an important point 
to consider. By articulating their visions, public authorities at the local and national/federal levels might rein-
force the creation of windows of opportunity, as well as strengthen the good development of niches. Once 
visions have been established and articulated between public authorities at different scales, policy makers 
need to propose means to reach those visions, in order to acknowledge the existence of some technological 
innovations, such as ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes and send a signal to the private sector. Do-
ing so will also contribute to the steering of the development of smart cards, IMPs, and MaaS and enable 
those solutions to come to life. Again, the 2001 MTS, where the Mayor of London specifically presented 
smart cards as a mean to reach its vision, can be quoted here as good practice to learn from. Similarly, the 
Transport and Communications Architecture 2030 and 2050 report by the LVM, which formally presents 
MaaS as a way to improve the energy efficiency of the Finnish transport system, is also worth quoting. 
2) (L & N) Coordinate visions between public authorities of different territorial scales and for-
mally present ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes as a means of reaching the vision’s
objectives.
As seen in the analysis of the three cases studies, adopting a governing-by-doing approach for the develop-
ment of smart cards, IMPs, and MaaS might not be the most relevant and effective way to move forward. 
Thus, collaborating with the private sector is relevant but requires public authorities at the national and local 
scales to become the “matchmakers” between public (transport authorities for example) and private actors 
(ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes operators). By doing so, public authorities will contribute to the 
development of the dedicated niche-related social network, and to the “correct” implementation (and use) 
of those solutions. The LVM in Finland can be seen as an example to follow at the national scale in terms of 
having initiated public–private collaborations and pushed for the development of the Finish MaaS social 
network. 
3) (L & N) Act as the matchmaker between public and private actors in order to foster public-
private collaborations; for example, by organizing events or launching transport-focused think
tanks that bring together state and non-state actors.
While governing by doing might not be the most effective way for ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes to move forward, governing by authority should also be considered very carefully. While it might 
help things happen quickly, it might also lock things in a specific state, which could be synonymous with 
negative consequences in the long term, and difficulty reaching the more advanced steps of the transport 
integration ladder later on. In the case of London, while governing by authority led to the unfolding of smart 
cards, it seems now complicated to transition from smart cards to IMPs or MaaS due to technological lock-in. 
The use of governing by authority must only be reserved to unlock situations from institutional dead-ends. 
Therefore, public authorities should, as much as possible, opt for governing by enabling, coupled with strong 
political leadership from politicians and policy makers, and use authority measures only in extreme cases. 
4) (L & N) Use governing-by-enabling measures as much as possible and only opt for govern-
ing by authority (legislation/regulation) when all other options have proved ineffective.
For solutions that are not yet mature (as was the case for MaaS and IMP), public authorities should provide 
funding in order to guarantee good development of niches and of learning among niche actors. In particular, 
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public authorities might be tempted to award funding to consortia that bring public and private actors to-
gether, as it might also be a good occasion to play matchmaker and develop a strong social network. Public 
authorities must also be careful not to overfund niches in order to avoid the “funding to death” phenome-
non, and should instead let things develop in a bottom-up fashion, not under the constraints created by the 
dependence on external funding sources. 
5) (N) For not-yet-mature ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, provide the right bal-
ance of funding so that innovations can develop in a bottom-up fashion and avoid the “fund-
ing to death” phenomenon.
As seen in the cases of MaaS in Helsinki and IMP in Vienna, public transport authorities and railway under-
takings might put the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes in jeopardy. In order to 
avoid such dead-ends, public authorities interested in seeing such schemes emerge must adopt a more co-
herent discourse vis-à-vis PTAs and RUs. On one hand, central governments must stop protecting state-
owned RU from rail market opening. By introducing competition, national governments can make RU under-
stand that they have competitors, especially in the digital world, and help push ICT-supported integrated 
mobility schemes forward. On the other hand, local governments must become more involved if PTAs refuse 
to collaborate, as they usually own those and might be able to leverage them in some ways. Having local and 
central governments clearly show political support might be a way to pressure RUs and PTAs, and ultimately 
make them shift from protectionist behavior to more collaborative behavior. 
6) (L & N) Demonstrate clear political support for ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes
(horizontal governance) and use parallel mechanisms such as rail market opening, in order to
have RUs and PTAs change from protectionist to more collaborative behaviors.
As mentioned earlier, ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes are currently more of an add-on than a 
disruptive innovation that has the potential to produce alone a regime shift towards the post-car system. 
Therefore, I recommend that public authorities, specifically at the local level, develop, in parallel, travel de-
mand policies to make smart cards, IMPs, and MaaS more successful. It is necessary to ensure that there is a 
“stick” (negative incentive) for people to embrace ICT-supported integrated mobility scheme, as was the 
case for London, when the Oyster was launched jointly with the congestion-charging scheme. Other mecha-
nisms, such as the implementation of a road charging tax (as proposed in the 2017 MTS and considered at 
some point in Finland), might also be a way to mitigate rebound effects of ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes. In particular, road charging could be integrated in MaaS and IMP packages at some point, which 
would create an even higher incentive for people used to travel with their own car to shift for more sustain-
able transport modes. 
7) (L) Develop, in parallel, travel demand policies such as congestion charging or road charg-
ing in order to incentivize people to use ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes and to
mitigate potential rebound effects.
ICT-supported mobility services (e-hailing, carsharing, etc.) can be relevant to solve the “last-mile problem” 
and have a role to play in making people move away from car ownership. However, a potential issue with 
ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes is that they favor those modes over sustainable transport modes 
such as PT, walking, and cycling. In order to avoid such unwanted situations, it is important for public author-
ities to gain access to the operation data of ICT-supported mobility service providers in order to learn how 
people are using them. There is also a need for public authorities to gain access to the data of ICT-supported 
integrated mobility scheme operators. By getting access to a MaaS operator’s operational data, public au-
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thorities might be able to obtain a much more comprehensive understanding of how citizens are moving on 
a day-to-day basis, through the mobility services they consume, and thus plan for the last steps of the 
transport integration ladder. 
8) (L&N) Develop data-sharing agreements/regulations for ICT-supported mobility service
providers and ICT-supported integrated mobility scheme providers to obtain a better under-
standing of citizens’ mobility habits.
In order for ICT-supported mobility services to complement public transport, rather than cannibalize it, it is 
important to embrace those new transport solutions, as adopting a laissez-faire approach or banning those 
solutions will not act in favor of creating an integrated transport system. In particular, and building on the 
previous recommendation, although no examples were available in the three cases of studies, the develop-
ment by local authorities of data-led regulation42 (that is, regulation relying on the opening of operation data 
by ICT-supported mobility services providers) must be considered. Once such regulations are developed, the 
integration of ICT-supported mobility solutions in smart cards, IMPs, and MaaS by ICT-supported integrated 
mobility schemes operators will help ensure those solutions improve the performance of transport systems, 
rather than worsen it.  
9) (L) Develop, in parallel, (data-driven) regulations to ensure ICT-supported mobility services
(e-hailing, carsharing, etc.) become available and complementary to sustainable transport
modes.
Throughout the analysis of the three case studies, it appeared that in order to be really effective, the devel-
opment of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes was to be considered at the metropolitan scale and 
not the local scale (cf. the Vienna case). Therefore, more bottom-up collaboration between cities of the 
same metropolitan area is necessary when it comes to the development of smart cards, IMP, and MaaS 
when no metropolitan transport authority exists. While central governments might be able to enforce the 
creation of a metropolitan body to handle this task in some centralized countries (as happened in the UK), it 
is very unlikely to happen in other administrative settings, especially in federal countries. To push for more 
metropolitan bottom-up collaboration, EU actors ultimately have a role to play; for example, through the 
strengthening of regions. 
10) (L) Collaborate with local governments of neighboring cities in order to enhance the de-
velopment of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes at the metropolitan level, and not
only at the city level.
As seen throughout this piece of work, physical infrastructure is a prerequisite for ICT-supported integrated 
mobility schemes to come to life. In particular, the presence of physical integration – that is, having 
transport modes physically connecting to one another – is a crucial element for having a flowing transport 
system and minimizing friction within it. Therefore, it appears that public authorities must also use urban 
design if they are interested in jumping on the digitally integrated transport system bandwagon. First, public 
authorities have to make sure modes are connected physically to one another. Second, they must anticipate 
the availability of space when planning transport nodes so that soon-to-come mobility services that require 
spatial components (such as station-based carsharing and bikesharing) can physically “plug in” into the exist-
ing infrastructure. 
42 See Voege (2019). 
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11) (L) Use urban planning to ensure transport modes are physically integrated to one anoth-
er, and plan transport nodes so they can physically accommodate and integrate new mobility
services.
It is worth underlining the importance for public authorities to know why they want to push smart cards, 
IMP, and MaaS forward. Such authorities must be careful when enabling those solutions that they do so not 
only to favor their innovation agenda, but also as a means to reach (sustainable) transport policy targets. 
Some of those ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes might have unanticipated consequences (espe-
cially MaaS), which is why public authorities must also be careful not to push too hard for their develop-
ment. Of course, having those solutions available and functioning for a city or a country might help increase 
its competitiveness and attractiveness, especially in a globalized economy, but this should not be the only 
driver for pushing those forward. 
12) (L & N) Consider the underlying reasons supporting a push to develop ICT-supported inte-
grated mobility schemes, and do so to push a transport and climate agenda rather than just
an innovation agenda.
The question of the business model adopted by ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes operators is an 
important and difficult one. As seen in this thesis, some business models might push operators to actually 
sell more mobility services, not less, which would actually worsen more than improve the performance of 
transportation systems. Therefore, the question for public authorities to contract one of those operators and 
subsidize it to ultimately reduce the risk of having him provide unsustainable transport service remains an 
important one. It is not clear yet whether public authorities should automatically consider this option, be-
cause not enough data is available yet on the impact of MaaS and IMP on people’s travel behavior. As soon 
as this is the case, however, it will become clearer whether public authorities should allow MaaS operators 
to compete (Finland), select one operator to work with (London), or act in a kind of PPP model where they 
fund the back-end (data platform) and regulate competition between companies interested in building their 
front-end on top of it (Vienna). 
13) (L & N) Closely monitor research into the impact of MaaS and IMP on existing transport
systems to ultimately decide which MaaS operator’s business model to support.
Last but not least, it appeared that societal actors were not involved in niches in our three case studies, 
which is an important criterion to consider for socio-technical transitions to take place. Thus, public authori-
ties should push for the inclusion of societal actors in order for the ICT-supported integrated mobility solu-
tions to be developed by the private sector to fit societal needs as much as possible. Including societal actors 
might also ultimately be a way to avoid unanticipated consequences and plan for potential rebound effects. 
14) (L & N) In order to avoid unanticipated consequences of ICT-supported integrated mobility
schemes and plan for potential rebound effects, push for the inclusion of societal actors in the
niches.
6.2 Generalizability of the findings 
Qualitative case studies are often criticized for a lack of generalizability, and the findings of the present the-
sis may face similar criticism. According to Firestone (1993), there are three models of generalizability: statis-
tical, analytical, and case-to-case generalizability. To begin, I agree that statistical generalization (that is, 
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generalization from the three cases to a larger population) is hard to obtain from the current study, but I 
ultimately join Polit and Beck (2010) for whom qualitative research does not aim at statistical generalization 
but rather to provide a rich and contextualized study of phenomena through the intensive study of particular 
cases. I then argue that the degrees of analytical and case-to-case generalizability (also called transferability) 
of this study’s findings should not be ignored. The analytic generalizability of a case study depends on the 
similarity of the results of the case(s) with an already existing theory (Yin, 2003). First, my findings proved to 
be coherent with the propositions drawn from the governance and socio-technical transition literature. It 
seems that none of my results went against the axioms of the two streams of literature used, which illus-
trates the non-negligible level of analytical generalizability of the present study.  
Second, the findings of this thesis might also be generalizable to similar cases (case-to-case generalizability). 
For example, they might be generalizable for cities that have similar contexts in terms of public transport 
availability, car-ownership levels, digitalization, and institutional frameworks. Stockholm, Copenhagen, or 
Singapore could be instances to cite here. However, the number of other cases to which this thesis’ findings 
might be generalized is very limited. Indeed, London, Vienna and Helsinki are currently among the “best” 
cities when it comes to the quality and sustainability of urban transport. For example, according to the re-
cent Arthur D. Little Urban Mobility Index 3.0,43 all three of those cities rank among the 10 most performant 
cities worldwide. The above-mentioned cities to which this thesis’ findings might be generalized also rank 
high on the same index. Therefore, it seems that the present findings might only be generalized to “already-
doing-good” cities, which could be criticized. In those cities, ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes are 
perhaps less necessary than in cities where mobility is still heavily dominated by car-based mobility modes. 
Paradoxically, however, it is only if less-performing cities manage to improve the performance of their 
transport systems that the present findings will be useful for them. Consider the example of Accra (Ghana), 
which ranks among the five worst performing cities in the Urban Mobility Index 3.0. Given Accra’s low rank-
ing, one might assume that it would need to improve more than cities ranking above it in order to improve 
its position. In other words, Accra seems to be more demanding of solutions that can make it perform better 
than cities already performing well. However, the context of Accra is too far from that of the three cases 
studies explored for this thesis’ findings to be applied. For example, there is a non-negligible part of 
transport in Africa – up to 50 percent in the poorest areas (Cervero and Golub, 2007) – that is provided in-
formally and is completely unregulated. Although IMP and MaaS could have very positive consequences on 
transportation systems in Accra, it would be necessary to tackle the informal (and thus institutional) 
transport issue before considering developing ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes there. An unregu-
lated semi-public transport system is often synonymous with different fare systems and a lack of physical 
integration, which are prerequisites for smart cards, IMP, and MaaS. Similarly, Houston, Texas ranks among 
the 10 worst performing cities in the United States. However, due to the context (urban sprawl, high car-
ownership levels), public authorities in Houston would probably be more interested in addressing other 
transport issues, such as funding of public transport infrastructure, than developing ICT-supported integrat-
ed mobility schemes. To conclude, it seems that my findings are generalizable to cities performing at least as 
well as Helsinki, Vienna, and London, which is somewhat reductionist. For cities that are not performing as 
well, there are more important things for public authorities to work on, and they should not view ICT-
supported integrated mobility schemes as a magic bullet to solve all their transport issues. ICT-supported 
integrated mobility schemes come after the basic steps of the transport integration ladder, and public au-
thorities should not forget this. 
43 http://www.adlittle.com/futuremobilitylab/assets/file/180330_Arthur_D.Little_&_UITP_Future_of_Mobility_3_study.compressed.pdf, 
accessed 3 July 2018. 
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6.3 Contribution to research 
I believe the present thesis has contributed to three important streams of literature and helped address the 
research gap presented in the literature review chapter (Chapter 2). First, by shedding light on the nuts and 
bolts of ICT-supported integrated mobility scheme development, I believe my research has contributed to 
the literature focusing on transport integration. As explained in Chapter 2, most of this literature has sought 
to understand the impact of integrated transport schemes, but not so much regarding how such solutions 
come to life and what is the underlying governance of their development. Thus, by emphasizing the role that 
public authorities play in their unfolding, I believe the present study has added to the literature on transport 
integration answers to the question of “how to get there”, while most of the earlier research has been con-
cerned with answering the question of “why get there”. The present dissertation has also contributed to the 
transport integration literature by proposing the so-called “new” transport integration ladder. While the 
transport integration ladder had already been established by transport scholars in the past, it missed the 
integration steps that had been enabled by the ICTs, which are now integrated all together in the ladder 
proposed in this thesis. Within the transport integration literature, I also believe the present research work 
has helped bring clarity to the MaaS concept. As mentioned in Chapter 2, there is a lot of confusion about 
this term, and I hope that, by having defined it as the most advanced of the ICT-supported integrated mobili-
ty schemes, I have provided some clarity to the MaaS concept. Last but not least, I believe this thesis has 
contributed to the transport integration literature by the use of qualitative case study as research strategy, 
and by the use of phenomenology as methodology. Most of the studies in the transport integration litera-
ture, and more generally in transport research, are more quantitative; however, as suggested by Lyons and 
Urry (2006), social sciences-based studies have a central role to play in transport research, which is what my 
work has sought to do. 
The second stream to which the present thesis has contributed is the transport governance literature. As 
mentioned in the literature review chapter, most of this literature has focused on the impact of specific gov-
ernance tools on the performance of transport systems. The amount of research endeavors that have sought 
to study the politics of transport policy has, to the best of my knowledge, remained limited. By having looked 
at the game of actors having supported the development of smart cards, IMPs and MaaS, I believe the pre-
sent study has helped address this research gap. Secondly, the transport governance literature has mainly 
looked at the governance of specific transport modes, or the governance of transport and climate change 
(specifically using the MLG), but not so much at the governance of intermodal transport, which is another 
reason why I believe the present research work makes a relevant contribution. Last but not least, the 
transport governance literature has not really looked at the governance of digital transport solutions, as it is 
quite new. Therefore, by focusing on the governance of transport solutions facilitated by the ICTs, I also feel 
the present thesis has helped fill this research gap. I have also contributed to the governance literature by 
integrating Etkowitz (2008) into the framework of Bulkeley and Kern (2006), which I feel lacked a dimension 
for public authorities adopting a governing-by-laissez-faire approach. I hope this “revised” governing frame-
work will be used by other scholars interested in looking at bottom-up innovation developments in urban 
infrastructure systems. I believe this thesis has also contributed to the governance literature by applying the 
governing framework to the organization of the transportation sector. Prior to this study, the (original) 
framework had only been applied to the governance of cities (and climate change) in general, and more 
recently to the governance of so-called sharing cities (van den Eijnden, 2017), but never (to the best of my 
knowledge) to a specific urban activity sector, such as transport. By using phenomenology as methodology, I 
also feel I have contributed to the transport governance literature that has hitherto been based more on 
quantitative than qualitative enquiries. 
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Finally, I believe the present thesis has also contributed to the literature focusing on socio-technical transi-
tions. Although the study of the mobility transition has been at the heart of this literature for a long time, 
only a limited number of studies have looked at the processes supporting the birth and diffusion of smart 
cards, IMP, and MaaS, which is what I have done in this study. I believe this thesis has addressed two of the 
shortcomings of the MLP framework. First, by using the transition literature to conduct a comparative analy-
sis between three cases of studies, the thesis has addressed criticisms of MLP detractors, for whom transi-
tion studies often withdraw their findings from the analysis of single cases (Geels, 2006). Secondly, by com-
paring three cases rooted in different geographical contexts (London, Vienna, and Helsinki), the thesis has 
answered the critique that transition frameworks often lack a geographical dimension (Hodson and Marvin, 
2010; Coenen et al., 2012; Whitmarsh, 2012). Although the MLP does not, as an analytical tool, pay much 
attention to the geography, it does not restrain researchers from investigating geographies (and, for exam-
ple, urban design) as important elements of socio-technical transitions, and potential contributors to the 
creation of “windows of opportunity”.  
6.4 Limitations of the research 
The first limitation of the present research pertains to the choice of methodology. Although phenomenology 
appeared as the most relevant methodology to generate a thick description of how public authorities react 
in the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes, other methodologies could have also 
been used. In particular, it would have been interesting to conduct an ethnographic study to answer this 
thesis’ research question. By being located in a PTA for a defined period of time, I might have drawn differ-
ent insights into how public authorities react to new transport solutions and to transport digitalization on a 
day-to-day basis. However, it would have been quite complicated to conduct three ethnographic case stud-
ies, which is what I would have had to do to fit my transport integration ladder framework. Conducting three 
case studies would have been synonymous with conducting three ethnographic studies of three different 
public transport authorities, which would have been quite complicated given the time and resources I had. 
Furthermore, conducting ethnographic studies usually requires speaking the language in which the re-
searcher is being “immersed”, which would have been a problem for the Vienna and Helsinki cases. Howev-
er, I believe that ethnographic studies might be something to keep in mind for future research looking at the 
governance (and politics) of smart transportation system development. 
One could criticize this research endeavor for the cases studied. As previously mentioned, this dissertation 
looked at three cases of studies that already rank well from a transport perspective. Some might say that it 
would have been interesting to take more extreme cases from more different contexts to compare, in order 
to increase case-to-case generalizability. However, as explained in the methodology chapter (Chapter 3), the 
amount of cases available to study ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes development was (and is still) 
very limited due to the novelty of the concept, which impacted the choice of cases. Still, looking at smart 
cards (Oyster and CPC) in London, IMP in Vienna, and MaaS in Helsinki seemed to be the best options at the 
time this study started, back in 2015. Some might also criticize the difference in research methods used to 
conduct the three case studies. While both desk research and interviews were used for the Vienna and Hel-
sinki cases, only desk research was employed for the London case. This could suggest a lack of triangulation, 
and therefore a lack of robustness of the qualitative inquiry for the London case compared to the Vienna and 
Helsinki cases. I agree that I could have conducted interviews for the London case study in order to be as 
systematic as I was for Vienna and Helsinki. However, one reason for conducting interviews in Vienna and 
Helsinki and not in London also pertains to the language barrier. As I do not speak either Finnish or German, 
there were many documents I found online that I could not understand by myself (as they were in one of 
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those languages). Therefore, it was necessary to conduct interviews with stakeholders of Vienna and Helsinki 
in English to access information. The London case was somewhat different as all of the online documents 
were in English. Thus, I was able to get access to much more data from documents for the London case, than 
for the Helsinki and Vienna cases, especially thanks to the research team of students that worked on the 
London case in 2015 as part of their coursework. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), researchers 
could get their case studies “checked” by experts in the subject to increase the validity. This is something I 
have done when submitting papers to conferences or journals. However, I decided not to have experts 
comment on the cases directly as I doubted their ability to “validate” research in which they have played no 
role (Sandelowski, 1998).  
6.5 Recommendations for future research 
More empirical research looking at other cases of ICT-supported integrated mobility unfolding needs to be 
conducted in order to build a more holistic understanding of the governance of development of digital inte-
grated transport. Although such research endeavors have been undertaken (e.g., Smith et al., 2018b), those 
remain marginal and only focused on a limited number of countries (Sweden, Finland, UK, and Austria). As 
MaaS operators have recently announced they will launch their services in Belgium, Singapore, and other 
countries, I hope that more researchers will undertake inquiries to understand how ICT-supported integrat-
ed mobility schemes are developing over there, hopefully using the governing framework presented in this 
thesis, and further integrating it with the MLP and other transition frameworks. Other conceptual frame-
works might also be used to look at the governance of MaaS. For example, using the Multi-level Governance 
(MLG) framework, given its problem solving capacity in complex governance contexts (Scharpf, 1997), might 
prove useful44. For researchers interested in continuing to use the MLP, and paying more attention to agency 
and politics into the overall mobility transition, the Multiactor Perspective (MaP) framework proposed by 
Avelino and Wittmayer (2016) might be also be worth trying.  
It might also be worth using game theory to analyse the behaviour of certain actors in the three cases stud-
ied in the thesis. In particular, the case of IMP development in Vienna could serve as a relevant empirical 
basis to conduct a “prisonner’s dilemma” analysis. Case n°2 can indeed be understood as a situation where 
the two principal (public) stakeholders (the ÖBB and WS) prefer to each pursue their own interests, without 
taking into account the potential utility resulting from a collaboration with the other, fitting quite well the 
prisonner’s dilemma (PD) problem definition. PD has been used quite often in the governance literature, see 
for example Héritier (2003), but has not yet been used in transport governance studies and would make a 
valuable contribution. 
The three cases studied in the present dissertation only had limited time spans (10–15 years). It would be 
interesting to look at the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes with a longer time 
span. Indeed, if MaaS really is a system innovation, it will evolve from the niche to the regime layer and alter 
the incumbent automobility regime. However, as with all socio-technical transition, this will take decades to 
happen. The innovation journey of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes will ultimately have to be 
studied by (transition) scholars in 20 to 30 years from now to understand how those solutions succeeded (or 
failed) in changing the mobility regime as it is currently. In particular, studying their development on longer 
time period should also enable researchers to validate (or not) the place of ICT-supported integrated mobili-
44 For that reason Prof. Finger and myselft realized an MLG analysis of the Helsinki case study in a dedicated publication, see Audouin and 
Finger (2018a), which has been published in the MaaS special issue of the Journal of Transportation Research in Business and Management 
(RTBM).  
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ty schemes in the overall transport integration ladder, to understand if smart cards, IMPs and MaaS are a 
gateway to more advanced integration steps, such as integrated transport and land use and ultimately inte-
grated transport policy. 
The analysis of the case studies was conducted using two different conceptual frameworks, one drawn from 
the governance literature and the other from the socio-technical transition literature. Having used both 
literatures, this thesis has partially answered the call of academics to combine both approaches (Hoffmann 
et al., 2017); this has been done in parallel, whereas it would have been interesting to come up with a 
framework combining both approaches upfront and analyze the cases comparatively with it. Therefore, I 
suggest that more theoretical research should be conducted to ultimately come up with a comprehensive 
framework combining both approaches, which could be used not only to look at the development of bot-
tom-up innovations in the transport sector, but also in other urban utility sectors such as energy, water, 
waste or postal services. 
In all of the three cases studies explored in this dissertation, public transport authorities and railway under-
takings were either reluctant to engage with companies proposing ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes, or wanted to do everything by themselves, which is ultimately to be linked with their concerns 
about seeing their brands fade away or become less powerful. Marketing research has demonstrated that 
brand equity is positively correlated with the firm performance (Aakers, 1996). PTA’s brand equity is directly 
linked with transit identity, which is known to be a function of vehicles, infrastructure (shelters and stations), 
and so-called collateral material (Hess and Bitterman, 2008). By not engaging in the development of ICT-
supported integrated mobility schemes, PTAs seem to believe they are losing an opportunity to develop 
collateral material – that is, to increase their brand equity – and thus to ultimately increase their perfor-
mance. However, the link between brand equity and PTA and RU’s performance has not yet been clearly 
established. While research has demonstrated the positive correlation of the two elements for product in-
dustries, as well as for some service industries, such as the hotel and fast-food industries (Kim and Kim, 
2005) or telecommunications, payment, and internet services (Chang and Liu, 2009), it has not yet done so 
for the transit industry. Thus, I believe that research should be carried out to explore the link between brand 
equity of PTAs and RUs and their performance. If findings indicate that the performance of PTAs and RUs is 
not correlated with their brand equity, it might be easier to make them understand that being in the driving 
seat for the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes development may not be worth it.  
This thesis was written based on the assumption that ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes are benefi-
cial for transport systems. However, there is an increasingly growing body of literature that has been criticiz-
ing this assumption. Indeed, several leading academics have recently questioned the capacity of private-
sector provided MaaS to efficiently tackle traffic congestion and improve transportation systems perfor-
mance (Pangbourne et al., 2018; Hensher, 2018). Additional research must be conducted to better under-
stand the underlying business models (e.g., Sarasini et al., 2016), and their impact of such schemes on exist-
ing transport systems. Research must also look at the impact of those schemes on users’ behaviors (rebound 
effects). Building on Geels (2012: 479), it remains to be seen whether ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes really deliver efficiency improvement or are just “temporary measures that delay gridlock for an-
other 10 years or so”. 
Practice theory also seems to be worth using to ultimately look at the diffusion and acceptance of ICT-
supported integrated mobility schemes. Practice theory offers ways of “understanding human action, and its 
relation with social order and change” (Watson, 2012: 489) and has been used increasingly in transport re-
search. For example, it has been employed to look at car dependent practices (Mattioli et al., 2016), as a lens 
to understand domestication of electric vehicles (Ryghaug and Toftaker, 2014), and to analyze the practice 
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of utility cycling (Spotswood et al., 2015). Faivre d’Arcier and Lecler (2018) have also used it to look at the 
uptake of carsharing. However, to the best of my knowledge it has not yet been used to look at the domesti-
cation of smart cards, IMP, and MaaS. Thus I believe that using theories of practice to look at the uptake of 
ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes might be relevant for future research. 
Some more quantitative studies studying the impact on travel behavior of ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes have already been conducted using survey methods; see, for example, Sochor et al. (2016). Howev-
er, studies looking at the behavior change of smart cards, IMP, and MaaS users should be conducted using 
data taken directly from the companies operating such schemes. Using surveys always involves a risk of not 
capturing all the behaviors, which is why using anonymized data from Upstream or MaaS Global, for exam-
ple, might be more relevant in the future. This will ultimately depend on the willingness of those companies 
to share operational data with researchers. While Oyster data are partially available for study thanks to TfL, 
this does not seem to yet be the case for MaaS and IMP schemes. Given the likeliness of being confronted to 
a lack of data available of how are people using smart cards, IMP, and MaaS, simulation studies that use, for 
example, agent-based modeling, should be carried out on the subject. Similarly, more research focusing on 
the impact of smart cards on existing urban transportation systems is required. Although most of the re-
search to date has demonstrated a positive impact on PT ridership, cost reduction for the PTA, it is hard to 
isolate the effects that smart cards had on other factors such as economic growth and PT infrastructure de-
velopment. Therefore, it might be worth trying to use randomized control experiments, which might enable 
to better isolate variables and draw new conclusions on the real impacts of such schemes when not com-
bined with other transport-related measures. 
6.6 Concluding remarks 
Throughout this thesis, I have tried to provide rich and thick descriptions of how ICT-supported integrated 
mobility schemes come to life, in order to understand the role that public authorities play in their develop-
ment. I hope that my recommendations, despite their limitations, will be useful for city and central govern-
ments that are keen to see smart cards, IMPs, and MaaS develop on their territories and wish to make the 
most out of those solutions from a public policy perspective. In other words, I hope my recommendations 
will help policy makers align smart transport solutions (as ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes) with 
the sustainable mobility paradigm. 
Given that ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes are still in their infancy (especially for IMPs and MaaS 
that are less than five years old), and the center of much attention from scholars and practitioners, I am very 
much looking forward to the future. In particular, I look forward to results showcasing the impact of those 
schemes on existing transport systems. I am also excited about the unfolding of automated mobility services 
in the coming years, as this will be a game-changer in terms of how people move within cities. Self-driving 
vehicles will change urban mobility landscapes dramatically, which is why robust ICT-supported integrated 
mobility schemes need to be in place as soon as possible, in order to minimize the SDV disruption and make 
the most out of it. Given the time needed for public authorities to react to disruption in the transport sector, 
there is a need to act quickly, as automated mobility services will soon be burgeoning in cities around the 
world – I am talking about years, and not decades as some detractors might be suggesting. 
This thesis has been an incredible ride for me, where I have learnt deeply about a variety of subjects includ-
ing urban mobility, governance, and innovation management. As I have observed in this piece of research, 
the cross-fertilization of those three subjects is a very promising and emerging field to which I hope I have 
contributed. However, it is now time for me to try and put into practice everything I have observed through 
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this research endeavor. I now wish to put the knowledge acquired through this dissertation to good use by 
working for a stakeholder looking at ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes in order to help it harness-
ing the full potential of those innovations. While there is of course an urgent need for more research to be 
conducted on the above-mentioned subject, I also believe that moves of scholars from academia to practice 
are needed to pave the way from automobility towards more sustainable transport systems. 
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Frishammar, J., Söderholm, P., Bäckström, K., Hellsmark, H. & Ylinenpää, H. (2015). The role of pilot and demonstration plants in technological de-
velopment: synthesis and directions for future research, Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 27(1), 1-18. 
Frost and Sullivan (2015). Car Sharing in London, Vision 2020, http://dru-cdn.zipcar.com/sites/default/files/pdfs/car-sharing_in_london_-
_vision_2020_-_final.pdf?_ga=1.26641598.260003760.1400514471, accessed 3 February 2017. 
Galland, S., Knapen, L., Gaud, N., Janssens, D., Lamotte, O., Koukam, A., & Wets, G. (2014). Multi -agent simulation of individual mobility behavior 
in carpooling. Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies 45, 83-98.  
Gannon, M. (2005). Funding London’s underground investment program, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110725155616/http://www.ciltuk.org.uk/download_files/ltfapr06underground.pdf, accessed 26 January 2017. 
Garcia, F., de Koning Gans, G., & Verdult, R.  (2012). Tutorial: Proxmark, the Swiss Army Knife for Technical Report for RFIDSec 2012 Tutorial, Rad-
boud University Nijmegen. 
Garton-Grimwood (2016) UK Fifth Carbon Budget, House of Commons Library, researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP -7555/CBP-
7555.pdf, accessed 27 January 2017. 
Geels, F. W. (2002). Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: a multi-level perspective and a case-study. Research poli-
cy, 31(8), 1257-1274. 
Geels, F. W. (2004). From sectoral systems of innovation to socio-technical systems: Insights about dynamics and change from sociology and insti-
tutional theory. Research policy, 33(6), 897-920.  
Geels, F. W. (2005). The dynamics of transitions in socio-technical systems: A multi-level analysis of the transition pathway from horse-drawn car-
riages to automobiles (1860–1930), Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 17(4), 445-476.  
Geels, F. W. (2005b). Technological transitions and system innovations: a co-evolutionary and socio-technical analysis. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Geels, F. W. (2005c). Processes and patterns in transitions and system innovations: refining the co-evolutionary multi-level perspective. Techno-
logical forecasting and social change, 72(6), 681-696. 
Geels, F. W. (2007). Transformations of large technical systems: A multilevel analysis of the Dutch highway system (1950-2000). Science, Technol-
ogy, & Human Values, 32(2), 123-149. 
Geels, F. W. (2011). The multilevel perspective on sustainability transitions: Responses to seven criticisms. Environmental innovation and societal 
transitions, 1(1), 24-40. 
Geels, F. W. (2012). A socio-technical analysis of low-carbon transitions: introducing the multi-level perspective into transport studies. Journal of 
Transport Geography, 24, 471-482. 
Geels, F. W., & Schot, J. (2007). Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways. Research policy, 36(3), 399-417. 
Geels, F. W., Kemp, R., Dudley, G. & Lyons, G. (2012). Automobility in Transition? A Socio-Technical Analysis of Sustainable Transport, Routledge. 
Geels, F.W. (2006). Major system change through stepwise reconfiguration: a multi- level analysis of the transformation of American factory pro-
duction (1850– 1930). Technology in Society, 28 (4), 445–476. 
Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures: selected essays. New York: Basic Books.  
Geis, I., & Schulz, W. H. (2016). Incentivizing Modal Change: Exploring Effect of Multimodal Information and Ticketing Systems for Medium and 
Long Distances in Europe. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, (2565), 1-7. 
Genus, A., & Coles, A. M. (2008). Rethinking the multi-level perspective of technological transitions. Research policy, 37(9), 1436-1445. 
Giesecke, R., Surakka, T., & Hakonen, M. (2016). Conceptualising Mobility as a Service: A User Centric View on Key Issues of Mobility Services. 
Eleventh International Conference on Ecologial Vehicles and Renewable Energies (EVER) 
Gil, A., Calado, H., & Bentz, J. (2011). Public participation in municipal transport planning processes – the case of the sustainable mobility plan of 
Ponta Delgada , Azores , Portugal. Journal of Transport Geography, 19(6), 1309–1319. 
Givoni, M., & Banister, D. (2010). The need for integration in transport policy and practice in (Eds) M. Givoni, D. Banister,  Integrated Transport 
from Policy to Practice, Routledge. 
Givoni, M., & Rietveld. P. (2007). The access journal to the railway station and its role in passengers’ satisfaction with rail travel. Transport Policy 
14: 357-365. 
  240 
GLA (2001) The Mayor’s Transport Strategy highlights, http://plangate.no/areal-transport/london/Transport%20for%20London%20-
%20transport%20strategy%202001%20-%20highlights2.pdf, accessed 27 January 2017. 
GLA (2011). Written submissions received for the Transport Committee’s investigation into the future of ticketing, 
https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla_migrate_files_destination/Evidence%20for%20Future%20of%20Ticketing.pdf, accessed 20 
June 2018. 
GLA (2015). Historical population 1939-2015, https://data.london.gov.uk/dataset/population-change-1939-2015, accessed 16 February 2017. 
Goldman, T., & Gorham, R. (2006). Sustainable urban transport: Four innovative directions. Technology in society, 28(1), 261-273. 
Golub, A., Balassiano, R., Araújo, A., & Ferreira, E. (2009). Regulation of the informal transport sector in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: welfare impacts and 
policy analysis. Transportation, 36(5), 601-616. 
Gössling, S., & Cohen, S. (2014). Why sustainable transport policies will fail: EU climate policy in the light of transport taboos. Journal of Transport 
Geography, 39, 197-207. 
Grabe, W. (1988). English information management and technology transfer: A rationale for English as an international languag e. World Englishes, 
7, 63–72. 
Gray, D. E. (2009). Doing research in the real world (2nd edition). London: Sage. 
Greater London Authority Act (1999). http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/29/pdfs/ukpga_19990029_en.pdf, accessed 31 January 2017. 
Green, R. (1991). Reshaping the CEGB: Electricity privatization in the UK. Utilities Policy, 1(3), 245-254. 
Groot, T., & Budding, T. (2008). New public management's current issues and future prospects. Financial Accountability & Management, 24(1), 1-
13. 
Grotenhuis, J. W., Wiegmans, B. W., & Rietveld, P. (2007). The desired quality of integrated multimodal travel information in  public transport: Cus-
tomer needs for time and effort savings. Transport Policy, 14(1), 27-38. 
Guba, E. G. (1981). Criteria for assessing the trustworthiness of naturalistic inquiries, Educational Communication and Technology Journal, 29, 75–
91. 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research, In N. K. Denzin, & y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative re-
search (pp. 105-117). London: Sage. 
Guba, E.G. & Lincoln, Y.S. (1989). Fourth Generation Evaluation. Newbury park, CA: Sage.  
Guest, G, Bunce, A., & Johnson, L. (2006). How many interviews are enough? An experiment with data saturation and variability. Field Methods, 
18(1), 59-82 
Guihaire, V., & Hao, J. K. (2008). Transit network design and scheduling: A global review. Transportation Research Part A: Po licy and Practice, 
42(10), 1251-1273. 
Gummesson, E. (1991). Qualitative Research in Management. Qualitative Methods in Management Research. London: Sage. 
Haila, A., & Le Gales, P. (2005). The coming age of Metropolitan Governance in Helsinki? In H. Heinelt, D. Kubler (Eds) Metropolitan Governance, 
capacity, democracy and the dynamics of place (pp. 117–132), Routledge. 
Halvorsen, T., Hauknes, J., Miles, I., & Røste, R. (2005). On the differences between public and private innovation. Publin R esearch Report, Publin 
Report No. D9. 
Hamekoski, K., Sihto. S. (1996) Transportation System 2020 and air quality in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area, Finland, Transactions on the built En-
vironment, 23. 
Hansen, C. J. (2006). Urban transport , the environment and deliberative governance : the role of interdependence and trust. Journal of Environ-
mental Policy & Planning, 8(2), 159–179. 
Harding, S., Kandlikar, M., & Gulati, S. (2016). Taxi apps, regulation, and the market for taxi journeys. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and 
Practice, 88, 15-25. 
Harris, S. (2011) A brief History of London Transport, 
http://www.railnews.co.uk/content/documents/A%20brief%20history%20LT%20Chap%201%20v1%20FULL.pdf, accessed 27 January 2017. 
Harrison, N.E. (2006). Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm. State University of New York Press.  
Hart, O. (2003). Incomplete contracts and public ownership: Remarks, and an application to public-private partnerships. The E conomic Journal, 
113, C69-C76. 
Haveri, A., & Airaksinen, J. (2007). Inter municipal cooperation in Finland: old traditions and new promises in R. Hulst and A. van Montfort (eds) In-
ter-municipal cooperation in Europe. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Head, B., & Alford, J. (2008). Wicked Problems: The Implications for Public Management, Panel on Public Management in Practice International 
Research Society for Public Management 12th Annual Conference 26-28 March 2008, Brisbane, Australia. 
Healey, P. (2004). Creativity and urban governance. Policy studies, 25(2), 87-102. 
Hebbert, M. (2012). Megaproject as keyhole surgery: London Crossrail. Built Environment, 38(1), 89-102. 
Heikkilä, S. (2014). Mobility as a service, a proposal for Action for the Public Administration, Case Helsinki, Master Thesis, Aalto University School 
of Engineering. 
Hekkert, M. P., Suurs, R. A., Negro, S. O., Kuhlmann, S., & Smits, R. E. (2007). Functions of innovation systems: A new approach for analysing tech-
nological change. Technological forecasting and social change, 74(4), 413-432. 
Helsinki Region (2015). Facts about the Heslinki Region, http://www.helsinkiregion.fi/www/HS/en/city-information/, accessed 8 November 2016. 
Helsinki Time (2014). The future resident of Helsinki will not own a car, http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/11062-the-
future-resident-of-helsinki-will-not-own-a-car.html, accessed 4 December 2016. 
Helsinki-Uusimaa Regional Council  (2016). Helsinki Uusimaa-Region in figures, http://www.uudenmaanliitto.fi/files/18339/Helsinki-
Uusimaa_Region_in_Figures_2016.pdf, accessed 8 November 2016. 
  241 
Henry, N. (1987). The Emergence of Public Administration as a Field of Study. In R.C. Chandler (ed.) A Centennial History of the American Adminis-
trative State. New York: The Free Press. 
Hensher, D. A. (1991). Competition Ownership of Bus and Coach Services. Taylor & Francis.  
Hensher, D. A. (2017). Future bus transport contracts under a mobility as a service (MaaS) regime in the digital age: Are they likely to change? 
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 98, 86-96. 
Hensher, D. A., & Reyes, A. J. (2000). Trip chaining as a barrier to the propensity to use public transport. Transportation, 27(4), 341-361. 
Hensher, D. A., & Stanley, J. (2010). Contracting regimes for bus services: What have we learnt after 20 years?. Research in Transportation Eco-
nomics, 29(1), 140-144. 
Hensher, D. A., & Wallis, I. P. (2005). Competitive tendering as a contracting mechanism for subsidising transport: the bus experience. Journal of 
Transport Economics and Policy (JTEP), 39(3), 295-322. 
Héritier, A. (2003). New modes of governance in Europe: increasing political capacity and policy effectiveness. In T. Borzel and R. Cichowshi (Eds) 
The state of the European Union, pp. 105-126, Oxford University Press. 
Hermann, C. (2006). Liberalisation, privatisation and regulation in the Austrian local public transport sector, Austrian Country Report, Forschungs- 
und Beratungsstelle Arbeitswelt (FORBA), Wien. 
Hernandez, S., Monzon, A., & de Oña, R. (2016). Urban transport interchanges: A methodology for evaluating perceived quality.  Transportation 
Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 84, 31-43. 
Herranen, T. (1988). Hevosomnibusseista metroon - Sata vuotta Helsingin joukkoliikennettä. Helsingin kaupungin liikennelaitos. 
Hess, D. B., & Bitterman, A. (2008). Bus rapid transit identity: An overview of current “branding” practice. Journal of public transportation, 11(2), 
19-42. 
Hey, K. (2009). Regulating London's Bus Services 1919–1924: A Reappraisal, The London Journal, 34(1), 17-32. 
Hidalgo, D. (2009). Citywide transit integration in a large city: The Interligado system of Sao Paulo, Brazil. Transportation Research Record: Journal 
of the Transportation Research Board, (2114), 19-27. 
Hietanen, S. (2014). Mobility as a Service’ – the new transport model? Eurotransport, 12(2), 2-4 
Hillman, K. M., & Sandén, B. A. (2008). Exploring technology paths: the development of alternative transport fuels in Sweden 2007–2020. Techno-
logical Forecasting and Social Change, 75(8), 1279-1302. 
Hillman, K., Nilsson, M., Rickne, A., & Magnusson, T. (2011). Fostering sustainable technologies: a framework for analysing the governance of in-
novation systems. Science and Public Policy, 38(5), 403-415. 
Hine, J., & Scott, J. (2000). Seamless, accessible travel: users’ views of the public transport journey and interchange. Transport Policy, 7, 217–226. 
Hirsch, L., Jordan, J., Hickey, R., & Cravo, V. (2000). Effects of fare incentives on New York City transit ridership. Transportation Research Record: 
Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 1735, 147-157. 
Hodge, G., & Greve, C. (2010). Public-Private Partnerships: Governance Scheme or Language Game? Australian Journal of Public Administration, 
69(s1), s8-s22. 
Hodson, M., & Marvin, S. (2010). Can cities shape socio-technical transitions and how would we know if they were?. Research policy, 39(4), 477-
485. 
Hodson, M., Marvin, S., Robinson, B., & Swilling, M. (2012). Reshaping Urban Infrastructure. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 16(6), 789-800 
Hoffmann, S., Weyer, J. & Longen, I. (2017). Discontinuation of the automobility regime? An integrated approach to multilevel governance. Trans-
portation Research part A: policy and practice, 103, 391-408. 
Hofling, K. (2010). Expansion of the Vienna subway. Vienna, Austria: Wiener Linien. 
Hogge, B. (2015) Open Data, Six stories about impact in the UK, Omidyar Network, 
https://www.omidyar.com/sites/default/files/file_archive/insights/Open%20Data_Six%20Stories%20About%20Impact%20in%20the%20UK/Open
Data_CaseStudies_Report_complete_DIGITAL_102715.pdf, accessed 25 January 2017. 
Holmberg, P., Collado, M., Sarasini, S., & Williander, M. (2016). Mobility as a service – MaaS: Describing the framework, Viktoria Swedish ICT. 
Hommels, A. (2005). Studying obduracy in the city: Toward a productive fusion between technology studies and urban studies, Science, Technolo-
gy, & Human Values, 30(3), 323–351. 
Hood, C. (1991). A public management for all seasons?. Public administration, 69(1), 3-19. 
Hooghe, L., Marks, G. (2003). Unraveling the central state, but how? Types of multi-level governance. American political science review 97(2), 233-
243. 
Hoogma, R., Kemp R., Schot, J., & Truffer, B. (2002). Experimenting for Sustainable Transport. The Approach of Strategic Niche Management. Lon-
don and New York: Spon Press. 
House of Commons (2015). The UK Constitution, a summary with options for reform, https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
committees/political-and-constitutional-reform/The-UK-Constitution.pdf, accessed 13 February 2017. 
Hseuh-Bruni, A. (2015). Le Corbusier’s Fatal Flaws – A Critique of Modernism. Trinity College Digital  Repository, Hartford, CT.  
HSL (2012). Annual Report, https://www.hsl.fi/sites/default/files/uploads/hsl_vuosikertomus_2012_en_www.pdf, accessed 1 December 2016. 
HSL (2014a). Funding methods for public transport infrastructure in large Nordic urban regions, Presentation done on October 20th 2014 
HSL (2014b). HSL and Finnish Transport Agency developing a journey planner for Finland, https://www.hsl.fi/en/news/2014/hsl-and-finnish-
transport-agency-developing-journey-planner-finland-5843, accessed 19 January 2017. 
HSL (2014c). Transport System Planning in the Heslinki Region, http://www3.amb.cat/repositori/PMMU/20150128/1-HELSINKI%20-
%20Tuire%20Valkonen%20Transport%20System%20Plan%2027.1.2015.pdf, accessed 9 November  2016. 
HSL (2014d). Travel Card is the most popular, https://www.hsl.fi/en/news/2014/travel-card-most-popular-4591, accessed 1 December 2016. 
HSL (2014e). Helsinki Region Transport - Annual Report 2014, Helsinki, Finland. 
  242 
HSL (2015). Helsinki Region Transport System Plan, Helsinki, Finland. 
HSL (2016a) HSL moves us all, https://www.hsl.fi/sites/default/files/uploads/hsl_moves_us_all_1.pdf , accessed 17 January 2017. 
HSL (2016b). Kutsuplus Final report, https://www.hsl.fi/sites/default/files/uploads/8_2016_kutsuplus_finalreport_english.pdf, accessed 1 Decem-
ber 2016. 
HSL (2016c). Trial of new ticketing devices started, https://www.hsl.fi/en/news/2016/trial-new-ticketing-devices-started-8214, accessed 1 De-
cember 2016. 
HSL (2018). HSL to make mobile tickets available via OpenMaaS sales interface on 2 April 2018. https://www.hsl.fi/en/news/2018/hsl-make-
mobile-tickets-available-openmaas-sales-interface-2-april-2018-14846, accessed 20 April 2018. 
Hu, X., Giang, N. K., Shen, J., Leung, V. C., & Li, X. (2015). Towards mobility-as-a-service to promote smart transportation. In Vehicular Technology 
Conference, September 6 2015, IEEE. 
Hughes, O. (2012). Public management and administration, fourth edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hughes, T. P. (1987). The evolution of large technological systems. The social construction of technological systems: New directions in the sociolo-
gy and history of technology. In W. Bijker, T. Hughes, T. Pinch (Eds.). The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the histo-
ry of Technology (pp. 51-82). MIT Press. 
Hull, A. (2005). Integrated transport planning in the UK: From concept to reality. Journal of transport Geography, 13(4), 318-328. 
Hull, A. (2008). Policy integration: what will it take to achieve more sustainable transport solutions in cities? Transport policy, 15(2), 94-103. 
Husserl, E. (1970). Logical investigations (Trans. D. Carr) New York: Humanities Press.  
Hynes, M. (2016). Developing (tele) work? A multi-level sociotechnical perspective of telework in Ireland. Research in Transportation Economics, 
57, 21-31. 
Iammarino, S. (2005). An evolutionary integrated view of regional systems of innovation: concepts, measures and historical perspectives. Europe-
an planning studies, 13(4), 497-519. 
ICF Consulting services (2016). Social Conditions in Urban Public Transport, Companies in Europe, http://www.uitp.org/sites/default/files/cck-
focus-papers files/Social%20conditions%20in%20UPT_FR_Annexes_%20revised%2014072016.pdf, accessed 6 May 2017. 
ICLEI (2003). Better Public Transport for Europe through Competitive Tendering - A Good Practice Guide, ICLEI European Secretariat GmbH, Frei-
burg. 
ICLEI and difu (1999). Lokale Agenda 21 im europaischen Vergleich, Bonn, Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, 
Umweltbundesamt.  
Ieromonachou, P., Potter, S., & Enoch, M. (2004). Adapting Strategic Niche Management for evaluating radical transport policies––the case of the 
Durham Road Access Charging Scheme. International Journal of Transport Management, 2(2), 75-87. 
Illich, I. (1973). Energie et Equité, Paris: Seuil. 
Iltanen J. (2001) Minne metro kuljettaa? Vuosisata metrosuunnitelmia Suur- Helsingissä. Helsingin pitäjä, 1(33), 5-43. 
INRIX Research (2016). Europe’s traffic Hotspots, Measuring the impact of congestion in Europe. http://inrix.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/INRIX-Europes-Traffic-Hotspots-Research-FINAL-hi-res-1.pdf, Accessed August 28th 2017. 
Inwood, S. (2005). City of cities the birth of Modern London. Pan MacMillan 
ITS in Europe (2014). Final Programme of the 10th European Congress and Exhibition on Intelligent Transport Systems and Services.  
ITS International (2015) Mobility as a Service (MaaS) Alliance launched, http://www.itsinternational.com/event-news/its-world-
congress/2015/news/mobility-as-a-service-maas-alliance-launched/, accessed 18 January 2017. 
Jamasb, T., & Pollitt, M. G. (2011). Electricity sector liberalisation and innovation: An analysis of the UK's patenting activities. Research Policy, 
40(2), 309-324. 
Janic, M., & Reggiani, A. (2001). Integrated transport systems in European Union: An overview of some recent developments. Transport Reviews. 
vol. 2 (4), s. 469-497. 
Jansen, H. (2017). Planning Public Transport, Customer Representation and Passenger Rights in Europe, Austria, in H. L. Dienel and M. Schiefel-
busch (Eds.) Public Transport and its Users, The passengers perspective in planning and customer care, Routledge. 
Jittrapirom, P., Caiati, V., Feneri, A. M., Ebrahimigharehbaghi, S., González, M. J. A., & Narayan, J. (2017). Mobility as a Service: A Critical Review of 
Definitions, Assessments of Schemes, and Key Challenges. Urban Planning, 2(2), 13-25. 
Jørgensen , T., & Bozeman, B.(2002). Public Values Lost. Comparing Cases on Contracting out from Denmark and the United States, Public Man-
agement Review , 4(1), 63 – 81. 
Joslin, A., & Morris, W. P. (2013). Ridership Impacts of South Florida’s EASY Smart Card. National Center for Transit Research. Rapport No. BDK85 
977-42. Tampa, FL : Florida. 
Kamargianni, M., Li, W., Matyas, M., & Schafer, A. (2016). A critical review of new mobility services for urban transport. Transportation Research 
Procedia, 14, 3294-3303. 
Kamargianni, M., Matyas, M. (2017). The Business Ecosystem of Mobility as a Service. 96th Transportation Research Board (TRB) Annual Meeting, 
Washington DC, 8-12 January 2017. 
Kamargianni, M., Matyas, M., Li, W., and Muscat, J. (2018). Londoners’ attitudes towards car-ownership and Mobility-as-a-Service: Impact assess-
ment and opportunities that lie ahead. MaaSLab - UCL Energy Institute Report, Prepared for Transport for London. 
Kamga, C., Yazıcı, M. A., & Singhal, A. (2013). Implementation of interactive transit information kiosks at New York City transit facilities: Analysis of 
user utilization and lessons learned. Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, 35, 218-231. 
Karlsson, M., Koglin, T., Kronsell, A., Mukhtar-Landgre, D., Lund, E., Sarasini, S., Smith, G., Sochor, J., & Wendle, B. (2017). Mobility-as-a-Service: A 
tentative framework for analysing institutional conditions, Proceedings of the 45th European Transport Conference, Barcelona, 4-6 October 2017. 
Katikireddi, S. V., Smith, K. E., Stuckler, D., & McKee, M. (2016). Devolution of power, revolution in public health?. Journal of Public Health, 39(2), 
241-247. 
  243 
Katz, B., Puentes, R., & Bernstein, S. (2003). TEA-21 reauthorization: Getting transportation right for metropolitan America. The Brookings Institu-
tion Series on Transportation Reform. 
Kay, J. A., & Thompson, D. J. (1986). Privatisation: a policy in search of a rationale. The economic journal, 96(381), 18-32. 
Kemp , R., Schot, J. & Hoogma, R. (1998). Regime shifts to sustainability through processes of niche formation: The approach of strategic niche 
management, Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 10(2), 175-198.  
Kemp, R., & Loorbach, D. (2006). Transition management: a reflexive governance approach. In J.-P. Voß, D. Bauknecht, & R. Kemp (Eds.) Reflexive 
governance for sustainable development (pp. 103–130), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Kemp, R., Avelino, F., & Bressers, N. (2011). Transition management as a model for sustainable mobility. European Transport/Trasporti Europei, 
47, 1-22. 
Kemp, R., Rip, A., & Schot, J. (2001). Constructing transition paths through the management of niches. In: Garud, R., Karnoe,  P. (Eds.), Path De-
pendence and Creation (pp. 269–299), Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Kennedy, D. (1995). London bus tendering: a welfare balance. Transport Policy, 2(4), 243-249.  
Kennedy, D. (1996). The Economics of London Bus Tendering, PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Sciences, 
http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1997/1/U482971.pdf, accessed 20 January 2017. 
Kenyon, S., & Lyons, G. (2003). The value of integrated multimodal traveller information and its potential contribution to modal change. Transpor-
tation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour, 6, 1-21. 
Keohane N.O., Olmstead S.M. (2016). Market Failures in the Environmental Realm. In: Markets and the Environment. Washington, DC: Island 
Press. 
Kettunen, P. & Kungla, T. (2005). Europeanization of sub-national governance in unitary states: Estonia and Finland, Regional & Federal Studies, 
15:3, 353-378. 
Kickert, W. (1993). Complexity, governance and dynamics: conceptual explorations of public network management. in J. Kooiman (Ed.), Modern 
governance (pp. 191-204), London: Sage Modern governance. 
Kim, H. B., & Kim, W. G. (2005). The relationship between brand equity and firms’ performance in luxury hotels and chain resta urants. Tourism 
management, 26(4), 549-560. 
Kim, K. S., & Dickey, J. (2006). Role of urban governance in the process of bus system reform in Seoul. Habitat International, 30(4), 1035–1046. 
Kitchin, R. (2014). The real-time city? Big data and smart urbanism. GeoJournal, 79(1), 1-14. 
Klima und Energiefonds (2015). Model regions of electric mobility in Austria, Experience from six years of pioneering work, 
https://www.klimafonds.gv.at/assets/Uploads/Broschren/Modellregionen-der-Elektromobilitt/MODELREGIONSofelectricmobilityinAustria.pdf, 
accessed 28 May 2017. 
Klima und Energiefonds (2016). Electric Mobility Flagship projects, https://www.klimafonds.gv.at/assets/Uploads/Broschren/Leuchttrme-der-E-
Mobilitt/2016ElectricMobilityFlagshipProjectsEN.pdf, accessed 8 June 2017. 
Klitkou, A., Bolwig, S., Hansen, T., & Wessberg, N. (2015). The role of lock-in mechanisms in transition processes: The case of energy for road 
transport. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 16, 22-37. 
Knoflacher, H. (2007). Success and failures in urban transport planning in Europe—understanding the transport system. Sadhana, 32(4), 293-307. 
Köhler, J., Whitmarsh, L., Nykvist, B., Schilperoord, M., Bergman, N., & Haxeltine, A. (2009). A transitions model for sustai nable mobility. Ecological 
economics, 68(12), 2985-2995. 
König, D., Piri, E., Karlsson, M., Sochor, J., Heino, I. (2016). Deliverable 5: Technology for MaaS. MAASiFiE project funded by  CEDR. 
Konvitz, J. W., Rose, M. H., & Tarr, J. A. (1990). Technology and the city. OAH Magazine of History, 5(2), 32-37 
Koppenjan, J. J. F. M. (2005). The Formation of Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons from Nine Transport Infrastructure Projects in The Nether-
lands. Public Administration, 83(1), 135-157. 
Kostal, T., Michalitsch, V., & Obermann, G. (2014). Local Public Transport in Vienna by Wiener Linien - Governance and Provision of Services, Work-
ing paper CIRIEC N° 2014/17, ISSN 2070-8289. 
KPMG. (2017). Reimagine Places: Mobility as a Service, http://kpmg.com/uk/reimagine-maas, accessed 9 October 2017. 
Kuby, M., Barranda, A., & Upchurch, C. (2004). Factors influencing light-rail station boardings in the United States. Transportation Research Part A: 
Policy and Practice, 38(3), 223-247. 
Kuusi, T. (2015). The Finnish Great Depression of the 1990s: Soviet Trade or Home-Made?. ETLA Working Papers No 32.  
Laakso, S., Keinanen, O. (1995) Helsinki in J. Berry& S. McGreal (Eds) European cities, planning systems and property markets. Routledge. 
Labour Party (2015). The Labour Party Manifesto 2015, https://b.3cdn.net/labouruk/e1d45da42456423b8c_vwm6brbvb.pdf, accessed 14 Febru-
ary 2017. 
Labourlist (2017). Tube dispute has its roots in the Tory rule which ran London for the 1 per cent not the 99 per cent, TSSA chief writes, 
https://labourlist.org/2017/01/tssa-the-tube-dispute-has-its-roots-in-the-tory-rule-which-ran-london-for-the-1-per-cent-not-the-99-per-cent/, ac-
cessed 31 January 2017. 
Laperrouza, M. (2009). Does the liberalization of the European railway sector increase systemic risk?. Critical Infrastructure Protection III, 19-33. 
Lathia, N., & Capra, L. (2011). How smart is your smartcard?: measuring travel behaviours, perceptions, and incentives. In Proceedings of the 13th 
international conference on Ubiquitous computing, 291-300. 
Le Squeren. (1991). Passenger information. In: Proceedings of the DRIVE Conference: Advanced Telematics in Transport, 2, 1204–1215. 
Legacy, C., Curtis, C., & Sturup, S. (2012). Is there a good governance model for the delivery of contemporary transport policy and practice? An ex-
amination of Melbourne and Perth. Transport Policy, 19(1), 8-16. 
LEK (2016). Contactless Payments and Open-Loop Ticketing: What does this mean for transit authorities, and is there a business case for adoption? 
http://cdn.lek.com/sites/default/files/LEK_Mastercard_Contactless_Payments_Mark_Streeting.pdf, acceseed 13 February 2017. 
Levinson, D. (2007). Density and dispersion: the co-development of land use and rail in London. Journal of Economic Geography, lbm038. 
  244 
Li, T., Sun, D., Jing, P., & Yang, K. (2018). Smart Card Data Mining of Public Transport Destination: A Literature Review. Information, 9(18). 
DOI:10.3390/info9010018. 
Li, Y. (2018). The role of public authorities in the development of Mobility-as-a-Service. In M. Finger & M. Audouin (Eds.) The Governance of Smart 
Transportation Systems. Springer. 
Li, Y., & Voege, T. (2017). Mobility as a Service (MaaS): Challenges of Implementation and Policy Required. Journal of Transportation Technologies, 
7, 95-106. 
Liebowitz, S. J., & Margolis, S. E. (1995). Path dependence, lock-in, and history. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 11(1), 205-226. 
Lindseth, G., & Reitan, M. (2007). The urban governance of transport and the environment in the city of Kristiansand. Journal of Environmental 
Planning and Management, 50(1), 135-151. 
Litman, T. (2010). Transportation Cost and Benefit Analysis II–Travel Time Costs, Victoria Transport Policy Institute, Victoria, Canada. 
Loikanen, H.A, Rantala, A., & Sullstrom, R. (1998) Regional Income Differences in Finland 1966 – 1996. Discussion papers, 181, Government Insti-
tute for Economic Research. 
London Assembly (2011) The future of Ticketing, 
https://www.london.gov.uk/moderngov/documents/s7401/The%20Future%20of%20Ticketing%20-%20Appendix%201.pdf, accessed 25 January 
2017. 
Loorbach, D. (2007). Transition management: new mode of governance for sustainable development. PhD Thesis. Erasmus University, Rotterdam. 
Loorbach, D., & Rotmans, J. (2006). Managing transitions for sustainable development. In Understanding industrial transformation (pp. 187-206). 
Springer, Dordrecht. 
Loorbach, D., & van Raak, R. (2006). Strategic niche management and transition management: different but complementary approa ches. Discus-
sion paper. DRIFT, Erasmus University Rotterdam 
Loughlin, J. (2000). Regional autonomy and state paradigm shift I Western Europe Regional and Federal Studies, 10(2), 10-34 
Lundvall, B. Å. (1992). National systems of innovation: Toward a theory of innovation and interactive learning. London and New York: Anthem 
Press. 
Luther, K. R. (2000). Austria: a democracy under threat from the freedom party?. Parliamentary affairs, 53(3), 426-442. 
LVM (2007). Finnish transport policy Challenges and guidelines, 
https://www.lvm.fi/documents/20181/819363/finnish+transport+policy.+challenges+and+guidelines.pdf/02c2b88e-1d2f-4285-b4b5-
7671b4f85f23?version=1.0, accessed 2 December 2016. 
LVM (2009). Finland’s Strategy for Intelligent Transport, https://www.lvm.fi/documents/20181/817459/Programmes+and+strategies+6-
2009/c32cbc43-fb94-45c5-a9d9-208fa4cbc37f?version=1.0, accessed 2 December 2016. 
LVM (2010). ￼Digitaalinen Suomi, uusi liikennepolitiikka, 
https://www.lvm.fi/documents/20181/722521/Luonnos+19.8.2010.+Digitaalinen+Suomi,+uusi+liikennepolitiikka.+Tulevaisuuskatsaus+puolueille.
pdf/c896173c-3b93-4eab-8515-c344b599348d?version=1.0, accessed 5 December 2016. 
LVM (2011a). Productive and inventive Finland Digital Agenda for 2011–2020, 
http://www.oph.fi/download/135323_productive_and_inventive_finland.pdf, accessed 5 December 2016. 
LVM (2011b). Transport revolution, International perspectives, https://www.lvm.fi/documents/20181/813660/Julkaisuja+28-2011/5432beb5-
d26c-469c-af87-82b6b1f20e69?version=1.0, accessed 2 December 2016. 
LVM (2012c). Kilpailukykyä ja hyvinvointia vastuullisella liikenteellä, http://www.hare.vn.fi/upload/Julkaisut/17748/670671812912207.PDF, ac-
cessed 2 December 2016. 
LVM (2013). Towards a new transport policy: Intelligence in Transport and Wisdom in Mobility, 
https://www.lvm.fi/documents/20181/799943/Intelligence+in+Transport+and+Wisdom+in+Mobility+Finlands+Second+Generation+Intelligent+St
rategy+for+Transport/ba5a1095-d82f-4d02-b90c-eefb9f6d043c?version=1.0, accessed 2 December 2016. 
LVM (2014a). Fair and Intelligent Transport, Working Group Final report, 
https://www.lvm.fi/documents/20181/797516/Fair+and+Intelligent+Transport+%28Publications+5-2014%29/5f1ab2ab-07d3-4fa9-a441-
dcc55d8ffd04?version=1.0, accessed 2 December 2016. 
LVM (2014b). Hallitus keskusteli liikenteen rakenneuudistuksesta, https://www.lvm.fi/-/hallitus-keskusteli-liikenteen-rakenneuudistuksesta-
743875, accessed 2 December 2016. 
LVM (2014c). ITS European Congress 2014 Opened, https://www.lvm.fi/en/-/its-european-congress-2014-opened-747298, accessed 6 December 
2016. 
LVM (2014d). Traffic Lab opens: new transport services to be expected for autumn, https://www.lvm.fi/en/-/traffic-lab-opens-new-transport-
services-to-be-expected-for-autumn-795369, accessed 6 December 2016. 
LVM (2015). Minister Risikko: Provision of UBER rides is legal, but driving reauires taxi licence, https://www.lvm.fi/en/-/minister-risikko-provision-
of-uber-rides-is-legal-but-driving-requires-taxi-licence-796955, accessed 5 December 2016. 
LVM (2016). Development of the transport network, https://www.lvm.fi/documents/20181/880492/29-
2016+Development+of+the+transport+network/ffa2cdd7-5218-4413-805d-6ef78bae5d31, accessed 19 January 2017. 
LVM (2016). Legislation, an enabler for MaaS: Finnish Transport code, presentation at the 7th IRU International Taxi Forum, C ologne 5th of No-
vember 2016, https://www.iru.org/sites/default/files/2016-11/iru-taxi-forum-2016-huhtanen-en.pdf, accessed 1 December 2016. 
LVM (2017b). Taxi and vehicle-for-hire services in the Act on Transport Services. Factsheet 60/2017, 
https://www.lvm.fi/documents/20181/937315/Factsheet+60-2017+Taxi+and+vehicle-for-
hire+services+in+the+Act+on+Transport+Services.pdf/bbb5ca8a-d24d-4b41-a5be-004f4036aeb2, accessed 25 October 2017. 
LVM (2017c). Act on Transport Services. English version. https://www.lvm.fi/lvm-site62-mahti-portlet/download?did=246709 accessed 25 October 
2017. 
LVM (2017d). Second stage of the Act on Transport Services encompasses the whole transport system. Press release. Helsinki.  
Lyons, G. (2001). Towards integrated traveller information, Transport Reviews, 21(2), 217-235. 
  245 
Lyons, G. (2006). The role of information in decision-making with regard to travel, Intelligent Transport Systems, 153 (3): 199-212. 
Lyons, G., & Harman, R. (2002). The UK public transport industry and provision of multi -modal traveller information. International Journal of 
Transport Management, 1(1), 1-13. 
Lyons, G., & Urry, J. (2006). Foresight: the place of social science in examining the future of transport. Paper presented at Evidence-Based Policies 
and Indicator Systems, 11-13 July, London. 
Lyons, G., Jain, J., Mitchell, V., & May, A. (2012). The emergent role of user innovation in reshaping traveler information services. In: Geels, F., 
Kemp, R., Dudley, G. and Lyons, G. (Eds.) Automobility in Transition? A Socio-Technical Analysis of Sustainable Transport (pp. 268-285), New York: 
Routledge. 
MaaS Alliance. (2017). White Paper: Guidelines & Recommendations to create the foundations for a thriving MaaS Ecosystem, https://maas-
alliance.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/09/MaaS-WhitePaper_final_040917-2.pdf, accessed 19 September 2017. 
MaaS Global (2016a) MaaS Finland to revolutionize the global transportation market, http://maas.global/maas-finland-to-revolutionize-the-
global-transportation-market/, accessed 18 January 2017. 
MaaS Global (2016b) Veho builds value adding services to its customers, http://maas.global/veho-builds-value-adding-services-to-its-customers/, 
accessed 18 January 2016. 
MaaS Global (2016c). MaaS Finland has officially changed its name to Maas global accessed on http://maas.global/maas-finland-has-officially-
changed-its-name-to-maas-global/, accessed 18 January 2016. 
MaaS Global (2016d). Lahitaksi bringing their taxis as part of Whim offering, http://maas.global/lahitaksi-bringing-their-taxis-as-part-of-whim-
offering/, accessed 18 January 2016. 
MaaS Global (2016e). MaaS Globals Whim app wins the smart city action award, http://maas.global/maas-globals-whim-app-wins-the-smart-city-
action-award/, accessed 18 January 2016. 
MaaS Global (2016f). Helsinki takes another pioneering step in mobility services: HRT public transport added to the Whim mobility app, 
http://maas.global/helsinki-takes-another-pioneering-step-in-mobility-services-hrt-public-transport-added-to-the-whim-mobility-app/, accessed 
18 January 2016. 
MaaS Global (2017g). Toyota and its insurance partner make significant capital investment in Finnish company MaaS Global, 
http://whimapp.com/2017/06/19/toyota-insurance-partner-make-significant-capital-investment-finnish-company-maas-global-2/, accessed 26 
June 2017. 
Magnin, G., & Lacassagne, S. (2003) Quantification des emissions de gaz a effet de serre a l’echelle territorial, Energie-cités, http://www.energy-
cities.eu/IMG/pdf/quantification_territoriale_ges.pdf, accessed 5 May 2017. 
Malerba, F. (2002). Sectoral systems of innovation and production. Research Policy, 31(2), 247–264. 
Mao, L. Z., Zhu, H. G., & Duan, L. R. (2012). The social cost of traffic congestion and countermeasures in Beijing. Proceedings of the Ninth Asia Pa-
cific Transportation Development Conference, pp. 68-76 
Margetts, H. (1997). The 1997 British general election: New labour, new Britain? West European Politics, 20(4), 180-191. 
Markantonakis, K., Tunstall, M., Hancke, G., Askoxylakis, I., & Mayes, K. (2009). Attacking smart card systems: Theory and practice. information se-
curity technical report, 14(2), 46-56. 
Markard, J., & Truffer, B. (2008). Technological innovation systems and the multi-level perspective: Towards an integrated framework. Research 
policy, 37(4), 596-615. 
Markard, J., Raven, R., & Truffer, B. (2012). Sustainability transitions: An emerging field of research and its prospects. Research policy, 41(6), 955-
967. 
Marletto, G. (2014). Car and the city: Socio-technical transition pathways to 2030. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 87, 164-178. 
Marsden, G., & Docherty, I. (2013). Insights on disruptions as opportunities for transport policy change. Transportation research part A: policy and 
practice, 51, 46-55. 
Marsden, G., & Reardon, L. (2018). Governance of the Smart Mobility Transition. Emerald Points. 
Marsden, G., & Rye, T. (2010). The governance of transport and climate change. Journal of transport geography, 18(6), 669-678. 
Martinuzzi, A., & Steurer, R. (2003). The Austrian strategy for sustainable development: process review and policy analysis. European Environ-
ment, 13(5), 269-287. 
Matas, A. (2004). Demand and revenue implications of an integrated public transport policy: the case of Madrid. Transport Reviews, 24(2), 195-
217. 
Matthews, H. (2001). Citizenship, youth councils and young people's participation. Journal of youth studies, 4(3), 299-318. 
Mattila, M., & Raunio, T. (2002). Government formation in the Nordic countries: The electoral connection. Scandinavian Political Studies, 25(3), 
259-280. 
Mattioli, G., Anable, J., & Vrotsou, K. (2016). Car dependent practices: Findings from a sequence pattern mining study of UK time use data. Trans-
portation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 89, 56-72. 
May, A. D., & Roberts, M. (1995). The design of integrated transport strategies. Transport Policy, 2(2), 97-105. 
May, A. D., Kelly, C., & Shepherd, S. (2006). The principles of integration in urban transport strategies. Transport Policy, 13(4), 319-327. 
May, A.D., Matthews, B., & Jarvi-Nykanen, T. (2001). Decision making requirements for the formulation of sustainable urban land use transport 
strategies. 9th World Conference on Transport Research, Seoul. 
Mayes, K. (2017). An introduction to smart cards. In K. Mayes & K. Markantonakis (Eds) Smart Cards, Tokens, Security and Applications (pp. 1-29). 
Springer. 
Mayntz, R. (2003). New challenges to governance theory, in H. P. Bang (ed.) (2003) Governance as social and political communication. Manches-
ter: Manchester University Press. 
Mayor of London (2004). The London Plan, https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/planning/london-plan/past-versions-and-alterations-london-
plan/london-plan-2004, accessed 27 January 2017. 
  246 
Mayor of London (2008). The London Plan, 
https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/the_london_plan_consolidated_with_alterations_since_2004_reduced.pdf, accessed 27 January 
2017. 
Mayor of London (2010) Mayor’s Transport Strategy, https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/mts_executive_summary.pdf, accessed 25 
January 2017. 
Mayor of London (2011) Delivering London’s energy future, The Mayor’s climate change mitigation and energy strategy, 
https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla_migrate_files_destination/Energy-future-oct11.pdf, accessed 27 January 2017. 
Mayor of London (2015). London Infrastructure plan 2050: Transport supporting paper, 
https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Transport%20Supporting%20Paper_3.pdf, accessed 25 January 2017. 
Mayor of London (2016a). The London Plan, https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/the_london_plan_malp_final_for_web_0606_0.pdf on 
January 27th 2017 
Mayor of London (2016b) Part 2 Draft Consolidated Budget 2017-2018, 
https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/part_2_explanation_of_proposals_2017.01.17_final.pdf, accessed 15 February 2017. 
Mayor of London (2017). Mayor Transport Strategy, Draft for public consultation, https://consultations.tfl.gov.uk/policy/Mayors-transport-
strategy/user_uploads/pub16_001_mts_online-2.pdf, accessed 23 June 2017. 
McDonald, N. (2000). Multipurpose Smart Cards in Transportation: Benefits and Barriers to Use. University of California Trans portation Center Re-
search. Paper n°630. 
McGuire, M. (2006). Collaborative public management: Assessing what we know and how we know it. Public administration review, 66(s1), 33-43. 
Megginson, W. L., & Netter, J. M. (2001). From state to market: A survey of empirical studies on privatization. Journal of economic literature, 
39(2), 321-389. 
Meinander, H. (2011). A History of Finland, London: Hurst and Company. 
Menzel, G., & Böhm, M. (2014) Deployment of Interoperable Cross-Border Multimodal Traveller Information in Central Europe, Proceedings of the 
Transport Research Arena. 
Meredith, J. (1998). Building operations management theory through case and field research, Journal of Operations Management,  16, 441-454. 
Merk, O. (2014). Metropolitan Governance of Transport and Land Use in Chicago, OECD Regional Development Working Papers, 2014/08, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. 
Merriam, S. N. (2009). Qualitative research and case study applications in education (2nd edition), San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Merton, R., Fiske, M., & Kendall, P. (1990). The Focused interview: A manual or problems and procedures (2nd edition). New York: The Free Press.  
Metro Report (2017) Länsimetro extension opens in Helsinki, http://www.metro-report.com/news/single-view/view/laensimetro-extension-
opens-in-helsinki.html, accessed 24 November 2017. 
Meyer, G., & Shaheen, S. (2017). Disrupting Mobility: Impacts of Sharing Economy and Innovative Transportation on Cities. Springer. 
Mezghani, M. (2008). Study on electronic ticketing in public transport, European Metropolitan Transport Authorities (EMTA).  
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: An expanded source book (2nd edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Millward, R. (1997). The 1940s Nationalizations in Britain: Means to an End or the Means of Production? The Economic History Review, 50(2) , 
209-234. 
Mladenovic, M. (2018). How Should We Drive Self-Driving Vehicles? Anticipation and Collective Imagination in Planning Mobility Futures, in M. 
Finger & M. Audouin (Eds.) The Governance of Smart Transportation Systems. Springer.  
Mohaymany, A. S., & Gholami, A. (2010). Multimodal feeder network design problem: ant colony optimization approach. Journal of transportation 
engineering, 136(4), 323-331. 
Montavon, M., Steemers, K., Cheng, V., & Compagnon, R. (2006). La Ville Radieuse by Le Corbusier, once again a case study. Pa per presented at 
the 23rd Conference on Passive and Low Energy Architecture, Geneva, 6-8 September 2006. 
Monteiro, R. S. (2005). Public-private partnerships: Some lessons from Portugal, EIB Papers, ISSN 0257-7755, 10(2), 73-81. 
Montero, J. (2018). Regulating Transport Platform: the case of carpooling in Europe. In M- Finger, & M. Audouin (Eds.) The Governance of Smart 
Transportation Systems. Springer. 
Monzon, A., & Di Ciommo, F. (Eds.). (2016). City-HUBs: Sustainable and Efficient Urban Transport Interchanges. Boca Raton: CRC Press.  
Moradi, A., & Vagnoni, E. (2018). A multi-level perspective analysis of urban mobility system dynamics: What are the future transition pathways?. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 126, 231-243. 
Morbitzer, M. (n.d) The MIFARE Hack, Radboud Univiserity Nijmegen. 
Morgan, N. (2017). Cycling infrastructure and the development of a bicycle commuting socio-technical system: the case of Johannesburg. Applied 
Mobilities, 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1080/23800127.2017.1416829. 
Moriarty, P., & Honnery, D. (2008). The prospects for global green car mobility. Journal of Cleaner Production, 16(16), 1717–1726. 
Morrison, K., & Minnis, J. (2012) . Carscapes: The Motor Car, Architecture and Landscape in England, Yale University Press, New Haven.  
Morse, J. M., Barrett, M., Mayan, M., Olson, K., & Spiers, J. (2002). Verification strategies for establishing reliability and validity in qualitative re-
search. International journal of qualitative methods, 1(2), 13-22. 
Mulgan, R. (1997). Contracting out and accountability. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 56(4), 106-116. 
Muller, S. (2016) How does an Oyster Card work, http://www.alphr.com/technology/1002164/how-does-an-oyster-card-work-0, accessed 13 Feb-
ruary 2017. 
Müller, Wolfgang C. (2006). Parteiensystem: Rahmenbedingungen, Format und Mechanik des Parteienwettbewerbs, in H. Dachs, P. Gerlich, H. 
Gottweis, H. Kramer, V. Lauber, W. Müller, & E. Tálos (Eds.), Politik in Österreich: Das Handbuch (pp. 279–304). Wien: Manz. 
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Appendix 1 : List of interviewees 
Code Organization Mean 
Date of the 
interview 
IH1 MaaS Global Physically 8.2016 
IH2 Transdev Skype 9.2016 
IH3 Finnish Rail (VR Group) Physically 12.2016 
IH4 Helsinki city transport (HKL) Physically 12.2016 
IH5 Ramboll Physically 12.2016 
IH6 Eera Physically 12.2016 
IH7 Lahitaksi Physically 12.2016 
IH8 SITO Physically 12.2016 
IH9 
Helsinki Metropolitan 
Transport Authority (HSL) 
Physically 
12.2016 
IH10 
Finnish Ministry of Transpor-
tation (LVM) 
Physically 
12.2016 
IH11 City Car Club Physically 12.2016 
IH12 City of Helsinki Written 12.2016 
IH13 Forum Virium Skype 1.2017 
IH14 SITOWISE Skype 3.2018 
IH15 Helsinki Business Hub Skype 3.2018 
IH16 
Helsinki Metropolitan 
Transport Authority (HSL) 
Skype 
5.2018 
IV1 Wiener Linien Physically 5.2017 
IV2 Fluidtime Physically 5.2017 
IV3 
Upstream + TBWA Research Physically 
5.2017 
IV4 AustriaTec Physically 5.2017 
IV5 ETA Consulting Physically 5.2017 
IV6 Taxi 31300 Physically 5.2017 
IV7 City of Vienna (MA18) Physically 5.2017 
IV8 City of Vienna (MA25) Physically 5.2017 
IV9 ÖBB + iMobility Physically 5.2017 
IV10 CityBike Physically 5.2017 
IV11 Klima und Energi Fund Physically 5.2017 
IV12 FFG Physically 5.2017 
IV13 Car2Go Skype 5.2017 
IV14 VAÖ Skype 5.2017 
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Appendix 2 : Semi-structured interviews guidelines 
A) History of [your organization]
1. What has been the History of [your organization]? (How has it been created, when, what is its man-
date, day to day operations…)
2. Explain the corporate governance of [your organization] (how many departments, is the CEO elect-
ed/appointed, what is the budget, from where does it come from, to who is it accountable to…)
3. Describe the relation of [your organization] with public authorities (city and Ministry of Transporta-
tion)
4. Digitalization is impacting transport. How has [your organization] been considering it in its last stra-
tegic plans? (Strategy point of view)
5. What actions has [your organization] undertaken to develop digital services/products in the last
years?
B) Role of [your organization] in the development of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes
6. Historically, from the very beginning, explain how did [your organization] get involved in the ICT-
supported integrated mobility schemes project: when did it first hear about it, who approached
[your organization], when, what was [your organization] first reaction, what were the key actions
(meetings / pressure from the city hall?) that convinced [your organization] to join the development
of an ICT-supported integrated mobility scheme…?
7. How do ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes fit in [your organization] overall Strategy?
8. Explain with as much details as possible the agreement [your organization] has with the ICT-
supported integrated mobility scheme provider (business model, contract …)
9. Has [your organization] been interested in taking the lead in the project (developing its ICT-
supported integrated mobility scheme)?
10. From your personal point of view, what are the main remaining bottlenecks (political, economical,
social, technological…) for a full implementation of ICT-supported integrated mobility schemes?
C) Role of public authorities
11. In your point of view what should public authorities do to make ICT-supported integrated mobility
schemes happen?
12. From your point of view, is it what public authorities in your city did? What should have they done
more/better/differently?
13. We see non-public (private) actors trying to take the lead on this kind of projects. How do you see
that? will they be successful in your opinion?
14. Overall if you had the power to organize differently the governance of the ICT-supported integrated
mobility scheme development in [your city], what would you change? (Would you involve any other
actors more/less, create specific policies/incentives?)
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15. The Finnish Transport code is regarded by many as a real enabler for MaaS. What is your opinion on 
it and on similar legislations45? 
 
16. How do you see [your organization] evolve if the studied ICT-supported integrated mobility scheme 
is rolled-out successfully? 
 
17. What is next for [your organization]? (In general and regarding ICT-supported integrated mobility 
schemes) 
 
                                                                    
45 For this question, we of course explained what the Finnish Transport code was about for interviewees that were not familiar with it. 
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